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ABSTRACT 
Marshal Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy, Hero of the Soviet Union, Order of 
Victory, Knight of the Bath, OBE, victor of Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, the destruction 
of German Army Group Centre and East Prussia, participated in some of the most 
significant operations in the history of war, let alone the twentieth century.  Yet, in the 
English speaking world Rokossovskiy is unknown, a name, vaguely associated with 
famous events.  There is no sustained historical analysis of Rokossovskiy’s style of 
leadership and operational command in the English language. 
 
Rokossovskiy rejected the authoritarian leadership culture of Stalin’s Soviet Union and 
Zhukov’s Red Army.  Rokossovskiy was highly demanding and occasionally harsh but 
his leadership encouraged initiative, consultation, trust, delegation and tolerated 
mistakes in a way that made him unusual, indeed exceptional, in the Red Army.  It was 
primarily an authoritative style of leadership but Rokossovskiy practised different forms 
and styles of leadership guided by his own instinctive judgement according to the 
demands of the situation and the nature of his subordinates.  This was a considered 
philosophy of leadership and command that set him apart from his contemporaries. 
 
Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership was intimately connected to his conduct of 
operations.  As one of the Red Army’s finest commanders, respected by the Wehrmacht 
and the Red Army, Rokossovskiy’s operational art was dominated by the idea of depth.  
Rokossovskiy, the Pole, was the heir to a long Russian tradition, centuries old, of deep 
operations, whereas Zhukov, the Russian, was committed to operational encirclement 
and annihilation, a Germanic concept. 
 
Marshal Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy had a distinct military style of his 
own: his style of leadership challenged the Red Army’s authoritarian culture whilst his 
style of operations endorsed the historical traditions of the Russian army.  It makes him 
one of the most significant military commanders of the twentieth century. 
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GLOSSARY 
Army Group Major German military formation of strategic 
proportions. 
Auftragstaktik German system of command in the field that 
encouraged flexibility, initiative and judgement in 
order to facilitate rapid, agile operations.  It originated 
in the period of Scharnhorst reform 1807-1813 and was 
developed throughout the nineteenth century.  It was 
central to German military thinking in the period 1921-
1945. 
Bewegungskrieg German military term for an aggressive mobile war. 
Bitva Term used to denote historic battle that has taken place 
rather than in progress. 
Boy Combat or process of battle 
Boyevoye A term meaning battle or combat. 
Boyevoye Doneseniye Battle or operations report usually covering a single 
day covering all armies within a front.  It included 
information on the results of fighting, troop location 
and enemy activity. 
Boyevoye Rasporyazheniye Battle Instructions 
Boyevoy Sostav Fighting Strength 
Boyevaye Zadacha Combat mission. 
Chast’ Russian term for a unit. 
Cheka The Extraordinary Committee to Combat Counter-
revolution and Sabotage.  It was set up by Feliks 
Dzerzhinskiy on 20th December 1917.  Its members 
became known as ‘Chekists.’ 
Front The basic Soviet operational grouping of forces in the 
Great Patriotic War.  It is similar to an Army Group. 
Frontovaya 
Nastupatel’naya Operatsiya 
Front Offensive Operation 
Frontovaya 
Oboronitel’naya Operatisya 
Front Defensive Operation 
xiv 
 
General’nyi Shtab The General Staff 
GKO (Gosudarstvenniy 
Komitet Oborony) 
State Defence Committee set up on 30th June 1941and 
chaired by Stalin.  It oversaw the Soviet war effort 
integrating political, military, social and economic 
factors. 
Glubokiy Boy Deep Battle 
Glubokaya Operatsiya Deep Operation 
Kampaniya Voyennaya Military Campaign: a period of time during which 
interim goals are achieved through the conduct of 
operations as part of an overall strategy 
Kesselschlacht Battle of encirclement and annihilation 
Konno-Mekhanizirovannaya 
Gruppa 
Cavalry Mechanised Group (CMG) 
Kontrastupleniye Counteroffensive of at least operational scale, possibly 
strategic involving several fronts e.g.  Stalingrad. 
Kontrudar Counterblow: conducted by troops as part of an 
operational formation, often an army or corps to defeat 
an attacking enemy and regain ground.  In a defensive 
operation numerous counterblows may occur either 
simultaneously or consecutively. 
Maskirovka A mandatory method of combat support prior to an 
operation.  The purpose was to confuse, deceive and 
disinform the enemy while concealing Soviet forces, 
intentions, time and location of attack.  At the tactical 
level it was primarily physical in character.  It was 
more psychological at the operational level. 
Mobile Group (Podvizhnaya 
Gruppa) 
Generic Soviet term for a formation designed to 
conduct deep operations. 
Napravleniye Nastupleniya A Russian term denoting the main axis of attack. 
Nastupatel’naya Operatsiya Offensive on an operational scale usually conducted by 
a front with a unified operational concept and plan 
designed to achieve operational goals as part of a 
campaign or strategy. 
Nastupleniye A Russian term denoting an offensive designed to 
defeat the enemy and secure operational victory. 
xv 
 
NKVD Narodny Kommissariat Vnutrennykh Del (People’s 
Commissariat for Internal Affairs 
Obkhod (Turning Move) A form of operational manoeuvre in depth designed to 
turn the enemy physically and mentally in terms of 
forcing him to abandon his mission in favour of 
survival.  It is not a flank attack or a double 
envelopment. 
Oborona The Russian word for defence. 
Oboronitel’naya Operatsiya A defensive operation made up of a combination of 
tactical battles. 
Obstanovka Russian word for situation 
Okruzheniye Russian word for encirclement. 
Okhvat An attack on the enemy flank 
Operational Art 
(Operativnoye Iskusstvo) 
The creative art of command of forces at the 
operational level of war.  It is concerned with the 
theory and practice of preparing and conduction 
operations by major military forces. 
Operational Level The level of war that involves direct command of large 
military formations in the field.  It occupied an 
intermediate position between strategy and tactics in 
the Great Patriotic War.  An operational force was 
usually a front but occasionally an army could be 
involved in fighting of such scale, numbers, duration 
and significance that it had operational implications.   
Operativnaya Direktiva Operational Directive: a formal document issued by an 
operational commander to subordinates.  It indicated 
the objectives of an operation, the missions of 
individual armies and the time by which mission were 
to be achieved. 
Operativnaya Gruppa Operational group 
Operativnaya Obstanovka Operational Situation 
Operativnaya Svodka Operational Report or Summary. 
Operatsiya Russian word for operation 
Operatsionnoye 
Napraveleniye 
Operational Sector 
xvi 
 
Otkhod Withdrawal 
Plan Operatsii Operational Plan: formal document drawn up by the 
staff to reflect the operational commander’s concept.  It 
indicated the initial and subsequent missions of front 
units such as armies as well as the most likely enemy 
course of action.  It also indicated the depth and 
duration of an operation.  It is closely related to an 
operational directive. 
Platsdarm Bridgehead 
Polevoy Ustav Field Regulations 
Posledovatel’niye Operatsii Successive Operations 
Prikaz Order 
Schwerpunkt German military term denoting the main point of 
effort. 
Shtab Staff or headquarters 
SMERSH(Smert’Shpionam) 
Death to Spies 
A state organisation set up in spring 1943 to monitor 
all aspects of the armed forces. 
Sostav Strength or Establishment 
Srazheniye Engagement 
Stavka (Verkhovnaya 
Glavnokommandovanya) 
Chaired by Stalin.  The Supreme Soviet Military 
Headquarters referred to as STAVKA VGK in wartime 
documents.  It incorporated the General Staff and 
advised Stalin on military strategy. 
Stavka Representatives Senior officer appointed by Stavka to liaise with senior 
operational commanders in the field.  Often 
responsible for ensuring co-ordination between fronts. 
Stellungskrieg German term for positional war. 
Strategiya Izmora Strategy of Attrition 
Strategiya Sokrushniya Strategy of Annihilation 
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Strategy The use of armed forces to achieve military objectives 
in order to bring about enemy military defeat through 
the execution of a war plan.  It relates to broad 
fundamental factors affecting the manipulation of 
armed forces and the conduct of war.  Strategy breaks 
up the conduct of war into campaigns and sets 
operational objectives.  It does not involve their direct 
command in the field.   
Tactical Level The command of forces in battle to bring about the 
achievement of operational objectives.  In Soviet 
military thinking the tactical level was subservient to 
the operational and strategic level. 
Tankovaya Armiya Tank Army 
TSAMO:Tsentral’nyi Arkhiv 
Ministerstva Oberony 
Central Archive of the Russian Ministry of Defence 
Tsel’ Operatsii Operational Aim or Goal 
Tvorchestvo Creative military thinking at the operational level 
designed to transform abstract operational concepts 
into practical operations.  It was central to operational 
art. 
Ucheniye Training 
Udar Shock, Strike or Blow 
Udarnaya Armiya Shock Army 
Upravleniye Headquarters 
Upravleniye Voyskami Command and Control of Troops 
Voysk Forces or troops 
Vozdushnaya Armiya Air Army 
Wehrmacht The armed forces of Nazi Germany including army, 
airforce and navy. 
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TRANSLITERATION 
In order to present Cyrillic Russian names, places and terms in English I have adopted 
the system of transliteration recommended by the US Board on Geographical Names.  It 
is also used by NATO.  However, where the Russian ending - ЫЙ is ungainly in 
English such as –yy, I have amended it to –y.  In the case of names, ИЙ is transliterated 
as –iy, thus Rokossovskiy, Sokolovskiy and Malinovskiy.  In terms of place names this 
means Novgorod Severskiy.  However, where a term is in common usage such as 
Moscow, I have used the Anglicised version.  Similarly, I have used Konev rather than 
Koniev or Konyev and Beria not Beriya.  The historic names of locations in central, 
eastern Europe and Russia are a complex business, many having changed names (and 
owners) on a regular basis in the last two centuries.  If in doubt I have adopted the term 
by which a place is more easily recognisable in the context of World War Two.  
Therefore, the text refers to Danzig not Gdansk, Konigsberg not Kaliningrad, Stalingrad 
not Volgograd.  The Germans referred to Thorn fortress but in Rokossovskiy’s English 
language memoirs it is Torn.  I have opted for Thorn on maps and Marienburg rather 
than Marienbad.  I have used Belorussia rather than Byelorussia, Belarussia or White 
Russia because that was the term used by the Red Army.  Equally  I have opted for the 
Vistula and the Narev as they are more easily recognisable.   
 
Soviet Fronts are identified by word with numbers added if several fronts shared the 
location name.  For example, the Belorussian Front and 1st Belorussian Front, 2nd 
Belorussian Front.  Russian armies are referred to in a numerical fashion, hence  16th 
Army, 2nd Guards Army, 13th Army.  German army groups are labelled in words, such 
as Army Group Centre, as are German armies, such as Sixth German Army, Ninth 
German Army.  The exception is on maps drawn by the author to save space.  I have not 
used Roman numerals to identify corps’ for three reasons: one there are not many in the 
text, two to save space on maps and three because I have never found it helpful.  
Therefore, Rokossovskiy’s 9th Mechanised Corps is not IX Mechanised Corps and 
XXXXVII Panzer Corps is 47th Panzer Corps.  On all maps drawn by the author 
German formations are rendered in black ink and Red Army formations in red ink.  The 
first time a specific person or organisation is referred to I have tried to name them or it 
in full including the patronymic.  Therefore, Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy 
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and Narodny Kommissariat Vnutrennykh Del (People’s Commissariat for Internal 
Affairs- the NKVD) before subsequently abbreviating and using initials or common 
acronyms.  All dates are referred to in the western calendar style. 
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KEY TO MAP ABBREVIATIONS 
Red Army Map Abbreviations: 
 
AA Air Army 
CC Cavalry Corps 
CMG Cavalry Mechanised Group 
GCC Guards Cavalry Corps 
GRC Guards Rifle Corps 
GTA Guards Tank Army 
RC Rifle Corps 
RD Rifle Division 
 
 
German Map Abbreviations: 
 
AC Army Corps 
PzC Panzer Corps 
PzD Panzer Division 
ID Infantry Division 
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INTRODUCTION 
On 17th August 1937,1 Corps Commander Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy, 
of 5th Cavalry Corps, in the Leningrad Military District, was arrested and beaten 
senseless.  He was ‘tried’, imprisoned and left to rot.2  Eight years later, on 24th June 
1945, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy, hero of 
the Soviet Union for his commanding roles at Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, the Red 
Army’s destruction of German Army Group 
Centre and victory in East Prussia, took command 
of the Red Army victory parade in Red Square.3 
To a man and an Army that had been mauled, 
indeed savaged, initially by Stalin’s NKVD, then 
by the Wehrmacht, Red Square, in June 1945, was 
an extraordinary personal, and, to a lesser extent, 
institutional vindication.  It confirmed 
Rokossovskiy’s status as one of the Red Army’s 
leading field commanders, a man who had played 
a key role in the Wehrmacht’s defeat.  Few 
commanders made a more sustained, direct and 
significant contribution to the German defeat on 
the Eastern Front.  Yet, in the Western world, 
Rokossovskiy is virtually unknown, a footnote in history.   
 
The ashes of Rokossovskiy are buried in the Kremlin Wall.4 
In Russia, Rokossovskiy’s life and career are well-known, 
but in the western world he remains an obscure historical 
figure.  Yet, ironically, during World War Two, he was 
among the best known Red Army generals.  In January 
1943, the photograph of Rokossovskiy with Field Marshal 
Paulus at Stalingrad, following Paulus’ surrender, was seen 
around the globe.  Similarly, in August 1943, Rokossovskiy 
made the front cover of Time magazine.5  Twelve months 
 
Figure 1: K.K. Rokossovskiy 
(Kardashov, 1980) 
 
Figure 2: Rokossovskiy on 
the cover of Time Magazine, 
23 Aug 1943 
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later, in August 1944, Rokossovskiy was involved in the Warsaw Uprising.6  Finally, 
Rokossovskiy’s meeting with Montgomery at Wismar on 5th May 1945 and again in 
Berlin, in July 1945, were famous in their day.  However, Rokossovskiy’s early years 
and his formative experiences in World War One, the Russian Civil War and the inter-
war years, apart from the Purge of 1937, are a mystery to western readers.7 
 
It is clear that Rokossovskiy’s career on the Eastern Front during World War Two was 
of considerable historical significance.  Yet, with the exception of one short, 
biographical chapter there is no dedicated, peer reviewed writing on Rokossovskiy in 
the English language.  Therefore, there is a compelling need for a sustained, thematic 
historical analysis of Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership and operational command.   
 
The Aim 
The aim of this doctoral thesis is to examine the military style of Marshal of the Soviet 
Union Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy, one of the most significant but 
relatively unknown military commanders of the twentieth century.  It will examine both 
his style of leadership and operational command on the Eastern Front during the Great 
Patriotic War, June 1941-May 1945.   
 
Research Objectives 
This thesis will examine the military style of Marshal Konstantin Rokossovskiy as a 
case study of Soviet leadership and operational command on the Eastern Front.  It is not 
a biography of Rokossovskiy’s life.  Its primary focus will be a sustained analysis of 
Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership and conduct of operational art during the Great 
Patriotic War.  The style of Rokossovskiy’s leadership will be described and examined, 
both in terms of its intrinsic nature, and, by using the medium of modern leadership 
theories and literature, through a retrospective historical analysis, incorporating various 
themes or traits, common to the idea of leadership.  The thesis does not aim to propose a 
theory of leadership, nor does it claim to be an exhaustive analysis of the nature of 
leadership.  It will argue that Rokossovskiy had a distinctive style of leadership, one 
that enabled him to plan and conduct operations in a manner that was different from 
other Red Army commanders.  This thesis will discuss the historical literature on 
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Rokossovskiy’s career, both English language and Russian.  It will reveal that official 
Soviet literature in the Cold War era was seriously duplicitous in its coverage of 
Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership and operational command, while western literature is 
generally shallow, invariably brief and remarkably ignorant of the true historical 
significance of Rokossovskiy’s career, his style of leadership and operational command.  
The thesis will demonstrate that Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership set him apart from 
the wider leadership culture of Stalin’s Red Army and from contemporaries such as 
Konev, Zhukov and Vatutin.   
 
The thesis will not provide a narrative of events on the Eastern Front, nor will it simply 
be a detailed account of the various historically significant operations that Rokossovskiy 
was involved in.  Nevertheless, a sustained, thematic analysis of Rokossovskiy’s 
experiences as a Front commander in the period July 1942-May 1945, presents the 
student of military history with an excellent opportunity to analyse the role of the Front, 
the Front commander and the military style of one of the Red Army’s finest operational 
commanders.  It will discuss the origins of Soviet operational theory and manoeuvre 
warfare, before examining the influence of Tsarist and Soviet inter-war thinking upon 
Rokossovskiy’s operational art.  The thesis will identify the hallmarks of 
Rokossovskiy’s operational command whilst comparing his methods with those of 
leading contemporaries, such as Zhukov, Vatutin, Sokolovskiy and Konev.  Equally, by 
analysing Rokossovskiy’s operational art, this thesis will demonstrate that there were 
different forms of Soviet operation, not just one massive juggernaut, rolling west.   
 
This thesis will discuss the main influences on Rokossovskiy’s operational style and 
assess his value as a representative model, or otherwise, of distinctly Soviet/Russian 
operational theory.  It will argue that Rokossovskiy’s operational command indicates 
leading Red Army commanders had distinct methods of conducting operations.  These 
virtually amounted to personal, as well as institutional signatures.  Indeed, the 
operational methods of Rokossovskiy and Zhukov varied as much as, if not more than, 
some of their more celebrated Wehrmacht contemporaries, whose conduct of operations 
was dominated by one theme, the encirclement and annihilation of the enemy.  This 
thesis will argue that not only did Rokossovskiy possess a particular style of leadership 
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that set him apart from his contemporaries, but that his distinctive style of operational 
art made him the natural heir of the Russian/Soviet tradition of operational thinking. 
 
In summary, the main objectives of this work are firstly to engage in a sustained critical 
analysis of Rokossovskiy’s truly distinct style of leadership.  Secondly, to analyse the 
origins, style and historical significance of Rokossovskiy’s operational art and 
command during the Great Patriotic War.  Finally, this thesis will rescue 
Rokossovskiy’s reputation from relative obscurity and reveal the genuine historical 
significance of his style of leadership and operational command. 
 
Originality and Value of Study 
The pressures of time and space, plus the sheer scale of the war, mean that while 
frequently informative and of great analytical value, most books on the Eastern Front 
during World War Two do not really offer any sustained analysis of the leadership style 
and command of operations by individual commanders, particularly on the Russian 
side.8  Numerous volumes contain a great deal of information about operations that 
commanders such as Rokossovskiy were involved in, but little about their style of 
leadership, operational art, whether their style changed or if individual Red Army 
commanders differed in their approach to command.  If general surveys of the Eastern 
Front understandably lack any sustained analysis of particular operations or individual 
commanders, then arguably the opposite is true of other literature on the war in the east, 
which is often characterised by a detailed focus on a particular event, operation or 
campaign.   
 
In many ways special studies of Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk and Berlin are of great 
value, the best being excellent additions to the body of knowledge.9  However, even the 
best, in Russian, are inevitably constrained by their narrow focus,10 while others are 
often marred by idiosyncratic and/or an obsessive interest in the detailed minutiae of the 
subject matter.11  Therefore, much of the material on the Eastern Front is either too 
general, given the size of the war, or too detailed, because of the narrow terms of 
reference.  An original, thematic study of Rokossovskiy, offers an opportunity to bridge 
this gap.  No sustained study of Rokossovskiy’s career, his style of leadership or the 
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nature of his operational art exists in the English language.12  In Russian, four 
biographies of Rokossovskiy do exist.   
 
Although informative about Rokossovskiy’s life and times, they are generally 
descriptive and narrative in character.  They do not contain any sustained analysis of 
Rokossovskiy’s leadership style, nor do they rigorously scrutinise the nature of his 
operational art.  The memoirs of those who served with Rokossovskiy during the Great 
Patriotic War give important insights into one of the Red Army’s most talented 
commanders, but they do not explore his leadership methods or the essence of his 
operational command.13  Equally, the journal literature of the Soviet era, if not the new 
Russian era, from 1992, invariably produced rather orthodox and hagiographical 
reflection upon Rokossovskiy’s achievements.  In summary, rather like much, but not 
all, western historical literature on the Eastern Front, Soviet writing on Rokossovskiy 
was generally about what happened, when it happened, who did it, what they were 
trying to do and how awful or resolutely glorious it was.  In short, western, Soviet and 
new Russian literature does not provide a sustained, thematic analysis of Rokossovskiy.  
Therefore, there is considerable scope for, and indeed a compelling need for a critical 
assessment of the leadership and command of Rokossovskiy. 
 
Historical Value of Rokossovskiy as a Case Study 
Rokossovskiy’s experience of operational command on the Eastern Front during the 
Great Patriotic War was unique, both in terms of its duration and its operational 
significance.  Naturally, many senior commanders, apart from Rokossovskiy, played a 
key role in the survival and subsequent victory of the Red Army.  However, Zhukov and 
Vasilevskiy were often away from the front, engaged in strategic or operational 
planning, or, present for short, fleeting periods of time, on different sectors.  They were 
not, despite their extensive and invaluable contribution, a consistent and enduring 
presence, charged with leading tactical or operational formations.  As Chief of the 
General Staff, and as a Stavka representative, Vasilevskiy spent a lot of time in the field, 
but his experiences as a field commander do not compare with those of Rokossovskiy.  
Vasilevskiy never commanded a corps or an army in the field.  Therefore, he had no 
experience of tactical command during the Great Patriotic War.  Equally, despite taking 
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command of 3rd Belorussian Front, in February 194514, and in Manchuria, during 
August 1945, Vasilevskiy’s operational command was not comparable with 
Rokossovskiy’s, for by 1945, the Red Army was already marching to victory.15   
 
Similarly, although Zhukov commanded a corps against the Japanese at Khalkin-Gol, in 
August 1939, he never commanded a corps or army during the Great Patriotic War.  
Zhukov did spend significant periods as a Front commander, particularly in 1941 and 
1945, but he was rarely in one place, with one command, for any prolonged period of 
time.  16 This is not to suggest that episodic service at the front 
was less important in the defeat of the Wehrmacht.  Indeed, to 
make such an argument in the case of Marshal Zhukov, Marshal 
Vasilevskiy, Aleksey Innokentyevich Antonov (1896-1962)17 and 
Air Chief Marshal Aleksandr Alexandrovich Novikov (1900-
1976)18 would be absurd.  Nevertheless, Zhukov and Vasilevskiy 
are unsuitable case studies from which to examine the evolution 
of the Red Army in the field during the Great Patriotic War.  In contrast, as a corps and 
army commander, Rokossovskiy endured the catastrophic collapse of the Red Army 
during June-October 1941 and also survived redemption through mortification at 
Moscow, during November-December 1941.  Rokossovskiy’s sustained length of 
active, direct service, as Front commander, is without equal in the Red Army during the 
Great Patriotic War.  In short, the breadth and depth of Rokossovskiy’s service as a 
tactical and operational field commander has a special significance of its own. 
 
No other senior Red Army officer saw as much continuous, 
active service in the field as Rokossovskiy.  He started at 
“about 4 a.m. on June 22.”19  According to Rokossovskiy, “the 
duty officer brought me a telephone message from 5th Army 
Headquarters telling me to open the top secret operational 
envelope.”20  The South-Western Front was less chaotic than 
the Western Front but “we were unable to get in touch with the 
District command, to whom we were directly subordinated, and 
throughout the day of 22nd June did not receive a single order or instruction from 
them.”21 At dawn on 24th June 1941, Rokossovskiy skilfully handled 9th Mechanised 
 
Figure 3: A.A. Novikov 
(en.wikipedia.org) 
 
Figure 4: Rokossovskiy, 
1941 
(Kardashov, 1980) 
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Corps in its first encounter with 13th Panzer at Klevan,22 displaying unusual tactical 
acumen, as well as moral courage, in adapting to circumstances as he encountered them, 
rather than engaging in blind, but suicidal, counter-attacks.23   
 
After four years, of more or less continuous service as a corps, army and Front 
commander, Rokossovskiy’s war finished on 5th May 1945, with a mopping up 
operation on the Danish island of Bornholm, in the Baltic.24 No other Soviet 
commander, apart from Konev,25 held the formal position of Front commander longer 
than Rokossovskiy.  However, Konev, unlike Rokossovskiy was sacked twice as a front 
commander.  Once, as Western Front commander, on 10th October 1941 and secondly 
on 27th February 1943, again while in command of Western Front.26 Konev’s career was 
relatively dormant until the Steppe Front’s activation and the successful Belgorod 
Operation of 3rd-23rd August 1943, began a rise that culminated in the Berlin Operation 
of 16th April-2nd May 1945.27  In contrast, Rokossovskiy played a key role at Moscow, 
Stalingrad and Kursk before shattering Army Group Centre in July 1944 followed by 
victory in East Prussia during January-February 1945.  Equally, Rokossovskiy, unlike 
Konev, Andrey Ivanovich Yeremenko,(1892-1970)28 Vasily Danilovich Sokolovskiy 
and Kyrill Meretskov, was never sacked during the Great Patriotic War. 
 
Structure of Thesis 
This thesis will be divided into two parts.  Part One will discuss Rokossovskiy as a 
relatively unknown but historically significant commander.  It will begin with a review 
of Rokossovskiy’s formative years, World War One and the inter-war years.  It will 
discuss his experiences as the most significant military victim and survivor of Stalin’s 
Purge, before conducting an analysis of the key military operations that Rokossovskiy 
conducted during the Second World War.  Chapter 2 will analyse the literature, both 
Russian and English, concerning Rokossovskiy’s historical image and reputation as well 
as the Great Patriotic War.  The historical significance of Rokossovskiy’s memoirs, 
censored and uncensored, will be analysed in detail, as will recent historical literature 
indicating Rokossovskiy has been seriously misrepresented concerning the Belorussian 
campaign of 1943-1944.  The second chapter will conclude with an analysis of the 
Russian archival collection Russkiy Arkhiv.   Chapter 3 will concentrate on 
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Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership.  It will review, analyse and critique significant 
historical and contemporary models and styles of leadership.  The general leadership 
culture and reputation of the Red Army will be discussed, before engaging in a 
sustained thematic analysis of Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership.  The key themes of 
Rokossovskiy’s leadership will be identified, defined and analysed in order to deliver a 
comprehensive assessment of this relatively unknown, yet significant military leader.  
 
Part Two of the thesis will analyse Rokossovskiy’s operational command on the Eastern 
Front during the Great Patriotic War.  Chapter 4 will review Soviet military thinking in 
the period 1905-1936 in order to identify the origins of the intellectual framework and 
culture of command known as Soviet operational art. This defined the parameters in 
which operational commanders such as Rokossovskiy, conceived, planned and 
conducted operations.  Chapter 5 will discuss the operational level of command, the 
level of command at which Rokossovskiy spent the majority of the Great Patriotic War.  
It will discuss key Soviet operational concepts of successive operations, depth, the 
theory of the front  as an operational force, operational art and the role of the front 
during the war.  These were core Soviet operational concepts. As Rokossovskiy spent 
more time fighting the Wehrmacht than any other Soviet operational commander, his 
career is of particular relevance as a case study through which to analyse these concepts.  
In turn, these concepts are of considerable importance in any sustained, thematic 
analysis of Rokossovskiy’s operational command.   
 
Chapter 6 will will analyse  key aspects of Rokossovskiy’s operational command in 
terms of the conception, preparation and initial stages of an operation.  Chapter 7 will 
take a broader and deeper conceptual overview of Rokossovskiy’s operational style.  It 
will define the basic forms of operation common to Soviet operational art, before 
identifying and analysing Rokossovskiy’s preferred style of operations.  It will analyse 
Rokossovskiy’s operational methods in comparison with Brusilov and Zhukov.  In 
addition, this chapter will assess the character of Rokossovskiy’s deep operations and 
his use of elite Soviet operational manoeuvre forces.  Chapter 8 will analyse the manner 
in which Rokossovskiy manipulated and controlled the substantial forces under his 
command.  It will discuss the complex issue of operational synchronisation, before 
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examining how Rokossovskiy generated operational momentum through the 
harmonisation of attrition and manoeuvre.  Finally, the chapter will analyse 
Rokossovskiy’s judgment as a commander and his ability to make the right decisions in 
the most challenging and demanding circumstances.  However, the thesis will begin 
with an examination of Rokossovskiy’s formative years, his experiences in World War 
One, the Russian Civil War (1918-1921), the inter-war years and the Purge, of which 
Rokossovskiy was the most significant survivor. 
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PART ONE: THE UNKNOWN LEADER 
 
CHAPTER 1:  
FORMATIVE YEARS AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 
ROKOSSOVSKIY’S CAREER 
 
Early Years 
There has been considerable dispute about whether Rokossovskiy was born in Poland or 
Russia, on 21st December 18961 just nineteen days after his contemporary and rival, 
Zhukov.2  In the Soviet version, Rokossovskiy was born in Velikiye Luki, the son of a 
Polish railway worker and a Russian mother, a former teacher from Pinsk, who 
allegedly taught him a love of books, as well as fluent Polish and Russian.3  As a boy, 
Rokossovskiy moved to Warsaw following his father’s work on the Warsaw-Moscow 
railway.  Rokossovskiy had two sisters, Yelena and Maria4 and the family settled on the 
eastern bank of the Vistula, in the district of Praga.5  In 1905, Rokossovskiy’s father 
was killed in an accident.6 He died slowly.7  To make matters worse, Rokossovskiy’s 
younger sister, Maria, died shortly afterwards.8  By early 1911, following his mother’s 
death, Rokossovskiy, aged 14, was an orphan.  He lived with his grandmother and then 
his aunt9 where, allegedly, aged just 14, he expressed a growing interest in Bolshevism 
and was imprisoned for political agitation.10 
 
In August 1914, Rokossovskiy volunteered for the Imperial Russian Army.  He was 
accepted into the 6th Squadron, 5th Kargopolskiy Dragoon Regiment, part of 5th Cavalry 
Division.11  He also, according to one biographer, modified his name from the Polish 
sounding Konstantin Casimiriwicz, to the more Russian Konstantin Konstantinovich 
Rokossovskiy,12 later Marshal of the Soviet Union and a genuine hero of the Soviet 
people.  Rokossovskiy was never a Polish hero.  In 1944, he was irredeemably linked 
with the catastrophe of the Warsaw Uprising and later reviled for his willingness to 
serve as Stalin’s appointed Polish Minister of Defence between 1949-56.  In 1991, a 
statue of Rokossovskiy, in Gdansk, formerly Danzig, was torn down.13   
12 
 
 
It now seems likely that Rokossovskiy was actually Polish.  In 
April 1940, in a personal biography written by Rokossovskiy, a 
month after his release from the Gulag, he stated he was born in 
Warsaw in 1896.  It is highly unlikely, that in an official state 
document written just weeks after his release that Rokossovskiy 
was playing fast and loose with the truth.14  In the 1950’s, 
Rokossovskiy allegedly told the future General Jaruszelski, “I 
was born a Pole, I am a Pole and I will always be a Pole.”15  
Norman Davies suggests that Rokossovskiy was born in Velikiye Luki, but that, 
“in reality, Rokossovskiy was a typical product of the ethnically mixed 
borderlands of the old Tsarist Empire.  He was not a full-blooded Russian; but 
he was not really a Pole either.  His father was descended from a family of 
déclassé Polish nobles, who had participated in the Risings of 1831 and 1863 
and who had subsequently been stripped of their land and status.”16 
Rokossovskiy was not involved in the Russo-Polish War of 192017 but the Polish 
connection haunted Rokossovskiy’s life and career.  In 1937, Rokossovskiy was 
condemned as a Polish spy and sent to the Gulag.  On 21st July 1944,18 Rokossovskiy’s 
forces were the first Soviet troops to cross the Polish border.  In August 1944, in a 
terrible irony, Rokossovskiy observed the Warsaw Uprising from Praga, his residence 
as a child, on the eastern bank of the Vistula.   
 
Stalin deprived Rokossovskiy of the ability to act.  The 1st Belorussian Front’s failure to 
help the Warsaw insurgents has demonised Rokossovskiy in the eyes of many Poles.  
However, it is now generally accepted that, in August 1944, when the Rising began, 1st 
Belorussian Front was in no fit state to support it.19  As a former inmate of the Gulag, 
partly incarcerated on suspicion of being a Polish spy, of Polish extraction and with his 
sister Yelena, living in Warsaw, Rokossovskiy was in a very precarious position.  He 
was being investigated by SMERSH,20 and almost certainly knew it.  In these 
circumstances, Rokossovskiy took a remarkable risk, as early as 8th August 1944, by 
putting forward an operational plan for the liberation of Poland,21 a plan that would 
inevitably have seen Soviet troops fighting for Warsaw.  It is difficult to know quite 
 
Figure 5: Rokossovskiy 
(rulers.org) 
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what Rokossovskiy really thought about the Rising.  These matters will be covered in 
greater detail later but it is clear that Rokossovskiy had no real control over the course 
of events.22 
 
World War One and the Russian Civil War (1914-1921) 
The formative military experience of Rokossovskiy’s life was World War One.  Having 
volunteered, in August 1914, aged 17, Rokossovskiy won the George Cross, 4th Class, 
for an action during 8th August 1914, on the River Pilica.23  In spring 1915, fighting 
with 5th Cavalry Division, on the River Bzura, as part of the Western Front, 
Rokossovskiy was nominated for the George Cross, 3rd Class, but it was not awarded.24  
In August 1915, Rokossovskiy was joined in the 5th Cavalry Regiment by his first 
cousin, Konstantin Franz Rokossovskiy, on the western Dvina.25  Subsequently, in early 
May 1916, Rokossovskiy participated in a cavalry raid, led by Under-Officer Adolf 
Yushkevich.26  It was a defining moment in Rokossovskiy’s life.  Yushkevich, a career 
soldier, from 1910, became Rokossovskiy’s mentor.  It was Yushkevich, more than 
anyone or anything else that eventually persuaded Rokossovskiy to side with the Reds 
in 1917-18.27  It was not the last time that Rokossovskiy’s life was shaped by Adolf 
Yushkevich.  This friendship would cast a long shadow. 
 
On 21st November 1916, Rokossovskiy was made an under officer, the equivalent of a 
non-commissioned officer28 and was unsuccessfully 
nominated for another George Medal.  Rokossovskiy 
remained on the western Dvina, taking part in numerous 
small actions, but no huge attack like the Brusilov Offensive 
of June 1916.  There is no evidence that Rokossovskiy, or his 
unit, were particularly mutinous following the March 1917 
Revolution.  Indeed, as late as 24th August 1917, 
Rokossovskiy was still part of a coherent fighting unit, 
engaged in sustained fighting with German infantry and 
cavalry.  In fact, Under-Officer Rokossovskiy was awarded 
the George Cross, 2nd Class, for his actions in August 1917.29  
It was confirmed in December 1917, but never formally awarded as Rokossovskiy had 
 
Figure 6: Under Officer 
Rokossovskiy, 1916 
(Rokossovskiy, 2002) 
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joined the Red Guards.30  As 5th Cavalry Kargopolskiy Regiment disintegrated in 
December 1917, Rokossovskiy’s cousin, Franz, begged him to go west, together with a 
group of Polish dragoons.31  Rokossovskiy refused and went east with Yushkevich, to 
join the Red Guards.  Rokossovskiy had made a fundamental decision between Poland 
and the Red Army.  It would dominate the rest of his life. 
 
In January-February 1918, Rokossovskiy was elected as a squadron commander in 
Yushkevich’s cavalry detachment.32  In March 1918, Detachment Yushkevich evolved 
into the Kargopolsky Red Guards Detachment.  It was deployed first, to Bryansk, then 
northern Ukraine, in April-May 1918, where it was involved in heavy fighting.33 
However, in May 1918, Rokossovskiy’s unit was sent east to Siberia, to confront 
Admiral Kolchak’s forces.34Rokossovskiy’s civil war was not particularly dramatic in 
its historical significance.  He did an awful lot of fighting, but was not at Tsaritsyn later 
Stalingrad where Iosef Stalin played a leading role in the defence of the city, nor was he 
ever part of the famous 1st Cavalry Army.  Nor did Rokossovskiy take part in the ill-
fated Polish War of 1920.35  
 
However, he was involved in one of the Red Army’s most serious defeats.  By July 
1918, Rokossovskiy’s 1st Urals Cavalry Regiment was in the 3rd Urals Division, part of 
3rd Red Army.36  In October 1918, 3rd Urals Division changed its name to 30th 
Division.37 On 17th November 1918, 3rd Red Army began a counter-offensive with 
Yushkevich’s regiment, including Rokossovskiy, attacking the River Silva, as part of 5th 
Brigade.38 At first, 3rd Red Army’s offensive went well, taking Omsk in November 
1918.  However, as 1st ,2nd ,4th and 5th Red Armies advanced east and south-east, on the 
northern, left flank, 3rd Army became isolated between Perm and Yekaterinburg.39  The 
3rd Army began to falter against heavy opposition.  Soon, its advance became a 
nightmarish withdrawal, a withdrawal carried out in the fearful conditions of a Siberian 
winter, during November-December 1918. 
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Figure 7: Collapse of 3rd Red Army in December 1918 with 30th Cavalry Division 
(Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya, (Soviet Military Encyclopaedia), Vol. 6, p.297) 
 
The 3rd Army “stumbled and then collapsed as its soldiers retreated two hundred miles 
in twenty days.”40  In temperatures of -35°Centigrade, “the commanders of the Third 
Army’s engineer and transport groups and many other senior officers defected to the 
Whites.”41  The 30th Division, and in particular, Rokossovskiy’s unit found itself on the 
left flank of 3rd Army, separated from neighbouring formations,42 acting as a rearguard 
while under constant attack from Kolchak’s forces.  “On the day before Christmas, the 
battle-weary soldiers of the Third Red Army, some of whom begged their comrades to 
shoot them to spare them from going on, finally gave up Perm, centre of the Ural 
mining industry.”43  The Whites captured “43,000 tons of coal, 1.2 million tons of ore, 
nearly 350,000 tons of smelted and manufactured metals, 297 locomotives, 3,000 
freight cars, 250 machine guns, 20,000 rifles, 10,000 shells, 10 million rifle cartridges 
and nearly 20,000 men.”44 
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In January 1919, “Kolchak positioned nearly half of his 112,000 troops to face the 
Second and Third Armies in the northern Perm-Viatka sector.”45  The 3rd Army hovered 
on the edge of utter annihilation.  In the fraught political, social, economic and 
psychological conditions of revolutionary Russia, in January 1919, 3rd Army’s defeat 
and collapse represented a serious crisis for the Reds.  A commission of investigation, 
led by Stalin and Felix Dzerzhinskiy, the head of the Cheka was dispatched.  Its 
findings, at the end of January 1919, made sombre reading.  It lambasted 3rd Army’s 
leadership and told of sabotage, desertion and betrayal as “entire regiments and 
battalions had deserted under fire.”46  The “morale and efficiency of the army were 
deplorable owing to the weariness of the units, the result of six months of continuous 
fighting without relief.”47  Troops had been in battle unaware of how to use weapons, 
Red units had inadvertently attacked other Red units and bridges were not demolished 
to cover an unplanned and chaotic retreat.48 
 
In February 1919, after a period of hospitalisation, Rokossovskiy returned to the line.but 
in May 1919, Yushkevich, Rokossovskiy’s mentor, was seriously wounded.49  As the 
Red Army moved east against Kolchak, after 
three years, Rokossovskiy and Yushkevich 
went their separate ways.  Yushkevich was 
killed at Perekop, the isthmus leading to the 
Crimean Peninsula commanding a cavalry 
regiment in Blyuker’s 51st Division.50  The 
ghost of Yushkevich would return to haunt 
Rokossovskiy.  In May 1919, Rokossovskiy’s 
unit became the 2nd Independent Urals Cavalry 
Detachment.  It had about five hundred men 
and remained part of 30th Division and 3rd Red 
Army.  During summer 1919, Rokossovskiy 
moved steadily east with Eastern Front and, on 
15th July 1919, he was involved in the re-
capture of Yekaterinburg.51  In the wake of 
Yekaterinburg, Rokossovskiy was promoted to 
 
Figure 8: Advance of 3rd Red Army in 1919 
(Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya, (Soviet Military 
Encyclopaedia), Vol. 6, p.296) 
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command 2nd Independent Urals Cavalry Detachment52 and in September 1919, 
Rokossovskiy’s forces took part in the Tobola Dance, a sustained series of skirmishes 
along the River Tobola with White cavalry.  Raiding, skirmishing and minor actions 
dominated 3rd Red Army’s advance, contributing extensively to Rokossovskiy’s tactical 
education.53  On 4th November 1919, Rokossovskiy received his first Order of the Red 
Banner.  However, just three days later, on 7th November 1919, Rokossovskiy took a 
bullet through the shoulder while attacking Kolchak’s headquarters in Omsk.54  After a 
period of convalescence, Rokossovskiy returned to 2nd Cavalry Detachment.55   
 
On 23rd January 1920, Rokossovskiy was given command of 30th Cavalry Regiment.56  
The remainder of Rokossovskiy’s civil war was spent east of Lake Baikal, in eastern 
Siberia, chasing down White forces.  These forces were led by Semenov, a Cossack 
chieftain and former Tsarist officer who had exploited the chaos of 1917-18 to establish 
control over huge areas of the Trans-Baikal region.57  Semenov, a man described by an 
American observer, General Graves as “a murderer, a robber and a most dissolute 
scoundrel,”58 imposed a reign of terror on the region.  Semenov was in the pay of the 
Japanese and sadistically assisted by Baron Roman Ungern-Sternberg, another former 
Cossack, and “a man grown used to killing and, perhaps unhinged by having held too 
long the power of life and death over others.”59 
 
On 15th May 1920, Rokossovskiy’s 30th Cavalry Regiment, attached to 35th Infantry 
Division found itself on the borders of Russia and Mongolia.  In comparison with the 
dramatic events in European Russia, this was unglamorous, relentless tactical war that 
slowly wore down the Whites.  The Americans and Japanese continued to support anti-
Bolshevik forces in eastern Siberia but with Kolchak’s defeat and the general decline in 
White fortunes during 1920, American support drifted away.  Nevertheless, “as late as 
1921, the Japanese supplied Siberia’s last White forces with twelve thousand rifles, fifty 
machine guns, and over three hundred thousand cartridges.”60  Rokossovskiy led 
hundreds of cavalry raids over vast areas and gained huge experience in the 
intellectually demanding task of finding, fixing and then defeating his opponents.  In 
June 1921, he was wounded for a second time,61 when launching a cavalry charge on 
the Mongolian border.  Finally, Ungern was captured and executed on 15th September 
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1921.62  The remaining months of the war amounted to a mopping up operation, but 
Vladivostok was not captured until October 1922. 
 
The Inter-War Years (1922-1937) 
By the end of the Russian Civil War, 
Rokossovskiy’s unit was part of 5th Kuban 
Cavalry Brigade.  It was disbanded and, by July 
1922, Rokossovskiy was in command of 27th 
Cavalry Regiment, receiving, in 1923, an 
excellent report that described him as energetic, 
decisive but calm.63  In December 1923, 
Rokossovskiy’s reputation was endorsed by 5th 
Army’s commander, General, later Marshal 
Ioronim P. Uborevich (1896-1937).64 He 
commended Rokossovskiy as a young officer of great potential 
who must not be missed by the Red Army.65  Rokossovskiy was 
rewarded with a place on the Higher Command Cavalry Course in 
Leningrad, during 1924-25.  The student register included Zhukov, 
Bagramyan, Yeremenko and 
Romanenko.66  Bagramyan described 
Rokossovskiy as distinguished in his manner and bearing with 
a very impressive physique and a sharp analytical mind.67 
 
In 1925, Rokossovskiy returned east as an adviser to the 
Mongolian People’s Army, which later named the 1st 
Mongolian Cavalry Division after him.68  In Mongolia, he was 
re-united with the wife he had married in 1923 and daughter 
Adya.69  In the wake of his Mongolian tour of duty, by 
September 1926, Rokossovskiy was commanding 75th Cavalry Regiment,70 part of 5th 
Cavalry Brigade.71  In October 1928, Rokossovskiy was promoted to command of 5th 
Cavalry Brigade72 before receiving orders in January 1929 to attend the Frunze 
 
Figure 9: Rokossovskiy (centre), 1923 
(Rokossovskiy, 2002) 
 
Figure 10: Rokossovskiy, 
1924 
(Rokossovskiy, 1997) 
 
Figure 11: Rokossovskiy 
and his wife, 1928 
(Rokossovskiy, 2002) 
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Academy.73  Rokossovskiy studied tactics and operational art as well as familiarising 
himself with the new ideas that were beginning to influence the Red Army.74   
 
It was a short KUVNAS (Course of Improvement for Higher Officers) developed to 
“remedy the situation whereby the army, due to its revolutionary origins, found itself 
with a large number of senior officers who had either no formal military education at all 
or only what they had received as junior officers in the First World War.”75  In 1928-29, 
the Frunze Academy was at the centre of a highly creative period in Soviet military 
thinking.  Kardashov argues that “with interest Rokossovskiy familiarised himself with 
the works of M.N. Tukhachevskiy, S.S. Kamenev, A.I. Kork and other distinguished 
military thinkers.”76  It was the only formal officer training course Rokossovskiy ever 
attended77 and stimulated an enduring interest in military theory.  It also introduced 
Rokossovskiy to the ideas of the Red Army’s leading thinker, Vladimir K. Triandafillov 
(1894-1931)78 and his thoughts on modern armies.79   
 
It is difficult to prove whether or not Rokossovskiy was genuinely interested in the 
intellectual development of Soviet inter-war thinking.  The fact that he was a 
professional, vocational soldier in all that he did, suggests he would have considered it 
his duty to be aware of current military thinking.  Rokossovskiy was not an esoteric 
military thinker, but an officer of applied intellect, who thought about his profession of 
arms in a considered and intelligent manner.  Yet, he was no fool: Marshal of Aviation, 
Aleksandr Yevgen’yevich Golovanov (1904-1975), the commander of the Soviet 
bomber force in World War Two, felt Rokossovskiy was by far the most intelligent 
general the Red Army possessed.80  In the course of researching this thesis the author 
attempted to examine the details of Rokossovskiy’s experiences at the Frunze Academy, 
who he met, who tutored him and his confidential report.  However, this proved 
impossible to achieve. 
 
Rokossovskiy’s return to 5th Cavalry Brigade coincided with Chiang-Kai-Shek’s 
intrusion upon the Trans-Siberian railway, a critical strategic asset for the Soviet Union.  
In August 1929, the Special Far Eastern Army was set up under Blyukher and on 17th-
18th November 1929,81 Rokossovskiy’s 5th Cavalry Brigade led the decisive, deep 
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turning move that induced the Chinese forces to withdraw.82  On 13th February 1930, 
Rokossovskiy received the Order of the Red Banner and was awarded command of 7th 
Samara Anglo-Proletarian Cavalry Division.83  It was a significant promotion as well as 
a change of environment.  The 7th Samara Division, part of Timoshenko’s 3rd Cavalry 
Corps, was stationed in Belorussia, whereas Rokossovskiy had been almost exclusively 
in the east since he crossed the Urals in 1919.  The 7th Samara had four regiments, 37th, 
38th, 39th and 40th, each of six squadrons, in total 7,000 men, based in Minsk.  By quirk 
of historical fate, the officer commanding 39th Cavalry Regiment and Rokossovskiy’s 
direct subordinate was a certain G.K. Zhukov, later Marshal of the Soviet Union.84   
 
However, after two years in European Russia, on 22nd February 1932, Rokossovskiy 
returned to the Trans-Baikal, where he assumed command of 15th Cavalry Division.85  
This represented an important statement of confidence by the Red Army in 
Rokossovskiy’s abilities.  In the early 1930’s, the Soviet Union’s greatest strategic 
threats appeared to lie in the east, not the west.  Chiang-Kai-Shek had already indicated 
the vulnerability of the Trans-Siberian railway in 1929.  Similarly, the Japanese 
invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was a distinctly menacing turn of events for the Soviet 
Union.  The Japanese Kwantung Army was a formidable force.  It was countered by the 
Soviet Far Eastern Army, of which 15th Cavalry Division was a key part, as it possessed 
the mobility, endurance and firepower required to conduct operations in this rough, 
barren region.  Rokossovskiy was a highly experienced commander in the Far East and 
15th Cavalry Division was one of the first Soviet cavalry formations to include a 
mechanised unit, 15th Cavalry Regiment.86  Rokossovskiy had been appointed to a key 
command in a vital strategic location,87 at a time of increased tension and the distinct 
possibility of war. 
 
In his 1934 report, Rokossovskiy was described as tactically and operationally well-
prepared, possessing good initiative and summarised as an excellent commander of 
cavalry.88  In September 1935, following the formal re-introduction of ranks into the 
Red Army, Rokossovskiy was made a KomDiv or divisional commander.89  
Rokossovskiy’s star continued to shine and “at the beginning of 1936 Rokossovskiy 
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moved from Zabaikal to Pskov, where he received command of 5th Cavalry Corps,”90 in 
the Leningrad Military District.  He also received his first Order of Lenin.91   
 
A corps was the Red Army’s highest peacetime formation and 5th Cavalry Corps was 
undergoing significant changes in 1936, in order to make it compatible with the Red 
Army’s tactical doctrine of deep battle.  In his last attestation, before his arrest in the 
Purge of 1937, Rokossovskiy received a glowing endorsement from Commander of the 
Army First Class, General of the Army Boris M. Shaposhnikov, commander of the 
Leningrad Military District.92  Shaposhnikov testified 
“komdiv Rokossovskiy showed a full understanding of 
his work in operational situations and executes them very 
well.  A very valuable quality in a commander.  Entirely 
suited to the role of cavalry corps commander.  Worthy of 
being conferred with the rank of KomKor.”93  Thus, 
Rokossovskiy was considered fit for promotion to the 
rank of corps commander.  In addition, to Rokossovskiy’s 
impressive collection of inter-war reports, Shaposhnikov’s thoughts confirm 
Rokossovskiy’s outstanding qualities as an officer.  This makes Rokossovskiy’s 
experiences in the Purge94 even more incomprehensible. 
 
The Purging of Rokossovskiy (1937-1940) 
Rokossovskiy was arrested on 17th August 1937.95  He was charged with failure to 
ensure the material supply of his corps96 and accused of being a Polish and Japanese 
spy.  He was beaten up, tortured and sent for trial.  Rokossovskiy was confronted by the 
confession of his co-conspirator, one Adolf Yushkevich.  Rokossovskiy pointed out that 
Yushkevich had died a hero’s death at Perekop in 1920,97a death he claimed had been 
reported in Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), the Red Army’s own newspaper.  He was 
convicted all the same.  In one account, he spent the next three years at Vorkuta, a 
Gulag camp, 1,000 miles east of Moscow, inside the Arctic Circle, close to the White 
Sea.98  Rokossovskiy was put to work as a domestic servant for a “loutish warder named 
Buchko, his duties consisting of fetching the man’s meals, tidying and heating his 
cottage and so forth.”99  To a proud and personally correct man, the humiliation of one’s 
 
Figure 12: B.M. Shaposhnikov 
(stel.ru) 
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fate in the hands of such a petty camp tyrant was probably difficult to endure.  However, 
in Vorkuta, indoor duties were preferable to outdoor labour and probably saved 
Rokossovskiy’s life.  Rokossovskiy was released on 22nd March 1940,100 just ten days 
after the end of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War (November 1939-March 1940) that 
brutally exposed the Red Army’s weaknesses in the wake of the Purge. 
 
This is the conventional, received version of Rokossovskiy’s purge.  In recent years 
evidence has come to light that as early as 13th July 1937, Rokossovskiy was implicated 
in a Trotskyite plot relating to his time as 15th Cavalry Division’s commander.  101  He 
was arrested in August 1937 and imprisoned in Leningrad’s Kresty prison.102  He was 
denounced as a counter-revolutionary103 and in September 1937 named as an enemy of 
the people.104  In the wake of Rokossovskiy’s arrest his wife and daughter were thrown 
out of their accommodation.105  This article also provides information from 27th June 
1937, that Rokossovskiy’s Communist Party Membership Number was 0456018 and his 
nationality was Polish.   
 
Similarly, in 2001, Anatoly Karczmit’s novel, Rokossovskiy: A Glorious Crown of 
Thorns, was published by Astrel.106  A dramatic novel based on archival documents and 
the testimony of those close to Rokossovskiy, the account, if true, between pages 90 and 
160, supplies unprecedented details about Rokossovskiy’s experience during the Purge.  
It reveals that as soon as the Purge began, Rokossovskiy, as a 
Pole, expected the worst.  He assumed that he was already on a 
blacklist107 and the Polish question was profoundly influential in 
the Purges.  Sadykiewicz believes that Aleksey Innokentyevich 
Antonov (1896-1962),108 who later played a critical role as the 
Deputy and the Chief of the General Staff, during the Great 
Patriotic War,109 was also arrested.110  Antonov’s mother was 
Polish and, like Rokossovskiy, his maternal grandfather had been 
banished to Siberia for taking part in the Polish rebellion of 1863-
64.111  Furthermore, Antonov was also born on 9th September 1896, in Grodno, a 
Polish/Russian border town and grew up speaking fluent Polish from an early age as 
well as German, French and English.112   If Antonov was arrested, his incarceration was 
 
Figure 13: A.I. Antonov 
(en.wikipedia.org) 
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brief.  It did not stop him being appointed as Chief of Staff of the Moscow Military 
District, in summer 1937.  In December 1938, Antonov was succeeded by Sokolovskiy.  
Sadykiewicz suggests Vasily Danilovich Sokolovskiy (1897-1968), an impeccably 
reliable political Soviet general, if ever there was one, was also briefly arrested,113 but 
quickly released.  It is interesting to note given the Polish strand that Sokolovskiy was 
also born in Grodno, in September 1897.114 
 
In mid June 1937, the political and intelligence officers of Rokossovskiy’s 5th Cavalry 
Corps informed him that he was being relieved of command115 and put under house 
arrest, in the intelligence quarters of 5th Cavalry Corps.116  No reason was given.  In 
short, Rokossovskiy was arrested two months before the conventionally accepted date 
of his incarceration.  He was denied contact with anyone, including his family.  In late 
June 1937, two NKVD officers arrived.  Rokossovskiy was arraigned before a meeting 
of 5th Cavalry Corps’ political members and denounced as an enemy of the state, a spy 
and a traitor.  A more serious charge in 1937 can hardly be imagined.  Rokossovskiy 
was stripped of his party membership and removed from active service.  However, 
intriguingly, he was put on the reserve list.117   
 
In the wake of his denunciation, Rokossovskiy was released from house arrest and 
returned home to his wife and eleven year old daughter.  In August 1937, in what is 
conventionally assumed to be the original date of his purging, three NKVD officials re-
arrested Rokossovskiy and ‘reviewed’ the case.118  The review took three years during 
which Rokossovskiy spent long periods in Leningrad’s Kresty prison, much of it in 
solitary confinement.  The majority of the evidence against Rokossovskiy was induced 
from other, hapless, desperate, enemies of the state.  Senior officers gave incriminating 
evidence against Rokossovskiy in relation to his long service in the east, particularly as 
officer commanding 15th Cavalry Division, 1932-35.   
 
Two officers, Griaznov and Czaikovski, alleged that in 1916, Adolf Yushkevich, a Pole, 
had recruited Rokossovskiy, a Pole, into the Polish secret services.  It was also claimed, 
that as officer commanding 7th Samara Division in Belorussia in 1931, Rokossovskiy 
had facilitated the escape of Yushkevich into Poland.119  Rokossovskiy was also 
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accused of spying for the Japanese, in the period 1932-34, during the highly sensitive 
period following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931.  Rokossovskiy’s orders 
that his communications officers should study Japanese were cited as evidence of 
treasonous intent, not professionalism.  It was also suggested that he had tried to recruit 
Soviet soldiers for the Japanese secret service.120   
 
In March 1938, after seven months of interrogation, Rokossovskiy was transferred to 
the Lubiyanka, in Moscow.  He endured more solitary confinement and questioning by 
a brutal NKVD officer, Mikhail Urnov.  Rokossovskiy was presented with new witness 
evidence concerning treasonous dealings with the Japanese and Poles.  He refused to 
sign a confession, was pinned to a chair and given a terrible physical beating.  He was 
left unconscious and bleeding for twenty minutes.  Urnov returned, blustering that 
Rokossovskiy would now sign a confession, but apparently Rokossovskiy raised 
himself from the floor and swung a table leg at Urnov.  Urnov returned with more 
guards, five in total, and inflicted an even more savage beating, in which Rokossovskiy 
lost eight teeth and suffered three broken ribs.  He was returned, unconscious, to his cell 
and left for dead.  After five days, with untreated wounds, Rokossovskiy was finally 
hospitalised.  A rapid physical recovery made him fit for more psychological torment.  
He was put in a special solitary confinement cell, unable to lie down properly.  He was 
forced to sit or stand in his own excrement.121   
 
In the most terrible of ironies, Rokossovskiy received some 
physical, if not mental respite, on 29th September 1938, when 
Beria replaced Yezhov, as head of the NKVD.  In a piece of 
psychological theatre suffused with macabre intent, 
Rokossovskiy was interrogated by Viktor Abakumov,122 the 
future head of SMERSH.123  Abakumov, “violent, uncultured 
and devious……was tall and handsome”124 deliberately wore 
an impeccable uniform, while questioning the ragged, shoeless 
and filthy Rokossovskiy, the personally correct, well-mannered career officer of the Red 
Army.125  In March 1939, Rokossovskiy was formally court-martialled in the Supreme 
Soviet.126  He had no defence team. 
 
Figure 14: L. Beria 
(historycentral.com) 
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Rokossovskiy condemned the veracity of the witness statements against him, as the 
product of lies and torture.  Rokossovskiy asked to cross-examine Griaznov and 
Czaikovski, but was told the former had been executed, while the latter had died in jail.  
Yet, for Rokossovskiy, the worst was to come.  Andrei Belozerov, an old comrade and 
close friend, testified that Rokossovskiy had told him, in confidence, that he was a 
Polish spy.  In addition, Belozerov confirmed Rokossovskiy’s role in Yushkevich’s 
escape, in 1931.  Rokossovskiy was appalled that one of his closest friends could 
recount such damning lies.  In response to the judge’s inquiry about the truth of his 
allegations, a distressed and shaking Belozerov looked at Rokossovskiy and declared 
they were lies, extracted under torture.  He removed his shoes and socks: he had no 
toenails and defiantly endorsed Rokossovskiy’s protestations that Yushkevich had been 
killed, in 1920, at Perekop, in the service of the Red Army.127   
 
The court was adjourned, indefinitely.  Rokossovskiy returned to solitary confinement, 
more interrogation and another trial, in September 1939,128 before the same judges.  
Again, the court failed to find a verdict and Rokossovskiy was returned to prison.  
However, he was released on 22nd March 1940, just days after the end of the Soviet-
Finnish War (November 1939-March 1940) that revealed the shocking state of the Red 
Army.  It clearly needed officers of Rokossovskiy’s calibre.  Sadykiewicz believes that, 
without the embarrassment of the Red Army in Finland, Rokossovskiy would not have 
been released.129   
 
It is difficult to be categorical about such matters, but there was no inevitability about 
Rokossovskiy’s release, or that he would not be returned to the 
Gulag.  The Purge, although not as virulent, carried on during the 
Second World War: Kyrill Meretskov (1897-1968) the former 
Chief of the General Staff was imprisoned between June-
September 1941.130  Several Soviet officers such as D.G. Pavlov 
were executed in July 1941 and from spring 1943 the Red Army 
was haunted by Abukamov’s SMERSH.131  It was a fearful, 
monstrous organ of Stalin’s state. 
 
Figure 15: K. Meretskov 
(northstarcompass.org) 
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“It had seven branches: it conducted surveillance over the army staff and all 
forces, it pursued and killed deserters and self mutilators, it formed “blocking 
squads” to shoot retreating soldiers, it supervised quartermasters and field 
hospitals, it filtered suspected collaborators in reoccupied territory, it watched 
over contact with allies and the enemy.  SMERSH terrorized the army and all 
who lived in combat zones, and squeezed everything it could from German 
prisoners.  SMERSH made death in battle preferable to retreat for Russians 
and to surrender for Germans, but as an intelligence organization it was a 
liability.  Most of its men were as aggressive and ignorant as Abakumov; they 
shot or hanged many loyal and able officers and men.”132 
One can only speculate about Rokossovskiy’s private thoughts and emotions during 
the Warsaw Rising of August 1944, when he became involved in another ghastly 
Polish and Russian drama.  The Poles thought him a traitor: the Soviet regime and 
Abukamov had tortured him, as a Polish spy. 
 
The Eve of War (1940-1941) 
Rokossovskiy returned to 5th Cavalry Corps, now in the Ukraine and in June 1940, took 
part in the Red Army’s annexation of Bessarabia.133  In December 1940, Rokossovskiy 
received command of 9th Mechanised Corps.134  In theory, the mechanised corps’ were 
operational strike formations designed to drive the enemy off the soil of the Soviet 
Union.  Yet, confusion surrounded their role and in December 1940, Rokossovskiy 
directly asked for clarification of 9th Mechanised Corps’ role.135  As late as May 1941, 
he condemned Kirponos, the Kiev Special Military District commander’s analysis of 
their exercises as “extremely superficial, so much so that we could hardly make out 
what was expected of us.”136   
 
There was a chronic shortage of equipment.  The 9th Mechanised Corps was promised 
new tanks.  It went to war in old tanks that Rokossovskiy had mothballed during pre-
war exercises to ensure that if, or when, war broke out, 9th Mechanised had at least some 
tanks that worked.  The whole corps had barely exercised as a complete unit due to 
shortages of armour, ammunition and fuel, while many officers were inexperienced, if 
not incompetent and lacking field skills.  The 131st Motorised Division walked: there 
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were no lorries.  In truth, “the bitter fact was that the corps was mechanised in name 
only.”137  
 
A mixture of luck, foresight and skill enabled Rokossovskiy to survive the bewildering 
early days of Operation Barbarossa.  He was fortunate that 9th Mechanised Corps was 
not in the immediate border region and admitted he was unsure how it would have 
performed if it had been engulfed in the main line of attack.138  It was not caught up in 
the early battles and Rokossovskiy had time to impose a 
degree of organisational coherence upon 9th Mechanised 
Corps.  In reality, Rokossovskiy’s foresight had 
persuaded him to prepare his formation for war and he 
warned his officers to stay close by their units, at least 
forty-eight hours before the German invasion.  As early as 
18th June 1941, Rokossovskiy knew that a German 
deserter had revealed to Major-General Ivan I. 
Fedyuninskiy (1900-1977) of 15th Rifle Corps139 the date of the German attack.  Major-
General Potapov, 5th Army’s commander, rejected the information, warning of agent 
provocateurs and suggested angrily to Fedyuninskiy that “you are sounding the alarm 
without reason.”  In contrast, 
“on June 20, I was visited by the commander of the mechanized corps, 
General K.K. Rokossovskii(sic), who was on his way from the training area.  
We had a frank talk.  Rokossovskii(sic) shared my fears.  He, too, was worried 
by the situation and by our excessive fear of provoking (the Germans), a fear 
which impaired the combat readiness of the troops located along the frontier.  
I invited the general to remain overnight, but, thanking me, he refused: “at 
such times, it is better to be closer to one’s units.”140 
It was Rokossovskiy’s first act of leadership in the Great Patriotic War.   
 
The Rise of Rokossovskiy 
An obvious, but frequently overlooked, indicator of the significance of Rokossovskiy’s 
career is his rise through the higher levels of the Red Army’s high command during the 
Great Patriotic War.  “In the spring of 1940, after a holiday with my family in Sochi on 
 
Figure 16: I.I. Fedyuninskiy 
(Rokossovskiy, 1985) 
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the Black Sea coast,” he wrote in his memoirs “I had an invitation from Marshal 
Semyon Timoshenko.  The People’s Commissar of Defence received me warmly.  
Marshal Timoshenko suggested that I resume command of 5th Cavalry Corps, which I 
had commanded in 1936-37.”141  In these, understated words, Rokossovskiy described 
how he resumed his active military career, as a colonel, following his release from the 
Gulag, on 22nd March 1940.   
 
In June 1940, Rokossovskiy, along with 479 others, was 
promoted to the rank of major-general.142  By August 1941, 
Lieutenant-General Rokossovskiy had received command of 
16th Army.143  This was followed, on 18th January 1943, by 
Rokossovskiy’s promotion to Colonel-General, whilst he was 
engaged in operations at Stalingrad.  In 
April 1943, Rokossovskiy was 
appointed General of the Army,144 and, on 29th June 1944, 
received the highest rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union.145  It 
was a remarkable record, bettered only by Marshal Aleksandr 
Mikhaylovich Vasilevskiy, (1895-1977)146 who in a meteoric 
rise went from major-general in June 1940, to Marshal by 
February 1943.147  Naturally, ascent to the highest rank does not 
automatically reflect ability and merit, a fact painfully borne out 
by Stalin’s cronies Kliment YefremovichVoroshilov (1881-
1969),148 Grigoriy Ivanovich Kulik (1890-1950)149 and Semen 
Mikhailovich Budenny (1883-1973)150 but in Rokossovskiy’s 
case, there is little doubt as to his worth, or the genuine 
distinction of his record.  If men such as Georgiy 
Konstantinovich Zhukov (1896-1974) and Ivan Stepanovich Konev (1897-1973), 
achieved the rank of Marshal before Rokossovskiy, nevertheless, with the exception of 
Vasilevskiy, Rokossovskiy rose further and faster, to an equal rank, the highest rank in 
the Red Army, Marshal of the Soviet Union. 
 
 
Figure 17: A.M. Vasilevskiy 
(ets.ru) 
 
Figure 18: G. Zhukov 
(photobucket.com) 
 
Figure 19: I. Konev 
(media-2.web.britannica.com) 
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Rokossovskiy’s Role In Key Operations 
As early as July 1941151, as the commander of an ad hoc military formation,152 known 
as Group Rokossovskiy,153 Rokossovskiy played an important role in delaying the 
German encirclement of Smolensk.154 On 7th August 1941, he inherited 16th Army from 
the wounded Lieutenant-
General Mikhail F. Lukin.155 
The 16th Army had faced 
encirclement and annihilation 
within Smolensk156, but during 
November-December 1941, 
Rokossovskiy’s 16th Army, 
played a critical role in the 
defensive phase of the battle of 
Moscow (15th October-5th 
December 1941), a key turning 
point in World War Two.157 
Naturally, the performance of 
16th Army was not the only, or 
perhaps the most important 
factor, in determining the 
outcome of the battle of 
Moscow, but it did make a 
truly significant 
contribution.158  
 
Indeed, in the last days of November 1941, Rokossovskiy’s 16th Army, while fighting a 
furious tactical battle, assumed an operational, arguably strategic significance, out of all 
proportion to its size.  It is the argument of this thesis that at Moscow, no other Soviet 
commander or army, with the possible exception of Chuikov’s 62nd Army at Stalingrad, 
fought and prevailed in a tactical encounter of such ferocity and significance that it had 
operational, strategic and even grand strategic implications.  It was a critical event: 
defeat at Moscow frustrated the German aim of winning the Soviet war in one campaign 
 
Figure 20: Smolensk and Yartsevo:10th July-10th August 1941. 
 (Bellamy, Absolute War, 2007, p.241.) 
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and condemned Hitler’s Germany to a prolonged war of attrition on several fronts.  
Rokossovskiy’s 16th Army did not drive the Wehrmacht from the field, nor can it claim 
to have won the battle of Moscow.  However, its contribution to the frustration of 
German hopes was an event of considerable historical significance. 
 
 
Figure 21: Vyazma and Bryansk: October 1941 
(Bellamy, Absolute War, 2007, p.258) 
 
On 13th July 1942159, Rokossovskiy was appointed to command the Bryansk Front, 
covering the south-western approaches of Moscow.160 It was, potentially, a critical 
sector, as Stalin believed the German summer offensive would attack Moscow, from the 
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south-west.161  It would have been Rokossovskiy’s responsibility to defend Moscow, 
although by the time Rokossovskiy took active command of the Bryansk Front, it was 
reasonably clear, although not certain, that the German schwerpunkt was not heading for 
the Soviet capital.162  The Germans moved east and south-east towards a date with 
destiny at Stalingrad.  It was the start of Rokossovskiy’s quietest period of service on 
the Eastern Front, particularly when Stavka ordered 38th Army to the Voronezh Front 
and reduced the Bryansk Front to a minor role.163  The front was so dormant that in 
September 1942, Stalin himself rang Rokossovskiy, to inquire “whether I did not find 
the situation to dull for my liking.”164  
 
Rokossovskiy was summoned to Moscow.  He was informed that he was to command a 
major Soviet counter-offensive in the Stalingrad region.  “The plan was to concentrate a 
strong force (no less than three combined armies and several armoured corps) on the 
flank of the enemy occupying the country between the Don and the Volga with the 
purpose of counter-attacking south and south-east from the vicinity of Serafimovich.”165  
This was the original, the first plan for a Soviet counter-attack at Stalingrad.  However, 
as the situation in the city deteriorated, during late September and early October 1942, 
the proposed offensive was cancelled.  Few, in the western world, are aware that this 
plan, which throws considerable light upon the Soviet high command’s approach to 
Stalingrad, even existed.  Rokossovskiy’s selection to command it was symptomatic of 
his standing and the importance of his location as an indicator of significant, impending 
Soviet operations.   
 
Rokossovskiy did go on to play a key role at Stalingrad.  In November 1942, the Don 
Front, under Rokossovskiy’s command, played a supporting role in Operation 
Uranus,(19th –23rd November 1942), when the Red Army encircled the Sixth German 
Army and elements of Fourth Panzer Army in the Stalingrad pocket.  However, it was 
under Rokossovskiy’s direction that the encircled Sixth Army was annihilated.166 The 
German defeat at Stalingrad was a shattering blow to the reputation of the 
Wehrmacht.167 Yet, from the Russian perspective, surprisingly little is known about 
Operation Kol’tso (10th January-2nd February 1943), the final Soviet operation at 
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Stalingrad.  However, in terms of Rokossovskiy’s style and the wider war in the east, it 
was a critical event.168 
 
 
Figure 22: Eastern Front: November 1942-March 1943 
(Glantz and House, 1995, When Titans Clashed, p.131.) 
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If little is known about Operation Kol’tso, even less is known about the operation 
Rokossovskiy’s forces engaged in during February-March 1943.169 On 4th February 
1943, just two days after the German surrender at Stalingrad, Rokossovskiy was ordered 
to Moscow.  He was informed that the Don Front was to be rapidly re-deployed,170 to 
the central sector of the Eastern Front.171 There, under Rokossovskiy’s command, a 
newly formed Central Front would launch a huge, north-easterly deep operation towards 
Smolensk.  It was, to that date, the most ambitious deep operation undertaken by any 
Soviet formation.  The operation of February 1943 is indicative of several things.  First, 
Rokossovskiy’s considerable standing within the high command.  This was a vital 
operation, on a key sector of the Eastern Front, at a critical time.  Stavka was going for 
the strategic jackpot and it picked Rokossovskiy for the job.  Second, it demonstrated 
the Soviet General Staff’s growing confidence in the aftermath of Stalingrad.  Third, it 
showed Stalin and Zhukov’s sustained obsession with Army Group Centre.  Fourth, the 
operational concept and Rokossovskiy’s handling of the operation, reveal a great deal 
about the different forms of Soviet operation and Rokossovskiy’s operational style.  The 
operation failed, but this does not alter the fact that Rokossovskiy was involved in one 
of the most significant, but least known operations of World War Two.   
 
During the Cold War era, the February 1943 operation more or less disappeared172 from 
the official pages of Soviet history.173 In contrast, the pages of history are inundated 
with the Kursk Operation of July 1943.  At Kursk, the last major German offensive on 
the Eastern Front was defeated by a massive Soviet defensive operation.  174 There is 
considerable historical debate about certain tactical battles within the Kursk 
engagement, the numbers involved, casualties incurred and the propaganda 
subsequently dished out on all sides.175 However, there is relatively little historical 
debate about the strategic implications of Kursk.  It was a decisive turning point of the 
war, the point at which most Germans realised that not only was Germany unlikely to 
be victorious in the East, but that it was facing the prospect of utter defeat.  If Stalin 
secretly contemplated the possibility of a compromise peace, in spring 1943,176after 
Kursk he had little incentive to ponder anything other than the destruction of Nazi 
Germany. 
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The contribution of Rokossovskiy’s Central Front, to the Soviet victory at Kursk, is 
often overshadowed by the dramatic events at the southern end of the salient.  The 
fluctuating collision between the German forces in the south and Vatutin’s Voronezh 
Front is undeniably compelling, particularly the ferocity of the clash at Prokhorovka on 
12th July 1943.177 In recent times, historical research has called into question the true 
significance of Prokhorovka, and, by implication, if the Soviets claimed it was the key 
turning point, the whole significance of the Soviet victory at Kursk.178 Yet, to endlessly 
debate the significance of Prokhorovka in determining the outcome at Kursk, is to miss 
the point, for the true source of the Soviet operational, not tactical victory at Kursk, lay 
at the northern end of the salient, with Rokossovskiy’s Central Front. 
 
The German objective at Kursk was the encirclement and annihilation of all Soviet 
forces in the Kursk salient, with Model’s Ninth Army coming from the north, through 
Rokossovskiy’s Central Front, to meet Manstein’s forces, Fourth Panzer Army, 2nd SS 
Panzer Corps and Army Abteilung Kempf, coming from the south, by defeating the 
Voronezh Front.179  This required complete German success in the south, but also in the 
north, over Rokossovskiy’s Central Front, something the Germans clearly did not 
achieve.  Therefore, despite the historical hullabaloo about what did or did not happen at 
Prokharovka, the origins of the German failure at Kursk lay in Rokossovskiy’s 
defensive victory over Model’s Ninth Army, at the northern end of the salient.  This fact 
is frequently overlooked in both Soviet and western historical literature. 
 
As early as 10th July 1943, two days before Prokharovka, the Central Front had already 
beaten off Ninth Army.180  Rokossovskiy’s victory meant any German success at Kursk, 
not just Prokharovka, could only be of relatively limited tactical importance in relation 
to the original German objectives.  In fact, Rokossovskiy’s success meant Prokharovka 
was actually of little relevance to the overall operational engagement at Kursk.  Indeed, 
it does raise the question of why German commanders in the south actually fought 
Prokharovka, given that they must have been aware of the operational significance of 
Rokossovskiy’s victory.  In theory, but no more, the utter implosion of the Voronezh 
Front could have raised the possibility of the Central Front’s rear being smashed, on the 
anvil of the German Ninth Army, by the hammer of the German Fourth Panzer Army.  
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However, given the presence of the massive Soviet strategic reserve, the Steppe Front, 
under Konev, east of the Kursk salient, any German advance on Rokossovskiy’s Central 
Front would have been exposed to a huge Soviet flank attack, an encounter to dwarf 
Prokhorovka.   
 
 
Figure 23: German Intentions at Kursk in July 1943. 
(Bellamy, Absolute War, 2007, p.561.) 
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In the aftermath of the Central Front’s defensive victory at Kursk, just five days later, 
on 15th July 1943, it was engaged in a multi-front operation.181  Operation Kutuzov was 
an integral part of the Kursk Strategic Operation, involving the Western, Bryansk and 
Central Fronts, deployed respectively in an arc from north to south.182  It was the first 
substantial, multi-front operation, undertaken by the Red Army since it had been re-
equipped during the spring of 1943, in order to develop a greater capacity for deep 
operational manoeuvre.183  On 5th August 1943, the Soviet government celebrated the 
fall of Belgorod and Orel with an artillery barrage in Moscow, but in fact, Operation 
Kutuzov was an attritional slogging match.184 Nevertheless, Operation Kutuzov 
provides a yardstick by which to assess the Red Army in summer 1943, as well as the 
opportunity to examine Rokossovskiy’s evolution as a commander of offensive 
operations.  In relative, if not absolute terms, Operation Kutuzov was the closest 
Rokossovskiy came to outright failure as an operational commander.  It is clear that 
Rokossovskiy was unhappy with the planning and execution of Kutuzov.185    
 
The operations undertaken by Rokossovskiy’s Central and Belorussian Fronts in the 
period August 1943-April 1944 are frequently, perhaps inevitably, overshadowed by 
Kursk and the subsequent collapse of Army Group Centre, in June 1944.  During this 
period Soviet strategy concentrated on the Ukraine at the expense of Belorussia, but, 
nevertheless, this was a formative period in the development of Rokossovskiy’s 
operational style.  The Central Front, renamed the Belorussian Front on 20th October 
1943, conducted operations with a creativity, flexibility and speed that regularly enabled 
Rokossovskiy to out-manoeuvre the Wehrmacht.  It was Rokossovskiy’s forces that 
bounced the Dnepr, crossed the Sozh and the Desna.  Indeed, “at the end of September 
the Central Front in co-operation with other fronts had achieved outstanding operational 
success.”186  Rokossovskiy’s forces penetrated the Panther position and treated Second 
and Ninth German Armies to a lesson in operational manoeuvre, despite the difficult 
nature of the terrain.187  It was here that deception, surprise, rapier like deep thrusts, 
harmonisation of attrition and manoeuvre, the ability to acquire, retain and exploit the 
initiative through operational momentum emerged as the hallmarks of Rokossovskiy’s 
operational art.  In addition, it was during this period that Rokossovskiy developed the 
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idea of dual main efforts, within a broad front, in contrast to the orthodox Soviet 
approach of a single main effort.   
 
However, if the Belorussian Front’s operations in autumn 1943 were notable for their 
success, those of winter 1943-44 were characterised by frustration and missed 
opportunities.  A combination of wet weather, the diversion of Soviet resources into the 
Ukraine and mistakes by Red Army commanders, added up to a number of failed Soviet 
operations.  Rokossovskiy’s conduct does not appear to have contributed to these 
flawed operations.188  Indeed, the sharp contrast between Rokossovskiy’s operational 
successes and the mediocrity of Sokolovskiy’s Western Front was a stark one.189  This 
thesis will shed light on Rokossovskiy’s operations in Belorussia during the winter and 
spring of 1944, operations that set the scene for the Belorussian Operation (23rd June-
29th August 1944) in the summer of 1944. 
 
The Normandy landings of June 1944 clearly played a part in accelerating and shaping 
the nature of Germany’s defeat in World War Two, but in Normandy the German defeat 
took several weeks.  In Belorussia, from 22nd June- 4th July 1944, German Army Group 
Centre was simply shattered190.  Operation Bagration was the centrepiece of the Soviet 
campaign of 1944.  It is now widely regarded as the most impressive Soviet operation 
of World War Two.  Rokossovskiy’s 1st Belorussian Front played a critical role in the 
strategic disaster that overwhelmed Army Group Centre in June 1944.  The core 
elements of Rokossovskiy’s operational style coalesced in a devastating display of 
operational art that submerged Ninth Army, induced the collapse of Fourth Army and 
the implosion of Army Group Centre.191   
 
In spite of the overwhelming Soviet strength and crippling German weakness that 
prevailed in late 1944 and 1945, Army Group Centre, although weaker than between 
1941-43, was not an empty shell.  It was outnumbered,192 but it was not full of old men 
and fanatically committed young boys.  It was not ‘undermined’ by Romanians, 
Hungarians or Italians and it had strong defences, in difficult terrain, from which it had 
repeatedly beaten off numerous Soviet assaults.  However, its defences lacked depth and 
defensive preparations were undermined by the refusal of German military intelligence 
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and senior Army Group Centre commanders to consider that a major, not a minor Soviet 
offensive was building in Belorussia.193  Army Group Centre was, despite its 
weaknesses, a frontline German army group, manned by experienced, if no doubt worn 
troops, deployed in areas of marsh and forest, apparently unsuitable for rapid, agile 
manoeuvre war.  Nevertheless, it is the contention of this thesis that in Operation 
Bagration, Rokossovskiy’s 1st Belorussian Front played a key tactical, operational, but 
also, uniquely, a strategic role, one that made the difference between defeat and disaster 
for Army Group Centre. 
 
 
Figure 24: The Belorussian Operation and the advance on Warsaw. 
(Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 1995, p.200.) 
 
The summer of 1944 was the zenith of Rokossovskiy’s career, culminating, on 29th June 
1944, in his promotion to Marshal of the Soviet Union.194 However, autumn 1944 
brought the horror of the Warsaw Uprising.  Furthermore, on 12th November 1944, 
Stalin informed Rokossovskiy that he was to be replaced by Zhukov195 as commander 
of 1st Belorussian Front.196 At a stroke, Rokossovskiy was taken from the Warsaw-
Berlin axis and appointed to command 2nd Belorussian Front, north of Warsaw, on the 
borders of East Prussia.  In January 1945, Rokossovskiy began the East Prussian 
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Operation,197one of the more challenging and demanding Soviet operations of World 
War Two.  It was conducted in an atmosphere of appalling, murderous retribution,198 
but in purely military terms, Rokossovskiy rose to the challenge and shattered the 
German defences.  The East Prussian Operation, in conjunction with the East 
Pomeranian Operation of February-March 1945,199 played an important role in breaking 
the fanatical military resistance of German formations fighting on German soil, before 
the Berlin Operation.  Rokossovskiy’s wartime career finished with the 2nd Belorussian 
Front’s Oder-Elbe Operation.200  It began on 20th April 1945 although in 
Rokossovskiy’s words “after April 27 the enemy was no longer capable of holding any 
line and we began a rapid pursuit of his fleeing units.”201  On 3rd May 1945, 2nd 
Belorussian’s troops established contact with 2nd British Army, south of Wismar.202  
After two days of mopping up, on 5th May 1945, 2nd Belorussian Front suspended active 
operations.   
 
Figure 25: Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of 
the Soviet Union, K.K. Rokossovskiy, 1944 
(Rokossovskiy, 2002) 
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CHAPTER 2:  
LITERATURE SURVEY 
This chapter will assess the general English and Russian language historiography of the 
Second World War, particularly the Eastern Front.  It will then discuss Russian and 
Western impressions of Rokossovskiy.  It will also comment on the nature, character 
and credibility of the relevant historical sources, primary and secondary concerning 
Rokossovskiy.  It argues that for different reasons, in Russian and Western literature, 
Rokossovskiy is both famous and unknown.  It will conclude that a survey of the 
current historical literature indicates the value of a thematic, analytical assessment of 
the leadership and command of the most significant, yet relatively unknown military 
commander of the twentieth century. 
 
General Literature of the Second World War 
In contrast to the more restrained total war in the west, the absolute war in the east was 
either a ghastly, apocalyptic crusade for the Fatherland, or a heroic, desperate, 
ultimately triumphant war for survival.  In the western world there is an enormous body 
of literature concerning the Second World War.  However, it is dominated by the 
experiences of the Anglo-American forces.  Modern western historiography 
increasingly acknowledges that the Second World War was ultimately decided on the 
Eastern Front but rarely covers the war, especially from the Russian/Soviet perspective, 
in proportion to the historical significance of its outcome.   
 
Nevertheless, the war in the East has been the source of many accomplished historical 
surveys.  The relevant volumes of Germany and the Second World War provide a 
detailed account of the war in the east, primarily but not exclusively, from the German 
perspective.1 In the English language, Ziemke’s Stalingrad to Berlin and Seaton’s The 
Russo-German War 2 record the course of military operations in the east in a thorough 
way, but mainly from a German perspective.  The recollections of German officers 
provide an insight into the war in the east and the conduct of operations.  However, 
these accounts are coloured by the emotional proximity of the individuals to events they 
were involved in, as well as their distinct cultural and psychological perspectives 
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concerning the nature of the war, the Red Army and the Russian/Soviet people and their 
culture.  A more Russian/Soviet perspective is provided by John Erickson’s works, The 
Road to Stalingrad and The Road to Berlin, whose breadth and depth continue to set the 
gold standard of English language historiography of the Nazi-Soviet war.3 Equally, the 
sheer quantity and quality of work published by David M. Glantz, from When Titans 
Clashed to detailed accounts of Barbarossa and Kursk,4 has done much to reveal how 
the Red Army survived and eventually prevailed over the Wehrmacht.  Similarly, Chris 
Bellamy’s Absolute War has provided a comprehensive insight into how the Soviet state 
and the Red Army approached, fought and ultimately prevailed in this most savage of 
human tragedies.5  These are supplemented by Richard Overy’s Russia at War,6 Evan 
Mawdley’s Thunder In the East,7 and Catherine Merridale’s Ivan’s War.8 All approach 
the war in a different style but as a group they provide the student of history with an 
introduction to the general nature of the Eastern Front.   
 
The main Russian work on Rokossovskiy by Vasily I. Kardashov, a Soviet era 
biography of Rokossovskiy will be discussed at length later in the chapter.  9  It has 
been supplemented in the post Soviet era by three biographical texts that reveal 
Rokossovskiy’s story and personality without sustained analysis of his leadership and 
operational command.  A.F. Korol’chenko’s work 10 focuses on the war but provides 
brief material on Rokossovskiy’s experiences as a young man and during the interwar 
years.  However, half the text is anecdotal recollection designed to embellish the 
‘legend’ of Rokossovskiy.  It is not a comprehensive examination.   
 
Kirill Konstantinov’s 2006 11 work is biographical and provides a sound historical 
narrative without being authoritative.  It is a more substantial work than Korol’chenko 
with a six page section discussing Rokossovskiy experiences as ‘a guest of the 
NKVD’12 dating his arrest as 17th August 1937 13 However, it has little new information 
about aspects of Rokossovskiy’s career that were obscured during the Cold War.  The 
other biographical work on Rokossovskiy is that of Vladimir I. Kardashov.14  It seems 
to do no more than ‘build on’ the earlier more substantial work by Vasily I. Kardashov. 
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Soviet Historiography of the Great Patriotic War 
During the Soviet era, Russian historiography was dominated by official histories such 
as Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 15 The History of the 
Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union and Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny 1939-1945 
- The History of the Second World War, 1939-1945.16 These multi-volume histories 
produced in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s are extremely effective in conveying the 
sheer scale of the war and the Red Army’s general conduct of operations.  In many 
respects, complete with excellent maps and detailed historical narrative they are an 
important source of information about how the Red Army fought the Great Patriotic 
War.  However, they are a reflection of their times, namely the Cold War, distorted by 
political censorship and the desire to present the Red Army’s victory in the most 
positive light.   
 
The credibility of Soviet official histories as authentic records of the Red Army’s 
victory has inevitably been undermined by their insufficiently rigorous analysis of 
Soviet military operations, as well as the deliberate omission of information considered 
incompatible with the prevailing Soviet line.  This policy of censorship and omission 
had a dramatic impact upon the official Soviet historical literature of the Cold War era.  
Several operations that Rokossovskiy was involved in during the Great Patriotic War, 
including an entire campaign in Belorussia in early 1944, find barely a mention, indeed 
usually no mention at all, in the general histories of the Soviet era.  As such, despite 
their wealth of historical narrative, the Soviet official histories are an incomplete 
testimony to the wartime career of one of the Red Army’s leading commanders.  In 
contrast, the most recent Russian history of the war is considerably more rigorous in its 
analysis of the Soviet conduct of war, but has less basic information about the actual 
course and conduct of operations.  It has more intellectual argument but less history.17   
 
The Soviet historical record of the war was also notable for its massive body of journal 
literature, nostalgic anniversary accounts of great victories, unit histories and memoir 
literature.  The journal literature contains numerous informative articles, many officially 
authored by, or about, famous Red Army commanders and operations during the Great 
Patriotic War.  Indeed, several were officially written by Rokossovskiy,18 some 
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involving conversation with an interviewer19 and others telling of famous victory.  
These articles are often dismissed as historical propaganda and their limitations as a 
genuine historical source cannot be overlooked.   
 
However, journal articles often give the reader detailed historical information about 
significant operations.20 Indeed, some articles were of genuine historical significance.  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s previously censored sections of Rokossovskiy’s 
memoirs were first published in Soviet journals.21 Yet, in the main, Soviet journal 
literature of the Cold War consisted of detailed historical narrative designed to 
consolidate the received version of the Red Army’s struggle against Nazi Germany.  
The Soviet journals are a flawed source of tampered or embellished historical record.  
However, they also contain detailed information about units and formations under 
Rokossovskiy’s command during the Great Patriotic War. 
 
As the Cold War dragged on Soviet historiography was influenced by nostalgia as well 
as a desire to honour the Red Army’s wartime generation.  In the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s, Soviet journal literature commemorated great victories22 and/or heroic struggle 
in substantial detail.  It celebrated and mourned famous sons23 of the Red Army, such as 
Rokossovskiy.  Indeed, Soviet journals such as Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal (The 
Military History Journal) often marked significant birthdays of renowned Red Army 
commanders, as it did on the occasion of Rokossovskiy’s seventieth birthday in 
December 1966.  This article which claimed Rokossovskiy was born in Velikiye Luki is 
a celebration writ large of Rokossovskiy as a man, Bolshevik and commander.  24   
Soviet literature that marked great victories such as Stalingrad, if translated into 
English, was often uncomfortably25 bombastic in tone, wallowing in the Red Army’s 
retrospective glory and the triumph of its struggle over great adversity.  In general, such 
accounts usually involved a general narrative of military operations, punctuated with 
anecdotal accounts of deeds of individual heroism followed by formulaic recognition of 
the great work done by the Party.   
 
These literary tributes to the Red Army were a form of retrospective historical witness 
concerning the Soviet regime’s political legitimacy during the Cold War.26 It was an 
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attempt to portray a wartime image of dynamic social cohesion with government, army 
and people fused as one in the struggle with Nazism.  In addition, they were a licensed 
historical tribute to the millions lost in the war.  The journal literature endorsed the Red 
Army and its soldiers’ sacrifice, but remained silent about the true cost of historic 
victories and defeats, marred by huge loss of life, often the product of political and 
military incompetence on an almost unimaginable scale. 
 
The panoramic picture painted by Soviet historiography was acutely conscious of the 
historical significance of the Great Patriotic War in relation to the political, social and 
cultural context of the Cold War.  Soviet historiography went through several phases 
during the Cold War.  The first phase of Stalinist adoration lasted from approximately 
1946-1956, until Khrushchev’s speech at the Twentieth Party Congress.  In this period 
the outbreak of war and the horrendous trials of the Soviet people were blamed upon the 
aberrant nature of Nazism.  Survival was achieved through the resolute socialist 
endurance of the Soviet people and a resurgent Red Army inspired and guided by 
Marshal Stalin.27  
 
In the Stalinist world, Comrade Stalin had “laid the first 
foundations of Soviet operational art”28 in the Russian Civil 
War, while later “Soviet operational art covered an enormous 
developmental path during the Great Patriotic War.  Guided 
by Stalin’s military genius, this development unswervingly 
followed ascending lines, having achieved its quintessence 
during the last stage of the war.”29 It was axiomatic that 
“Soviet operational art reached its heyday during the Great 
Patriotic War, when our armed forces, inspired and directed 
by Comrade Stalin’s military leadership genius, provided numerous and unsurpassed 
models of organizing and conducting modern operations.”30  
 
Indeed, “led by Stalin’s genius, Soviet operational art during the Great Patriotic War 
achieved unprecedented heights and a flowering not seen until then, and rightly 
occupied the position of the most perfect and progressive operational art in the world.”31 
 
Figure 26: Stalin 
(br.geocities.com) 
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Apparently, “Comrade Stalin personally directed the improvement of the operational 
expertise of Soviet forces”32 and “Stalin’s wise leadership ensured the undeviating 
growth of the Soviet Army’s operational expertise during this most difficult war, the 
likes of which the history of past military art, covering many centuries had not known, 
and which was unattainable for our enemies.”33 The victory had been won and “Soviet 
operational art achieved these results because its creator was the great Stalin.”34 
 
These were the rituals of post-war Stalinist Russia.  At a distance of half a century such 
commentary takes on an almost satirical character but in the late 1940s the need to 
humour Stalin’s malevolent ego was no joke.  In all other respects, these are informative 
articles, written by intelligent and erudite military scholars of the Red Army.  Stalin’s 
utter domination of Soviet society and culture, civil and military, ensured that in life and 
in death, the man who crippled the Red Army before the war took the credit for its 
victories after the war.   
 
The period of Stalinist adoration was brought to an end by 
Khrushchev’s speech at Twentieth Communist Party 
Congress in 1956.35 This speech, which also singled out 
Rokossovskiy’s experiences,36 denounced Stalin’s Purge37 
and refusal to accept or disseminate intelligence about 
German war preparations.  Khruschev revealed how Stalin’s 
excesses had undermined the ability of the Soviet armed 
forces to fight effectively, thereby bringing down mayhem, 
slaughter and death on the Soviet people.  The survival of the 
Soviet people and the Red Army was now attributed to socialism, the Red Army’s 
endeavour, the people’s loyalty and, of course, the selfless efforts of the Communist 
Party.  The grotesque inclination to attribute all military success to Stalin’s benevolent 
guiding hand was abandoned.   
 
The late 1950s and early 1960s witnessed an avalanche of Soviet literature such as 
Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza and numerous memoirs, but 
de-Stalinization did not usher in a new era of historical objectivity and open inquiry 
 
Figure 27: N. Khruschev 
(nobelprize.org) 
52 
 
about the Red Army.  In fact, the orthodoxy of Stalinist adoration was merely 
superseded by that of the Party in alliance with the Red Army.  The genuinely nefarious 
consequences of Stalin’s leadership and the caricature of Marshal Stalin, the great 
military leader, were convenient alibis that disguised or excused the gross incompetence 
displayed by many in the Party and the Red Army.  Therefore, in an irony of history, 
just as many Germans blamed Germany’s woes and her defeat on Hitler, ignoring their 
own acquiescence and culpability, so in the Khrushchev era, the calamities of the Great 
Patriotic War could be attributed to Stalin, thereby obviating, indeed effectively 
outlawing, further historical inquiry into the role of the Party and the Red Army.   
 
The post-Stalin alliance of the senior political and military leadership of the Soviet 
Union ensured that leading Red Army commanders were spared rigorous critical 
examination of their conduct during the Great Patriotic War.  Therefore, under 
Khrushchev, Soviet historiography asserted that Party, Socialism, Red Army and people 
had combined to rescue the Revolution from the mortal jeopardy in which Stalin had 
placed it.  The Khrushchev era did facilitate an escape from Stalinist hagiography.  In 
this, strictly relative sense, historical inquiry was more open and encouraged a surge in 
historical publications.  However, it might be argued that given Stalin’s hideous 
stranglehold upon the Soviet Union, an increase in historical activity, if not objectivity, 
was an inevitable consequence of Stalin’s death.  In reality, one form of historical 
orthodoxy supplanted another. 
 
In the Brezhnev era (1965-87)38 themes established under Khruschev evolved, matured 
and atrophied into suffocating orthodoxy.  The conspiracy of silence and conceit 
between Party and Army reached its apogee.  There was less criticism and less praise of 
Stalin, indeed Stalin was more or less shunted off the historical stage.  However, the 
renewed emphasis on conventional military operations, from 1965 onwards, generated a 
highly productive period in Soviet operational thinking, military historiography and 
literature.  The Soviet Army drew inspiration and intellectual justification from Soviet 
inter-war theory and military practice during the Great Patriotic War.  A flood of 
articles examined the operational problems of the 1960s and 1970s through the medium 
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of Soviet theory and practice in the period 1905-1945.  Seminal articles such as Georgiy 
Isserson’s 1965, Razvitiye Teorii Sovetskogo Iskusstva v 30-ye Godu39 (The 
Development of Soviet Operational Art in the 1930’s)and the publication of A.B. 
Kadishev’s Voprosy Strategii i Operativnogo Iskusstva v Sovetskikh Voyennykh 
Trudakh (Question of Strategy and Operational Art in Soviet Military Works 1917-
1940)40 revealed the intellectual vitality of Soviet military thinking.  In 1970, M.V. 
Zakharov’s O Teorii Glubkoy Operatsii41 (On the Theory of Deep Operations) 
confirmed the growing intellectual interest in the inter-war and Great Patriotic War 
years.   
 
This massive intellectual effort was supported by the publication of the multi-volume 
Soviet Military Encyclopaedia, published in eight volumes in the period 1976-1980.  
The Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya shares all the strengths and weakness of 
Soviet military historiography.  It is an unrivalled source of basic, detailed historical 
information on virtually all significant wars, operations, commanders, battles, weapons 
systems and military ideas, Russian and foreign in the modern era.  In the case of 
Rokossovskiy it provides a detailed biographical record of his birth, military career, 
commands and operations ranging from World War One, the Russian Civil War and the 
whole of the Great Patriotic War.42  However, the detail complied with the established 
rules of Soviet historiography carrying the same distortions and omissions of other 
Soviet literature.  Nevertheless, Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya also contained 
exceptional articles such as Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov’s 1977 exposition of deep 
operations43 and other articles defining operational art.44 In summary, the dynamic 
military thinking of the 1960s and 1970s was both a catalyst and a symptom of an 
explosion of literature that ‘confirmed’ the prowess of the Red Army and its 
commanders, during the Great Patriotic War.   
 
The post Stalin orthodoxy of the Party, Red Army and people united under the socialist 
banner was sustained and deepened.  Soviet historiography was compelled to acquiesce 
in the exaggeration of the wartime role of political leaders such as Brezhnev.45 In return, 
the Party made no attempt to expose the incompetence and brutality of many famous 
Soviet wartime commanders.  This is the era of public hagiographical recollection in 
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Voyenno Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, and the Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya of 
Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, the Belorussian Operation and Berlin, legendary 
commanders with chests full of medals recounting the deeds of the Red Army.  There 
was little attempt to acknowledge that between 1942 and 1945 many senior 
commanders were inept or had sustained serious defeats and massive losses.  Soviet 
commanders, including Rokossovskiy, were presented as men of unswerving 
determination who, supported by the Party and the people, led the Red Army to victory.  
In summary, in the period 1965-87, at least in public, there was little objective historical 
analysis of Red Army commanders such as Rokossovskiy.   
 
Russian Views of Rokossovskiy 
On 3rd August 1968, Marshal of the Soviet Union Konstantin 
Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy died.  He was mourned, officially 
and spontaneously, as a true servant of the Soviet Union.  As a 
Red Army commander associated with the Great Patriotic War, 
Rokossovskiy was a celebrated public figure, a historic figure, 
virtually a legend in his own lifetime.  The Soviet leadership, the 
Soviet Army and the Soviet people knew who Rokossovskiy was, 
what he did, when he did it and where he did it, namely Moscow, 
Stalingrad and Kursk.  In the wake of his death, few would have expressed any private, 
certainly not public, disquiet about the burial of Rokossovskiy’s ashes in the Kremlin 
Wall.   
 
The Soviet Union’s industrial scale official recollection of the Great Patriotic War 
ensured Rokossovskiy was famous.  However, although millions knew of 
Rokossovskiy’s life and career, few understood it, especially in terms of his style of 
leadership and operational command.  In the second half of the twentieth century, the 
Soviet political and military leadership regularly manipulated history to project a 
dynamic retrospective image of the Red Army in World War Two.  It is a fact that the 
historical records of Zhukov and Sokolovskiy were ‘amended’ during the Cold War in 
line with the political and military imperatives of the Soviet leadership.  Equally, Soviet 
 
Figure 28: Rokossovskiy 
on Soviet Stamp, 1976 
(stamprussia.com) 
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historical literature presented Rokossovskiy in a manner that served the interests of the 
Soviet state at the expense of historical objectivity.   
 
It is a matter of considerable historical irony that 
Rokossovskiy, so poorly treated during the Purges, presented 
the Soviet system with an ideal public figure.  During the 
Cold War, Rokossovskiy was projected as a commander of 
knowledge and skill, possessing traditional martial virtues of 
physical and moral courage, an officer of the Red Army who 
led his men with unflinching dedication to the Socialist cause and the Soviet people.  
This was a man whose personal honour and sense of duty enabled him to overcome 
conditions of extreme duress in order to defeat the Wehrmacht.  An officer and a 
Bolshevik, tall in stature, elegant of posture with the physical presence to dominate and 
the social grace to refrain from doing so in a crude, boorish manner.  In summary, 
Soviet historiography presented Rokossovskiy as the idealistic epitome of the Red 
Army, a man who embodied its virtues and ethos.   
 
The credibility of this projection lay in Rokossovskiy’s genuine status as an outstanding 
leader and a field commander.  It is hardly surprising that politically driven Soviet 
historiography presented him as an ideal, the custodian of the Red Army’s spirit.  The 
true historical irony is that Rokossovskiy fitted the bill precisely because he was not a 
shining representative of the Red Army’s culture, but a much older, wider martial 
tradition.  In fact, Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership and operational command was 
entirely at odds with the authoritarian nature of Stalin’s Red Army.  There was no real 
discussion of how radically Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership differed from his famous 
contemporaries, nor any prolonged analysis of his operational art, except where it 
confirmed and legitimised existing Soviet claims.  As a result, the truly radical nature of 
Rokossovskiy’s military style, how and why it differed so conspicuously from other 
Soviet commanders, the implications of this and what that said about the ‘orthodox’ 
Soviet command methods used during the Great Patriotic War, were rarely addressed.  
Soviet historiography made Rokossovskiy famous.  It also ensured other aspects of his 
leadership and command remained secret.   
 
Figure 29: Rokossovskiy 
(theeasternfront.co.uk) 
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Rokossovskiy’s posthumous memoirs clearly demonstrated he had distinct ideas on 
leadership.  Equally, historical snippets in various memoirs suggested Rokossovskiy’s 
style of leadership, certainly his personality, was different to his famous 
contemporaries.  The constraints of the Soviet era ensured these opaque mirrors of 
historical inquiry were never really examined with any great clarity.  In summary, the 
Soviet historical record presented a wealth of detail about Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, 
the Dnepr, Belorussia and East Prussia.  It established Rokossovskiy’s claim as a great 
Soviet commander.  It also established a downright misleading impression of 
Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership and operational command.  Rokossovskiy was 
confirmed as a representative of the Red Army and Soviet martial ‘traditions.’ In truth, 
nothing could have been further from the truth. 
 
Kardashov’s Biography 
In 197246, two years after the first Soviet edition of Rokossovskiy’s memoirs was 
published47, a Soviet historian, Vasily I. Kardashov published a biography of 
Rokossovskiy, reprinted in 1980.48  The edition referred to in this work and consulted 
by the author is the 1980 edition.  It is a substantial piece of work covering 
Rokossovskiy’s entire life and career.  The reader is presented with a comprehensive 
account of who Rokossovskiy was, where he served, what he did and when it happened.   
In contrast to Rokossovskiy’s own memoirs, Kardashov’s biography is an excellent 
source of information concerning his early years.  It also has substantial chapters 
concerning Rokossovskiy’s experiences in World War One49 and the Russian Civil 
War.50  In addition, the reader is informed about Rokossovskiy’s career during the 
1920’s and early 1930’s.  Kardashov’s biography has a considerable commentary on the 
build up to the war following Rokossovskiy’s release from the Gulag in March 1940.51  
Equally, Kardashov’s presents an impressive narrative of the war years.  The reader 
receives a detailed account of Rokossovskiy’s war.  Indeed, it is almost a daily account.   
 
The biography contains detailed information about the conduct of operations.  For 
example, in August 1941, Kardashov gives a detailed account of the Dukhovschina 
Operation, east of Smolensk.52  He relates the actions of Group Rokossovskiy, the 
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objectives of the operation and the course of the fighting.53  In a similar way Kardashov 
provides a substantial record of Rokossovskiy’s improvised but successful operations 
on the River Vop, at Yartsevo, north of Smolensk, during July-August 1941.54   He 
describes Rokossovskiy’s arrival in the middle of the night on 18th July 1941, 55  with a 
small, inexperienced group of officers and relates how Group Rokossovskiy engaged 7th 
Panzer Division, north of Smolensk and prevented it from encircling the city.56  
Kardashov also indicates that the battles for Yartsevo with 7th Panzer Division on the 
River Vop made Group Rokossovskiy a famous formation, whose exploits were 
covered in Pravda, Red Star and Izvestiya.57  
 
There is considerable detail on a curious episode in early October 1941.  On 5th October 
1941, Rokossovskiy was ordered by Konev58, the Western Front commander, to leave 
16th Army’s troops and make his way to Vyazma.  Rokossovskiy was mystified but 
obeyed.  The promised troops were not there.  Rokossovskiy led his men out of 
encirclement59 to be faced with a board of inquiry; led by Voroshilov, Bulganin and 
Konev.60  Rokossovskiy, a Gulag survivor, was in serious danger of facing an 
accusation that he had abandoned his forces and disobeyed orders.  A more ominous 
charge in October 1941 can hardly be imagined.  He was saved by the suggestion of 
Malinin, his Chief of Staff, that he take a copy of Konev’s original order.61   
 
The fighting at Volokalamsk during October 1941 is covered in detail and Kardashov is 
surprisingly frank about the mythical nature of the events surrounding the Panfilov’s 
316th Infantry Division at Volokalamsk.62  Furthermore, Kardashov provides impressive 
detail concerning operations and events not really covered in other literature.  
Rokossovskiy’s reaction to being seriously wounded63 and hospitalised in March 1942 
is recounted.64  He provides information that Rokossovskiy’s wife and daughter were 
first in Kazakhstan and then Novisibirsk during the war65 He indicates that on the 
Bryansk Front Rokossovskiy emphasised to his fellow officers that it was necessary to 
listen to ordinary soldiers66  In relation to the Loyev Operation of October 1943, 
Kardashov presents key information that the Dnepr was four hundred metres wide and 
eight metres deep in this sector.  67  Kardashov also provides considerable detail on the 
planning of Operation Bagration, especially Rokossovskiy’s confrontation with Stalin in 
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May 1944.68  In summary, as a basic source of information concerning the life, career 
and times of Marshal Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy, who he was, what he 
did, who he did it with, what he was trying to do, the course of events during the Great 
Patriotic War and the nature of Rokossovskiy’s personality, Kardashov is an important 
source.   
 
However, as well as exemplifying the strengths of Soviet historiography, such as 
detailed historical narrative, Kardashov’s work contains several flaws that undermine its 
credibility.  Kardashov had access to significant, undisclosed sources of historical 
information, verbal and written, concerning Rokossovskiy’s experiences but there are 
no references at all, throughout the book.  Equally, while Kardashov provides a detailed 
account of Rokossovskiy’s experiences in World War One and the Perm Defensive 
Operation in Siberia (29th November 1918-6th January 1919)69 during the Russian Civil 
War, he supplies just twelve lines on Rokossovskiy’s ordeal during the Purges.   
 
Equally, Kardashov can provide extensive details of alleged dialogue between 
Rokossovskiy and his senior commanders.  It is, of course, entirely possible that the 
dialogue is a faithful rendition of what took place, but it is impossible to check.  The 
suspicion is that the dialogue conforms to an image entirely in keeping with the official 
version of the war.  The narrative is characterised by anecdotal reflection of the course 
of events rather than a considered analytical overview.  There is no real analysis of why 
an operation took place, whether it was the correct operation or whether it could have 
been carried out in a different manner.  In a similar way, although Kardashov will 
acknowledge that an operation failed to achieve all its objectives, there is no sustained 
analysis of why it failed or how, if it all, an operation might have been conducted in a 
different manner.   
 
For example, Kardashov provides information about the Don Front’s attacks north of 
Stalingrad, in October 1942, but does not comment on the fact that Rokossovskiy had 
earlier informed Stavka he did not believe that these attacks should take place.70  The 
February 1943 Operation is mentioned but is not analysed in proportion to its 
significance.71  Equally, in common with other Soviet sources, Kardashov either could 
59 
 
not or would not discuss the full scope, duration and implications of Rokossovskiy’s 
Belorussian campaign of autumn 1943-spring 1944.72  In essence, operations are 
reported in substantial detail but this is not used as a springboard for a sustained critical 
analysis of Rokossovskiy’s command.   
 
In addition, beyond relating the commonly accepted aspects of Rokossovskiy’s style of 
leadership and operational command, there is no real attempt to identify and analyse the 
key themes, beyond approval of the universal martial qualities that he possessed.  There 
is no analysis because it would have exposed the gap between Rokossovskiy’s methods 
and the wider Red Army, especially other senior commanders.  In summary, the 
Kardashov biography of Rokossovskiy is a product of the Brezhnev era.  It is detailed 
and informative, but its main purpose was to present Rokossovskiy as the historic 
custodian of the Red Army’s martial virtues, the symbol of its professional competence 
in the service of the Revolution, Army and people.  It was not to provide a systematic 
and sustained analysis of Rokossovskiy’s leadership and operational command.   
 
English Impressions 
In English historiography Rokossovskiy is a footnote, connected with historic events 
viewed mainly from a German perspective.  He is famous in passing, but in reality quite 
unknown.  A recent British publication discussing the great military commanders of 
history does not include Rokossovskiy, but does include Konev and Zhukov.73  Richard 
Overy observes that while western audiences may have heard of up to a dozen Red 
Army commanders, only two, Konev and Zhukov, are genuine household names.74  In a 
similar way Rokossovskiy is not included in The Oxford Companion to Military 
History.75  It is absolutely extraordinary that a senior commander involved in such 
significant historical events as Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, the Belorussian and East 
Prussian Operations has possessed such a low, almost invisible historical profile in the 
English speaking world.  There is one dedicated piece of historical literature in the 
English language on Rokossovskiy although recent works have thrown light upon this 
famous but still unknown Soviet commander. 
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Bellamy presents Rokossovskiy as a talented operational commander known as 
‘dagger’, respected by the Germans, Stavka and those under his command.  
Rokossovskiy is depicted as thoughtful but dynamic, with a discerning intellect, a 
commander who revelled in responsibility and craved independence in the planning and 
conduct of operations.76  Pleshakov presents Rokossovskiy as a tough, professional 
soldier, imposing and decisive with a pronounced 
commitment to duty.  Pleshakhov also cites Rokossovskiy 
dealing with defeatism and desertion in a robust, ruthless 
manner.  Pleshakhov suggests that this public refusal to 
tolerate defeatism and desertion was a matter of calculated 
self-preservation for a Gulag survivor, as much as a 
principled abhorrence of the abdication of duty.  Indeed, 
Rokossovskiy is presented as a commander with scores to 
settle in his memoirs, a member of a senior command group compared to mafia dons, 
each with their own chosen men.77  
 
Zhukov’s biographer Otto Chaney78 also questions Rokossovskiy’s personal qualities.  
Chaney argues Zhukov’s fury at Rokossovskiy’s subversion of the chain of command, 
at Istra, near Moscow, in November 1941, was entirely justified.  Chaney suggests that 
Zhukov was not an impossible boss, more that Rokossovskiy was an awkward 
subordinate, talented, but jealous of his independence.  Chaney argues it was 
Rokossovskiy’s reaction to Stalin’s appointment of Zhukov to command of 1st 
Belorussian Front, in November 1944 that poisoned their personal relations, not 
Zhukov’s abrasive character.79  Rokossovskiy was a fiercely independent and confident 
commander but Chaney’s portrayal of him as a petulant individual dominated by the 
desire for glory is not supported by other sources.  On the other hand, Chaney’s 
argument that Zhukov’s anger was reserved for difficult subordinates who failed to 
comply with orders, is contradicted by an overwhelming body of evidence.80 
 
The Richard Woff Article 
One dedicated piece of historical scholarship on Rokossovskiy exists in the English 
language.  Stalin’s Generals, edited by Harold Shukman81 contains biographical 
 
Figure 30: Rokossovskiy 
(theeasternfront.co.uk) 
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sketches of Red Army commanders during the Great Patriotic War.  It is not an 
exhaustive and authoritative encyclopaedia.  It is an informative collection of 
biographical narratives designed to communicate who these commanders were, where 
they had been, what they had done and in a general sense, the nature of their 
personality, style of leadership, operational command, strengths and weakness and 
historical reputations.   
 
It contains a chapter, written by Richard Woff, on Rokossovskiy.  It provides 
information about his alleged place of birth, experiences in World War One, the Russian 
Civil War, the inter-war years, the Purge and the Great Patriotic War.  It also provides a 
chronological narrative of major operations that Rokossovskiy was involved in on the 
Eastern Front.  It is an informative general account of Rokossovskiy’s life and career, 
before, during and after the war.  It argues Rokossovskiy’s personality, demeanour and 
style of leadership were different from other more abrasive contemporaries.82  Indeed, 
there is a strong implication that Rokossovskiy was primarily an officer and a 
gentleman, infused with a noble warrior ethos.  In this sense, the chapter achieves its 
objective of introducing the general reader to one of the Red Army’s most impressive 
but relatively unknown commanders.   
 
However, Woff’s chapter does not analyse Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership and 
operational command.  In fact, it poses and leaves unanswered, as many questions as it 
resolves.  Rokossovskiy’s conduct of operations is not discussed in sufficient depth to 
convey a true impression of his military style as a field commander.  Also, Woff’s 
chapter is occasionally undermined by lack of evidence and factual errors.  For 
example, Woff implies that Rokossovskiy’s decision to side with the Reds was more 
opportunistic than ideological but supplies no evidence.  Similarly, he states that many 
German generals considered Rokossovskiy the Red Army’s best general,83 but presents 
no evidence.  Equally, unlike other sources, including Rokossovskiy’s own memoirs, 
Woff suggests that on 12th July 1941, Stavka ordered Rokossovskiy to take command of 
4th Army, not Group Rokossovskiy.  He cites no evidence, although he points out that 
4th Army was disbanded before Rokossovskiy arrived at the Western Front.84  
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In addition, Woff suggests that in 1935 Rokossovskiy returned to the Far East in order 
to command 15th Cavalry Division.  According to Woff, after a brief period he returned, 
in February 1936, to 5th Cavalry Corps, in the Leningrad Military District.85  Yet, all 
other sources agree that Rokossovskiy spent three years, 1932-35, in command of 15th 
Cavalry Division.  This was not a minor episode: in 1937 one of the main accusations 
against Rokossovskiy was that he spied for the Japanese, while in command of 15th 
Cavalry Division between 1932-35.  Similarly, Woff suggests the row between 
Rokossovskiy and Zhukov, in November 1941, at Istra, “did not, however, affect the 
close relationship and mutual respect which developed between Zhukov and 
Rokossovsky thereafter.”86  In fact, as Rokossovskiy’s memoirs show, it fundamentally 
affected their relationship.  There may have been mutual respect and professionalism, 
but Rokossovskiy and Zhukov had a tense personal relationship. 
 
Woff’s article never establishes the wider themes of Rokossovskiy’s operational 
command.  Therefore, Woff devotes only one sentence to Operation Ring, the final 
operation that liquidated Sixth German Army at Stalingrad.87  Similarly, 
Rokossovskiy’s frustrations during Operation Kutuzov in July-August 1943 enable the 
student to gain a wider understanding of Rokossovskiy’s military style.  It is barely 
mentioned in passing by Woff.  Equally, Woff devotes only a couple of sentences to 
Belorussia in autumn 1943.  In a general sense, it was not a major Red Army campaign 
but it was an extremely important phase in the evolution of Rokossovskiy’s operational 
style.  Woff’s article has only five lines on Operation Bagration in June-July 1944; two 
on the Lublin-Brest Operation of July 1944.  In essence, Woff’s article does not contain 
any sustained analysis of Rokossovskiy’s operational command.88 
 
In contrast, Rokossovskiy’s personality and the human dimensions of his command are, 
in relative terms, discussed in more detail.  Rokossovskiy’s attitude to the Warsaw 
Uprising, its timing and its leaders are covered.  Rokossovskiy’s interview with 
Alexander Werth, the British war correspondent at Warsaw is synthesised and 
Rokossovskiy’s comments on the military situation east of the Vistula, in August 1944 
are revealed, but not analysed.  However, the German counter-attack east of Warsaw on 
31st July 1944, a critical event, that undermined 1st Belorussian Front’s ability to cross 
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the Vistula, east of Warsaw, is not mentioned.  Similarly, in relative terms, considerable 
space is devoted to the human drama of Rokossovskiy’s disconsolate, proud 
conversation with Stalin, in November 1944, following what he perceived as the 
humiliation of being transferred to East Prussia, away from the main Warsaw-Berlin 
axis.  Equally, while Woff has little say on Rokossovskiy’s conduct of the East Prussian 
Operation, he does assess the human calamity that descended on East Prussia and 
Rokossovskiy’s reaction.89   
 
Therefore, the only dedicated piece of historical literature on Rokossovskiy in the 
English language is primarily descriptive rather than analytical.  Indeed, beyond a 
general claim that Rokossovskiy was more humane than many of his contemporaries, 
Woff does not identify or examine the key themes of his leadership and command.  
However, Woff does capture the essence of Rokossovskiy’s personality and provides an 
insight into his character.  Indeed, there is much to commend Woff’s argument that “of 
the leading Red Army commanders, Rokossovsky (sic) combined outstanding 
professional ability with self-effacing modesty, and a sense of traditional military 
values.”90 
 
English Snapshots and Russian Narratives: Rokossovskiy’s War 
The English language literature on Rokossovskiy consists mainly of snapshots about the 
Purge, Stalingrad, Kursk or Belorussia.  Several authors, including Erickson and 
Conquest, discuss Rokossovskiy’s arrest and incarceration.  There is little agreement on 
location, duration and release concerning Rokossovskiy’s imprisonment.  Applebaum 
suggests Rokossovskiy was imprisoned in Vorkuta, 91 Bellamy in Kamchatka,92 Woff in 
Leningrad.93 Beevor introduces Rokossovskiy as a survivor of the Purge,94 a former 
inhabitant of Beria’s Gulag. 
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In Sebag Montefiore’s Stalin, Rokossovskiy is mentioned twice in relation to the Purge.  
On 6th May 1940, just weeks after Rokossovskiy’s release from the Gulag, Stalin notes 
Rokossovskiy’s lack of fingernails and asks if he was arrested and tortured.95  Secondly, 
Rokossovskiy is depicted as a figure of great moral 
courage, a survivor of the Purge, who in May 1944, is 
prepared to confront Stalin over the Belorussian 
Operation.96  Reese suggests Rokossovskiy was in 
Leningrad’s Kresty prison and the Lubiyanka in 
Moscow.  He suggests Rokossovskiy was released in 
March1939, not March 1940, but provides no evidence.  
Sadykiewicz argues Rokossovskiy’s was under house 
arrest two months before his formal arrest, imprisoned 
in the Kresty and the Lubyanka and suffered three trials, including one before the 
Supreme Soviet.97  In summary, in English Rokossovskiy is generally known as a 
victim of the Purge and is presented, accurately enough, as the most significant military 
survivor.   
 
Rokossovskiy’s role at Moscow during November-December 1941 is discussed in 
Erickson’s Soviet High Command and The Road to Stalingrad.  The shattering ordeal is 
vividly portrayed but there is no real analysis of Rokossovskiy’s leadership and 
command.  Similarly, Klaus Reinhardt’s Moscow-The Turning Point, records the 
importance of Rokossovskiy’s 16th Army at Moscow,98 but does not discuss his 
operational methods or leadership.  In a similar way the Soviet literature of the Moscow 
defensive operation focuses on historical narrative and there is no sustained, thematic 
analysis of Rokossovskiy’s leadership and command. 
 
The second volume of the Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 
discusses Moscow.  However, Rokossovskiy is mentioned merely in passing.  The 
impersonal historical narrative relates 16th Army’s presence at Vyazma99 and its actions 
at Volokalamsk,100 but has little analysis of Rokossovskiy.  The 16th Army’s crisis, at 
Moscow, in late November 1941, has two pages of narrative but Rokossovskiy is a 
peripheral figure.101  Equally, Volume 4 of Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny 1939-1945 
 
Figure 31: Rokossovskiy, 1940 
(Rokossovskiy, 2002) 
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discusses Volokalamsk.102 It also covers 16th Army’s struggle north-west of Moscow, in 
late November 1941,103 but with no real analysis of its commander.  The Sovetskaya 
Voyennaya Entsiklopediya has a lengthy entry on the battle of Moscow.  The 16th 
Army’s role is recounted but there is no analysis.104 In summary, the official Soviet 
literature is narrative in character with a shallow acquaintance with a multitude of 
events, involving numerous formations.  There is no considered analysis of 
Rokossovskiy.  This is also true of Shaposhnikov’s Moskovskaya Operatisya 
Zapadnogo Fronta (The Moscow Operation of the Western Front)105 and E.M. 
Sokolov’s Bitva za Moskvu (The Battle for Moscow).106 These are extraordinarily 
detailed historical narratives about Moscow and the subsequent Soviet counter-
offensive.  The 16th Army’s role is outlined in terms of dates, objectives and progress 
but there is no thematic analysis of Rokossovskiy’s leadership and command.   
 
The western literature of Stalingrad is dominated by the German experience.  It 
concentrates on Paulus’ character, the German failure to anticipate encirclement, the 
Romanians, the airlift, the German failure to breakout, Hitler’s interference, Paulus’ 
surrender and the ordeal of the German soldiers.  It is as though the Russians, apart 
from Chuikov, are extras in a German drama played out in Russia.  The English 
speaking literature also focuses on Operation Uranus, the encirclement of Sixth Army, 
in which Rokossovskiy’s Don Front played a subordinate role.  At Stalingrad, from 
September 1942-February 1943, Rokossovskiy was involved in the preparation, 
encirclement, containment and final destruction of Sixth German Army.  In fact, he was 
the only Soviet field commander involved in all phases of the Stalingrad campaign.  
However, although Erickson provides snippets of information about Rokossovskiy’s 
role, in general, in western historiography, he is not instinctively associated with 
Stalingrad.   
 
Indeed, occasionally, Rokossovskiy seems nothing more than an historical prop, written 
out of the main script.  The German defeat at Stalingrad was a pivotal historical event, 
but Sixth German Army’s annihilation by Rokossovskiy’s Don Front is often lost in the 
nightmarish last days of the German soldiers.  There is very little analysis, in English, of 
Operation Ring the final Soviet operation at Stalingrad.  Rokossovskiy is mentioned just 
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three times in Beevor’s discussion, although his meeting with Paulus is recorded.107  
Similarly, history remembers the Soviet ultimatum on 8th January 1943, but forgets it 
was Rokossovskiy’s idea.108  Therefore, although Rokossovskiy is superficially famous 
for his involvement in the Stalingrad campaign, his style of leadership and operational 
command during this period are virtually unknown.   
 
Volume 3 of Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza covers the 
Stalingrad encirclement in considerable detail109 but Rokossovskiy’s Don Front is 
mentioned just once.110 It contains ten pages on Operation Ring, but actually there is 
little discussion of the fighting conducted by Rokossovskiy’s Don Front in the period 
10th –24th January 1943.111  The last phase of Operation Ring, 24th January-2nd February 
1943, is covered in less than two pages, with Rokossovskiy barely mentioned.112  
Indeed, the Soviet ultimatum of 8th January 1943, signed by Voronov and Rokossovskiy 
is given greater consideration than Rokossovskiy’s conduct of operations.113  In 
summary, there is no substantial analysis of Rokossovskiy’s leadership and operational 
command during operations at Stalingrad.   
 
Volume Six of Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny also covers Operation Uranus in an 
extended narrative of events.  The Don Front’s contribution is incidental: its 
dispositions are identified114 with 65th Army’s breakthrough briefly recounted115 as well 
as 24th Army’s unsuccessful attacks north of Stalingrad.116  The Don Front and 
Rokossovskiy’s contribution to Operation Uranus is overshadowed by the more 
significant actions of the South-West and Stalingrad Fronts.  The Don Front’s 
destruction of the German Sixth Army in January 1943 is covered in more detail than in 
Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovetkogo Soyuza.  The decision to place all 
Soviet forces at Stalingrad, including Chuikov’s 62nd Army, under Rokossovskiy’s 
command is recounted117 as is Rokossovskiy’s plan for Operation Ring.  Naturally, the 
Soviet ultimatum occupies a prominent place118 but the actual conduct of operations 
during Operation Ring is dealt with in just two pages.  In summary, there is no proper 
analysis of Rokossovskiy’s planning and conduct of Operation Ring.  Equally, although 
the Sovetskaya Voyenna Entsiklopediya gives a detailed overview of Stalingrad,119 it 
does not examine Rokossovskiy’s actions in any depth. 
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The Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza and Istoriya Vtoroy 
Mirovoy Voyny are not the authoritative Soviet accounts of the Stalingrad Operation.  In 
1965, Soviet historians, operating under Rokossovskiy’s editorial name published 
Velikaya Pobeda na Volge (The Great Victory on the Volga).120 It is a comprehensive 
examination of the entire Stalingrad campaign dated 17th July 1942-2nd February 1943.  
The conception, planning, organisation and execution of Operation Uranus are 
examined in substantial detail,121 including Rokossovskiy’s Don Front.122 The Don 
Front’s involvement in Operation Uranus is assessed and Velikaya Pobeda na Volge 
also provides unusual detail on the Don Front’s intense operations against German 
forces north of Stalingrad between 24th-30th November 1942.123  An extended narrative 
discusses the futile efforts of Rokossovskiy’s Don Front and Yeremenko’s Stalingrad 
Front, to crush the German pocket between 2nd-12th December 1942.124  The Middle 
Don Operation (16th-31st December 1943) often known as Operation Small Saturn is 
assessed 125 as is Operation Winterstorm, the German relief operation on Stalingrad in 
December 1942.126.   
Velikaya Pobeda Na Volge also provides the most detailed account of Operation 
Ring.127  The planning and preparation of Soviet forces are examined with 
Rokossovskiy’s orders to the Don Front’s armies covered in a concise and simple 
manner.128  This is followed by a detailed narrative of Operation Ring covering the 
entire operation 10th January-2nd February 1943.129  However, Velikaya Pobeda Na 
Volge is not analytical in character and there is no sustained attempt to examine 
Rokossovskiy’s leadership and operational command.  It is a comprehensive historical 
record of the whole Stalingrad campaign but does not assess Rokossovskiy’s military 
style either at Stalingrad or in a wider comparative context before and after Stalingrad.   
In addition to Velikaya Pobede na Volge A.M. Samsonov’s Stalingradskaya Epopyeya 
130(The Stalingrad Epic) provides a massive, detailed assessment of the Stalingrad 
campaign.  It contains chapters written by (or under the name of) senior commanders 
such Zhukov, Vasilevskiy, Yeremenko, Voronov and Rokossovskiy.  Rokossovskiy’s 
chapter Na Stalingradskom Napravleniy (On the Stalingrad Direction) is a detailed 
overview of his involvement in the Stalingrad campaign.  It is more analytical in 
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character and contains valuable insights into the initial counter-offensive proposed at 
Stalingrad in September 1942.131 It also covers the early days of his command of the 
Don Front and the general situation north of Stalingrad in September-October 1942.132  
It discusses Operation Uranus (19th-23rd November 1942) and the Don Front’s 
operations.133 There is a detailed discussion about the initial planning for the destruction 
of the German pocket and Rokossovskiy analyses the prospective role of 2nd Guards 
Army.134  Rokossovskiy indicates that he disagreed with Vasilevskiy’s response to 
Operation Winterstorm, a controversial matter dealt with at greater length in 
Rokossovskiy’s uncensored memoirs.135  Rokossovskiy’s account concluded with a 
detailed examination of Operation Ring.   
A.M. Samsonov’s other work Stalingradskaya Bitva136 is a detailed history of the Soviet 
campaign at Stalingrad.  It includes brief details on the Don Front’s plan for Operation 
Uranus137 and a short review of 65th Army’s role in the German encirclement.138 
Operation Ring is examined but the dominant theme is narrative rather than thematic.  
The Don Front’s initial plan and Stavka’s response is covered139and Samsonov provides 
a detailed narrative of Operation Ring.140  It identifies key decisions taken by 
Rokossovskiy 141but there is no substantial analysis of his command.  It concludes with 
Rokossovskiy’s understated communiqué to Moscow, on 2nd February 1943 that the 
Don Front had fulfilled its orders.142  
 
History’s obsession with the Germans and the southern end of the Kursk bulge, in both 
English and Russian, has overshadowed Rokossovskiy’s critical role at Kursk.  
However, English language historiography is not entirely ignorant of Rokossovskiy’s 
role at Kursk.  The Soviet General Staff Study, The Battle For Kursk 1943 provides 
substantial information on Rokossovskiy143 but contains no real analysis of 
Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership and operational command.  David M. Glantz and 
Jonathan M. House’s The Battle of Kursk144 is an excellent account with a brief, if basic 
biographical sketch of Rokossovskiy.145 It is a concise account of the Central Front’s 
struggle with Ninth German Army but does not analyse Rokossovskiy’s leadership and 
command.  In the end, Rokossovskiy’s experiences at Kursk are overshadowed by the 
clash between Vatutin’s Voronezh Front, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, Fourth Panzer Army 
and Prokharovka.146  In summary, at least in English, Rokossovskiy is famous for being 
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at Kursk but there is little analysis of his actual leadership and operational command.  A 
recent account of Kursk is five hundred pages long: Rokossovskiy is mentioned just 
twice, in passing, a member of the supporting cast.147  
 
The Soviet coverage of Kursk follows a familiar pattern of general narrative in broad 
ranging official histories or extraordinarily detailed historical narrative in specialist 
studies.  Volume 3 of Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvenoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza outlines 
the Central Front’s plans148 and highlights the massive concentration in 13th Army’s 
sector, adding a quotation from Rokossovskiy149 A detailed account reveals the Central 
Front’s defensive operation against Ninth German Army150 but there is no analytical 
overview of Rokossovskiy’s command.  Operation Kutuzov, the multi-front Soviet 
counter-offensive, on the northern face of the Kursk bulge is covered 151but the Central 
Front’s initial attack, on 15th July 1943, merits just four lines.152 Subsequently, the 
Central Front narrative jumps forward to 12th August 1943 and there is no other 
coverage of Rokossovskiy’s Kromy Operation.  Therefore, 15th July-16th August 1943, a 
period of continuous fighting against fierce German opposition is dismissed in ten lines.  
There is no examination of Rokossovskiy’s command.    
 
Volume 7 of Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny outlines the position, plans and 
dispositions of the Central Front at Kursk,153 followed by a narrative of the struggle 
with Ninth German Army.154  The Central Front’s participation in Operation Kutuzov is 
mentioned155 with a brief indication that it was a difficult operation.156 The operations 
of late July and early August 1943 merit no more than a single line indicating Stavka’s 
intentions.157 In summary, the Soviet general histories provide a basic outline of events 
at Kursk, followed by a general narrative designed to mark the Red Army’s progress to 
victory.  There is no sustained analysis of Rokossovskiy’s operational art.  The 
Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya has an overview of Kursk158 but it considers the 
5th July-23rd August 1943 in a single entry.  It has no detailed reflection on 
Rokossovskiy.  The Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya also has a narrative of 
Operation Kutuzov.159 
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Bitva pod Kursk, (The Battle for Kursk) the original Soviet General Staff Study of 1946-
47, reprinted in 2006,160 is an extraordinarily detailed narrative of the entire Kursk 
Operation, encompassing the defensive phase and the subsequent counter-offensives 
launched by the Red Army.  The course of events, decisions made, formations involved 
are recounted in remarkable detail.  As a comprehensive source of information Bitva 
pod Kursk, like Shaposhnikov’s work and Velikaya Na Pobede, is a treasure chest of 
data.  There is a wealth of detail concerning the actions of commanders such as 
Rokossovskiy but little systematic analysis of his operational command.   
 
If there is a general familiarity with the Russian crossing of the Dnepr in autumn 1943 
in the western world, few know Rokossovskiy’s Central Front crossed the Dnepr first, 
in September 1943.  Volume 3 of Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovestskogo 
Soyuza presents the reader with a comprehensive account of Rokossovskiy’s advance to 
the Dnepr.161 The success of the Central Front’s left-wing is highlighted but the 
laboured advance of the right-wing is acknowledged, 162 before its success in crossing 
the Desna on 16th September 1943 is recorded.163 The 13th Army’s historic forcing of 
the Dnepr on 22nd September 1943 is covered in detail as is the struggle to establish a 
bridgehead over the Dnepr.164 
 
Volume 7 of Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny gives a detailed account of the Central 
Front’s advance to the Desna and the Dnepr.165  The 13th Army’s struggle to consolidate 
its bridgehead is covered and there is an appraisal of the Central Front’s stuggle on its 
right-wing, between the Pripyat and the Dnepr.  Similarly, there is detailed information 
on 60th Army, especially, 7th Guards Mechanised Corps’ success in establishing another 
bridgehead over the Dnepr, closer to Kiev.  The section concludes with a ringing 
endorsement of the Central Front’s progress.166 In a similar way, Sovetskaya Voyennaya 
Entsiklopediya provides a very detailed and highly informative account of the 
Chernigov-Pripyat Offensive.167  Indeed, the coverage of Rokossovskiy’s advance to the 
Dnepr seems strangely out of proportion to the scant coverage of his conduct at 
Moscow and Stalingrad.  However, one should not assume this is an intensely 
analytical, thematic examination of Rokossovskiy’s military style.  Rokossovskiy is 
mentioned by name, but beyond his flexible use of 60th Army, his operational conduct is 
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not scrutinised in any depth, despite the unusual detail concerning the Central Front’s 
operations in August-September 1943. 
 
John Erickson’s The Road to Berlin acknowledges Rokossovskiy’s autumn 1943 
Belorussian campaign but it is really no more than historical snippets that record the 
existence of these operations.168 Ziemke’s Stalingrad to Berlin pays some attention to 
this sector but his discussion of Rokossovskiy is brief.169  In general, English language 
historiography has paid little attention to the Belorussian campaign.  The Belorussian 
campaign of October 1943-April 1944 also reveals the limitations of the Istoriya 
Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza and the Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy 
Voyny as credible historical records of the Red Army’s conduct of operations on the 
Eastern Front.  The Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza, Istoriya 
Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny and public Soviet historiography in general, seriously 
misrepresented the scale and significance of the Soviet Belorussian campaign, 
particularly Rokossovskiy’s operations in 1943-1944.   
 
Volume 3 of Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza initially 
acknowledges, almost in passing, that Stavka was planning the liberation of 
Belorussia.170  It acknowledges that in October 1943, the Red Army received the 
mission to liberate Belorussia and that Stavka developed detailed plans to destroy the 
enemy across the whole central sector of the Soviet-German front, from Vitebsk to 
Orsha.171 By spring 1944, the Red Army had clearly failed to achieve this.  Indeed, 
between October 1943-April 1944, the 1st Baltic Front, east of Vitebsk and the Western 
Front, on the Smolensk direction, east of Orsha, created an attritional bloodbath that 
saw Soviet forces grind out victories at massive cost.  In short, in strategic terms the 
Belorussian campaign of 1943-44 was a failure.  The Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy 
Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza makes no attempt to explore, explain or analyse this anomaly.  
Indeed, apart from a passing reference or two, it makes virtually no comment on 
Rokossovskiy’s extensive operations in south-eastern Belorussia during autumn 1943.  
It provides little more than a brief summing up of Rokossovskiy’s position by 
December 1943.172 
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Volume 7 of Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny acknowledges that the 1943 Belorussian 
campaign was strategic in scale.173  It cites the Gomel-Rechitsa Operation of November 
1943 as a simultaneous operation planned to coincide with other Soviet operations in 
eastern and north-eastern Belorussia.  It does provide a more extensive commentary on 
Rokossovskiy’s operations than Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo 
Soyuza but explicitly states that operations began on 15th October 1943 with 
Rokossovskiy’s brilliant Loyev Operation.  It is now known that Rokossovskiy began 
operations in early October 1943.  In common with other Soviet literature, including 
Rokossovskiy’s own memoirs, the Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny connives in creating 
the impression that the Loyev Operation was curtailed on 20th October 1943.  There is a 
deliberate emphasis on the Loyev Operation’s early successes, ignoring the more 
extended operations conducted by Rokossovskiy.  In a similar vein, the Gomel-Rechitsa 
Operation of November 1943 is presented with a specific termination date of 26th 
November 1943.174 The extension of Rokossovskiy’s operations into a drive on 
Kalinkovichi, a key German position, in late November and early December 1943 is not 
mentioned.   
 
In Volume 8 of Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny there is a brief discussion of Soviet 
strategy in Belorussia during 1943-44175 together with a brief overview of operations in 
Belorussia in autumn 1943.176  The Mozyr-Kalinkovichi Operation of January 1944 is 
given token recognition, despite its success,177 although there is more discussion of the 
successful Zhlobin-Rogachev Operation of February 1944.  There is also a terse 
acknowledgement that 1st Baltic Front and the Western Front had been less than 
successful in achieving their objectives east of Vitebsk and Orsha.178  However, there is 
no comparative analysis of this sustained failure in contrast with the relative success of 
Rokossovskiy’s Belorussian operations.  Indeed, these operations are not covered in 
Rokossovskiy’s memoirs, even the uncensored version.  Rokossovskiy conducted far 
more extensive operations in Belorussia than those officially recognised by Soviet 
historiography.  The reasons for this will be debated in detail at a later stage: suffice it 
to say that the official Soviet historical record of Rokossovskiy’s Belorussian campaign 
was the victim of serious historical duplicity.   
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In comparison with Stalingrad, western historiography is ignorant about the scale, 
sophistication and success of the Belorussian Operation.  It was an operation that 
reflected the essential characteristics of Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership and 
operational command, but in English there is no real understanding of Rokossovskiy’s 
role in the Belorussian Operation.  The translated Soviet General Staff study gives a 
detailed insight into the planning and conduct of the Belorussian Operation.179  It is a 
dry, terse account and very informative on Rokossovskiy’s command of 1st Belorussian 
Front.  Nevertheless, there is no real assessment of Rokossovskiy’s operational art.  
There is no comparative analysis, no attempt to place Rokossovskiy’s leadership and 
operational command in a wider context.  It tells us what he did, but it does not analyse 
the wider nature of his style of leadership and command.  The most authoritative 
Russian source on the Belorussia Operation is A.M. Samsonov’s Osvobozhdeniye 
Belorussii (The Liberation of Belorussia), a comprehensive, detailed account of the 
entire operation by senior commanders involved in the destruction of Army Group 
Centre.180  
 
John Erickson provides an excellent overview of the planning and execution of the 
Belorussian Operation but his direct analysis of Rokossovskiy is limited.181 Carell 
vividly recounts Army Group Centre’s defeat making brief reference to Rokossovskiy 
in comparison to Manstein.182  Ziemke and Seaton cover the defeat of Army Group 
Centre primarily from the German perspective.  Rokossovskiy is mentioned in passing 
but no more.  Equally, the calamity that befell Army Group Centre is covered in 
considerable detail, again mainly from the German perspective, in Volume 8 of 
Germany and the Second World War.183  In Where Titans Clashed, Glantz conveys the 
sheer scale of the Belorussian Operation184 but is unable to investigate Rokossovskiy’s 
contribution, its significance and his methods in any sustained way.  In Soviet 
Blitzkrieg, Walter S. Dunn provides an excellent assessment of the Belorussian 
Operation,185 but not an analysis of Rokossovskiy.  Gerd Nieplod’s excellent The Battle 
for White Russia: The Destruction of Army Group Centre 186is a comprehensive account 
of the German defeat with substantial information on the use of 12th Panzer Division 
south of Minsk to counter Rokossovskiy’s 1st Belorussian Front.  It is, however, written 
primarily from the German perspective.  Finally, although it is idiosyncratic and 
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dominated by the German perspective, Rolf Hinze’s East Front Drama-1944 does 
convey the catastrophe that submerged the German forces in Belorussia.187  
 
The Lublin-Brest Operation, conducted by Rokossovskiy’s 1st Belorussian Front, 18th-
31st July 1944, has been overshadowed by what preceded it, the Belorussian Operation, 
and what followed it, the Warsaw Uprising.  Erickson’s The Road To Berlin contains 
half a dozen detailed pages on the Lublin-Brest Operation.188  It conveys the apparently 
overwhelming success achieved by the left-wing of Rokossovskiy’s 1st Belorussian 
Front, but is almost alone as an English language account.  Equally, there is little 
analysis of Rokossovskiy’s operational command.  In Soviet Military Deception, Glantz 
assesses 1st Belorussian Front’s attempts to deceive the Germans189 but in Where Titans 
Clashed, Glantz devotes just one page to the Lublin-Brest Operation.190  It is a brief 
narrative of who did what, why, where and when, no more.  However, elsewhere Glantz 
provides a more extensive documentary account of the Lublin-Brest Operation but it is 
mainly a narrative of events.191  This is symptomatic of the relatively meagre attention 
paid to the Lublin-Brest Operation.  Yet, the Lublin-Brest Operation actually offers a 
splendid opportunity to assess Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership, particularly in 
relation to the Soviet concept of operational synchronisation.   
 
Rokossovskiy’s connections with the Warsaw Uprising have been recorded in far more 
detail.  Norman Davies’ Rising ’44192 discusses Rokossovskiy and is critical of 
Rokossovskiy’s failure to help the insurgents.  Alexander Werth’s Russia at War 
contains an interview in which Rokossovskiy criticised the timing of the rising and 
explained 1st Belorussian Front’s failure to enter Warsaw.193  Erickson discusses the 
political and strategic context of the Warsaw Uprising in great detail.194  
Rokossovskiy’s involvement is assessed sporadically, but there is little analysis of how 
Rokossovskiy’s conduct at Warsaw fits into a wider analysis of his leadership and 
command.  Indeed, Erickson is more critical of Rokossovskiy, or at least 1st Belorussian 
Front’s HQ’s, inconsistent treatment of Chuikov’s 8th Guards Army in the Magnuszew 
bridgehead.195  Yet, even here, in relation to the notorious events of the Warsaw 
Uprising, Rokossovskiy is overlooked, famous but unknown.  Hitchcock’s Liberation: 
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The Bitter Road to Freedom, Europe 1944-1945, discusses Warsaw and the Soviet 
failure to help in some detail, yet Rokossovskiy is not even mentioned, once.196   
 
The brutal, but highly effective East Prussian Operation conducted by Rokossovskiy’s 
2nd Belorussian Front in January-February 1945 has been extensively documented.  It 
has been the subject of considerable comment, reflecting the appalling, savage character 
of the fighting and in particular the ghastly retribution taken by Soviet troops on the 
people of East Prussia.197  This has rather overshadowed analysis of the military aspects 
of the operation, but in many respects it is an important indicator of the nature of 
Rokossovskiy’s leadership and operational command.   
 
The human dimensions of the East Prussian Operation are studiously avoided in official 
Soviet literature.  However, they are a useful source of detailed historical narrative.  
Volume 5 of the Istoriya Velikoy Otecehstvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza presents an 
overview of the detailed planning of the East Prussian Operation.198 A narrative outlines 
the tough fighting that took place and in an unusually direct personal attribution it 
singles out Rokossovskiy’s decision to commit 8th Guards Tank Corps.199  It identifies 
19th January 1945 as the critical day and delivers an account of the 2nd Belorussian 
Front’s spectacular progress, highlighting the cultural and historic significance of East 
Prussia.200  A similar structure is adopted to recount Rokossovskiy’s East Pomeranian 
Operation of February-March 1945.  The plan of operations is described, formations 
identified and the course of operations discussed in a chronological narrative punctuated 
by key events.201  Nevertheless, the discussion of both operations does not include any 
sustained analysis of Rokossovskiy’s role or his conduct of operations. 
 
The Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny account of the East Prussian Operation is similar in 
character and structure.  It describes the general operational situation and the plan of 
operations,202 including a detailed outline of 2nd Belorussian Front’s deployment in the 
bridgeheads over the River Narev.203 However, Rokossovskiy is mentioned just once 
and there is no real attempt to analyse his operational concept.  This is followed by a 
chronological narrative of the East Prussian Operation that does not differ in its 
essentials from that provided in the Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovestkogo 
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Soyuza.  It is a concise but limited overview that does not identify or examine the key 
aspects of Rokossovskiy’s conduct during this operation in any systematic manner.     
 
John Erickson 204 reveals the barbaric, almost apocalyptic frenzy of the East Prussian 
Operation giving public witness to scenes of savage inhumanity as Rokossovskiy’s 
troops swept through East Prussia.  He also records, along with Beevor that 
Rokossovskiy tried to curb the unbridled, merciless depravity.  Certainly he is no sense 
accused of encouraging or instigating the wave of retribution that engulfed East Prussia.  
Once again Hitchcock does not mention Rokossovskiy even though the shocking 
progress of Soviet troops through Germany is central to his discussion.  Rokossovskiy is 
not blamed for the mayhem, but nor is his futile attempt to halt the carnage 
acknowledged.205   
 
Naturally, the sadistic behaviour of the Soviet troops has overshadowed Rokossovskiy’s 
handling of his forces in a highly complex, dynamic operation.  206Erickson discusses 
2nd Belorussian Front’s scattering of the German forces in late January 1945, while 
Seaton observes that the German military were impressed by the speed and power of the 
East Prussian Operation.  Hastings records the campaign but also emphasises the 
grinding horror of 2nd Belorussian Front’s progress through East Prussia and later 
Pomerania.207  Therefore, although Rokossovskiy is both famous/infamous for his 
involvement in the East Prussian Operation, the highly controversial nature of the 
operation has undermined any sustained analysis, in English, of his style of leadership 
and operational command, other than in the moral context, in which Rokossovskiy has 
generally fared better than other Soviet commanders. 
 
In 1945, Rokossovskiy was no longer on the main Warsaw-Berlin axis.  The East 
Prussia Operation and East Pomeranian Operation were of great political, military and 
psychological significance but were overshadowed by Zhukov’s advance on the Oder, 
east of Berlin and the question of whether the Red Army would attempt to bounce the 
Oder, then advance, without pause, on Berlin.  The East Pomeranian Operation of 
February-March 1945 is the subject of a detailed historical narrative in Istoriya Vtoroy 
Mirovoy Voyny.  208  The Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 
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gives a similar narrative of the East Pomeranian Operation.209  Rokossovskiy was not 
directly involved in the Berlin Operation of April 1945.   
 
Indeed, perhaps it is Rokossovskiy’s absence from Berlin that explains why he has not 
entered western consciousness in the same way as Zhukov or Konev.  In an official 
sense, the April 1945 Oder-Elbe Operation, undertaken by Rokossovskiy’s 2nd 
Belorussian Front, was part of the Berlin Operation.  It was conducted simultaneously 
and one of its objectives was to prevent German forces, north of Berlin, interfering in 
the German capital.  The Oder-Elbe Operation is hardly covered by the Istoriya Velikoy 
Otechestvenneoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza.  The initial stages are covered in less than a 
page.210  The narrative is concluded with a brief outline of 2nd Belorussian Front’s 
progress by the end of April 1945.211  In a similar way, after briefly outlining its 
aim212Volume 10 of the Istoriya Velikoy Mirovoy Voyny covers the actual conduct of 
the Oder-Elbe Operation is less than a page.213  In reality, Rokossovskiy was a 
peripheral figure at Berlin.  The Oder-Elbe Operation is covered by Erickson,214 but 
barely mentioned in other English language sources.   
 
Rokossovskiy’s Personal Legacy: A Soldier’s Duty 
At the time of Rokossovskiy’s death in 1968, his memoirs, Soldatskiy Dolg, were 
written but unpublished.  Batov, Rokossovskiy’s former army commander and trusted 
subordinate supervised their publication.  In 1985, an English translation of 
Rokossovskiy’s memoirs, entitled A Soldier’s Duty was produced.215  Rokossovskiy’s 
memoirs are eloquent but simple in expression, written with a light touch untarnished 
by bombast, rhetorical denunciation or excessive self-justification.  The memoirs give 
an important insight into his personality, style of leadership, operational command and 
the Great Patriotic War.  However, they began in 1940 and finished in May 1945.  They 
contained hardly a sentence on Rokossovskiy’s service in World War One, the Russian 
Civil War and the inter-war period.  There is not a word about Rokossovskiy’s 
experiences during the Purge.  Rokossovskiy’s original memoirs were heavily censored.   
Naturally, this means that in retrospect Rokossovskiy transmitted a sanitised impression 
of the war.  This is particularly the case with regard to relationships within the Red 
Army’s high command, its preparation for and subsequent conduct of the war.  It is now 
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known that Rokossovskiy was prevented from discussing many things about Stavka, 
Soviet strategy, other Soviet commanders, certain Red Army operations and his own 
leadership and command during the war.   
 
It is clear that such ‘doctored’ publications should be treated with caution.  Yet, it is too 
easy to simply dismiss censored memoir literature as just personal and public 
propaganda.  In fact, despite extensive censorship, Rokossovskiy’s original memoirs 
were surprisingly informative and with close reading, quite revealing.  Rokossovskiy’s 
censored memoirs unambiguously reveal the inadequacy of South-Western Front in 
June 1941.  The weakness of Rokossovskiy’s 9th Mechanised 
Corps, allegedly an elite formation, is openly discussed.216  The 
censored memoirs candidly document the chaotic, disorganised 
and improvised nature of South-Western Front’s response to 
the German invasion.217  Rokossovskiy condemns Kirponos as 
an inadequate Front commander and does not hide his relief 
that 9th Mechanised Corps did not face the main German 
attack.218 Rokossovskiy also indicates that while some Soviet 
formations fought hard, some did not and that most formations were disorganised, ill-
prepared and poorly led, at all levels of command.219 It is, in short, a damming 
commentary, censored or not, upon the Red Army in June 1941.   
 
In a similar way, Rokossovskiy’s censored memoirs reveal his sharp disagreements with 
Zhukov during the battle of Moscow.  It is absolutely clear from these ‘dodgy’ memoirs 
that Rokossovskiy and Zhukov had diametrically opposed ideas about leadership and 
command.220  Rokossovskiy’s irritations about the postponement of Operation Ring, the 
annihilation of the Sixth German Army, at Stalingrad, in December 1942, are made 
clear.221 Rokossovskiy’s manipulated memoirs also reveal his anger that the Central 
Front’s contribution at Kursk had been overlooked, while the Voronezh Front had been 
lauded.  The evident difference in leadership and command style between Rokossovskiy 
and Vatutin, two leading field commanders is laid bare.222   
 
 
 
Figure 32: M.N. Kirponos 
(en.wikipedia.org) 
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Figure 33: Red Army border deployment in June 1941 showing 9th (IX) Mechanised 
Corps. 
(Bellamy, Absolute War, 2007, p.180.) 
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In addition, Rokossovskiy’s clash with the General Staff and Stalin over the Belorussian 
Operation is revealed223 while Rokossovskiy’s anger at the General Staff over the East 
Prussia in January 1945 positively hums out of the page.224  Therefore, Rokossovskiy’s 
censored memoirs cannot be entirely dismissed as the anodyne, neutered product of the 
state.  It is of course true that they demonstrate the lengths to which the Soviet 
leadership went to in order to present their war in the fairest odour.  Nevertheless, they 
are a generally informative, occasionally revealing insight into how one of the Red 
Army’s leading commanders fought the war.  They are an important building block in 
any study that seeks to understand and analyse Rokossovskiy’s wartime career.   
 
However, the censors made their mark and ensured the memoirs Rokossovskiy wrote 
were not those the reader bought.  As a result, there is a sense of much left unsaid.  In 
general, the key historical events of Rokossovskiy’s command are discussed, but not 
fully analysed.  On several occasions a contrived sense of frankness is created in order 
to disguise the true nature of the events being discussed.  In effect issues are raised in 
order that they should remain undisclosed or at the very least to avoid creating curiosity 
through brazen omissions.  In short, the Soviet authorities manipulate a shallow notion 
of revelation to conceal serious duplicity.  Rokossovskiy was a leading historical 
witness with the power to endorse the official version of the Red Army’s Great Patriotic 
War or to blow it out of the water.  In general, the aim was to contrive Rokossovskiy’s 
endorsement of the received version of the Great Patriotic War.  However, it is also true 
that censorship demanded stuff was omitted, buried or left out.   
 
Rokossovskiy’s memoirs were lucid, almost eloquent, but occasionally they are abrupt, 
indeed strangely terse.  A close reading of Rokossovskiy’s censored memoirs indicates 
that significant issues involving the Red Army’s conduct of the war, Rokossovskiy’s 
role and other leading Soviet commanders are not discussed in any depth at all.  In early 
December 1942, Rokossovskiy strenuously objected to Vasilevskiy’s diversion of 2nd 
Guards Army to deal with Operation Winterstorm, the German attempt to cut a corridor 
through to German forces trapped in the Stalingrad pocket.  The censored memoirs 
reduce this to “I said I was against it.”225  In December 1943, Rokossovskiy’s 1st 
Belorussian Front launched the Mozyr-Kalinkovichi Operation in south-eastern 
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Belorussia.  It was a major operation designed to target key German rail and road 
communications and supply lines.  It came very close to significant success but was 
reduced to “troops of the 65th and 61st Armies had advanced in the general Mozyr-
Kalinkovichi direction.”226 In summary, Rokossovskiy’s censored memoirs are both 
illuminating and misleading.   
  
Rokossovskiy’s Real Memoirs: Historical Dynamite 
In 1989-1991, a series of articles in Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal revealed the truly 
draconian censorship imposed upon Rokossovskiy’s original memoirs.227 Furthermore, 
in 1997 a new Russian language edition of Rokossovskiy’s memoirs was published.228 
These revealed that approximately 25 percent of 
Rokossovskiy’s original text had been deleted.  The new 
version of Rokossovskiy’s memoirs used the clever device 
of incorporating new, previously censored material in 
written Cyrillic alongside the original censored text in 
printed Cyrillic.  This enabled the original narrative of 
Rokossovskiy’s memoirs to survive but with more 
analytical depth and breadth.  The 1997 Russian version of 
Rokossovskiy’s memoirs is also particularly helpful as it contains a very useful 
chronological outline of the major operations that Rokossovskiy was involved in on the 
Eastern Front.  It gives the official name of the operation, the particular Stavka 
directive, the aim of the mission and a brief summary of the conduct and course of the 
operation including the precise date it began and finished.229  It also contains a brief 
autobiography written in December 1945, by Rokossovskiy, in which he states that he 
was born in Velikye Luki, in Russia, not Warsaw.230  Therefore, he suggests that his 
birth was Russian even if his official nationality according to the evidence of July 1937 
and April 1940 was Polish. 
 
It also contains a brief historical introduction by Dr.Alexsey Basov.  This is a 
biographical narrative.  It outlines Rokossovskiy’s birth, early years, experiences in 
World War One and the inter-war years.  It is noteworthy that a post Soviet era, 
uncensored version of Rokossovskiy’s memoirs, compiled with the assistance of his 
 
Figure 34: Rokossovskiy on 
cover of memoirs 
(Rokossovskiy, 2002) 
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family insists Rokossovskiy was born in Velikiye Luki, not Warsaw.  It is also 
interesting it contains only twenty lines on the Purge.  It suggests that Rokossovskiy 
was formally arrested in August 1937, relates Rokossovskiy’s Yushkevich defence, 
namely that his alleged accomplice had died in 1920, with a new twist, that 
Rokossovskiy told the court Yushkevich’s death had actually been reported in Krasnaya 
Zvezda, the Red Army’s official newspaper.231 This introduction is included in the 2002 
edition of Rokossovskiy’s memoirs, but the useful table of operations is not.  
Nevertheless, the main body of the text in both versions of Rokossovskiy’s new 
memoirs is the same and will be treated as Rokossovskiy’s uncensored memoirs with 
references drawn from the 2002 Olma Press edition of Soldatskiy Dolg.232 
 
Rokossovskiy’s real memoirs reveal his full, scathing criticisms of not only Kirponos 
and the South-Western Front, but the military leadership of the Red Army.  
Rokossovskiy is deeply critical of the decision to cannibalise the defences of the Soviet 
western border between 1918-1939, in order to utilise the extra territory gained through 
the annexations of the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Eastern Poland.  In June 1941, the 
Soviet Union was left with two incomplete defence lines233 and Rokossovskiy indicts 
the General Staff’s failure to persuade Stalin234 of the strategic risks involved in 
fortifying the new frontier by stripping the old border.   
 
Rokossovskiy reveals his sealed orders of 22nd June 1941 the day of the German 
invasion, actually envisaged a deep operational advance by a fully equipped mechanised 
corps into enemy territory.235  These orders bore no relation to the operational capability 
of 9th Mechanised Corps.  It was barely capable of moving never mind deep operational 
manoeuvre.  In Rokossovskiy’s words, 
“Put simply, the Corps was unready for military operations as a mechanized 
unit in any form.  There was no way the Kiev Special Military District 
(KOVO) headquarters and the General Staff did not know this.”236 
This plan is discussed by Pleshakhov and Bellamy.237 It suggests, either the plans 
were unchanged from the strategic pre-emption plan put forward by Zhukov on 15th 
May 1941, or the General Staff had not actually written new orders, either through 
ineptitude or an inability to face the Red Army’s lack of preparedness for war.  
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Similarly, although Rokossovskiy’s censored memoirs discussed poor fighting spirit 
among some Soviet troops in June 1941, they did not reveal the full malaise or the 
direct action that Rokossovskiy took to deal with it.  The new memoirs indicate 
Rokossovskiy confronted open insubordination, bordering on mutiny; that he 
personally threatened an officer with summary execution, rounded up hundreds of 
malingerers, sent them back to the front238 and ordered the execution of over a 
hundred.239   
 
 
Figure 35: The Red Army Scheme of Operations for a potential pre-emptive war. 
(Bellamy, Absolute War, 2007, p.108.) 
 
Rokossovskiy’s unedited memoirs also demonstrate that Rokossovskiy’s disagreements 
with Zhukov were not confined to the famous incident at Istra 
in late November 1941.  The mercurial, bullying and 
authoritarian nature of Zhukov’s leadership is revealed by an 
incident that occurred at the height of the battle of Moscow.  
Zhukov personally berated Rokossovskiy in the presence of 5th 
Army’s commander, Lieutenant-General Leonid 
Aleksandrovich Govorov, (1897-1955).  Zhukov ridiculed 
Rokossovskiy’s abilities and performance, rhetorically inviting Govorov to teach 
Rokossovskiy the art of command.240  A few minutes later, in receipt of information that 
 
Figure 36: G.K. Zhukov 
(answers.com) 
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Govorov’s 5th Army was being driven back, Zhukov summoned Govorov for a foul-
mouthed humiliation in front of Rokossovskiy.241  Rokossovskiy concedes Zhukov was 
under immense pressure but, 
“I can’t remain silent about the fact that, at the start of the war, and in the 
battle of Moscow, in significant instances which were not infrequent, he took 
no account of the time, and the forces, which his instructions and orders were 
throwing away.”242  
 
An Alternative Strategy? 
Rokossovskiy’s censored memoirs were ‘allowed’ to reveal Rokossovskiy’s tactical and 
operational abilities.  However, they did little to bring out Rokossovskiy’s ability to link 
tactical, operational and strategic factors.  The real memoirs demonstrate that 
Rokossovskiy presented an extended operational and strategic critique of Stavka’s 
conduct of the war, especially its unrealistic attitude towards constant operations and the 
massive loss of life.  Rokossovskiy’s comments on the 1939 and 1941 borders indicate 
his strategic insight.  However, this was not an isolated incident.  The complete 
memoirs show that Rokossovskiy presented an alternative operational and strategic 
appreciation of the Soviet conduct of the war at Moscow, Stalingrad, Belorussia and 
East Prussia, key turning points of the war.   
 
Rokossovskiy’s real memoirs indicate his awareness of the parallels between the 
German invasion and Napoleon’s march in 1812.243  They also demonstrate 
Rokossovskiy’s profound strategic, operational and tactical appreciation of the battle of 
Moscow.  Rokossovskiy believed the German defeat at Moscow was a turning point, an 
event of strategic significance that revealed the limits of German military power.  As 
early as December 1941, Rokossovskiy foresaw a war that ended in Berlin.244  This 
might be dismissed as retrospective strategic insight or the infection of Rokossovskiy’s 
judgement by the general euphoria of victory at Moscow.  Yet, Rokossovskiy 
understanding of Moscow was extremely sophisticated.  He appreciated that just 
because the limits of German military power had been exposed, this did not mean the 
Germans were finished, or that an unthinking commitment to a series of relentless, 
unceasing blows could rapidly destroy the Wehrmacht.   
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In complete contrast, Rokossovskiy argued that patient, intelligent operational and 
strategic command, that husbanded resources and then committed them to selective, key 
operations, was required to defeat the Wehrmacht.  The Soviet success at Moscow 
created the possibility, perhaps the probability of Soviet victory, but it would not be 
achieved quickly or easily.  In summary, the last thing the Red Army required was a 
blind, emotionally driven commitment to all-out attack.  All out attack was what the 
Red Army got: between December 1941-March 1942, Zhukov, Stavka and Stalin 
demanded over-ambitious, unceasing offensives from shattered, exhausted troops.245 
The polite version of Rokossovskiy’s memoirs indicated his irritation at being ordered 
to carry out relentless, pointless attacks during January-February 1942, with exhausted, 
ill-equipped troops for trivial objectives against an enemy who had recovered his 
composure.   
 
The real memoirs demonstrate Rokossovskiy’s anger at the blind strategic poverty of 
the Soviet conduct of the war in January-February 1942.  Rokossovskiy argued that,  
“Too many losses had been sustained by the armed forces from the first day of 
the war.  In order to recoup these losses, time was necessary.  We understood, 
that the war, in essence, had only just begun, that our victory in the great battle 
before Moscow where forces of three fronts had participated, was a turning 
point in the whole war, that this victory had given us a breathing-space, which 
we needed as much as air itself.”246 
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Figure 37: Red Army operations in late 1941 and early 1942on the Eastern Front. 
(Bellamy, Absolute War2007, p.343.) 
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Rokossovskiy believed the Germans recognition of their defeat at Moscow had 
introduced fundamental strategic change across the entire Soviet-German front.  In 
January 1942, the Germans adopted a position of strategic, operational and tactical 
defence, a posture that forced Soviet troops into protracted, attritional assaults against 
strong enemy positions.  Rokossovskiy felt this raised many critical questions such as, 
 “why did our high command, the General Staff, and Front commanders keep 
on with these pointless offensive operations?  It was clear that the enemy, 
although thrown back from Moscow for a hundred kilometres, had not lost his 
combat worthiness, that he had sufficient fighting power to organise solid 
defences, and, in order to launch a decisive, ‘destructive’ assault, it was 
necessary to gather sufficient forces, equipped with enough armaments and 
equipment.  All told, in January 1942, we did not have that.  Why, in such 
circumstances did we not use the time we had won from the enemy to prepare 
our armed forces for the operations planned for the summer, but we continued 
to wear out, not the enemy, but ourselves, in offensives without  
perspective.”247 
Rokossovskiy is sharply critical of Zhukov and Konev, for not persuading Stavka 
that it was foolish to attack an enemy who had dug in to defend his ground.  In 
Rokossovskiy’s words “there was a kind of paradox.  The stronger side defended, 
and the weaker attacked.”248  In summary, Rokossovskiy memoirs argue that, at 
least in the Moscow region, not only Stalin, but senior military commanders such as 
Zhukov and Konev wilfully ignored reality and got Soviet troops slaughtered. 
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Figure 38: Red Army Counteroffensive in the Moscow region: December 1941-March 
1942. 
(Bellamy, Absolute War, 2007, p.325.) 
 
 
 
89 
 
Rokossovskiy’s censored memoirs persistently but mildly expressed the refrain that 
Stavka was unrealistic in its expectations and did not give field commanders sufficient 
time to prepare operations.  It is a good example of how Soviet Cold War 
historiography raised an issue in order to avoid it.  However, Rokossovskiy’s real 
memoirs are consistently critical of Stavka and the senior military command of the Red 
Army.  Rokossovskiy’s ire was directed at Stavka’s wider strategic direction of the war, 
its unrealistic expectations about the Wehrmacht, constant operations, inadequate 
preparations and the meaningless massive loss of life, not just in 1941-42 but 
throughout the war.   
 
Rokossovskiy’s censored memoirs did discuss the Central Front’s ambitious February 
1943 operation against Army Group Centre, an operation driven by Stavka’s strategic 
ambition after Stalingrad.  The operation was acknowledged, but elsewhere it was 
written out of official Soviet historiography with Rokossovskiy censored memoirs 
allowed to raise it in order to obscure the true scope of the operation, thereby concealing 
the extent of Stavka’s failure.  Rokossovskiy’s real memoirs are forthright about 
Stavka’s lack of realism concerning the relative strengths of the Soviet and German 
forces.  He argued that,  
“in undertaking such a grandiose operation as a deep encirclement of the 
enemy’s Orel grouping, Stavka committed a coarse misjudgement, having 
overestimated its own capabilities and underestimated those of the enemy.”249 
 
Rokossovskiy reveals more about his disagreement with Stavka over the planning of the 
Belorussian Operation.  A censored section on why he insisted on a two-pronged assault 
despite objections from Stalin, Stavka and the General Staff is restored.250 Equally, he is 
scathing about the General Staff’s planning of the East Prussian Operation.  In effect, he 
accuses it of utter ineptitude involving an ignorant failure to heed the lessons of history 
concerning the relative merits of invading East Prussia from the south or the east.251 
 
In summary, Rokossovskiy’s relationship with Stavka involved conflict and 
disagreement.  Stavka is condemned as unprepared in 1941, unrealistic in its 
expectations throughout the war, and lacking intellectual and strategic coherence in its 
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planning, preparation and delivery of operations.  Above all, according to 
Rokossovskiy, Stavka was consistently over-optimistic about the Red Army’s power 
and the Wehrmacht’s weakness.  Therefore, instead of well planned, clearly thought out 
and prepared operations that could have had a decisive impact upon the war, like 
Stalingrad, Rokossovskiy accused Stavka of repeatedly ordering a series of impetuous 
headlong charges, in pursuit of victories that ignored the Red Army’s real combat 
power and the Wehrmacht’s resilience.  In short, Stavka was unrealistic in its 
expectations of Soviet operational commanders.  Rokossovskiy felt Stavka’s strategic 
grasp was inept and that even when it got it right, the prospects of decisive success were 
undermined by its impatience and lack of realism.   
  
Antagonism in the High Command 
The personal rivalry within the Soviet high command during the Great Patriotic War is 
well known, partly because even the censored memoirs of the 
Soviet era were actually quite frank about the antagonism 
between certain Soviet commanders, especially in the context 
of victory.  The censored memoirs show that at various stages 
of the war Rokossovskiy was in conflict 
with Zhukov, Stavka and the General 
Staff.  There was rivalry between 
Rokossovskiy and Vatutin in the period 
July 1942-December 1943.  Equally, at Stalingrad, there was 
tension between Rokossovskiy and Malinovskiy.  Similarly, there 
was distinct antagonism between Rokossovskiy and Yeremenko 
during the Stalingrad Operation.  Finally, Rokossovskiy makes it 
clear that while he respected Antonov’s intellect, Antonov, in clear contrast to 
Rokossovskiy, did not hold his ground against senior people and that his planning of the 
East Prussian Operation was badly flawed.252  Furthermore, Rokossovskiy’s uncensored 
memoirs reveal the extent to which animosity between leading Soviet commanders 
affected Soviet strategy even in the most famous engagements of the Great Patriotic 
War.   
 
 
Figure 39: A. Yeremenko 
(http://en.wikipedia.org) 
 
Figure 40: A.I. Antonov 
(generals.dk) 
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Figure 41: The Red Army’s Cosmic Strategic Plan: November-December 1942. 
(Bellamy, Absolute War, 2007, p.530.) 
 
 
92 
 
The Soviet censors were less charitable to posterity if personal conflict involved defeats, 
undermined operations, threatened famous reputations or tarnished heroic moments in 
the collective memory of the Great Patriotic War.  Therefore, a significant passage of 
Rokossovskiy memoirs involving Vasilevskiy at Stalingrad was removed.  It reveals the 
personal needle between them and Rokossovskiy’s belief 
that Stavka representatives interfered with the effective 
conduct of operations.  On 12th December 1942, in 
response to Operation Winterstorm, Vasilevskiy truncated 
Operation Saturn, the deep operation on Rostov, and by 
diverting 2nd Guards Army from the destruction of the 
German pocket at Stalingrad, effectively delayed its annihilation for a month, until 
January 1943.  Furthermore, by not returning 2nd Guards Army, the Don Front was 
robbed of the ability to destroy the pocket rapidly.  Rokossovskiy argued that “a brave 
variant would have opened up the prospect of significant future actions on the southern 
wing of the Soviet-German front.”253  This criticism was not entirely new for 
Rokossovskiy had indicated his dissent from Vasilevskiy’s approach in Stalingradskaya 
Epopeya.254 It was perhaps, no accident that just months later Vasilevskiy explained his 
decision to divert 2nd Guards and truncate Operation Saturn, in an article that contained 
a detailed account of 2nd Guards Army’s interception of Operation Winterstorm, south-
west of Stalingrad.255   
 
However, the scope of the criticism that Rokossovskiy unveiled in his memoirs and the 
implications of the argument he made, had significant implications for the 
historiography of Soviet strategy at Stalingrad.  Rokossovskiy argued 2nd Guards Army 
should be used with 21st Army to destroy the encircled German troops.  It should then 
be utilised for a deep operation on Rostov, designed to trap German forces belonging to 
Army Group A, south of the River Don.  In Rokossovskiy’s words,  
“Stavka preferred the variant suggested by Vasilevksiy.  They considered that 
he was more reliable…the operation was narrowed down because all attention 
and significant forces were diverted to the so-called Manstein group.  That 
helped the Germans escape an even worse fate.”256 
 
Figure 42: A.M. Vasilevskiy 
(cache.gettyimages.com) 
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Therefore, Rokossovskiy argues that by diverting 2nd Guards Army from Operation 
Ring and curtailing the depth of Operation Saturn, Vasilevskiy missed the opportunity 
to annihilate the Stalingrad pocket and trap German Army Group A in the Caucasus.  257 
 
Rokossovskiy’s Don Front was subsequently criticised by the General Staff for its 
failure, in January 1943, to rapidly annihilate the German Stalingrad pocket.  The clear 
implication was that the delay at Stalingrad undermined other Soviet operations in the 
winter of 1943, one of which was Rokossovskiy’s failed February 1943 operation, a 
failure he blamed on Stavka’s unrealistic timetable.  Furthermore, in February-March 
1943, the Soviet forces hammered in Manstein’s counter-offensive were mauled partly 
by the forces of German Army Group A, 1st Panzer Army, a force that escaped from the 
Caucasus, as well as by German troops transferred across from western Europe.   
 
 
Figure 43: German Operation Winterstorm and 2nd Guards Army. 
(Times Atlas of the Second World War, P.  Young (ed.), 1973, p.199.) 
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Rokossovskiy openly states that if Vasilevskiy had not been at Don Front headquarters, 
2nd Guards Army would not have been diverted.  Furthermore, that Operation Saturn, 
the deep operation designed to cut off German forces in the Don bend and the North 
Caucasus, would have gone ahead as planned.  The implications of this argument about 
Soviet strategy at Stalingrad are profound.  Rokossovskiy clearly implies that the blame 
for creating the strategic time and space that led to the events of February-March 1943 
lies with Vasilevskiy and the General Staff.  He is certainly suggesting that without the 
permanent diversion of 2nd Guards Army, time could have been saved and created at 
Stalingrad.  Equally, a bold execution of Operation Saturn would have denied German 
Army Group A time to escape.  This, in turn, would have denied 1st Panzer Army to 
Manstein, thereby undermining the German counter-offensive of February-March 1943.  
Time would also have been created for the proper preparation and execution of 
Rokossovskiy’s February 1943 offensive, an operation launched in an improvised and 
ad hoc manner that was largely curtailed in response to Manstein counter-offensive.  
Furthermore, time and space would have been created for the sustainable conduct of 
Operation Star and Operation Gallop,258 the very Soviet offensives that were heavily 
attacked in February 1943, by the same German troops that had escaped from the 
Caucasus region and been transferred from western Europe.   
 
The Manstein counter-offensive of February-March 1943 played havoc with Soviet 
operational and strategic calculations in spring 1943.  Rokossovskiy is arguing that 
Vasilevskiy’s decisions in December 1942 were not a piece of inspired operational art 
that secured the fate of Sixth German Army, but a major strategic blunder that rescued 
the Germans from an even bigger strategic catastrophe on the Eastern Front, the 
ramifications of which ran through March 1943, the Kursk Operation of July 1943 and 
beyond.  In summary, Rokossovskiy’s real memoirs contain a devastating critique of 
Soviet strategy, the Chief of the General Staff, Stavka and the influence of Stavka 
representatives during the winter of 1942-43.  It is hardly surprising that an analysis 
which suggested that as well as a great victory, Stalingrad was a missed opportunity was 
not allowed to sully the collective national memory.   
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Figure 44: Soviet offensives in January-February 1943 and German counter-offensive in 
February-March 1943 
(Times Atlas of the Second World War, P.  Young (ed.), 1973, p.203) 
 
Stavka Representatives 
The system of Stavka representatives by which Stavka259 imposed strategic direction on 
the war infuriated Rokossovskiy.  Rokossovskiy felt Stavka denied sufficient autonomy 
to field commanders and did not place enough trust in their ability to achieve 
operational objectives as part of the overall military strategy.  In both memoirs, 
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censored and real, Rokossovskiy repeatedly states that trust and confidence in the ability 
of commanders, at all levels, was central to effective command.  In other areas of the 
censored memoirs, Rokossovskiy often hints that for him the question of trust was 
fundamentally linked to autonomy, but it is only in the uncensored memoirs that the full 
implications of this emerge.   
 
During major operations Zhukov and Vasilevskiy were the main Stavka representatives 
although it was done by Voronov, Timoshenko and briefly, 
ironically, by Rokossovskiy, in December 1943.  In both emotional 
and intellectual terms Rokossovskiy deeply resented Stavka’s 
intrusion on the field commander’s autonomy.  He bristled under 
Stavka’s shackles and seized every opportunity to assert his 
independence in the planning and conduct of operations.  To 
Rokossovskiy, Stavka should plan, but field commanders should 
have autonomy in the creation and execution of operations designed to achieve Stavka’s 
objectives.   
“Such a representative, arriving at the headquarters of one of the fronts, more 
often than not, interfered in the front commander’s business, and undermined 
him.  In addition, he had no actual responsibility for the way things were done 
on the ground.  That was entirely the front commander’s responsibility, and 
often you got contradictory instructions on this or that question.  From Stavka, 
you would get one.  From its representative-another…….apart from that, the 
presence of a Stavka representative who was no less than the Deputy of the 
Supreme High Commander at the front commander’s headquarters cramped 
initiative, tied the front commander’s hands and feet, as it were.  It also raised 
questions about how much faith Stavka had in the front commander.”260 
Rokossovskiy practised what he preached: delegation was central to his style of 
leadership in a way that was entirely unnatural to most senior Soviet commanders. 
 
It is not difficult to see why Rokossovskiy’s true memoirs were suppressed during the 
Cold War.  The post-Stalin consensus between the senior political and military figures 
of the Soviet Union, concerning the Great Patriotic War would have been shattered.  In 
 
Figure 45: G.K. Zhukov 
(univer.omsk.su) 
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the early 1990’s short-lived archival access enabled scholars to present a more objective 
analysis of the Great Patriotic War.  This historical revision revealed the Red Army’s 
shocking incompetence, brutality and disregard for casualties, not just in the fight for 
survival in 1941-42, but in pursuit of victory between 1943-45.  These historical 
revelations exploded the convenient myth that only Stalinist excess, not Party 
complicity and military incompetence lay behind the appalling defeats and sickening 
casualties.   
 
Rokossovskiy’s uncensored memoirs would have seriously de-stabilised the post-war 
Soviet political and military edifice and the official version of the war.  In recent years 
access to Russian archives has been curtailed because unfettered access threatened to 
poison the collective memory of the Great Patriotic War, for many the one genuinely 
historic achievement of the Soviet Union.  In an era of alarming, deeply unsettling 
change, perceived by many as national humiliation, the undermining of the national 
memory of harmonious political, military and social cohesion and heroic reputations of 
men like Zhukov,261 perceived to be the saviours of their nation, has been a painful one.  
If it has been painful in the post Soviet era, one can imagine what the publication of 
Rokossovskiy’s unexpurgated memoirs would have done to the Soviet political system, 
the Red Army and the national memory of the Great Patriotic War.  Zhukov was a man 
of his times, Stalin’s times, Hitler’s times.  The objective of national survival appeared 
to override any reservations about his use of the means, namely the Red Army.  It was 
necessary and unavoidable.   
 
The true historical significance of Rokossovskiy’s memoirs, his style of leadership and 
operational command is that while a war of national survival was unavoidable, the 
manner in which it was fought was not inevitable.  Therefore, an uncensored version of 
Rokossovskiy’s memoirs raised very awkward questions about the Soviet military 
elite’s conduct of the war.  A censored version, amended to support, not challenge, the 
post-war orthodoxy offered the opportunity to validate the Red Army’s achievement by 
securing the endorsement of the ‘people’s marshal’, a man renowned for his traditional 
martial virtues.  It is worth remembering that Rokossovskiy was the victor of Moscow, 
Stalingrad, Kursk, Belorussia and East Prussia, the man who had commanded the Red 
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Army’s victory parade.  This was no ordinary Red Army officer and these were no 
ordinary memoirs.  It is hardly surprising the Soviet authorities suppressed 
Rokossovskiy’s uncensored memoirs: this was the public custodian of the Red Army’s 
ethos; its untarnished marshal challenging the received version of the Great Patriotic 
War.   
 
Rokossovskiy’s real memoirs portray a Soviet commander with the self-confidence and 
independent judgement to repeatedly challenge the basic strategic, operational and 
tactical direction of the war.  Rokossovskiy criticisms are incisive and thoughtful, 
challenging and occasionally revising the received version of grand Soviet historical 
events in a new light.  In the fullness of time history has invariably, if not entirely, 
endorsed Rokossovskiy’s criticisms of Stavka and the Soviet high command.  In 
summary, Rokossovskiy’s memoirs are an important historical document.  It is quite 
clear that in terms of his memoirs, style of leadership and operational command 
Rokossovskiy is no minor footnote in history. 
 
The Lost Rokossovskiy 
Nevertheless, Rokossovskiy’s real memoirs do not tell the whole story of 
Rokossovskiy’s war.  In a series of self-published volumes, analysed and studied by the 
present author, Glantz has demonstrated that several operations conducted by 
Rokossovskiy were removed from the public record of the Great Patriotic War.  Indeed, 
many of these operations are not discussed or even mentioned in the real version of 
Rokossovskiy’s memoirs.   
 
The Zhizdra-Bolkhov Operation (5th-14th July 1942) was conducted by Rokossovskiy’s 
16th Army and Lieutenant-General Pavel Alekseyevich Belov’s (1897-1962) 61st Army.  
Zhukov, as the Western Front’s commander personally supervised the operation that 
also involved the new, full strength, 10th Armoured Corps, a relatively rare asset in June 
1942.  This indicates a significant operation.  Yet, Rokossovskiy’s old memoirs do not 
openly discuss this operation.  In fact they ‘misplace’ the Zhizdra-Bolkov Operation and 
deliberately or otherwise, do not really analyse the two distinct operations conducted by 
16th Army in this area, in early summer 1942.  The first operation around the Zhizdra is 
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presented by Rokossovskiy as being in late May 1942262, although his biographer, 
Kardashov, suggests late May, into June 1942.  Rokossovskiy’s memoirs, old and new, 
discuss an operation that came close to success but eventually failed, incurring heavy 
losses amongst an armoured corps in its debut battle.  Rokossovskiy suggests that 
mistakes by his staff, given too much leeway by him, led to opportunities being missed 
and serious losses.263    
 
 
Figure 46: The 16th and 61st Army: Zhizdra-Bolkhov Operation (6th -15th July 1942) 
(Orenstein, Soviet War Experience, 1993, p.92.) 
 
Rokossovskiy does not name the operation or the armoured corps.  It is discussed in a 
cryptic manner, with much left unspoken, but a great deal implied.264  However, 
Rokossovskiy points out that,  
“in June the 16th Army attempted another offensive, again in the direction of 
Bryansk.  On orders from the Front Command, stronger forces were used, but 
the fighting nevertheless remained of a local nature.”265  
Rokossovskiy strongly implies, despite the misleading date, that this was actually a 
major operation.  He also implies that 16th Army was being asked to do too much and 
that he was not happy with the plan.  Therefore,  
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“the Front Commander arrived in person to observe the fighting, accompanied 
by the Air Force Commander.  Our neighbours, the 10th and 61st Armies, had 
been assigned only to pin down the enemy by stepping up activity.  The 
artillery support was somewhat less than in May as the assault frontage was 
wider.  There were fewer tanks, but this in Zhukov’s view was compensated 
by aircraft, which would be participating in considerable force.” 266   
 
The presence of airpower, armour, Zhukov and the commander of the air force is 
indicative of a highly significant operation, particularly as the true date of this operation 
was 5th -16th July 1942.  This was the same time as major Soviet counter-offensives co-
ordinated by Vasilevskiy, involving several tank corps and 5th Tank Army, were trying 
to attack the northern wing of the German forces that had recently launched Operation 
Blau on 28th June 1942.  Therefore, the Zhizdra-Bolhkov Operation of July 1942 was 
significant enough to involve Zhukov at a time of great crisis further south, on the 
Voronezh Axis.  It also explains why Rokossovskiy did not actually take up command 
of the Bryansk Front until 17th July 1942, even though he was officially appointed on 7th 
July 1942.  This would not have happened if the Zhizdra-Bolkhov Operation was an 
insignificant skirmish in June 1942, not as we now know, a highly significant Soviet 
operation of early July.1942.   
 
According to Glantz, the Zhizdra-Bolkhov Operation of June 1942 was never 
adequately discussed in any official Soviet publication.  However, it was examined in 
secret Soviet sources.267  These sources have recently been published in two forms, a 
CD Rom and in Soviet Documents on the Use of War Experience.  268A comparative 
reading of Rokossovskiy’s memoirs and the newly available secret accounts indicate 
they are both discussing the Zhizdra-Bolkhov Operation of July 1942.  These indicate 
that on 6th July July 1942, the first day of the offensive, 16th Army achieved surprise.269  
In Rokossovskiy’s censored memoirs, surprise was achieved on the first day of the May 
1942 attack.  In July 1942,  
“the situation urgently dictated taking advantage of the enemy’s confusion and 
quickly engaging the tank corps in battle.........the tank corps was engaged 
only by the evening of 7 July.  As a result of poor reconnaissance of the 
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terrain and direction of movement, the corps’ first echelons were tied up in a 
swamp.  The entire night of 7-8 July was spent dragging out the 
vehicles......thus as a result of great shortcomings in use and leadership of the 
tank corps, its commitment to battle on 8 July had no effect on the changing 
situation.”270   
 
In Rokossovskiy’s censored memoirs the late May 1942 attack in the Zhizdra area 
creates the opportunity for success and,  
“now was the time to bring in the armoured corps.  However, it failed to show 
up.  It had been ‘smooth on paper, but they forgot about the gullies’, as a 
Russian saying has it.  The corps approach routes crossed a paltry brook with 
marshy banks, and the tanks had got bogged down there.  The commanders 
had not reconnoitred the terrain before drawing up the plan, the result being a 
delay that tipped the scales against a successfully launched operation.  This 
unfortunate event taught us all a good lesson for the future.  It took two hours 
for the corps to extricate itself from the bog and reach the battlefield; two 
hours which the Germans did not waste.”271   
Therefore, what is presented in Rokossovskiy’s old memoirs as the May 1942 attack 
was really the major Zhizdra-Bolkhov Operation of 5th -16th July 1942. 
 
It is possible Rokossovskiy was concealing his own failings but he openly admits he 
gave his subordinates too much freedom and did not scrutinise their plan.  However, 
Rokossovskiy’s new memoirs discuss the Zhizdra-Bolkhov Operation in considerable 
detail as well as Zhukov’s presence and his alleged failure to properly communicate his 
plan to army commanders such as Rokossovskiy.272  Glantz suggests Zhizdra-Bolkhov 
was deleted from public Russian sources to hide the shortcomings of the Red Army.273 
In May-July 1942, the Red Army suffered a series of massive reverses.  In the Cold War 
it was easy to blame Stalin and the malign influence of political commissars.  However, 
the Red Army’s defeats in May 1942 at Kharkhov, eastern and western Crimea274 as 
well as the disastrous armoured counter-offensive, north of Voronezh, in early July 
1942, owed as much, if not more, to military incompetence, as they did to Stalin.   
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In early July 1942, the Red Army finally began to trade space for time against the 
Germans, in contrast to Stalin’s 1941 policy of stand, fight and be slaughtered.  The Red 
Army’s strategic retreat in the face of Operation Blau has been presented as the rational 
product of sane military strategy, formulated by senior military commanders and 
endorsed by a chastened Stalin.275  Yet, in July 1942, the Red Army actually had no 
choice but to retreat.  In May-June 1942, the Wehrmacht had repeatedly demonstrated 
its superiority.  The Red Army had either not learned the lessons of 1941 or had not 
applied them.  In spring 1942, the Red Army, driven by senior military commanders 
such as Timoshenko and Zhukov, encouraged by Stalin, charged at the Wehrmacht and 
was repeatedly thrashed, suffering immense losses.  Therefore, even if it had been 
competent enough, in the early stages of Operation Blau Timoshenko’s South-Western 
Front had insufficient troops to confront the Wehrmacht.276  The South-Western Front 
had been smashed at Kharkhov in May 1942, an operation enthusiastically endorsed by 
Timoshenko, not imposed on a reluctant Red Army by Stalin.   
 
As Rokossovskiy’s real memoirs show, senior Red Army commanders repeatedly 
overestimated the Red Army’s power vis-à-vis the Wehrmacht.  This suggests the 
Zhizdra-Bolkhov Operation was an incompetent operation launched by an 
inexperienced army learning to fight against a formidable enemy.  In all probability the 
Zhizdra-Bolkhov Operation was suppressed to protect Zhukov’s reputation and the 
post-war image of the Red Army.  The historical record of Operation Mars,277 in 
November 1942, was also suppressed to preserve Zhukov’s reputation.278  Similarly, 
Rokossovskiy’s comments on the Moscow counter-offensive and the Red Army’s 
response to Operation Blau, north-west of Voronezh, in July 1942 were removed.  This 
suggests the censors were acutely aware of the need to protect the personal and 
professional reputation of senior commanders and the Red Army.  In summary, this 
strongly suggests that the primary catalyst of Zhizdra-Bolkhov’s misrepresentation in 
Rokossovskiy’s memoirs was the censor, not the author.   
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Figure 47: German drive on Stalingrad in July 1942. 
(Bellamy, Absolute War, 2007, p.508.) 
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In addition, Glantz has demonstrated that in July-August 1942, Rokossovskiy’s Bryansk 
Front 279and Vatutin’s Voronezh Front undertook expensive, ineffectual military 
operations against German forces.  These operations are not mentioned in 
Rokossovskiy’s memoirs.280  Rokossovskiy’s Bryansk Front was the minor player but it 
was ineffective.  It is possible these operations were forgotten in order to protect 
Rokossovskiy’s reputation.  However, Rokossovskiy was prepared to curtail operations 
that endured heavy casualties for little gain.  In contrast, Vatutin was reprimanded by 
Stavka for continuing offensives beyond the point they had ceased to be effective.  It is 
more likely these operations were ‘ignored’ because they reveal the Red Army’s 
ongoing military incompetence in the summer of 1942. 
 
Belorussia: Autumn 1943 
On 1st October 1943, Stavka issued directives that determined the future operational and 
strategic direction of the Red Army’s strategy until spring and summer of 1944.  These 
strategic decisions had profound implications for Rokossovskiy and the subsequent 
post-war literature of the Great Patriotic War.  The Stavka, much to Rokossovskiy’s 
chagrin, ordered him to transfer 13th and 60th Armies, to the Voronezh Front and altered 
Rokossovskiy’s axis of advance, moving it north-east into Belorussia, away from the 
Ukraine.  The Bryansk Front was disbanded and its three armies, 3rd,48th and 50th, 
incorporated into Rokossovskiy’s Central Front.281  The directive also assigned 
Rokossovskiy strategic objectives that dominated his conduct of operations until July 
1944.  In essence, 
“The Central Front’s mission is to defeat the enemy Zhlobin-Bobruisk 
grouping and capture Minsk, the capital of Belorussia, by delivering its main 
attack in the general direction of Zhlobin, Bobruisk, and Minsk.  Allocate a 
separate group of forces for an offensive along the northern bank of the 
Pripiat’ River toward Kalinkovichi and Zhitkovichi.  The immediate mission 
is to capture the Bykhov, Zhlobin, and Kalinkovichi line and subsequently 
reach the Minsk, Slutsk and Sluch’ River line.”282  
 
These were significant operational and strategic objectives.  The strategic objectives 
were not actually achieved until July 1944.  Yet, in Soviet histories, journals and 
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memoir literature the Belorussian campaign is significantly under-reported.  In 
Rokossovskiy’s memoirs, censored and uncensored, late November 1943-April 1944 is 
dealt with in a few lines.  In the post-war era there was a concerted attempt to downplay 
the significance of Soviet operations in Belorussia from October 1943-April 1944.  
Indeed, a whole series of operations that Rokossovskiy undertook in Belorussia, during 
spring 1944, have been overlooked.  In summary, official Soviet historiography is less 
than candid about Rokossovskiy’s operations in Belorussia.    
 
As Glantz reveals the Central Front’s Chernobyl-Radomsyl Operation (1st-4th October 
1943) and the substantial German counter-attack (4th-8th October 1943) have been 
written out of Soviet history.283  These events are not discussed in either version of 
Rokossovskiy’s memoirs, nor are they covered in official Soviet publications.284  Yet, 
they were of considerable significance.  In strategic terms the Central Front’s crossing 
of the Dnepr285 threatened to split Army Group Centre and Army Group South.  In 
operational terms it threatened German forces in Kiev.  However, in tactical terms 13th 
Army was struggling hold the bridgehead.  Nevertheless, Stavka ordered the Central 
Front to expand its bridgehead and drive west, to the north of Kiev.  Simultaneously, 
further south, closer to Kiev, the Central Front’s 60th Army was also to move out of its 
bridgehead on the Dnepr.   
 
On 1st October 1943, 13th Army and 60th Army undertook the Chernobyl-Radomsyl 
Operation designed to expand the bridgehead, split German forces and outflank German 
troops in Kiev.  It was a massive gamble, and despite initial progress, after 72 hours, the 
Germans reacted ferociously.  In the north, 2nd ,4th, 5th and 12th Panzer Divisions, part of 
Army Group Centre, struck south against 13th Army’s northern shoulder, while further 
south, three German divisions crashed into 60th Army’s northern flank.  This German 
counter-stroke of 4th-8th October 1943, cut off Soviet forces moving west, split the 
Central Front’s bridgehead and forced 13th Army in a bitter fight to preserve the Dnepr 
bridgehead.  It was saved by Rokossovskiy’s foresight in giving 13th Army an entire 
anti-tank artillery brigade and the urgent committal of 7th Guards Cavalry Corps.286 
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Figure 48: Forcing of the Dnepr and the struggle for the Chernobyl Bridgehead, 20 Sep - 8 Oct 
1943 
(Stephen Walsh: adapted from David M. Glantz, Forgotten Battles, Vol. V, Part Two, p.567.) 
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In Belorussia, Soviet historiography has lauded Rokossovskiy’s Loyev Operation on the 
Dnepr 15th-20th October 1943.  It is reported, accurately enough, as a burst of 
operational brilliance deliberately curtailed by Rokossovskiy.  Soviet historiography has 
also presented Rokossovskiy’s Gomel-Rechitsa Operation (10th-30th November 1943) as 
another burst of creative, imaginative operational art.  In fact, as Glantz shows, far from 
being brief, isolated spurts of activity, these operations were part of a wider Gomel-
Rechitsa Offensive that began on 30th September 1943,287 two weeks earlier than 
generally acknowledged, in pursuit of the operational objectives laid down by Stavka on 
1st October 1943.  Furthermore, the Belorussian Front’s active operations continued 
well into December 1943, they did not cease on 30th November 1943. 
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Figure 49: The Loyev Operation: 15th-20th October 1943 
(Stephen Walsh: adapted from Glantz, Soviet Military Deception, p.255. 
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This, the extended Gomel-Rechitsa Offensive began in early October 1943, not on 15th 
October 1943.  It did not get off to an auspicious start as Belov’s 61st Army failed to 
expand its Dnepr bridgehead it had first won in the last days of September 1943.  In 
response, Rokossovskiy terminated the operation on 10th October 1943.  This was the 
background to 65th Army’s brilliant operation at Loyev from 15th-20th October 1943.  
Soviet official histories, journals288 and memoirs including Rokossovskiy’s memoirs, 
wax lyrical about the Loyev Operation, a genuinely brilliant creative response to the 
difficult terrain and the close proximity of rivers such as the Pronia, Sozh and Dnepr.  
However, Soviet literature also indicates that Rokossovskiy curtailed the Loyev 
Operation on 20th October 1943.  In fact, active operations continued until the end of 
October 1943.289  These operations caused consternation within the German high 
command and came very close to major operational success.  However, there is no 
sustained record of these operations in Soviet official histories, journal literature or 
memoirs.290  The only source is an obscure unit history.291 
 
Indeed, Rokossovskiy’s real, uncensored memoirs do not discuss the extended fighting 
of late October 1943.  Rokossovskiy suggests that on 20th October 1943 “I decided to 
halt the offensive temporarily.”292  As Glantz demonstrates, 61st Army had an important 
role in the Loyev Operation,293 but Rokossovskiy reduces it to “units of the 61st Army, 
operating to the south, on the western bank of the Dnieper, also went into action.”294  
Similarly, although 65th Army’s progress is recorded in detail, Rokossovskiy delivers a 
cryptic report on 61st Army “which also improved its positions on the western bank of 
the Dnieper by sending its main forces from the eastern bank.”295 
 
The First Kalinokovichi Operation: 8th-12th December 1943 
Soviet histories, journals and Rokossovskiy’s memoirs also fail to reflect the scale and 
significance of the Belorussian Front’s assault on Kalinokovichi in December 1943.  
These operations of early December 1943 are not discussed by Batov296 even though his 
65th Army was heavily involved and Kalinokovichi was a key German communications 
and supply point.  In late October and early November 1943, Rokossovskiy had briefly 
threatened it and provoked an immediate German reaction.297 In early December 1943, 
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once again Rokossovskiy created the opportunity to take Kalinokovivchi, but his mobile 
forces, two cavalry corps’, 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps and 7th Guards Cavalry Corps did 
not have the fighting power to take an objective the Germans regarded as pivotal to their 
position in south-eastern Belorussia, a vital link between Army Group Centre and Army 
Group South.  In short, Rokossovskiy had no forces capable of conducting sustained 
deep operations in Belorussia, because in line with Stavka’s strategic priorities, all five 
Soviet tank armies were in the Ukraine.  It is worth recalling that according to Stavka’s 
directive of 1st October 1943, Kalinkovichi was a key operational objective for 
Rokossovskiy. 
 
 
Figure 50: The Gomel-Rechistsa Operation 10th -30th November 1943. 
(Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 1987, p.190.) 
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Winter 1944: Rokossovskiy’s Belorussian Vanishing Act 
However, the patchy coverage of Rokossovskiy’s operations in autumn 1943 is 
positively loquacious in comparison with the disappearance of an entire series of 
operations conducted by Rokossovskiy in spring 1944.  There is no official 
recognition298 of these operations and no record of them in Rokossovskiy’s memoirs, 
censored or uncensored.  However, Glantz has established that Rokossovskiy conducted 
several operations in Belorussia during spring 1944.299 These operations were designed 
to harass the Germans, improve the Belorussian Front’s position and divert German 
resources.  They involved one or at most two armies, and were not designed to achieve 
decisive operational success.  Rokossovskiy’s aim was to keep the Germans off balance 
through a series of probes designed to make German tactical positions untenable, 
thereby undermining the operational coherence of their defences.  Rokossovskiy 
handled them with the balance of creativity, harmonisation of attrition and manoeuvre 
and operational synchronisation that were the hallmarks of his operational command on 
the Eastern Front.  In summary, these unknown operations do not contradict the main 
argument of this thesis rather they endorse and sustain its claim that Rokossovskiy was 
a highly creative and imaginative commander.   
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Figure 51: Rokossovskiy’s Lost Belorussian Operations: Winter 1944. 
(Stephen Walsh) 
111 
 
 
27RC
65A 18RC
1GTC
65A
105RC
61A
19RC
65A
1GTC
1GTC
61A
9GRC
1GTC
(4.1.44)
06.00 (12.1.44)
06.00 (14.1.44)
Ozarichi
56PzCorps
5PzD
20AC
292ID
102IDMozyr
Kalinkovichi
0                       10km
N
 
Figure 52: The Mozyr-Kalinkovichi Operation (8th-14th January 1944). 
(Stephen Walsh: adapted from Glantz, Forgotten Battles, Vol VI, Part Two, 2004, p.554.) 
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These operations began with the Byhkov Operation (3rd-8th January 1944) conducted by 
the Belorussian Front’s 3rd and 50th Armies.  The aim was to eliminate a German 
bridgehead on the Dnepr.  It was also designed to distract German attention from the 
more substantial Mozyr-Kalinkovichi Operation,300  The Mozyr-Kalinkovichi Operation 
(8th-14th January 1944) 301conducted by 61st and 65th Armies, featuring a deep operation 
by 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps and 7th Guards Cavalry Corps, supported by 1st Guards 
Tank Corps finally drove the Germans from Kalinkovichi.  This was a major, not a 
minor operation, involving over 200,000 troops,302 but there is hardly any trace of it in 
Soviet303 or western literature.  Rokossovskiy’s imaginative use of his mobile groups 
and the prolonged German resistance at Kalinkovichi indicate this was a key operational 
position and a significant Soviet success.   
 
Yet, the Mozyr-Kalinkovichi Operation is not discussed in detail in Rokossovskiy’s 
memoirs or any other Soviet publications.  A brief account of what is termed the 
Kalinkovichi-Mozyr Offensive Operation (8th-30th January 1944) is given in the 1997 
version of Rokossovskiy’s memoirs.  The dates of the offensive are different to those 
presented by Glantz, but no details of the location and duration of the fighting are 
presented.304  Therefore, despite its success, the Mozyr-Kalinkovichi Operation was not 
recorded, in detail, in any public sources with the exception of one obscure unit 
history.305  It was discussed by Panov in 1978306 but its absence from mainstream Soviet 
literature is bizarre given that it was a substantial Soviet operational victory.   
 
The Ozarichi-Ptich Operation (16th-30th January 1944) is not discussed by Rokossovskiy 
307
 but was mentioned briefly by Batov.308  The Belorussian Front’s forces advanced 15-
30 kilometres and took Ozarichi.  The operation was “successful but nonetheless 
overlooked by Russian history.”309  It was conducted simultaneously with the Parichi-
Bobruisk Operation (16th January-23rd February 1944) carried out by 48th Army and 65th 
Army.310  According to Glantz, “few records document the course of operations during 
this offensive.”311  The Parichi area had witnessed a major German counter-attack in 
December 1943.  It had left a salient protruding into the Belorussian Front’s lines.  It 
also meant German forces sat astride the route to Bobruisk, a major operational 
objective for Rokossovskiy.  Indeed,  
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“the fact was that this axis lay at the intersection of two important main 
railroad lines: Zhlobin-Bobruisk and Bobruisk-Parichi.  The enemy 
understood that if the Soviet force reached these railroad lines, further 
resistance in this region would be almost impossible and useless.”312   
 
In the first phase, 16th-27th January 1944, Romanenko’s 48th 
Army made little headway against fierce German 
opposition.313  After a short pause, Rokossovskiy renewed 
the attack on 2nd February 1944 but against strong German 
opposition, Rokossovskiy halted the assault on 6th February 
1944.  In the third phase of fighting (14th-23rd February 
1944) “as a result of combat in the difficult conditions of the 
forested and swampy terrain, the army (48th Army) did not 
fulfil its overall combat mission but achieved some tactical successes by the end of 
February.”314 
 
However, Rokossovskiy had attracted German reserves into the area.  This meant 
when he launched the Zhlobin-Rogachev Operation (21-26th February 1944), 
conducted by 3rd and 50th Armies, it was an outstanding success.  This is not a lost 
operation.315  There is a concise account of the operation in the chronology that 
accompanies the 1997 edition of Rokossovskiy’s memoirs.316  Equally, 3rd Army’s 
commander, Gorbatov left an extensive account of the operation.317  Nevertheless, 
the fact that the secret of its success lay partly in the obscure Parichi-Bobruisk 
Operation is not well known.  The Parichi-Bobruisk Operation is not mentioned in 
the 1997 memoirs but the relative timing of these operations was designed to link 
them and maximise the chances of success in the Rogachev-Zhlobin Operation.   
 
On 24th February 1944, Rokossovskiy’s 48th Army’s began the Mormal-Parichi 
Operation (24th-29th February 1944).318  It overlapped with the Zhlobin-Rogachev 
Operation and was designed to support as well as capitalise on it.  It was relatively 
successful, certainly in comparison with the Parichi-Bobruisk Operation, with 48th 
Army advancing from “2-18 kilometers along a 20-kilometer front, carving another 
 
Figure 53: P.L. Romanenko 
(Rokossovskiy, 1985) 
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sizeable chunk of territory from German defences west of the Dnepr river.”319  The 
final assault carried out by Rokossovskiy’s troops in the lost spring of Belorussia 
was conducted by 10th and 50th Armies to expand the Dnepr bridgeheads in the 
Bykhov region.320 These battles were not successful: in five days of fierce fighting 
50th Army made little progress.   
 
These operations stretched German resources in south-eastern Belorussia to the limit.  
The Germans had excellent defences and helpful terrain that together with their tactical 
prowess and Rokossovskiy’s lack of deep operational manoeuvre groups, prevented 
major Soviet victories.  Nevertheless, Rokossovskiy adapted his ends to his means and 
did not pursue operational victories beyond the capabilities of the Belorussian Front.  
The deliberately linked, successive and simultaneous nature of his attacks enabled 
Rokossovskiy to make use of his superior overall numbers and wear down the Germans 
in south-eastern Belorussia.  In this respect Rokossovskiy might be said to have 
conducted a campaign of attrition but the operational and 
tactical elements in winter 1944, as in autumn 1943, were 
notable for their creativity and imagination, certainly in 
comparison with the performance of other Soviet 
commanders in Belorussia.  In common with other Soviet 
forces in Belorussia, Rokossovskiy’s front failed to secure its 
strategic objectives, but despite setbacks and tactical defeats, 
Rokossovskiy did achieve several operational objectives assigned to him on 1st October 
1943.   
 
Rokossovskiy’s success in Belorussia raised several awkward questions for the post-war 
literature of the Soviet Union.  First, why did other Soviet commanders in Belorussia, 
achieve far less at much greater cost?  Second, what could Rokossovskiy have achieved 
if Stavka had provided him with more resources?  Third, was Stavka actually correct in 
its strategic prioritisation of the Ukraine?  Four, why did Stavka set Rokossovskiy such 
unrealistic objectives in October 1943?  Five, why did Rokossovskiy hardly mention 
these operations in either version of his memoirs?  Six, what induced official Soviet 
historiography to delete successful, never mind failed operations, from the historical 
 
Figure 54: Rokossovskiy 
(Shukman, 1993) 
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record, including Rokossovskiy’s uncensored memoirs?  During winter 1944, Soviet 
historiography records just one operation by Rokossovskiy’s Belorussian Front: the 
Zhlobin-Rogachev Operation.  Rokossovskiy’s memoirs, perhaps in a pointed, cryptic 
fit of pique, make no mention at all, of the Zhlobin-Rogachev Operation.  Did 
Rokossovskiy deliberately leave these operations out or was he forced to?  Were 
Rokossovskiy’s resources greater than he conceded and the operations left out to protect 
his reputation?  This seems unlikely.  Rokossovskiy did not achieve his strategic 
objectives in Belorussia but at the operational level, as several German sources suggest, 
Rokossovskiy had regularly outwitted and out-fought the Germans in south-eastern 
Belorussia.321  Rokossovskiy had nothing to hide, indeed quite the opposite.   
 
In the period October 1943-April 1944, Soviet military strategy chose the Ukraine over 
Belorussia, but this did not diminish Stavka’s expectations of Rokossovskiy’s 
Belorussian Front.  During the Cold War, by engaging in sparse, occasionally downright 
misleading coverage of the Belorussian campaign, Soviet historiography sought to 
create the impression that Belorussia was a relatively minor theatre of operations.  In 
fact, as the Stavka documents show and the official histories quietly concede, almost in 
passing, the Belorussian campaign was not a strategic holding operation, orchestrated 
by Stavka to release resources for the Ukraine before returning to Belorussia in summer 
1944.  On the contrary, in October 1943, Rokossovskiy was ordered to achieve 
extremely ambitious objectives with limited resources, resources that were significantly 
inferior to Red Army forces in the Ukraine.   
 
It seems clear that the Belorussian campaign was considerably more significant than 
official post-war Soviet literature was prepared to concede.  The idea that 
Rokossovskiy’s forces sat on their hands for over four months and conducted just one, 
short operation, the Zhlobin-Rogachev Operation, is absurd.  As Rokossovskiy testified 
in his memoirs, Stavka was notoriously over-ambitious and demanded more or less 
constant operations.  The urgent German response to Rokossovskiy’s operations in 
autumn 1943 indicates the Germans considered Rokossovskiy’s Belorussian Front a 
significant operational, potentially strategic threat.  Why did Stavka fail to appreciate 
the possibilities in Belorussia if the Germans did?  Why did it fail to support 
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Rokossovskiy’s Belorussian Front once it became clear the Germans were extremely 
concerned about the link between Army Group Centre and Army Group South.  Why 
did Stavka not reduce Sokolovskiy’s Western Front to a holding role and switch 
resources to Rokossovskiy?  By December 1943, Sokolovskiy was presiding over an 
attritional stalemate in eastern Belorussia, while opportunities created by Rokossovskiy 
went begging in south-eastern Belorussia.    
 
Therefore, in its strategic planning and conduct of the Belorussian campaign of 1943-
44, Stavka had much to hide.  First, Rokossovskiy’s success and the German reaction 
raised the possibility the Red Army could have split the Eastern Front by dividing Army 
Group Centre and Army Group South.  Second, Stavka clearly set objectives that were 
far beyond the means of Rokossovskiy’s forces.  Third, the Belorussian Operation of 
June-July 1944 actually achieved objectives set by Stavka in October 1943, objectives 
that might have been achieved earlier if Stavka had given Rokossovskiy more forces.  
Fourth, Rokossovskiy’s intelligent and imaginative command of the Belorussian Front 
formed an embarrassing contrast with other Soviet commanders in Belorussia.   
 
In recent years modern historical opinion has suggested that the Belorussian campaign 
of 1943-44 was deliberately misrepresented to protect the reputation of other Soviet 
commanders, mainly Sokolovskiy.  In October 1943, in three separate phases of fighting 
Sokolovskiy’s Western Front had relentlessly attacked 
and failed to penetrate the German defences east of 
Orsha, in eastern Belorussia.322 In the middle of October 
1943, Stavka strongly reprimanded Sokolovskiy for his 
handling of the Western Front.323  Nevertheless, 
Sokolovskiy was permitted to try again.  In five days of 
fighting, 14-19th November 1943, despite massive 
superiority in firepower and manpower, the Western 
Front advanced between 400-4,000 metres.  Orsha was 
not taken.  The Western Front suffered 38,756 casualties including 9,167 dead and 
29,589 wounded.  Stavka ordered the Western Front to continue: the assault was 
renewed from 30th November-5th December 1943.  In six days fighting, the Western 
 
Figure 55: V. Sokolovskiy 
(Photograph by Margaret Bourke-White, 
images.google.com) 
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Front again failed to take Orsha.  It advanced between 1-2 kilometres and incurred 22, 
870 casualties including 5, 611 dead and 17, 259 wounded.324  These failures carried on 
into 1944.  In February-March 1944 around Vitebsk, in conjunction with Bagramyan’s 
1st Baltic Front, Sokolovskiy presided over a further series of failed operations, 
followed by more defeats east of Orsha in March 1944.  In the end, on 12th April 1944, 
Stavka finally removed Sokolovskiy from command.325  
 
During the Cold War this record of incompetent, bloody failure, was removed from 
public view.  However, in recent years, General Makhmut Gareyev, a former Chief of 
the Soviet General Staff, who served in the Western Front during 1943-1944, has 
exposed the scope, scale and failure of the 1943-1944 Soviet Belorussian campaign.  
Gareyev explicitly compared Sokolovskiy’s Western Front’s conduct of operations in 
eastern Belorussia, between October-December 1943, with that of Rokossovskiy’s 
Belorussian Front during the Gomel-Rechitsa Operation.  He concluded, 
“These two fronts conducted their operations in very difficult operational 
situations and terrain conditions and with roughly comparable correlations of 
forces with the enemy.  However, if the Western Front’s forces did not 
advance and did not fulfil their missions, in spite of all the difficulties, the 
Belorussian Front’s forces broke open the enemy’s defences along a front of 
about 100 kilometers, advanced to a depth of up to 130 kilometers, captured 
the cities of Gomel’ and Rechitsa, and liberated tens of other populated points 
in southeastern Belorussia.  Therefore, the quality of preparations, the 
organization of combat operations, and the skill in commanding and 
controlling forces determined the outcomes of these operations.”326 
 
A secret Stavka commission condemned Sokolovskiy.327  The front command was cited 
as “the chief reason for the unsuccessful operations in the Western Front.”328 It 
concluded that “Army General Sokolovskiy has not risen to the occasion as a front 
commander”329 and “instead of learning from its mistakes and eliminating them, the 
Western Front command displayed wilfulness and conceit.”330 Sokolovskiy, Zhukov’s 
protégé, was condemned as inept, arrogant and unfit for operational command.  Yet, 
Sokolovskiy’s career flourished.  In April 1944, he became Zhukov’s Chief of Staff at 
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1st Ukrainian Front.  In November 1944, Sokolovskiy followed Zhukov to 1st 
Belorussian Front and he played a prominent part in the Berlin Operation of 1945.   
 
During the Cold War, from 1946-49, a period incorporating the Berlin airlift, 
Sokolovskiy commanded Soviet forces in Germany.  He was Minister of War for the 
Soviet Union (1950-52) at the height of the Korean War and fears about a Soviet attack 
on western Europe.  This was followed by an extended period of service as Chief of the 
Soviet General Staff (1952-60).331  In 1962, the definitive Soviet work on military 
strategy was published under his name and in 1963 Sokolovskiy served another year as 
Minister of War.  In summary, in the first two decades of the Cold War, Sokolovskiy 
was arguably the most important officer in the Soviet Army, a man who held the 
highest offices in the land.  It was imperative that his military incompetence during the 
Great Patriotic War, especially in comparison with Rokossovskiy in Belorussia, was 
kept secret.332  Therefore, Soviet historiography hid the defeats and failures of one of its 
worst operational commanders, Sokolovskiy, by obscuring the achievements of one of 
its best, Rokossovskiy.   
 
Russkiy Arkhiv: Velikaya Otechestvennaya 
During the writing of this thesis, despite repeated attempts the author was unable to 
secure direct access to the Red Army’s wartime archive in Podolsk.  However, it was 
possible to examine substantial primary archival material concerning Rokossovskiy’s 
style of leadership and operational command during the Great Patriotic War.  In the mid 
to late 1990’s a period of archival glasnost released a massive body of original Russian 
language documents from the Great Patriotic War.  This archival collection runs to 
thirty two volumes, of selected but not edited or annotated primary documents.  These 
documents, often several pages long, contain information ranging from the pre-war 
discussions, key Stavka333 and General Staff334 directives as well as extensive 
documentary information on every major theatre of operations.  In short, this archival 
collection provides a vital insight into the sheer scale of the Soviet Union’s struggle for 
survival and the Red Army’s strategic conduct of the war.  However, the archival 
collection also provides an unprecedented and as yet unsurpassed insight in to the 
operational conduct of the Great Patriotic War. 
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It provides detailed archival information on all of the key operations that Rokossovskiy 
conducted during the war.  It has information concerning the formation of Group 
Rokossovskiy in July-August 1941.  It has an extensive section on the battle of Moscow 
with specific archival material on Rokossovskiy’s 16th Army during both the defensive 
and offensive phases of the engagement.  Documentary evidence about Rokossovskiy’s 
involvement in the Stalingrad campaign proves that as early as October 1942 
Rokossovskiy was prepared to challenge Stavka’s insistence on more or less continuous 
ill-prepared offensive operations.  These primary sources also have extensive archival 
records concerning Rokossovskiy’s Central Front’s conduct of operations in February 
1943.335  Some of these documents are used in Glantz’s recent publication After 
Stalingrad336 but these operations have not been analysed in relation to Rokossovskiy’s 
wider style of leadership and operational command.   
 
In addition, the archival collection provides an extensive range of documents that 
highlight Rokossovskiy’s preparation for and subsequent conduct of the defensive phase 
of the battle of Kursk.  These documents offer a daily, almost hourly insight into the 
course of the battle during the critical period of 5th-10th July 1943.  They provide a 
detailed insight into how Rokossovskiy reconciled the competing tactical demands of 
the various army commanders under his control in order to maintain the operational 
coherence of the Central Front’s defences.  The original documents in this archival 
collection also provide a daily record of Rokossovskiy’s protracted struggle to wrestle 
the initiative from German forces in the Orel region in July-August 1943.  The 
collection contains a whole series of directives issued by Rokossovskiy to his army 
commanders.  It also contains Rokossovskiy’s nightly reports to Stavka about the 
Central Front’s offensive.  The archival documents provide a unique and extensive 
insight into Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership and operational command during a 
period of operations that has never been analysed in a sustained thematic manner.  It 
enables one to compare Rokossovskiy’s conduct in this period with the wider, 
underlying characteristics of his style of leadership and operational command.337  
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The archival collection also reveals the distinct character of Rokossovskiy’s operational 
method during the Belorussian Operation of June-July 1944 and indicates that, at least 
from Rokossovskiy’s perspective, the Belorussian Operation was never a great 
operational encirclement but a turning move or obkhod, a distinctly Russian form of 
operation.  These documents prove that Rokossovskiy’s 1st Belorussian Front, in 
contrast to the other fronts involved, had a distinct, absolutely key strategic role in the 
Belorussian Operation, one that turned a series of operational defeats into a strategic 
calamity for Army Group Centre.  The archival papers also contain information on the 
1st Belorussian Front’s neglected Lublin-Brest Operation.  These demonstrate how 
decisions taken by Stavka, not Rokossovskiy, ensured that 1st Belorussian Front was in 
no condition to approach and cross the Vistula, east of Warsaw, in early August 1944.  
Finally, the collection has a whole series of archival documents concerning the East 
Prussian Operation of January 1945.338  These documents throw little or no light upon 
the conduct of Soviet troops but provide an insight into the planning, preparation and 
conduct of the operation.   
 
These primary sources reveal Stavka’s interaction with key commanders, its response to 
key events, the origins of major operations, their original objectives, their conduct and 
eventual outcome.  The documents, particularly the ones relating to the conduct of 
operations are often several pages long and are usually presented in chronological order 
enabling one to build up an overall picture of certain operations from beginning to end.  
In Rokossovskiy’s case there are individual documents relating to virtually all phases of 
the war.  However, the extensive documents relating to the period October 1942-
January 1945 enable one to establish not only the character and conduct of individual 
operations but also to form an overview of Rokossovskiy’s operational command.  
Therefore, in conjunction with Rokossovskiy’s memoirs one is able to establish the key 
themes of Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership and operational command.  For example it 
is possible to chart the evolution of Rokossovskiy’s operational methods in the period 
October 1942-May 1944.  It is also possible to establish incidents which are simply 
peculiar to one operation or event, as well as identify consistent themes andtrends in 
Rokossovskiy’s leadership and operational command. 
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In addition, the documents enable one to create a picture of the realities of operational 
command on the Eastern Front.  This might involve a snapshot of Rokossovskiy’s mood 
on a single day such as 18th August 1943, or an archival record of several days 
concerning one operation such as Kursk.  Equally, as in July-August 1943, it might 
document days and weeks of continuous, frustrating operations with tired troops that 
had suffered heavy casualties against a determined and skilful opponent.  These 
documents provide a key insight into how Rokossovskiy reacted, his operational modus 
operandi, how he dealt with frustration and the nature of his leadership in such 
circumstances.   
 
Furthermore, by providing extensive archival material about Rokossovskiy during 1943 
the documents enable one to analyse the overall pattern of Rokossovskiy’s operations.  
This was a period of extensive trial and error with some success and relative failures far 
removed the rampaging success of 1944-45, when Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership 
and operational command inflicted defeat after defeat upon the Wehrmacht.   The 
documents of 1943 reveal the Wehrmacht’s extraordinary resilience through Stalingrad, 
Kursk and into the late summer and early autumn of 1943.  Rokossovskiy was fighting 
an opponent that retained its tactical fighting prowess late into 1943, especially if it had 
prepared defences and the Luftwaffe’s support.  Indeed, the archives show that the 
Luftwaffe was a major problem for Rokossovskiy’s Central Front during July-August 
1943.   
 
In summary, an extensive analysis of these documents in conjunction with 
Rokossovskiy’s memoirs enables one to identify, establish and confirm the essential 
hallmarks of Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership and operational command.  It is clear 
from these archival sources, in conjunction with his memoirs that Rokossovskiy 
consistently objected to poorly prepared operations launched with no serious chance of 
decisive operational success.  The archival documents also indicate that Rokossovskiy’s 
refusal to allow breakthrough battles to stagnate into prolonged positional attrition was 
a consistent theme of his operational command.   This is particularly clear from the 
documents relating to the Central Front’s offensive operations in July-August 1943 as 
well as the East Prussian Operation of 1945.   
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The archival documents reveal much about the nature of operational command on the 
Eastern Front.  Rokossovskiy’s initial operational directives, the key document that 
transformed a concept into an operational plan, are detailed documents that carefully 
outlined the role of each army within a front operation.  These directives clearly indicate 
the shock armies and holding armies, which armies are to put in the main assault and 
which armies are to conduct supporting attacks.  The directives reveal the distinction 
between ‘close’ tactical objectives and ‘further’ operational missions.  The directives 
indicate that for the first few days of an operation Rokossovskiy invariably laid down a 
specific timeline indicating by which day an army should have reached a certain line or 
town.  These detailed timelines, for each army, might run as far as the fifth or sixth day 
of an operation.  However, in line with Rokossovskiy’s emphasis on delegation and the 
use of initiative, these directives rarely contain specific instructions on how these 
objectives are to be achieved.   
 
The archival record also indicates the sheer physical and mental demands of operational 
command on the Eastern Front.  A front commander such as Rokossovskiy had to report 
every night to Stavka.  Rokossovskiy’s Central Front was in more or less continuous 
action from 5th July 1943-12th December 1943.  Naturally, not all Rokossovskiy’s 
armies were in continuous action all of the time but with the exception of a handful of 
days Rokossovskiy and his staff were either planning or conducting operations.  The 
archival record of six weeks of more or less continuous operations from 5th July- 14th 
August 1943,339 at the height of summer in 1943 indicates that front commanders such 
as Rokossovskiy were filing reports in the early hours of the morning just a few hours 
before operations began again in earnest in order to capitalise on maximum daylight 
hours.  The mental and physical strain on all involved on both sides from the lowest 
soldier to senior operational commanders such as Rokossovskiy must have been 
immense, truly staggering even without the nightly requirement to report to the likes of 
Zhukov and Stalin. 
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Summary 
Therefore, a substantial body of academic literature concerning the war does exist, and 
in general terms, this body of work does succeed in conveying the truly savage nature of 
the war, the sheer size of the military operations and the ghastly misery endured by 
millions of ordinary people caught up in an event of truly global historic significance.  
The Soviet official literature, massive multi-volume histories of the war, journals and 
memoirs does, in some respects, provide a detailed factual and chronological narrative 
of the war, but with regard to Rokossovskiy they have perhaps become more notable for 
what they left out rather than what they put into the public domain.  The Kardashov 
biography of Rokossovskiy is a substantial piece of historical narrative and an important 
source of uncontested, uncontroversial information about Rokossovskiy’s life and 
career.  There is however, relatively little detailed analysis of Rokossovskiy’s style of 
leadership and operational command.  This is the purpose of this academic thesis: to 
analyse the military style of Marshal Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy, one of 
the most significant but relatively unknown military commanders of the twentieth 
century.  It will begin with a detailed analysis of Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership.   
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CHAPTER 3:  
ROKOSSOVSKIY’S STYLE OF LEADERSHIP 
This chapter analyses the historical image of the Red Army, its leadership culture 
and authoritarian traditions, before discussing the main schools of leadership 
theory that have emerged during the last century.  It will then move to a sustained 
analysis of Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership.  The hallmarks of his leadership 
are examined, in order to identify his own ‘natural’ leadership style, the traits he 
demonstrated, and, the extent to which he anticipated or reflected aspects of 
leadership that, while not perhaps leadership styles or theories, in themselves, 
have become integral themes in the study of leadership.  It will argue that 
probably the greatest contrast between Rokossovskiy and his fellow senior 
commanders was his style of leadership.   
 
The Nature of Leadership 
 In the course of history, all armies, regardless of ideology and nationality, have 
been interested in leadership.  However, at the same time, leadership, although it 
is a continual source of public fascination,1 remains an elusive, indeed often 
downright puzzling phenomenon.  This, in itself, is hardly surprising, for 
leadership is an intangible matter, involving humans, not machines.  There is no 
infallible formula that guarantees success as a leader.  Equally, after decades of 
research, there seems to be no leadership style for all seasons, situations and 
people, military or civilian.  Leadership is easily discussed, but notoriously 
difficult to pin down.  There are many lists of desirable qualities,2 many books to 
read and courses to attend.  However, it is a fact, that many individuals, 
throughout history, have proved outstanding leaders, yet have never actively 
studied it,3 although they may have reflected upon it to refine or develop their 
‘natural’ abilities.    
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The Study of Leadership 
The twentieth century witnessed an explosion of inquiry, academic, business, 
military, political and popular into the notion of leadership.  In the opinion of Ott, 
Parkes and Simpson it “is one of the most magnetic words in the English 
language”4 and there seems little reason to doubt that “it is a highly valued 
phenomenon that is very complex.”5   In the eyes of Northouse, leadership is a 
process of interaction between leaders and followers.6  To Grint, a leader is out in 
front, the real question is whether he is pulling or is being pushed.7  To de Vries 
“it seems that more and more has been studied about less and less, to end up 
ironically with a group of researchers studying everything about everything and 
nothing.”8 For Gemill and Oakley, the whole notion of leadership is a contrived 
social myth and “belief in hierarchy and the necessity of leaders represents an 
unrecognised ideology”9 something “that induces massed learned helplessness 
among members of a social system.”10  In summary, according to Hosking, “the 
terms ‘leader’ and ‘leadership’ are much used, but poorly understood.”11 
 
Theories of Leadership 
The research literature on leadership reveals a wide variety of theories.  These 
seek to explain the essence of leadership, to identify different types and styles of 
leadership and make recommendations for the exercise of leadership, in pursuit of 
the holy grail: a universal theory that explains the nature and conduct of 
leadership.  Indeed, according to one commentator, Stogdill, there are nearly as 
many different definitions of leadership as those who have tried to define it.12   
 
The ‘Great Man’ and Trait School 
The ‘great man’ theories of the nineteenth century were “based on the belief that 
leaders are exceptional people, born with innate qualities, destined to lead.”13  In 
short, it was the destiny of Cromwell, Marlborough and Wellington, amongst 
others, to lead.  According to Bolden, Gosling, Marturans and Denson it was a 
short step from the ‘great man’ concept to the trait school.14  The trait school of 
thought, according to Ott, dominated the study of leadership until the middle of 
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the twentieth century.15 It still exerts considerable influence, explicit and implicit, 
upon society, civil and military, in the current era.  It is in tune with the popular 
notion that leadership is exercised by those with special innate qualities that 
manifest themselves in overt leadership from the front, heroic individuals, with 
firmness of purpose and strident tone.   
 
It revolved around the idea that some individuals, because of their traits, the 
product of personality and genes, are born leaders.  In effect, according to Grint, 
“there is no hope for those of us not born with certain gifts or talents for 
leadership.”16  It is assumed that because of who you are, what you are, not your 
skills and expertise, you will be able to adapt, regardless of the situation, or 
environment, and provide leadership.  The trait approach was, according to 
Northouse, the “first systematic attempt to study leadership”17 and is focused on 
the leader.  It pays little attention to followers, as they are assumed to lack the 
traits leaders possess.  It is thus, by its nature, an elitist concept of leadership.   
 
The trait school aims to identify the qualities that leaders possess, in order to find 
and select those who display such leadership qualities, those who are natural 
leaders.18  The trait school has succeeded in identifying many traits of leadership, 
but is less successful in pinning down which are more important than others, 
especially the intangible qualities of human nature, such as confidence, honesty 
and integrity.   
 
In the wake of the Second World War, until the late 1980’s, trait theory was 
unfashionable.  Stogdill’s finding in 1948, that “an individual with leadership 
traits who was a leader in one situation might not be a leader in another 
situation”19 was a significant challenge to trait theory.  However, in recent years, 
the trait school has seen a revival.  It has been argued that personality traits can 
identify leaders and followers, regardless of the situation.20  Equally, “it is 
unequivocally clear that leaders are not like other people.”21 Trait theory has 
evolved: it is now linked with Transformational Leadership22, charisma, 
Emotional Intelligence23 and the interaction of environment, as well as nurture.  
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Equally, while critics of trait theory appear content to identify traits not 
commonly associated with leadership, they seem less willing to discuss traits that 
a considerable body of research suggests24 are linked with leadership and 
command.  It is a legitimate school of thought, one that has contributed much to 
the debate about leadership. 
 
In the opinion of Northouse, the trait school has several strengths.  It appeals to 
the easily understood idea that leaders are people who dominate and lead the way.  
It gives people faith that their leaders are imbued with significant gifts that mark 
them out as special people capable of achieving remarkable things.  The trait 
school also has several decades of research to support the basic idea that certain 
personality traits play an important role in leadership.  It has established beyond 
reasonable doubt, over the course of many decades of research that intelligence, 
self-confidence, determination, integrity and sociability are key personal qualities 
in leadership.25  This gives people a clear set of yardsticks by which to assess 
leaders and leadership.  26 
 
However, it also has weaknesses.  The trait school body of research has identified 
an extensive list of qualities that are perceived to be important in leadership. 
However, it has not defined which are the most important.  Furthermore, the trait 
school does not satisfactorily address the situational context in which leadership is 
exercised.  It does not appear to accept that while one type of leadership may be 
appropriate in one situation, that does not mean it will be suitable in another 
scenario.  Finally, in the opinion of Northouse many of the traits identified as 
important are susceptible to subjectivity.  Equally, because it is based on inherent 
personality traits it is difficult to use the trait model for training in the skills of 
leadership. 27 
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The Skills Approach 
The skills approach to leadership was developed in the 1950s.  The Second World 
War had demonstrated that millions, not an elite few, appeared to possess the 
ability and skills to lead.  In the 1950s,28 Katz argued that leadership revolved 
around three broad skills: technical, human and conceptual, of which human and 
conceptual skills were the most significant for a senior leader such as 
Rokossovskiy.  Human skills, in which Rokossovskiy excelled, were vital in 
generating a positive and creative atmosphere.  The conceptual level reflected the 
ability to develop ideas and translate conceptual thought into practical planning 
and execution.29  In the Red Army it was called 
operational art. 
 
During the 1990s the skills approach became a 
prominent aspect of leadership theory and practice.  
The skills approach, like trait theory, is based on the 
leader, but argues that leadership is not an inherent 
aspect of personality, but a set of identifiable skills,30 
that can be learned, developed and improved through 
knowledge.  In short, it is not possessed by a gifted 
few, but a process, open to all, with skills that can be 
nurtured and refined through practice.31  This is a considerable strength of the 
skills approach.  Yet, presumably the skills approach accepts that due to natural 
ability, some will practice these skills with a higher degree of competence.  The 
skills may be identifiable and available, but without natural talent it is difficult to 
see how the skills approach can make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear.  Yet, others 
who never studied it, such as Rokossovskiy, excel.   
 
In a positive sense the skills model focuses on abilities rather than inherent, 
arguably elitist traits.  It proposes skills that can be learned, practised and 
developed in a manner that appears, at least in theory, to make leadership 
available to the majority, not the minority.32  In a more negative sense, the skills 
approach claims to be different from the trait school, but “the individual attributes 
 
Figure 56: Rokossovskiy in 
consultation. 
(Kardashov, 1980) 
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component of the skills model is trait driven.”33  The skills identified as central to 
effective leadership, are heavily dependent upon personality traits, both rational 
and emotional.  Ironically, perhaps the key attribute of the skills approach is its 
ability to enhance and nurture the leadership potential of those with the “right” 
qualities or traits, enabling them to make the most of their abilities.  In addition, 
critics argue that in many respects the skills approach is too broad and vague.  It 
makes it difficult to predict how such personal competencies will lead to more 
effective performance. 34 
 
The Style Approach 
The trait school emphasised the personal qualities of leaders and the skills 
approach focused on capabilities, but the style approach broke new ground by 
focusing on the behaviour of leaders.35  The style approach concentrated on what 
leaders actually did, not who they were or what key skills they needed to exercise 
effective leadership.36  The aim of the style approach was to discover how leaders 
behaved in pursuit of goals or objectives.  Two massive research programmes, 
carried out by Ohio State and Michigan University in the 1950s and 1960s, 
represent landmarks in the style approach and the study of leadership.   
 
The research programmes established that the behaviour of leaders generally fell 
into two categories: task behaviour and relationship behaviour.  As a result “the 
central purpose of the style approach is to explain how leaders combine these two 
kinds of behaviour to influence subordinates in their efforts to reach a goal.”37  
There was some inconclusive evidence that leaders capable of both task and 
relationship behaviour demonstrated particularly effective forms of leadership.38  
This thesis will argue that this was a distinct, singular quality of Rokossovskiy’s 
style of leadership that set him apart from other Soviet commanders who focused 
almost exclusively on the task.  
 
A key strength of the style approach was that it was not an elaborate complex 
theory, nor was it prescriptive in its recommendations.  Furthermore, by analysing 
the behaviour of leaders and identifying the concepts of task and relationship 
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behaviour, the style approach made an enduring contribution to the study of 
leadership.  It shone a light on the nature of leadership, and leaders, that retains its 
relevance to this day.  It was a major development in the conceptual study of 
leadership, applicable to most leaders, past or present, including Rokossovskiy.  It 
gave people a simple but broad vehicle through which to understand the nature of 
leadership, not a narrow prescription for how it should be done39   
 
Nevertheless, the style approach contains a weakness in that, although it devised a 
manner by which the style of leaders can be assessed, it has not established how 
these insights lead directly to improvements in performance and the achievement 
of objectives.  Equally, despite its declared intentions the style approach has not 
managed to find a definitive, comprehensive and universal theory of leadership. 
However, despite these weaknesses,40  
“the significance of this idea is not to be understated.  Whenever, 
leadership occurs, the leader is acting out both task and relationship 
behaviours: the key to being an effective leader often rests on how the 
leader balances these two behaviours.  Together, they form the core of the 
leadership process.”41  
   
The Situational Approach 
The situational approach to leadership was developed by Hersey and Blanchard.42  
It is based on the idea that different situations require different types of 
leadership.43  In short, no one person, whatever their personal qualities or traits, 
and no single style of leadership, can cope with all the potential situations, civil or 
military, that require leadership.  This is a key strength of the situational approach, 
namely that flexibility is built into the approach.  The essence of situational 
leadership is the ability to assess the nature of the situation44 and match it with a 
suitable form of leadership.  It is an intellectually demanding theory that requires 
great judgement and a flexible “repertoire of styles to suit the particular 
situation.”45  It also involves a degree of versatility that is perhaps as unrealistic as 
the trait idea that innate qualities enable certain individuals to lead in all 
situations.  Yet, the basic idea, that different situations need different leadership, 
141 
 
is a powerful and enduring one, a strength that confers significant credibility on 
the theory of situational leadership.46   
 
Situational leadership also requires a leader to assess the situation in terms of their 
subordinates’ capabilities, in relation to the task.  Naturally, most leaders make 
decisions, instinctive or considered, on whether a subordinate is qualified to 
achieve a certain task.  In one sense the prescriptive procedures for matching 
subordinates to appropriate situations are an important strength enabling leaders to 
make informed decisions and delegate in an appropriate manner to the right 
people.  Yet, the system of directive and supportive behaviours in the situational 
approach47 is complex and formulaic.  The procedures appear mechanical and 
time consuming with subordinates strictly categorized.48  It is difficult to see how 
this could be managed in a flexible manner in a dynamic, fast changing 
environment such as war.  It seems at odds with the principle of flexibility, 
otherwise inherent in situational leadership.  Finally, there is a sense in which 
situational leadership is permanently stuck in the present, assessing subordinates 
from a series of quick snapshots. 
 
The Contingency Theory 
Situational theory involves flexible adaptation to the situation.  However, the 
contingency theory49 seeks to match leaders to situations that suit their style of 
leadership.  It believes it is easier to change leader in response to the situation, 
rather than a leader repeatedly altering their style.50  In short, “it is called 
contingency because it suggests that a leader’s effectiveness depends on how well 
the leader’s style fits the context.”51  Contingency theory also incorporates aspects 
of the trait school and the style approach.  It is concerned with the inherent 
personal qualities of leaders, because it accepts the notion that a leader’s 
behaviour is influenced by whether leaders are primarily task motivated or 
relationship motivated.  Similarly, contingency theory believes a leader’s 
motivation is determined by the nature of their personality.   
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The personality of a leader and thus their attitude to leadership is determined by a 
test designed to assess their Least Preferred Coworker (LPC).52  Individuals are 
classed as high LPC or low LPC: those classified as low LPC tend to be task 
motivated, dominated by the need to achieve objectives.  Conversely, those 
marked as high LPC are inclined to see the development of good relationships as 
the key to effective leadership and the achievement of tasks.53  In contrast, Middle 
LPC’s are more independent, both of objectives and relationships, more 
autonomous in character, less driven by goals and less concerned by the opinion 
of others.54   
 
The exercise of leadership is also influenced by how leaders and followers relate 
to each other, their exchanges, the structure of the task and the formal power 
conferred, or otherwise, by the leader’s position.55   The contingency approach is a 
complex theory, based on a simple idea.  According to Northhouse an important 
strength of contingency theory is that it is backed up by a considerable body of 
research that confers significant credibility upon it as a theory of leadership.  In 
addition, it has widened professional and popular understanding of the impact of 
situations and context in the exercise of leadership.  Furthermore, it can be argued 
that a key strength of contingency theory is that it has proposed a more realistic 
understanding of the fact that individual leaders cannot hope to be equally 
effective in all situations.56   
 
However, it is argued that while there is evidence that contingency theory works it 
stuggles to explain why certain styles of leadership work in certain situations and 
others do not.57  In addition, it is reliant on the accuracy of the LPC scale to match 
leaders with situations.  It might be argued that this requires constant situational 
and leadership engineering.  It is difficult to see in a military context how units 
could change leaders in response to different situations. In summary, according to 
Northouse “it is a leader-match theory that emphasizes the importance of 
matching a leader’s style with the demands of a situation.”58 
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Path-Goal Theory 
Path-goal theory59 advocated by House and Mitchell was the first leadership 
programme that overtly examined the relationship between leaders and followers.  
It investigated how leaders motivated their subordinates in pursuit of objectives 
and challenged leaders to find styles of leadership that responded to their 
subordinates’ motivation.60  Therefore, 
“in contrast to the situational approach, which suggests that a leader must 
adapt to the developmental level of subordinates and unlike contingency 
theory which emphasizes the match between the leader’s style and specific 
situational variables, path-goal theory emphasizes the relationship between 
the leader’s style and the characteristics of the subordinates and the work 
setting.”61   
 
Path-goal theory was broken down into four main categories of leadership.62  
Directive leadership engages a leader in overt command, identifying and 
allocating tasks, how they are to be completed, the standards expected and setting 
deadlines.  The second element of path-goal theory involved supportive 
leadership.  It suggested that leaders should make a concerted effort to create a 
harmonious working atmosphere, cater for subordinates’ human needs and treat 
them as equals.  The third strand of path-goal was participative leadership, in 
which leaders actively involve their staff in the decision making process by 
inviting their opinions, encouraging them to be creative in their problem solving. 
 
The final strand was achievement-orientated leadership.  This form of leadership 
is the hallmark of leaders with high standards and high expectations and who 
demand continuous improvement.63 However, rather than being tyrannical 
martinets with unrealistic expectations, path-goal theory points out that such 
leaders also demonstrate confidence in their subordinates and understand that 
excellence will not materialise overnight.  Path-goal theory also makes it clear 
that a leader must know his subordinates,64 not just know of them.  A leader must 
understand them, their strengths and weaknesses, as well as their overt and 
underlying motivations, their character and aspirations.  This thesis will argue that 
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Rokossovskiy incorporated many aspects of what later became known as path-
goal theory in his leadership during the war. 
 
According to Northhouse one of the strengths of path-goal theory is that it 
provides a clear framework on which to base leadership.  Secondly, by placing 
motivation at the centre of the theory it helps leaders to develop a greater 
understanding of their subordinates, leading to more informed leaders who can 
develop their subordinates.  On the negative side, Northouse suggests that it is 
also a very broad and complex theory.  It is almost too comprehensive to make it 
practical.  Secondly, although path-goal is a cogent and intellectually coherent 
theory of leadership, it has not developed a clear body of evidence that indicates a 
direct link between its ideas and effective leadership.  Finally, although path-goal 
is concerned with the motivation of subordinates it remains, in the end, a theory 
centred around leaders and what they can do for subordinates.65   
 
 In summary, path-goal theory argued that leaders can and should display one or 
all of these four styles, or aspects of them, when dealing with different 
subordinates, at different stages in order to achieve the objective.66  The key issue 
is judgement and awareness of one’s subordinates.  Nevertheless, although path-
goal theory was the first major theory to focus on the motivation of subordinates it 
remained a leader centric concept.   
 
Leader-Member Exchange Theory (LMX) 
Northouse argues that “before LMX theory, researchers treated leadership as 
something leaders did toward all of their followers.”67 However, he argued “LMX 
theory takes still another approach and conceptualises leadership as a process that 
is centred on the interactions between leaders and followers.”68  The origins of 
LMX theory lay in the 1970’s and have been regularly revised during subsequent 
decades.  The basic idea of LMX theory is that leadership is a process of 
influence,69 but rather than being a uni-dimensional process, it is a dynamic 
exchange of influence, direct and indirect, conscious and unconscious, between 
leaders and followers.  As leaders and their subordinates get to know each other in 
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a professional and personal capacity, an ‘in’ and ‘out’ group develop, with one 
group close to the leader, trusted, valued, committed and full of initiative with a 
close personal identification between individual, leader and team.   
 
The out-group is distant and formally correct, in both their relations with the 
leader, and in carrying out their responsibilities.  There is less personal association 
and enthusiastic commitment, nor do they feel trusted, or inclined to be creative 
and dynamic as they do not feel their efforts will be appreciated.  70  A complex 
phase of social interactions, influenced by many intangible and unquantifiable 
factors, determines the composition of both groups.  These take place over three 
phases: the stranger phase, the acquaintance phase and the mature partnership 
phase.71  There is an instinctive recognition that these ideas seem to be a fact of 
life, a natural aspect of the human condition.72   
 
An important strength of LMX theory is that it provides a sharp and clear insight 
into the human aspects of the leadership process.  Secondly, it makes the 
interactive relationship between leaders and subordinates the focal point of the 
leadership process in a way that other theories of leadership do not.  Thirdly, it 
reveals in a very effective manner, the importance and breadth of communication, 
in the broadest sense, involved in the leadership process.  Fourth, it has proved an 
effective guide to getting things done and achieving objectives.  Fifth, it reminds 
us that in the end leadership and the achievement of objectives is heavily 
influenced by intangible human factors.73   
 
In a more negative light, advocacy of generating ‘in’ and ‘out’ groups, purely on 
the basis that they are effective, challenges basic principles and values of 
fairness.74  Secondly, if the existence of ‘in’ and ‘out’ groups is clear, this can 
undermine leadership in some areas while appearing to make it more effective in 
others.  Thirdly, although the aim might be to build an ‘in’ crowd that is as wide 
as possible, this is extremely difficult because of the intricacies and complexities 
of human nature.  Finally, according to Northouse the model of LMX theory 
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suggests that effective leadership can be developed by building trust, respect and 
commitment but does not indicate how this can be done.75 
 
Transformational Leadership 
Since the 1980s, transformational leadership has been a dynamic area of research 
in leadership.  Indeed, to some, it is part of a ‘new leadership’ paradigm.76  The 
term ‘transformational leadership’ was first employed in 197377 but came to 
prominence in 1978, through the work of James McGregor Burns.78  
Transformational leadership is concerned primarily with the human and emotional 
dimensions of leadership, not the dry mechanisms of process, acquisition of skills 
and capabilities.  It responds to the perceived human need for inspiration, to feel 
part of something greater than themselves.  Leaders are required to galvanise, 
inspire and nourish followers, implanting the idea of outstanding achievement 
through personal development and hard work.  In summary, 
“as its name implies, transformational leadership is a process that changes 
and transforms people.  It is concerned with emotions, values, ethics, 
standards, and long-term goals and includes assessing followers’ motives, 
satisfying their needs, and treating them as full human beings.”79 
It is therefore closely connected with, but not the same as charismatic leadership.   
 
In his original concept, Burns was at pains to distinguish between 
transformational and transactional leadership.  The former was concerned with 
inspiring personal transformation to induce a commitment to excellence based 
purely on the value of what they were trying to achieve, that the process and 
objective were intrinsically valuable.  80  Indeed, for Burns, there was a distinct 
moral theme to transformational leadership, in that it was both a force for good 
and beneficial in itself, thus disassociating it with the kind of charismatic and 
transformational leadership displayed by Hitler, Stalin, Mao and Pol Pot.81  In 
contrast, transactional leadership is based on the idea that in return for completing 
a task or achieving your objectives, you will receive a reward, be it financial, 
prestigious, professional or social.82  In short, transactional and transformational 
are entirely different leadership philosophies. 
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The idea of transformational leadership is an an appealing one with many 
strengths.  Firstly, it has been the subject of extensive research from several 
different perspectives that confer credibility upon its basic message.  Secondly, it 
is an instinctively powerful idea.  It is in tune with popular contemporary imagery: 
a transformational leader is out in front, a dynamic force for change pursuing a 
clear vision.  Thirdly, its emphasis that transformational leadership is an 
interaction between leaders and led, with an emphasis on the moral value of the 
process, as well as the objectives, is a seductive and genuinely inspirational vision 
for many.83  Advocates of transformational leadership such as Burns and Bass84 
are well aware that characteristics associated with transformational leadership 
have been used in the past by ruthless, charismatic but amoral leaders, for 
appalling ends.  The emphasis on values, morals and more than just self-interest is 
a strong, attractive message that dilutes negative associations with the past.  
Finally, there is also considerable evidence that not only is transformational 
leadership spiritually beneficial, but that it works.  In short, it is an effective form 
of leadership as well as an attractive one.85 
 
In a more negative sense some critics argue that while transformational leadership 
is visionary it lacks clarity.  It is heavily dependent upon intangible human traits 
such as vision, motivation, change, inspiration, trust, selflessness and altruism.  
How are such characteristics generated, sustained, nurtured or developed if they 
are not already present?  Second, it has been argued that transformational 
leadership is simply charismatic leadership, with all its attendant concerns, under 
a new name, a charge rejected by Bass, who argues that charisma is only one 
aspect of transformational leadership.86  Yet, there is no doubt that Bass considers 
charisma to be essential to effective transformational leadership.  He argues that, 
“attaining charisma in the eyes of one’s employees is central to succeeding 
as a transformational leader.  Charismatic leaders have great power and 
influence.  Employees want to identify with them, and they have a high 
degree of trust and confidence in them.  Charismatic leaders inspire and 
148 
 
excite their employees with the idea that they may be able to accomplish 
great things with extra effort.”87 
 
Third, it is argued that in reality transformational leadership believes leadership is 
driven by personal traits.  Is it advocated by people with a natural inclination to 
display and value the kind of dynamic, motivational leadership that leads them to 
believe they can transform others?  In short, it might be argued that 
transformational leadership is an intellectualisation of the subjectivity and 
occasional prejudice that allegedly infected the trait school.  Fourth, in a related 
point some claim that like the trait school, transformational leadership produces 
dominant leaders who engage in relatively little genuine interaction with 
followers.  Bass and Avolio argue that transformational leadership does not suffer 
from a ‘heroic leadership’ bias and  is equally compatible with other styles of 
leadership such as democratic, participative, directive and authoritarian.88  On the 
other hand Bass claims that “Napoleon declared that an army of rabbits 
commanded by a lion could do better than an army of lions commanded by a 
rabbit.  He was not far from the truth.”89  Critics argue that whatever the formal 
intentions of transformational theory, it has a natural tendency to develop 
‘messianic’ leaders.90 
 
The process of identifying transformational leadership with charismatic leadership 
gathered pace in the 1980s.91  Charismatic leadership is traditionally associated 
with exceptional, almost mystical gifts, of oratory, motivation and presence.  
Northouse cites the German, Max Weber, in 1947: Weber believed that charisma 
was almost a superhuman, divine phenomenon given to very few.92  These leaders 
tend to be dominant individuals with a strong desire to influence events, confident 
in the wisdom of their own beliefs and with strong values.  Charisma is perhaps 
best described as a kind of personal aura, visible in an arresting presence and 
compelling eyes and/or voice.  It can move individuals to transcend themselves, 
inspiring, in the best examples, extraordinary levels of personal endeavour, 
sacrifice and achievement, in the worst, the corruption of the individual 
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conscience in the pursuit of power, renown or a wider cause such as Nazism or 
Stalinism.   
 
In the modern era, charismatic leadership is much sought after, rarely seen and 
frequently over-rated.  Indeed, western society seems obsessed with it.  Charisma 
is often a less than objective assessment in the eyes of the beholder, perhaps more 
accurately described as hero worship or the triumph of blind faith over reason.  
Charismatic individuals, such as Hitler, are frequently erratic, egotistical 
individuals, inspiring and capable of great feats, but also nihilistic mayhem if 
frustrated in their cherished, frequently apocalyptic vision.  Transformational and 
charismatic leadership is closely associated with visionary thinking, and securing 
commitment to their vision is the main aim of such leaders.93 In summary, 
genuinely charismatic and transformational leaders are rare, and, usually combine 
charisma with other important attributes of leadership. 
 
By May 1945, Rokossovskiy had a remarkable string of victories to his credit, 
historic operations in the defeat of Nazi Germany.94  However, charisma was not 
central to Rokossovskiy’s leadership style.  Rokossovskiy sought glory, but was 
generally considered a modest individual.  If Rokossovskiy’s reputation was 
touched by charisma, it was an attribute cast upon him by his achievements, not 
his leadership style or any cult of personality.   
 
Democratic Leadership 
The idea of democratic leadership is an instinctively attractive notion for some 
and a contradiction in terms for others.  It is a term that is frequently referred to 
but inadequately defined.  Indeed, one authority has openly lamented the fact that 
“there is no clear and well-developed definition of the term within academia.”95  It 
is often proposed as an alternative to others forms of leadership, but without great 
definitional clarity, or any real concrete proposals as to how it should work, other 
than a general commitment towards participation, free discussion and open, 
collegiate decision-making.  This conceptual ambiguity has created a situation in 
which, 
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“literally hundreds of authors have not so much described as advocated 
democratic, participatory, and similar ‘alternative’ styles of leadership, 
contrasting them with authoritarian, supervisory, charismatic, and other 
conventional modes of leadership.”96 
In terms of its aspirations, democratic leadership does involve open discussion, 
the exchange of ideas, creativity, distribution of responsibility, consultation97 and 
the constructive participation of others in the formation of objectives and plans, if 
not in their execution.  Yet, it is also the case that one does not have to be a 
practising advocate of democratic leadership to incorporate these elements in to 
one’s style of leadership.  Rokossovskiy was not an advocate of democratic 
leadership, but his style was, in many ways, surprisingly democratic, certainly by 
the standards of the Red Army. 
 
Democratic leadership has a poor popular image.  It conjures up notions of 
leadership by committee, endless discussions, paralysis by analysis instead of 
decisions.98  It should not mean individuals avoid responsibility, nor does it mean 
that conflicting views are suppressed to find an artificial consensus.  Indeed, in the 
hands of a skilled commander or leader, democratic leadership encourages a sense 
of duty and the acceptance of responsibility.  Subordinates are encouraged to be 
creative, use their initiative and think in an inventive and open manner while 
retaining a disciplined focus on the task.  Equally, a democratic style of leadership 
that emphasises merit rather than conformity, rank pulling and posturing, can 
make full use of all the talents available.  In Rokossovskiy’s command, the able, 
inventive and quietly efficient found a place alongside the talented and forceful. 
 
In contrast, to authoritarian leadership, confident and effective democratic 
leadership tolerates mistakes, rather than searching for scapegoats.  It encourages 
risk taking, not a stifling conformity.  Equally, effective democratic leadership can 
encourage the honest appraisal of reality, rather than wishful thinking.  
Rokossovskiy was not a democratic leader: he was basically an authoritative 
leader who used a range of styles.  Yet, his style of leadership also contained 
many elements that might be described as democratic, open and participatory.   
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Goleman’s Theory of Leadership 
In an extended version of  ‘Leadership That Gets Results’ printed in the Harvard 
Business Review99 Goleman elaborated upon his theory of six leadership styles.  The six 
leadership styles were coercive, authoritative, affiliative, democratic, pacesetting and 
coaching.100  In Goleman’s view authoritative leadership is the “most strongly 
positive”101 because its innate qualities enable it to straddle and incorporate many of the 
more positive qualities associated with the other styles of leadership.  Goleman argues 
that while authoritative leadership is highly desirable and effective, truly impressive 
leadership demands leaders move between styles in relation to the nature of the task and 
their subordinates.  It is related to situation leadership.  Goleman is fully aware that 
personal qualities influence the nature and style of leadership exercised by all leaders.  
Indeed, he has convincingly argued that all leadership styles are influenced by 
underlying issues of emotional intelligence, personal qualities, characteristics or traits 
that make up the personality of an individual.  102 
 
Coercive or authoritarian leaders demand instant obedience.  They are dominated 
by the need to achieve, the use of personal initiative and self control.  Coercive 
leadership is also characterised by an attitude that reflects a temperamental 
inclination to instruct and dominate.  Authoritarian commanders are decisive, 
ruthless and aggressive.  They are often brilliant individuals, but, while they 
exercise command easily, their style of leadership is frequently too authoritarian.  
Authoritarians tend to extract obedience, neither inspiring, or taking the time to 
discover, willing compliance.  In both an implicit and explicit sense leadership is 
imposed by power and fear of retribution.  Authoritarian leaders and commanders 
are wary of discussion, presenting issues in black and white terms, with debate 
seen as a waste of time or, worse, an act of insubordination.   
 
Coercive leaders are suspicious of thinkers, uncomfortable with introspection, the 
creative and unorthodox.  Naturally, authoritarian leaders are intolerant of 
failure,103 demanding, as in the case of Zhukov, nothing less than perfection, from 
themselves and everyone else.104  The authoritarian leader is a famous character in 
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the pages of Russian and Soviet history, both civil and military, as well as many 
other countries.  There is little doubt that leading commanders such as Zhukov, 
Konev, Sokolovskiy, Yeremenko and Malinovskiy were, in almost every sense of 
the word, authoritarian in their leadership style.  Equally, it is fair to say that such 
commanders found a natural home in Stalin’s Red Army. 
 
In extremis, this style of leadership encourages excessive caution and conformity, 
something the Red Army was inclined towards, and, perhaps something many of 
its commanders were more comfortable with.  The paranoid conformists of 1941, 
whether authoritarian by instinct, or not, were unused to, unwilling to, or unable 
to switch on the moral and intellectual talents to deal with the fast moving 
operations imposed on them by the Wehrmacht.  Naturally, conformity inhibited 
creativity and, in the absence of orders or simply permission from Moscow, 
undermined the residual talents of the Red Army’s officers.  In Goleman’s 
opinion the coercive or authoritarian style of leadership works in a crisis but its 
overall impact is negative.105  Ironically, the underlying authoritarianism of Soviet 
society and the Red Army probably helped Rokossovskiy to develop and sustain a 
more imaginative and less coercive style of leadership.  In this army and society 
habits of obedience and compliance were deeply ingrained. Rokossovskiy used 
this as a platform from which to encourage greater creativity and initiative as part 
of an authoritative not authoritarian style of leadership. 
 
Authoritative leaders create a sense of vision that brings their subordinates106 with them 
by inspiring a sense of mission.  In this sense it is related to transformational leadership.  
This can act as a dynamic force for change in a leadership culture, particularly when the 
need for change is acknowledged either implicitly or explicitly by those that are led.107 
Authoritative leaders are self confident with an astute understanding of their 
subordinates as well as the tasks of leadership.  It is their ability to reconcile the two 
that acts a powerful catalyst for sustainable change.  Authoritative leaders define the 
standards expected in the fulfilment of individual tasks as part of an overall vision but 
give subordinates flexibility, the chance to use their initiative.  In short, “authoritative 
leaders give people the freedom to innovate, experiment, and take calculated risks.”108  
The historical evidence will demonstrate that judged by this definition Rokossovskiy 
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was a highly impressive authoritative leader, who nurtured, encouraged and developed 
the talents of his senior officers in a manner that was distinctly ununsual within the Red 
Army. 
 
Affiliative leadership places people first and is based up the idea that content 
subordinates are enthusiastic and committed.  In combination with ability this enhances 
the capacity to achieve goals but in harmony with others not at their expense.  
Affiliative leaders strive to create strong leadership groups bound by fierce loyalty109 
and friendship.  A sense of belonging110 and being valued creates trust that encourages 
open discussion and the exchange of ideas because subordinates work together for the 
group rather than in ruthless competition for the leader’s favour.  In simple terms if 
people like and trust each other they will communicate in a free and uninhibited way.  
This atmosphere engenders natural risk taking and innovation.111   
 
According to Goleman affiliative leadership is particularly appropriate in response to a 
group damaged by lack of trust and integrity among leaders.  It is also beneficial in 
dangerous environments such as war when leaders and subordinates need trust and an 
affinity for and with each other.  However, in Goleman’s eyes affiliative leadership 
should not be used on its own as its focus on praise, friendship and loyalty can lead to 
poor performance with standards neglected in favour of cordiality.  This can permit a 
creeping mediocrity to intrude upon the organisation, leading ultimately to failure.  
Goleman argues that a combination of authoritative and affiliative leadership is a highly 
effective mix.112 
 
To Goleman democratic leadership encourages participation and the exchange of ideas 
between leaders and subordinates.  He suggests true consensus can be highly effective 
in creating trust and commitment.113 However, it often takes time, can be used to avoid 
decision making and should never be used in a crisis.114  It was inappropriate for the 
repeated crises that Rokossovskiy encountered especially during 1941 and in the actual 
conduct of operations.  However, if used intelligently with judgement in an appropriate 
manner Goleman argues democratic leadership can have a distinctly positive impact. 
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The fifth style of leadership assessed by Goleman is pacesetting.  In Goleman’s eyes a 
pacesetter has demanding standards encapsulated in the notion of “do as I do, now.”115  
These leaders are perfectionists “obsessive about doing things better and faster” judging 
themselves and others severely.  There is an assumption and expectation that 
exceptional performance is normal.  Task is everything and those deemed responsible 
for failure are cast aside.  Pacesetters have a highly developed sense of duty, with a 
visible and distinctly overt leadership style, that demands instant compliance, combined 
with unstinting application to duty.  In many respects, such men or women are what 
society and the individual themselves call natural leaders.  They tend to be impatient 
and brusque, with a keen sense of hierarchy and power.   
 
In Goleman’s research despite its natural affinity to popular notions of leadership the 
impact of pacesetting leadership was generally negative.116  As well as extracting and 
imposing high standards, it was also associated with the fear of failure and117  
punishment.  In the longer term pacesetting creates a culture where initiative and 
imagination are squashed in the race to comply.  It also encourages micromanagement 
rather than delegation with leaders inclined to prescribe how something should be done 
as well as what should be done in order to retain control and ward off the lurking 
anxiety of failure.  However, Goleman acknowledged that pacesetting is also a highly 
effective leadership tool if used intelligently with the right people, in particular highly 
motivated subordinates that are capable and efficient.118 
 
The coaching style of leadership is associated with the nurturing of talent for the future.  
It is more experimental 119 and less directly concerned with results.  It is a strategic form 
of leadership and Goleman argues that although its impact is generally positive it is 
uncommon because even peacetime leaders are dominated by time and the tyranny of 
tangible results.120  Yet, there is clear evidence following the maelstrom of survival in 
the period June 1941-March 1942 that Rokossovskiy established a culture that identified 
and developed leaders at all levels of command.  In the circumstances of the Great 
Patriotic War and Stalin’s Red Army this was a truly radical and impressive piece of 
leadership. 
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In summary, Goleman discusses six styles of leadership that are related and overlap but 
are distinct.  There is a natural connection between the coercive and pacesetting forms 
of leadership as there is between democratic, affiliative and coaching styles of 
leadership.  In the opinion of this author Goleman’s theory is held together by a master 
principle which is actually more of a quality than a theory of leadership, namely 
judgment.  Judgement is an intangible matter; “at the lowest levels, judgement is a 
matter of common sense tempered by military experience.  As responsibility increases, 
greater judgement is required of commanders, which is largely a function of knowledge 
and intellect.”121  Therefore, at Rokossovskiy’s rank, a refined intellectual judgement 
was of critical importance.  It was a key characteristic of his leadership and operational 
command.  
 
Authoritarian Leaders and the Red Army Leadership Culture 
The historical image of the Red Army’s leadership style is a complex one.  It is 
dominated122 by images of politically reliable and ruthless 
commanders, driving on their troops, regardless of 
casualties.  There is some truth in this image.  As Hastings 
observed “Konev is sometimes described as ‘ruthless’.  This 
adjective seems superfluous in speaking of any Soviet 
commander.  None could hold his rank or perform the tasks 
demanded of the Red Army without possessing a contempt 
for life unusual even in the ranks of the Waffen SS.”123   
The Red Army’s commanders have been portrayed, almost without exception, as 
callous disciplinarians, representatives of a brutal Stalinist state, who ruthlessly 
wielded the immense human and material resources of the Red Army.    
 
It is rare for a Soviet commander to be presented as anything other than 
authoritarian in his style of leadership, although occasionally ‘tragic’ heroes such 
as Tukhachevskiy are presented as charismatic autocrats.124  Indeed, “there is no 
biographical evidence to suggest that Stalin’s marshals possessed either cultural 
refinement or humanitarian scruple, that any was, in truth, much more than a 
militarily gifted brute.”125  It is rare for a Soviet commander to be presented as an 
 
Figure 57: I. Konev 
(en.wikipedia.com) 
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intelligent general, a master of the art of war, capable of out-thinking their 
opponents.  It is even more unusual for history to contemplate the possibility that 
a leading Red Army commander may have possessed a discerning, thoughtful 
style of leadership.   
 
At the same time there is recognition of the talents of senior commanders.  Indeed, 
as Hastings concedes, 
“at the highest level, Soviet generalship was much more imaginative than 
that of the Western armies.  Zhukov was the outstanding allied commander 
of the Second World War, more effective than his Anglo-American 
counterparts, master of the grand envelopment.  Several other Soviet 
marshals – Vasilevsky,(sic) Konev, Chernyhakhovsky,(sic) 
Rokossovsky(sic) - displayed the highest gifts.”126 
 
In the immediate aftermath of World War Two, many German officers thought 
“the higher echelons of the Russian command proved capable from the very 
beginning of the war and learned a great deal more during its course.  They were 
flexible, full of initiative, and energetic.”127  Yet, there is always a caveat: that 
they were almost inhuman in their ruthless use of the immense, hapless numbers 
at their disposal.  German commanders believed “the large number of troop units 
that were available gave the Soviet command an advantage over the 
Germans………..In addition, the low valuation placed on human life freed the 
Soviet high command from moral inhibitions.” 128  During the Cold War, western 
historiography tended to ignore the positive assessments and judge the Red Army 
by the negative.   
 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that the entire leadership culture of 
Soviet society was brutal and callous.  Stalin’s attitude to losses was complete 
indifference.   
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“For him only the goal mattered.  He was never tormented by conscience 
or grief at the enormous losses.  News that large numbers of divisions, or 
corps or armies had been destroyed would alarm 
him, but there is not a single document in Staff HQ 
archives showing his concern about the number of 
lives lost.  He was oblivious of the fundamental 
principle of military art, namely, that the objective 
should be gained at minimal cost in human life.  
He believed that both victories and defeats 
inevitably reaped a bitter harvest, that it was an 
inescapable fact of modern warfare……….Given 
such vast military strength and a well-organized system of reserves, it 
seemed to Stalin quite unnecessary to make the attainment of strategic 
targets dependent on the scale of losses.”129 
 
Therefore, Stalin’s marshals were men of their times, a reflection of a cruel 
political system that placed no value on individual life.  The fact that “Stalin knew 
that Zhukov conceded nothing to him in toughness of character” is to be damned 
by appalling faint praise.130  During the war, according to Khrushchev, if a 
commander complained about incompetence, Stalin would often ask if the 
commander had punched the offender, and if he had not, to do so in the future.131   
 
In the early days of Barbarossa, in the absence of effective communications, this 
punitive, authoritarian culture left able commanders paralysed, caught between the 
Wehrmacht, Stalin’s NKVD and political commissars.  In 1941-42, authoritarian 
conformists of little talent, or able men intimidated into abject submission, were 
not what the Red Army needed to overcome the Wehrmacht.  Stalin’s 
authoritarian and vindictive instincts ensured that, at least initially, he sought to 
manage the crisis by institutionalising authoritarian conformity, rather than 
promoting those of a more imaginative, but potentially independent outlook.  It is 
perhaps a credit to Stalin’s intellect, that in the end, this most natural and cruel 
autocrat, realised that the Soviet Union’s survival depended on at least a 
 
Figure 58: Stalin 
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temporary relaxation of the mental shackles, that did so much to consolidate his 
own political power.   
 
Rokossovskiy and the Encouragement of Initiative 
Once the Red Army had established its consensus about 
the dominance of the operational level it was imperative 
that commanders fused all tactical units into one coherent 
operational whole.  In the context of operational 
synchronisation this had quite significant implications for 
the relative importance of tactical and operational 
initiative.  In 1924, Tukhachevskiy argued, 
“any suggestion of the exercise of independent 
command by junior commanders is unacceptable.  Not knowing the 
general situation, junior commanders are always liable to take decisions 
incompatible with it and this may engender a catastrophe.  It may cause a 
boldly conceived and executed operation, requiring precise co-operation 
between its component parts, to start coming apart at the seams.”132 
This became the general model of wartime practice, although Rokossovskiy was 
more inclined to encourage initiative than Tukhachevskiy and many wartime 
commanders.  The degree of operational centralisation practised by the Red Army 
in the Great Patriotic War has often provoked discussion about the relative lack of 
creative initiative displayed by Soviet tactical commanders.  German officers 
frequently claimed that Soviet tactical commanders carried out the plan regardless 
of the tactical circumstances that confronted them in battle.  In contrast, the 
Germans acknowledged that operational commanders such as Rokossovskiy were 
highly imaginative. 
 
By autumn 1942, the test of war had removed politically reliable but militarily 
incompetent figures such as Voroshilov133 and Budenny.134  They were replaced 
by professionals such as Zhukov, Vasilveskiy, Rokossovskiy, Konev and Vatutin, 
supported by capable army commanders, staff officers and mobile group 
commanders.  However, the disparity in creativity between operational and 
 
Figure 59: M. Tukhachevskiy 
(istorya.ru) 
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tactical commanders reflected the Red Army’s doctrinal belief that tactical 
success was fleeting, while operational success was decisive.  Soviet tactical 
command was defined by the wider operational plan, not individual tactical 
success.  The Red Army constantly urged its tactical commanders to display 
initiative in battle, but the Russian word initsiatiava did not, and does not mean 
the same as the western word initiative.  Soviet initsiatiava was about executing 
your tactical mission as effectively and rapidly as possible.  It was simply one 
piece in an overall operational picture, one step in a sequence of leaps designed to 
achieve the objective.  There was no place for unscripted, individual tactical 
initiative.   
 
Soviet tactical commanders did display considerable tactical wit, native cunning 
and ingenuity in surmounting the obstacles to an advance, but genuinely creative 
tactical flair was frequently subordinated to wider operational interests.  Equally, 
it is true to say that many Soviet tactical commanders showed little tactical 
imagination, were slavishly subservient to the letter of the plan and got their men 
slaughtered.  In effect, the Red Army curtailed tactical creativity in order to ensure 
operational coherence; without it operational synchronisation would have been 
more or less impossible, despite the fact that it was considered essential. 
 
Since the 1980’s the British Army and the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have 
developed a philosophy of leadership and command known as mission command.  
The British Army argues that “mission command is a philosophy of decentralized 
command intended for situations which are complex, dynamic and adversarial.”135  
Mission command is based around the idea that a leader and commander’s 
responsibility, at all levels within the chain of command, is to inform his 
subordinates of what is required, namely the mission, but refrain from instructing 
them on how it should be done.  In short, the commander outlines his intentions, 
or intent, and then delegates responsibility, relying on subordinates’ ability, 
initiative, creativity and will to accomplish the mission.   
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It is the senior commander’s responsibility to define the parameters of the mission 
thus conveying a clear framework of understanding within which subordinates are 
encouraged to use their initiative and imagination.  In essence, “the commander’s 
intent binds the activities of a dispersed force into a whole while maximising his 
subordinates authority to act.”136  Mission command formally delegates authority 
and power to subordinates but clarifies, directs and restrains their actions by 
emphasising the need to act in accordance with the commander’s intent.  In short, 
mission command does not confer complete independence of command because it 
recognises that unregulated individual initiative will produce chaos rather than 
flexible unity of effort in pursuit of the objective. 
 
As a philosophy, mission command has several strengths.  It encourages the 
acceptance of responsibility from the earliest stages of an individual’s career. By 
advocating the tolerance of well-intentioned mistakes, officers are given the 
opportunity to practice and refine their habits of decision making and judgement, 
marrying them with experience and intellect.  Furthermore, by allowing 
subordinates to exercise their initiative commanders are able to acquire a more 
informed and realistic understanding of their subordinates’ capabilities rather than 
observing a choreographed rendition of a well scripted performance.  In a similar 
way, subordinates acquire a more realistic understanding of their own role, that of 
others and a greater awareness and understanding of what is and what is not 
possible.  In theory, mission command fosters a culture infused with natural 
flexibility, creative imagination, risk taking, decisiveness and confident self-
reliance.  It becomes a way of thinking, not simply a formal method of command.  
As a result operations are conducted in a dynamic and flexible manner that saves 
time and instills natural speed and tempo into a unified effort to achieve the 
mission. 
 
Nevertheless, mission command also contains potential weaknesses which are not 
necessarily systemic but a product of the variables of human nature.  If the 
commander’s intent is unclear, poorly expressed, inadequately understood or 
unrealistic, then confusion and disunity of effort can result as subordinates 
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interpret their missions differently in relation to their perception of the 
commander’s intent.  Equally, undisciplined and egotistical subordinates can 
subvert the inherent flexibility within mission command.  This corrodes trust, a 
key element of mission command, and risks a situation where individual initiative 
is not exercised in pursuit of the commander’s intent.  Naturally, unscripted, ill-
disciplined individual initiative can seriously undermine unity of effort.  Mission 
command is a philosophy that encourages the use of individual initiative within 
defined parameters to achieve the objective.  In short, the use of initiative is a 
means to an end but there is a danger that individuals will see independence of 
command and decision making as a right in itself. 
 
In World War Two, German commanders were often highly creative in fashioning 
encirclements and the German concept of auftragstaktik made a virtue out of 
improvised tactical creativity.137  Auftragstaktik was a German command method 
begun in the period of reform initiated by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau between 
1806-1813 following the catastrophic Prussian defeat inflicted by Napoleon at 
Jena-Auerstadt in October 1806.  It was a response to the growing scale of the 
battlefield and to the shocking, lethargic performance of the Prussian officer 
corps.  It was a key German command principle throughout the nineteenth century 
and into the twentieth century.   
 
It is widely believed to have been a key factor in Prussia’s victory over Austria in 
1866 and in the Prussian/German victory over France in 1870.  The concept of 
auftragstaktik  reached its apogee during the inter-war years138 and was refined by 
Hans von Seeckt, the head of the Reichswehr (1919-1926).  Seeckt considered it 
to be essential that leaders on the spot made quick decisions based on instinct.139  
Soldiers and junior officers were to be “independent thinkers.”140  Yet Seeckt also 
emphasised the key quality of judgment, stressing the need to “understand when 
to act independently and when to wait for orders.”141   
 
The concept of mission command is often seen as an evolution of the historic and 
contemporary German notion of auftragstaktik.  In the sense that both 
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philosophies of leadership and command incorporate, either through choice or 
necessity, the ideas of delegation, they are clearly related.  However, recent 
historical opinion has questioned the extent to which mission command is a direct 
product of auftragstaktik.  In his recent, comprehensive historical study of The 
German Way of War Robert M. Citino142 has challenged contemporary Anglo-
American assumptions concerning auftragstaktik.  He argues, 
“it is customary today, in U.S. military circles for example, to use the term 
Auftragstaktik to describe the German doctrine of command.  According to 
the common explanation, the supreme commander (typically the Chief of 
the General Staff) devised a mission (Auftrag), but left the methods and the 
means of achieving it to the officer on the spot.  They could handle their 
commands as they saw fit, as long as they were acting within the mission 
defined by the supreme commander.  Analysts typically see this flexible 
command system as one of the secrets to German battlefield success.  In 
fact, defined in that way, Auftragstaktik is completely mythological.  The 
Germans hardly ever used the term when discussing issues of command.  
Rather , they spoke of ‘the independence of subordinate commanders,’ 
which is a very different thing.”143 
 
There is clear evidence that many Prussian and German commanders understood 
auftragstaktik’s primary meaning as independence of their command, namely that 
the field commander had the right, even the duty, to make independent decisions, 
even if this, as it frequently did, undermined overall operational cohesion in 
pursuit of strategic objectives, precisely the point outlined by Tukhachevskiy in 
1924.  In effect, many German field commanders appeared to reject the idea that 
their right to exercise initiative was bound and confined by the modern 
contemporary concept of the commander’s intent.  On occasions, senior Prussian 
and German commanders interpretations of auftragstaktik very nearly induced 
German defeat rather than victory  The stubborn independence exercised by 
commanders often directly contradicted and regularly subverted the overall 
commander’s intent.  In 1866, the activities of Prince Frederick Charles of 
Prussia,commanding 1st Prussian Army, and General Albrecht von Manstein, a 
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divisional commander who claimed he didn’t know Moltke, the supreme 
commander and ignored his instructions, severely threatened Moltke’s overall 
intent.  In short, 
“the Bohemian campaign was an example of Auftragstaktik only if having 
subordinate commanders ignore your directives, march south when you’ve 
distinctly ordered them to march east, and treat you with barely disguised 
contempt are truly a form of ‘flexible command.’  Frederick Charles of the 
1st Army, for example, had no understanding at all of Moltke’s strategy, 
didn’t much like the parts he did understand, and was loath to follow 
anything but a direct order from his uncle, the king.” 144 
 
Similarly, in 1870, the Prussian 1st Army’s commander, General Karl von 
Steinmetz engaged in an entirely unauthorised southward advance so he could 
fight the enemy where he had found them, regardless of the fact that he was 
directly contradicting von Moltke’s orders and nearly destroyed the entire 
operational plan.145  Likewise in August 1914, a solo eastward advance by corps 
commander, General Hermann von Francois, part of the 8th Prussian Army under 
General von Prittwitz, compromised the whole scheme of operations.  As his 
single corps engaged the Russians, Francois ignored Prittwitz’s orders to break off 
the battle.  Francois replied that he would break off, more or less, in his own good 
time when he had defeated the Russians.146  
 
The explanation for this apparently gross insubordination by such senior 
commanders is that they considered themselves to be following what they 
believed to be the single, dominant characteristic of the Prussian/German way of 
warfare, one they assumed almost without thinking was the commander’s intent, 
indeed the whole point of a war.147  Namely, that victory in war is achieved 
through the destruction of the enemy force in the field.  Senior commanders such 
as Moltke, understood that in pursuit of destroying the enemy in the field one 
required an overall plan in order to determine where, when and why one fought an 
enemy in order to maximise the chances of inflicting a massive defeat on an 
opponent.  In short, some battles were and are more important than others.  
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However, other German commanders, seem to have believed that one fought the 
enemy wherever you found them.  In their eyes this was why independence of 
command existed, to give field commanders the freedom and speed to find the 
enemy and destroy him.   
 
Clausewitz had repeatedly emphasised that “direct annihilation of the enemy’s 
forces must be the dominant consideration” in a war.148  In Citino’s words “this 
was the Clausewitz that most German officers knew, rather than the sage who 
wrote that ‘war is the continuation of policy by other means’.”149  In the period 
1866-1945, the German Army was obsessed with achieving the Clausewitzian 
ideal of the destruction of the enemy army in the field, through encirclement and 
annihilation or the kesselschlacht.  If armies were bigger, then axiomatically, 
encirclements had to be larger.  This scaling up of tactical principles reached its 
apogee, or nadir, with the Schlieffen Plan of August 1914, a war plan to encircle 
and annihilate more or less the entire French armed forces in a matter of weeks.   
 
In the Great Patriotic War, the Germans often appeared to sacrifice operational 
coherence on the altar of tactical creativity, with unity of effort loosely maintained 
by the idea of the kesselschlacht, the equivalent of the commander’s intent.  To 
the Soviets constant tactical improvisation was bad planning, not a military virtue, 
indicative of a lack of creative foresight.  Improvisation was a method of crisis 
management, not a standard operating procedure.  To the Germans, it was an 
acknowledgement of the chaotic nature of war.  The Germans expected tactical 
creativity during an operation in order to adapt and overcome, whereas the Soviets 
expected creative foresight to foresee and avoid.  In practice the polarised nature 
of these positions was significantly amended by the realities of fighting and 
Rokossovskiy certainly encouraged his junior officers to show more creativity 
than was customary in the course of an operation.  Nevertheless, the Germans and 
Soviets did have a different philosophical approach to the question of where, 
when, how, by whom and why creative initiative was exercised. 
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The size of Rokossovskiy’s commands, the need for timely decisions and the Red 
Army’s authoritarian leadership culture meant that Rokossovskiy’s style of 
leadership was confined to a limited numbers of senior officers, but it was very 
different from that of his contemporaries and succeeded in creating a different 
leadership culture.  In the contemporary era this might be classified or at least 
acknowledged as related to the idea of transformational leadership.  In his 
memoirs Rokossovskiy constantly remarks upon the need for creative thinking, 
trust, risk taking and the intelligent use of initiative.150  The evidence of the Great 
Patriotic War suggests that Rokossovskiy’s ideas were a genuine reflection of his 
actions, rather than a retrospective justification of a reality that had never existed.   
 
In contrast to Vatutin, who, by his own admission, allowed his staff officer 
training to persuade him of the need to do everything himself, 151 Rokossovskiy 
exploited his officers by granting them freedom to use their initiative.  Batov, 65th 
Army’s commander declared “from the summer of 1942 
until the end of the war I served under the command of this 
outstanding general”152 who 
“encouraged in every possible way the use of 
initiative and the showing of quick wit in battle.  He 
demanded talented people and students all of the 
time.  For the capable ones who had distinguished 
themselves in battle were created Front courses for junior officers and 
second lieutenants: they prepared our platoon and company 
commanders.”153 
 
In an army and state, notorious before and during the war, for discouraging the 
use of initiative, especially among junior officers, Rokossovskiy’s commitment to 
the use of creativity and initiative, among all officers, not just the senior 
commanders, was particularly noteworthy.  This is clear evidence of 
Rokossovskiy’s commitment to an authoritative rather than authoritarian style of 
leadership.  It was distinctly unusual and the closest that any senior Red Army 
commander got to the modern concept of mission command and the German idea 
 
Figure 60: P.I. Batov 
(www.coldwar.hu) 
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of aufstragtaktik.  Rokossovskiy’s impact on his junior officers was indirect, but 
he established the leadership and command culture in which they were trained and 
quite deliberately coached in order to nurture talent and ensure that it realised its 
full potential.  In short, in keeping with the achievement orientated leadership of 
path-goal theory, as an authoritative leader Rokossovskiy laid down the standard 
and ensured that courses were set up to develop and exploit natural leadership 
talent.   
 
The degree of personal initiative Rokossovskiy conferred on his senior 
commanders did contain certain perils.  It occasionally undermined rather than 
engendered operational synchronisation.  In February 1943, Kryukov’s 
impetuousness led 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps into a difficult situation.  154  None 
could accuse Kryukov of lack of initiative, perhaps judgement, but Rokossovskiy 
was never a commander to penalise initiative even if it occasionally led to 
mistakes.  Similarly, during the East Prussian Operation of January 1945, a small 
tank group broke into the Prussian town of Elbing and scattered its startled 
citizens by marching down the high street.  However, it became isolated and later 
2nd Shock Army had to launch a rescue operation.  Rokossovskiy was not pleased 
but there were no repercussions as this was clearly misguided initiative.   
 
If Rokossovskiy had personal reservations, he was 
prepared to allow an enterprising commander to prove 
him wrong.  In March 1945, 2nd Belorussian Front 
confronted the town of Stolp, in western Pomerania.  
After Stettin, Stolp was the second biggest town in the 
region.  It was heavily fortified and when A.P. 
Panfilov, 3rd Guards Tank Corps’ commander, claimed 
he could penetrate the town’s defences in twenty-four 
hours, Rokossovskiy was highly sceptical.  Nevertheless, in the wake of a clever 
tactical manoeuvre, Panfilov’s troops deceived the defenders and burst into Stolp, 
followed by 19th Army.155   
 
 
Figure 61: A.P. Panfilov 
(Rokossovskiy, 1985) 
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In August 1943, the initiative of 60th Army’s commander, Chernyakhovskiy, had 
rescued the faltering Cherigov-Pripyat Operation.  
However, as the subsequent operation developed 
“Chernyakhovsky’s insistence on advancing 
towards Kiev prevented the Army from widening 
the bridgehead.  Several days were wasted on 
fruitless attacks.”156  Rokossovskiy was more 
irritated about this entirely unscripted activity 
because it was not, unlike Kryukov, done in 
pursuit of an objective set by Rokossovskiy.  In 
effect, Chernyakhovskiy, had established a small operation of his own.  Naturally, 
this undermined the operational synchronisation of the Central Front, where 
Rokossovskiy was to establish as many sizeable bridgeheads across the Dnepr as 
possible.  This was insubordination, not the misguided, but welcome, use of 
initiative that Rokossovskiy was invariably inclined to accept. 
 
This style of leadership was very much in tune with the achievement-orientated 
strand of path-goal theory.  The aim was to develop the performance of all officers 
in order to maximise the Front’s fighting power.  It is no accident that dynamic, 
creative and imaginative commanders like P.I. Batov (1897-1985),157 I.D. 
Chernyakhovskiy(1906-1945),158 N.P. Pukhov (1895-1958),159 I.I. Fedyuninskiy 
(1900-1977),160 and V.T. Volskiy (1897-1946)161 flourished under Rokossovskiy.  
Old style Bolsheviks, full of ideological ardour, authoritarianism, but little wit or 
mental agility such as I.V. Boldin (1892-1965) and G.K. Kozlov (1902-1970)162 
did not thrive.  Furthermore, by displaying confidence and trust in his senior 
commanders Rokossovskiy created time and space for critical operational 
decisions.  In essence, and in sharp contrast with Vatutin, Rokossovskiy identified 
the decisions that mattered and was not unduly concerned with those that did not.  
These he left to Mikhail Sergeyevich Malinin, (1899-1960)163 his Chief of Staff 
from August 1941-November 1944, who Rokossovskiy described as a “calm, 
pedantic man with full confidence in himself and his subordinates.  One never 
doubted his ability to see that an order was carried out.”164  In short, Rokossovskiy 
 
Figure 62: I.D. Chernyakhovskiy 
(Rokossovskiy, 1985) 
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had a natural understanding of the difference between leadership and 
management, or command and staff work.  Rokossovskiy led, Malinin managed. 
 
Consultation In Planning Operations: The Encouragement of Initiative 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that Rokossovskiy’s commitment to 
consulting his colleagues about the planning and subsequent conduct of 
forthcoming operations was more than just a rhetorical device deployed in his 
memoirs to preserve his reputation for posterity.  Rokossovskiy always retained 
the ultimate power of decision, but involved senior officers in the planning of 
operations, as a matter of policy, not as an exception to the rule.  Rokossovskiy 
displayed an openness to ideas that has now been confirmed as a key personality 
trait in leadership.  The evidence suggests that such leaders tend to be informed, 
creative and insightful.165   
 
Batov suggests that when difficult problems were anticipated or confronted, 
Rokossovskiy was open to advice, suggestions and alternative proposals.166 In his 
opinion “this created a wonderful working atmosphere - neither constrained, nor 
apprehensive about speaking their minds, using their judgement.”167  It is easy to 
be sceptical of this statement but in Stalin’s Red Army this was an extraordinary 
state of affairs entirely out of keeping with the wider culture of the Red Army.  
This evidence suggests that by the contemporary standards of the Red Army, 
Rokossovskiy might be considered as a genuinely transformational leader who 
created a truly distinct working atmosphere within his command.  It was borne of 
his vision that army officers should be creative, imaginative, dynamic, decisive, 
with an almost vocational sense of duty, commitment to the highest standards and 
imbued with a desire to excel. 
 
By instinct, Rokossovskiy was personally creative and innovative in military 
thinking.  Indeed, the cultivation of ideas was central to his style of leadership.  In 
the period August 1941-November 1944, many of these ideas came from 
Rokossovskiy’s command group, made up of senior staff officers and army 
commander.  At the end of July 1941, Group Rokossovskiy, the ad hoc force that 
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became 16th Army, was reinforced by the full strength 7th Mechanised Corps.  It 
was the beginning of a long association for the staff of 7th Mechanised Corps 
remained with Rokossovskiy, in one form or another, until November 1944.   
 
Rokossovskiy’s senior commanders remained remarkably stable during the Great 
Patriotic War and this was undoubtedly a key factor in his operational success.  In 
the course of the war, until they parted in November 1944, this group of officers, 
led by Rokossovskiy, endured a range of situations, crises, defeat, failure, 
triumph, improvisation, planning, defence, attack, exhaustion and euphoria.  
Rokossovskiy knew his senior commanders well and considered an effective 
senior command team an essential aspect of leadership and command.  They were 
not simply the executors of his will, but a brains trust, men whose opinions he 
invited and considered, though it would be wrong to suggest they offered their 
thoughts as if it was their right.  Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership did contain 
participatory aspects, but it was not democratic leadership in its fullest sense. 
 
The importance of a genuine, senior command team 
was of central importance, not optional, to 
Rokossovskiy’s authoritative style of leadership.  On 
one occasion, Batov recalled Rokossovskiy saying to 
Malinin, his chief of artillery, Vasily Ivanovich 
Kazakov (1898-1968),168 Proshlyakov, chief of 
engineers and Oryol, the armoured commander that 
he was glad to serve with them and they were his 
men.169  In the contemporary era this would be termed affiliative leadership.  In 
the period August 1941-May 1945, many of the senior command staff and the 
army commanders remained under Rokossovskiy’s leadership for an unusually 
sustained period of time.  Certainly, Rokossovskiy, whether for personal or 
professional reasons, seems to have been closer to some commanders and senior 
officers than others. 
 
 
Figure 63: A.I. Proshlyakov 
(Rokossovskiy, 1985) 
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These men served with Rokossovskiy from August 1941-November 1944, in a 
partnership that survived and prospered, until 12th November 1944, when Stalin 
moved Rokossovskiy to 2nd Belorussian Front.  In the months and years from 
August 1941-November 1944, every time Stavka moved Rokossovskiy to another 
operational command, he always requested that this inner circle of officers went 
with him.  These men, in conjunction with army commanders such as Batov, 
Fedyuninskiy who served with Rokossovskiy for prolonged periods of time, 
performed an important psychological as well as professional role.  According to 
Batov, Rokossovskiy “did not like solitude, striving to work closely with his 
staff.”170  In one sense, one might interpret this as a sign of extraversion, the 
tendency to be sociable and assertive that research suggests are a common trait of 
leaders.171 However, it seems more likely that this was a considered aspect of 
Rokossovskiy’s leadership and an indication of the psychological horrors he 
endured in extended solitary confinement during the Purges.   
 
In the absence of this team of trusted, competent officers, Rokossovskiy’s ‘in’ 
crowd, it is difficult to see how Rokossovskiy could have practised the 
authoritative, but in many respects surprisingly participatory and democratic style 
of leadership, that became his hallmark on the Eastern Front.  In a contemporary 
context Rokossovskiy seems to have instinctively appreciated that in the Red 
Army, elements of affiliative and democratic leadership had considerable benefits 
in fusing task and relationship behaviour in order to get the military job done.  It 
also seems reasonable to conclude that in the wake of the Purges of the 1930’s 
and the witchhunt for scapegoats in 1941, Rokossovskiy’s use of what is now 
termed affiliative leadership must have been a powerful psychological tool that 
created tremendous trust between him and his senior command team.  In Stalin’s 
Soviet Union and Zhukov’s Red Army trust was a rare, one is tempted to say 
mythical and magical commodity that gave Rokossovskiy’s senior commanders 
the courage to use their initiative and speak their minds. 
 
During the planning of Operation Kol’tso, in December 1942, “all the leading 
Front and Army command personnel, generals and officers with experience and 
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knowledge were drawn into this work.”172  Of those senior officers, Rokossovskiy 
declared “what I liked best about them was their ability to uphold their views.”173  
During the preparations for Kursk, army commanders and staff officers were 
consulted extensively, while as a matter of principle, in his memoirs 
Rokossovskiy went out of his way to praise his senior officers, particularly 
unheralded ones, such as Proshlyakov, Chief of Engineers, whom Rokossovskiy 
singled out as having played a critical role in the defensive victory at Kursk.174   
 
In November 1943, in preparation for the Gomel-Rechitsa Operation, 
“the plan of the operation was the work of a large team.  The initial 
estimates had been drawn up by the Front Headquarters…….later the tasks 
had been worked out in detail with the army commanders, who had been 
assembled at P.I. Batov’s C.P.  This was a system of preparing for an 
operation that I always adhered to - time permitting of course.”175 
In the summer of 1944, Rokossovskiy attributed much of 1st Belorussian Front’s 
success in Operation Bagration and the Lublin-Brest Operation to the fact that 
“with the army commanders we had drawn up a detailed plan of the operation, 
fixing the main zones of the attack and giving concrete tasks to every 
formation.”176  This enabled Rokossovskiy to convey to his commanders a 
genuine understanding of the operational concept that underpinned his operational 
plans.  In particular, it made his tactical commanders aware of their role in the 
overall operation.   
 
Rokossovskiy’s sustained commitment to consultation and the encouragement of 
initiative in planning is borne out by the fact that he was still using it, indeed 
extending it further by the time of the East Prussian Operation, in January-
February 1945. 
“In all these preparations I employed the system of staff work which had 
served me so well in the past.  The operation was prepared by the 
collective effort of the personnel.  At headquarters we discussed the plans 
before taking final decisions, exchanged views on the utilisation and co-
ordination of the various arms and services, and heard and discussed 
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reports by officers from various formations.  We were thus able to avoid 
wasting time summoning department, arm and service chiefs, and listening 
to long, tiresome reports.  Procedures that had seemed suitable in 
peacetime did not justify themselves in war.”177  
The East Prussian Operation was particularly significant as Rokossovskiy was 
dealing with a different group of staff officers.  In the aftermath of Stalin’s 
decision to remove him from 1st Belorussian Front, in favour of Zhukov, on 12th 
November 1944, Rokossovskiy did not request that his usual group of staff 
officers should follow him to 2nd Belorussian Front.178   
 
It is interesting, that in January-March 1945, when conducting the East Prussian 
and East Pomeranian Operations with some different army commanders and 
especially staff officers, not of his own choice, with many ‘unschooled’ in his 
style of operations, Rokossovskiy was more authoritarian in his style of 
command, than at any stage, since the opening, chaotic weeks of the war.  
Nevertheless, in general Rokossovskiy’s style of command was marked by a 
commitment to work with senior officers in an authoritative style of leadership 
that also contained a substantial element of democratic leadership.  These close, 
trusted colleagues enabled Rokossovskiy’s method of leadership and command to 
work better, but ultimately they were a symptom of a well thought out style of 
leadership, they were not its co-authors.  It was highly successful and by the 
contemporary standards of the Red Army, a radical, bold, almost transformational 
style of leadership.  In the words of Batov, “looking back everyone wanted to 
think more confidently, function more confidently.”179 
 
The contrast between Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership and 
Sokolovskiy’s could hardly have been greater.  In its 1944 
report on Sokolovskiy’s Western Front the Stavka received 
information that, 
“the front commander, Comrade Sokolovsky(sic), is 
separated from his closest assistants-the commanders of 
the forces branches and the chiefs of the services by many  
Figure 64: Sokolovskiy 
(commons.wikipedia.org) 
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days, does not use them, and does not resolve their questions.  Some of the 
deputy commanders did not know about the missions of their branch forces 
with regard to ongoing operations, to say nothing of the fact that they were 
not included in the preparation of the operations.”180  
 
Rokossovskiy appreciated and understood the importance of senior officers 
speaking their mind and defending their judgement in a constructive exchange of 
views.  The Front’s command staff were his brains trust and to be cultivated and 
exploited in the planning and conduct of operations.  However, elsewhere,  
“The Western Front staff did not perform its role.  The staff is aloof and torn 
away from the front command and from vital missions resolved by its forces 
and, in essence, is some sort of statistical bureau, which only gathers 
information on the situation, and even this is late.  Matters of planning 
operations, organizing battle, and controlling the commander’s decision on 
matters is withdrawn from the staff’s functions.  During the course of 4 
months, the chief of staff and the entire staff were located a distance of 
about 100 kilometers from the disposition of the front commander, and 
during this time the commander and the chief of staff met one another no 
more than 3-4 times.”181  
This distant, detached style of leadership was not tolerated or practised by 
Rokossovskiy.  Indeed, the evidence is that he would have found such leadership 
and command incomprehensible, a contradiction in terms. 
 
Honest Reporting and Trust: The Encouragement of Ideas and Initiative 
Rokossovskiy’s officers did speak their mind rather than merely echo the thoughts 
of their commander.  On 26th January 1945, during a 
blizzard in a particularly intense phase of the East Prussian 
Operation, Rokossovskiy received an urgent message from 
N.I. Gusev (1897-1962),182 48th Army’s commander.  
Gusev warned that strong German forces were counter-
attacking west.  He doubted whether his own 48th Army 
 
Figure 65: N.I. Gusev 
(Rokossovskiy, 1985) 
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could hold them.   
Therefore, “knowing Gusev only too well as an intelligent and 
experienced general, we realised that, once he had raised the alarm, the 
danger was real.  We went into action at once, rushing a substantial 
portion of the forces of 5th Guards Tank Army, the 8th Tank Corps and 3rd 
Guards Cavalry Corps into the breach.”183 
 
The wisdom of Gusev’s information was borne out by the subsequent actions of 
the General Staff in sending out a warning of the German counter-attack, with the 
possibility that Soviet forces might have to be rushed to East Prussia should the 
attack develop into a full blown counter-offensive.184  This did not materialise but 
the benefits of mutual trust and honest reporting in the encouragement of initiative 
are clear from this episode.  Rokossovskiy’s commitment to honest reporting 
ensured that he dealt with reality, not a fiction contrived by commanders fearful of 
being made a scapegoat for events beyond their control.  This was not always the 
case with other Soviet commanders.   
 
In April 1944, the Stavka report on Sokolovskiy’s Western Front during 1943-
1944 in Belorussia indicated that it was consumed by a culture of dishonest 
reporting that seriously affected its combat performance.  This dishonesty and 
incompetence permeated the entire Western Front’s command culture.  In a 
specific section dealing with the front command, the report commented that in 
response to months of ineffective operations by the Western Front,  
“the front command did not present a report to the Stavka concerning these 
deficiencies and the reasons for the failure of the operations and, 
furthermore, did not disclose either for itself or for the Stavka the reasons 
the front did not fulfil the missions assigned by the Stavka.  In this instance 
the hushing up of the real reasons for the failure of the operations was 
nothing other than a form of deception of the Stavka by the front 
command.”185 
Numerous officers were aware of the flaws in the Western Front but had not dealt 
them because they were too intimidated to raise them.186 
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In contrast, on several occasions Rokossovskiy placed considerable trust in the 
initiative and abilities of army commanders, such as 60th Army’s 
Chernyhakhovskiy and 65th Army’s Batov.  This confidence and trust 
occasionally persuaded Rokossovskiy to alter Front operational plans in order to 
exploit opportunities created by commanders reacting to or shaping events in the 
field.  In August 1943, following 65th Army’s disappointing performance as the 
main strike army,187 Rokossovskiy ripped up the existing operational plan, to 
support 60th Army’s unexpected breakthrough, in what had originally been 
designated as a holding sector.188  The 60th Army smashed through the German 
defences.189  In a matter of weeks the Central Front had crossed the Dnepr, split 
Army Groups Centre and South and seriously threatened Fourth Panzer Army and 
Second German Army.190 
 
Delegation:The Encouragement of Ideas and Initiative 
Rokossovskiy was prepared to encourage risk taking and the use of initiative by 
delegating authority in a manner that is not usually associated with senior Red 
Army commanders.  However, Rokossovskiy not only delegated tasks to his 
officers but genuinely empowered his officers to use their talents and initiative in 
achieving complex and significant missions, not just mundane tasks.  On 10th 
November 1943, at the beginning of the Gomel Rechitsa Operation, Rokossovskiy 
decided that “since the main attack was in the 65th Army zone, I decided that the 
initial stages of the operation should be subordinated to the Army commander, 
P.I. Batov, thus giving him greater room for initiative.”191  In effect, 
Rokossovskiy was giving temporary control of the Front’s deep operational assets 
to a tactical commander.   
 
By 1944-45, such acts were more common among other Front commanders, but in 
autumn 1943, as well as delegating, Rokossovskiy was showing an unusual 
degree of trust and confidence in an army commander, his own judgement and his 
place within the Red Army high command.  Indeed, earlier in the war, on 5th July 
1943, at the height of the German assault at Kursk, when giving orders for 2nd 
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Tank Army to counter-attack, Rokossovskiy delegated active tactical leadership of 
the combined assault to 13th Army’s commander, Lieutenant General N.P. 
Pukhov.192   
 
By late 1943, Stalin had curbed his inclination to sack, scapegoat and execute 
generals, but it still took a brave commander to delegate authority and deliberately 
empower his subordinates in this way.  Nobody was under any illusions as to who 
would carry the ultimate responsibility for failure.  In such a centralised state and 
society, delegation and the fostering of individual initiative was not a natural 
instinct.  Rokossovskiy did not acquire his inclination to delegate from a Red 
Army system that was notoriously suspicious, not to say downright hostile, to 
such a command culture.  Yet, because of his style of leadership, Rokossovskiy 
understood his senior commanders well.  It was not a one off, but a habit, a style 
of command.  He chose well: Batov distinguished himself, took Rechitsa and 
paved the way for the Belorussian Front to establish a bridgehead at Zhlobin, over 
the massive, soggy Berezina-Dnepr confluence.193 
 
In his memoirs, Rokossovskiy gives an indication of his willingness to delegate 
and the confidence he was prepared to place in his commanders.  By January 
1945, Rokossovskiy was at 2nd Belorussian Front and “pleased with myself for not 
having succumbed to the temptation of taking my old colleagues with me.”194  On 
14th January 1945, the East Prussian Operation began, 
“the mist grew denser and the snow came down thicker.  A ceaseless 
rumble could be heard from the battlefield.  The OP had communications 
with all the armies of the forward and second echelons, as well as with 
formations subordinated to the Front.  We could receive all necessary 
information about the development of events at any time, but knowing 
from experience that in the initial stages of the fighting it is important not 
to distract the commanders from their task of troop control, I forbade 
anyone to call them, to telephone or telegraph.  Besides, I was sure that if 
any commander needed help or had registered a major success he would 
call me up himself.”195 
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The first three days of the East Prussian Operation did not go according to plan, 
but Rokossovskiy allowed his army commanders to sort out the problems.  He 
made only small changes after discussions with his army commanders at the end 
of each day.  Finally, after forty-eight hours as the German defences began to 
creak, he intervened decisively to complete the rupture196 in the German line, 
“reluctantly I was forced to throw the tank corps into action in the zone of 
48th, 2nd Strike and 65th Army to accelerate the penetration of the enemy’s 
defence.  The enemy, his strength sapped by counterattacks, collapsed 
under this blow.”197 
 
The contrast with Zhukov’s ill-tempered ranting a few 
months later, in April 1945, on the Seelow Heights, east of 
Berlin, is considerable.  198  On 15th April, Zhukov’s 1st 
Belorussian Front began its Berlin Operation.  The 
breakthrough battle on the Seelow Heights descended into a 
bitter attritional struggle with Soviet infantry units piled up 
and unable to break the German positions.  In contrast to Rokossovskiy’s patient 
empowerment of his army commanders in East Prussia,  
“fretting and fuming, Zhukov decided at noon that he could wait no longer 
and against the protest of the infantry commanders decided to call on both 
his tank armies……..in a transport of rage, with little to show for nine hours 
of infantry actions, Zhukov now intended to loose 1,337 tanks and SP guns-
six armoured corps- in order to smash his way to the heights.”199   
The original plan was abandoned and Zhukov, in stark contrast to Rokossovskiy 
took close authoritarian tactical control.  Indeed, “on Zhukov’s express orders the 
attack continued by night, with more tanks crowding in, roaring and grinding 
towards the German positions, only to be met with point blank fire which sent 
them reeling and blazing out of control.”200 No doubt, the officers of 1st 
Belorussian Front, including Malinin and V.I. Kazakov who laboured under 
Zhukov’s lash, ruefully recalled the days of Rokossovskiy. 
 
 
Figure 66: G.K. Zhukov 
(univer.omsk.su) 
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Rokossovskiy’s delegation did not involve the abdication of his responsibilities.  
It was Rokossovskiy’s conception, defined in modern British military doctrine as 
the commander’s intent201 that defined the parameters of all discussions right 
through the planning and execution of an operation.  The senior command team 
and army commanders did not replace Rokossovskiy but worked with him and for 
him, in the planning of operations.  Equally, in the conduct of operations while 
Rokossovskiy gave his senior commanders the opportunity to display their 
abilities it was in relation to specific objectives laid down by Rokossovskiy.  In 
short, in keeping with the traditions of German auftragstaktik and mission 
command, Rokossovskiy outlined what was to be achieved but was not 
prescriptive about how it was to be done.  The idea that a Soviet military 
commander might have possessed such a style of leadership and command is not a 
familiar theme in western historiography.    
 
Similarly, although Rokossovskiy was not prescriptive in terms of tactical 
procedures he kept a close eye on his army commanders’ habits to ensure they 
were professional and above all creative.  In January 1944, Rokossovskiy 
admonished Batov’s 65th Army for becoming predictable in their battle tactics.  
Indeed,  
“on the evening of 10 January, the front commander held a short critique of 
the past combat with the formations’ commanders and the branch chiefs at 
the 65th Army’s command post.  He said that the unsuccessful beginning of 
the operation (the Mozyr-Kalinkovichi Operation) was the result of the 
forces’ stereotypical actions……..General K.K. Rokossovsky(sic) advised a 
change in the tactics and the direction of the main attack.”202  
 
Nobody was sacked, berated or publicly humiliated.  The problem was identified 
and solved.  It is a good example of an authoritative leader setting the standard but 
retaining confidence in the ability of his subordinates to achieve it, Rokossovskiy 
ordered 65th Army to use 1st Guards Tank Corps in the breakthrough battle, rather 
than in an exploitation role in order to ensure Soviet infantry could neutralise 
German infantry who came out to fight after taking cover in prepared defences 
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during 65th Army’s predictable artillery barrage.  On 12th January 1944, 65th Army 
using the new, more integrated tactics, adapted by Rokossovskiy to meet the 
particular tactical problem broke the German line and surged towards 
Kalinkovichi.203  In a similar way following 61st Army’s failure to penetrate 
German defences east of Kalinkovichi, from 8th-12th January 1944, Rokossovskiy 
ordered 61st Army to be more imaginative.  Furthermore, Rokossovskiy openly 
praised Gorbatov’s 3rd Army for its creative use of ski units in Belorussia.204 
 
Army commanders who displayed initiative, energy, creativity and imagination 
under Rokossovskiy’s command were given ample opportunity in both the 
planning and conduct of operations to share their ideas and display their talents.  
However, if standards fell Rokossovskiy was quick to intervene in a constructive 
authoritative manner that ensured delegation was not an excuse for lazy habits or 
inept tactical command.  Rokossovskiy was not an authoritarian but he was an 
authoritative leader with the highest standards and expectations of his 
commanders. 
 
Sokolovskiy was more authoritarian than Rokossovskiy but also practised an 
‘accidental’ delegation that amounted to abdication.  
The constructive teamwork led by Rokossovskiy was 
absent from the Western Front where in contrast, “the 
front staff was pushed aside from planning the 
operations and fixed only the course of events, which 
developed in accordance with the armies’ plans.  The 
front staff had no operational planning documents on 
the conduct of operations at all.  All of the conducted 
operations were planned only in the armies and were 
verbally approved by the front command.  As a result, the front headquarters did 
not introduce its proposals to the command on the planning and conduct of the 
operations and did not exercise reliable control over the realization of the 
command’s decisions.”205   
 
 
Figure 67: V. Sokolovskiy 
(Photograph by Margaret Bourke-
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This is not to suggest that other Soviet officers were not 
popular and highly competent.  Indeed, “unlike many 
commanders, Vatutin was also well thought of by his 
subordinates and soldiers.”206  Nevertheless, Vatutin’s style 
of leadership was very different from Rokossovskiy’s.  
Alexander Werth relates the comments of Henry Shapiro, 
the United Press Correspondent in Moscow.  Shapiro met 
Vatutin, in late November 1942.  He recalled that, 
“I saw General Vatutin in a dilapidated schoolhouse at Serafimovich for a 
few minutes at four in the morning…….He was terribly tired; he had not 
had a proper sleep for at least a fortnight, and kept rubbing his eyes and 
dozing off.  For all that, he looked tough and determined, and was highly 
optimistic.”207  
The main cause of Vatutin’s exhaustion was the responsibility of command in the 
Stalingrad area, but his particular style of leadership also made it more difficult to 
delegate and for subordinates to use their initiative. 
 
On 9th December 1943, Rokossovskiy was ordered by Stavka to investigate why 
Vatutin’s 1st Ukrainian Front had made little or no progress since taking Kiev, on 
6th November 1943.208  It is possible that Stalin was playing off Rokossovskiy and 
Vatutin, in the way that he later played off Konev and Zhukov at Berlin.  At 
virtually the same time, on 9th December 1943, Stavka transferred six divisions 
from Rokossovskiy’s Belorussian Front to Vatutin’s 1st Ukrainian Front209 in the 
middle of Rokossovskiy’s drive on Mozyr and Kalinokovichi.  There had been 
latent tension between Rokossovskiy and Vatutin on several occasions such as the 
plans for an attack on Voronezh in July 1942.210  Similarly, Vatutin’s South-
Western Front had played the main role in the Stalingrad counter-offensive, a role 
initially assigned to Rokossovskiy.  In addition, there had been disagreements 
about different plans for defending the Kursk salient in May 1943 and most 
recently, in September 1943, when Rokossovskiy’s Central Front had been denied 
the chance to liberate Kiev, in favour of Vatutin’s 1st Ukrainian Front.   
 
 
Figure 68: N.F. Vatutin 
(corazzati.it) 
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Nevertheless, Rokossovskiy was very uncomfortable with his new assignment, 
especially, 
“as I was about to depart I was handed a telegram from the Supreme 
Commander with instructions to assume command of 1st Ukrainian Front 
if I deemed it necessary without seeking additional instructions.  I must 
admit this order embarrassed me.  Indeed, why should I have been selected 
to investigate the situation on 1st Ukrainian Front. ”211 
The 1st Ukrainian Front was a particularly volatile environment.  On 14th 
December 1943, Stavka sacked Lieutenant General V.I. Kuznetsov (1894-1964)212 
as the commander of 1st Guards Army, replacing him with Lieutenant General 
A.A. Grechko (1903-1976).213  Simultaneously 1st Ukrainian Front’s leadership, 
in short, Vatutin, was ordered to sort out the mess under threat of court martial.  
This directive was also given to the commander of the Belorussian Front, namely 
Rokossovskiy.214   
 
Rokossovskiy met Vatutin, west of Kiev, immediately informing him that he had 
no intention of taking command of 1st Ukrainian.  Yet, unsurprisingly Vatutin was 
tetchy and defensive “making conversation more like a guilty subordinate 
reporting to his superior.  I got impatient, and repeated that I had not come to 
conduct an investigation.”215  Vatutin relaxed a little.  Rokossovskiy suggested 
that Vatutin abandon his defensive stance and re-claim the initiative by counter-
attacking the Germans.  Once again, Vatutin enquired of Rokossovskiy, as to 
whether he was going to take command, 
“I retorted that I had no intention of doing anything of the sort, that I 
considered him as good a Front commander as I, and in general I wished 
my stay here to be as short as possible as I had plenty of work of my 
own.”216 
 
The air was cleared, a plan agreed.  Yet, the episode clearly made an impression 
upon Rokossovskiy.  The incident also reveals the extent to which leadership 
styles, as well as operational methods, varied dramatically between very senior 
Red Army commanders.  In his memoirs Rokossovskiy commented, at length, 
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upon Vatutin’s style of leadership, a commentary that provides a substantial 
insight into his own, 
“I was somewhat surprised by the way that Vatutin organised his work.  
He personally edited all directives and orders and discussed questions by 
telephone and telegraph with the armies and headquarters.  What then was 
the Chief of Staff doing?  I found General Bogulyobov at the other end of 
the village.  When I asked him why he permitted the Front commander to 
burden himself with staff work, Bogulyobov said there was nothing he 
could do about it, as the Front commander insisted on managing 
everything himself.”217 
 
Rokossovskiy told the Chief of Staff that it was not right, an assessment that 
Bogulyobov was in full accord with, but unsure about how to raise the delicate 
matter with Vatutin.  Rokossovskiy did it for him and Vatutin acknowledged “it’s 
all because I was a staff officer for so long………..I feel as though I must do 
everything myself.”218  In short, in some respects Rokossovskiy set the pace but 
tempered it with an inclination to listen, consult and delegate within a generally 
authoritative style of leadership.  Vatutin was a pacesetter: able, daring but driven 
to be in control of all details of an operation not just the critical ones.  In short, 
Rokossovskiy and Vatutin’s styles of leadership were very different. 
 
There was an ironic postscript to this episode.  In January 1945, Bogulyobov 
found himself as Rokossovskiy’s Chief of Staff, at 2nd Belorussian Front.  
Furthermore, at least initially, he did not like Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership 
any more than Vatutin’s.  According to Rokossovskiy, “General A.N. 
Bogulyobov, the Front Chief of Staff, a very pedantic man, as a good staff officer 
should be, frowned at our apparent violation of established procedures, but later 
conceded that my system was better suited to combat conditions.”219 
 
Rokossovskiy’s Toleration of Mistakes and the Encouragement of Initiative 
Rokossovskiy seems to have appreciated that no commander will take risks and 
exercise initiative unless senior commanders are occasionally prepared to tolerate 
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mistakes.  During the Great Patriotic War, Rokossovskiy tolerated honest 
mistakes in a way that Zhukov or Konev, to name but two Soviet commanders, 
either would not or could not, despite the fact that in comparison with 
Rokossovskiy, both made their own personal share of them.220  Above all, 
Rokossovskiy demonstrated to his commanders, that he believed in them after 
they had made mistakes not just before them when they possessed unblemished 
records.  In this sense he anticipated contemporary military thinking. In a passge 
that could have been written by Rokossovskiy, it is clear that,  
“the bond of trust includes the tolerance of well-intentioned mistakes.  If a 
subordinate cannot trust his superior to support him in such circumstances, 
the bond of trust will be eroded; the subordinate will not act on his own 
initiative; and the moral fabric of Mission Command will be destroyed.”221 
 
In the period 1943-45, Rokossovskiy tolerated several mistakes by Batov.  In 
December 1943, Batov lost the Parichi bridgehead in Belorussia to a German 
counter-attack.  Rokossovskiy had warned Batov to strengthen his reconnaissance 
but carried away by the momentum of his advance Batov did not heed this advice.  
On 20th December 1943, a German counter-attack smashed into both wings of the 
65th Army, threatening to encircle and annihilate it.  However, Batov’s desire to 
put matters right meant he delayed informing Rokossovskiy of the true gravity of 
the situation.  Rokossovskiy knew anyway through the Front’s intelligence 
organs.  He phoned Batov’s political commissar, Radetskiy, asking for the truth.  
Radetskiy replied that 65th Army was struggling to contain the Germans.  A few 
minutes later Batov called Rokossovskiy.  In a glacial voice Rokossovskiy asked, 
“Pavel Ivanovich, how long do you intend to move backwards?”  Batov admitted 
his mistake and Rokossovskiy severly reprimanded him, not for his mistake, but 
for his failure to report the situation earlier.  However, Rokossovskiy also gave 
Batov a rifle division and, if necessary, an entire artillery corps, to redeem the 
situation.222   
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Rokossovskiy did not sack Batov.  Batov was a proven commander, energetic, 
dynamic and full of initiative.  In short, the type of army commander that 
Rokossovskiy demanded in the conduct of operations.  Batov had made a serious 
mistake but one driven by a desire to strike deep into 
the German position.  It was probably this that saved 
Batov’s job.  If the German counter-attack had thrived 
due to laziness or unprofessionalism in the course of 
duty, almost certainly Batov would have been sacked.  
These were matters that Rokossovskiy would not 
tolerate.  Batov was lucky to survive.  It was an object 
lesson for him, one that he never forgot.223  By 27th 
December 1943, Batov had stopped the German drive 
but the Belorussian Front had lost the key Parichi zone: an excellent springboard 
for further assaults on German positions in south-eastern Belorussia, Bobruisk.  In 
June 1944, Batov’s 65th Army was entrusted with the responsibility of making a 
breakthrough in the Parichi sector.  In the opening days of Operation Bagration, 
65th Army distinguished itself and created the conditions for 1st Belorussian 
Front’s destruction of Ninth German Army.   
 
Similarly, in October 1944, again despite Rokossovskiy’s warnings, Batov’s 65th 
Army was taken by surprise and found itself in bitter fighting to retain a 
bridgehead over the Narev, north of Warsaw.  Rokossovskiy discussed the 
problem with Batov and made a reserve available to him “but the actual manner in 
which it would be used was left to the Army commander’s discretion.”224  Batov 
was fortunate in having Rokossovskiy as his boss.  It is difficult to see any other 
Soviet commander being so lenient.  Batov was definitely part of Rokossovskiy’s 
in-crowd.225  Yet, it was not just an exchange of emotion, between men who 
became close friends.  Batov was a tough, dynamic, imaginative commander, who 
had repeatedly performed well, more than well, in the past and would do so again 
in the future.  In short, Rokossovskiy had confidence in his proven abilities.  In 
October 1944, Batov smashed the German counter-attack and the Narev 
bridgehead was held. 
 
Figure 69: P.I. Batov 
(Rokossovskiy, 1985) 
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In July 1942, in the Zhizdra-Bolkhov Operation despite 
misgivings, Rokossovskiy acceded to Malinin, his chief of 
staff’s request, that, as a tank man, along with the armoured 
commander, Oryol, he be allowed to plan the commitment of 
the second echelon armoured corps.226  It was a detailed plan, 
indeed Rokossovskiy claimed it was “a schedule detailed 
down to the last hour and minute.”227  Rokossovskiy was 
concerned about this and a line of departure that was nearly 
20 kilometres away, but “assured that every contingency had been provided 
for…….shelving my misgivings, I accepted their plan.”228   
 
The infantry and artillery attack, planned by Rokossovskiy, broke the German line 
but the 10th Armoured Corps was unable to capitalise as it was stuck in 
marshland.229 “The commanders had not reconnoitred the terrain before drawing 
up the plan, the result being a delay that tipped the scales against a successfully 
launched operation.  This unfortunate event taught us all a good lesson for the 
future.”230  Malinin and Oryol, served with Rokossovskiy, in a very distinguished 
way, until November 1944, men who became experts in their jobs, consulted by 
Rokossovskiy in the planning of virtually every operation.  In short, his faith was 
more than repaid. 
 
In a similar way, Rokossovskiy tolerated mistakes by Kryukov, the dashing 
commander of 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, whose reckless headlong charge in 
February 1943 exposed his men and the Central Front, to a powerful German 
counter-attack.  “On 12th March six tank and mechanised divisions attacked from 
the north and south flanks and tried to cut off 2nd Cavalry Corps-they withdrew on 
foot to Sevsk.”231  The rescue diverted a considerable portion of the Central 
Front’s fighting power as “defences on the eastern bank of the river Sev were to 
be occupied immediately.”232  A serious crisis was averted, largely because the 
Germans main priorities were further south, in the Khar'kov region.  However, 
after a major board of inquiry,233 Kryukov, although reprimanded, continued to 
 
Figure 70: G.N. Oryol 
(Rokossovskiy, 1985) 
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serve under Rokossovskiy, until November 1944.234  Indeed, in his memoirs 
Rokossovskiy, an old cavalryman, recalled almost fondly that the old warhorse 
had got the bit between his teeth.235 
 
Finally, in January 1945, in the middle of the East Prussia Operation, 
Rokossovskiy admitted, 
“I was rather worried about the enemy force locked up in Torn.  According 
to a report from the 70th Army Commander, V.S. Popov, they were some 
5,000 strong, and they had refused to surrender.  When I learned that the 
city was besieged by only one division - and by then our divisions were 
sadly undermanned - I advised Popov to treat the enemy with caution.  
Torn was already some distance in our rear and this hornets’ nest had to be 
got rid of.”236 
A few hours later, a chastened Lieutenant General Vasily Stepanovich Popov 
(1893-1967)237 informed Rokossovskiy that the Torn garrison had broken out and 
was advancing on the Vistula crossing at Graudenz, still held by German troops.  
As 2nd Belorussian Front was stretched across East Prussia and fighting on both 
sides of the Vistula, this German force was a distinct threat.  After several days 
fighting, 2nd Belorussian Front finally stopped the Torn group just ten kilometres 
from the Vistula.  It numbered 30,000, not 5,000.  A mortified Popov, painfully 
aware of his miscalculation, expected the sack.  He was reprieved and remained 
with Rokossovskiy until May 1945. 
 
In summary, Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership was marked by a distinctly 
unusual willingness to tolerate mistakes, in a way that challenges the traditional 
image of authoritarian commanders, passing ruthless judgement upon 
subordinates for fear of being judged themselves by an intolerant and ruthless 
political system.  Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership tolerated commanders of 
proven creativity, initiative and daring, men who were calm under pressure, even 
if they made mistakes.  It is difficult to imagine Zhukov, Konev, Sokolovskiy, 
Yeremenko and Chuikov doing the same but then they possessed a different, 
authoritarian and coercive style of leadership.  Rokossovskiy did not. 
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A Soft Touch? 
Rokossovskiy was not some benevolent, paternal figure, but his willingness to 
tolerate occasional mistakes was so at odds with the prevailing leadership culture 
of the Red Army, that the question of the standard he set, a key aspect of 
leadership, regardless of style, is a pertinent one.  Commanders who made serious 
errors, were incompetent and displayed little creativity were not indulged.  
Similarly, those of an authoritarian, but pedestrian style of leadership, inclined to 
intimidate their subordinates, were not tolerated.  In short, Rokossovskiy accepted 
mistakes from those with the ability and qualities he desired.  Others were cast 
aside.   
 
In fact, far from being an indulgent leader, Rokossovskiy had very high personal 
and professional standards.  Indeed, in some respects he demonstrated many of the 
positive qualities of a pacesetting leader that has much in common with the 
authoritative leader's inclination to set the standard but have faith in his 
subordinates ability to achieve it.  Rokossovskiy was ruthless in the face of 
sloppiness or any dereliction of duty.  On 2nd April 1943, 
Rokossovskiy sacked Lieutenant General G.F. Tarasov, 
after a board of inquiry238 found Tarasov, 70th Army’s 
commander, guilty of incompetence.  239  In February 
1945, Rokossovskiy sacked Lieutenant General I.V. 
Boldin, hero of the defence of Moscow.  Boldin’s failure 
to detect a German withdrawal from the Augustow Canal, 
for 48 hours, into solid defensive positions, produced instant dismissal.240 He had 
been set a specific task which through negligence, he 
had failed to fulfil.241  Similarly, in February 1945, G. 
K. Kozlov’s failure to exploit an opportunity created 
for 19th Army, when it advanced only 25 kilometres in 
forty-eight hours, meant his replacement with 
Vladimir Zakharovich Romanovskiy (1896-1967).242   
 
 
Figure 71: I.V. Boldin 
(generals.dk) 
 
Figure 72: V.Z. Romanovskiy 
(Rokossovskiy, 1985) 
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Any theory or quality of leadership is influenced by personality and Rokossovskiy 
was no exception.  A strong sense of honour and pride in the profession of arms 
played an important role in his leadership.  Rokossovskiy could not abide 
dishonourable abdication in the face of duty.  In June 1941 he was enraged by a 
colonel’s casual rejection of the duty to lead.  Rokossovskiy was so infuriated by 
the officer’s sullen insolence that, in Rokossovskiy’s words, he literally blew up, 
drew his weapon and held it to the man’s head.243  Similarly, in October 1941, 
when an old veteran of World War One asked Rokossovskiy why the Red Army 
was retreating and not protecting the people, Rokossovskiy was deeply ashamed.  
It was an episode that he never forgot.244 
 
Rokossovskiy’s career suggests an almost vocational approach to being an officer.  
He combined very demanding standards with an absolute refusal to admit defeat, 
an attitude that survived, and enabled him to survive, the Purges, solitary 
confinement and the challenges of 1941.  It is worth bearing in mind that 
Rokossovskiy’s memoirs carried the title of Soldatskiy Dolg¸ A Soldier’s Duty.  
To Rokossovskiy, any deliberate dereliction or abdication of duty in the face of 
hardship was a scandalous mockery of an officer’s responsibility, especially in 
wartime.   
 
As Rokossovskiy acknowledged in his memoirs he ordered the execution of 
deserters in June 1941 and rounded up malingers abdicating their duty.  
Pleshakhov suggests this was driven by Rokossovskiy’s desire to be seen doing 
his own duty.245  As a former inmate of the Gulag, Rokossovskiy was bound to 
reflect upon the consequences of being seen to tolerate deserters and saboteurs, 
but the general pattern of his career makes it possible to argue that he was also 
genuinely enraged by the readiness to give up, the incompetence, the dereliction 
of duty.  A man who had endured and survived the Purge was unlikely to be 
charitable about abject defeatism and surrender just hours into the German 
invasion.  Similarly, Rokossovskiy was utterly scathing about Kirponos’ 
abdication of duty because “he was simply refusing to face the facts”246 rather 
than because he thought “its commander, Kirponos, was just a shallow upstart 
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completely unfit to command larger units - a person of ego but with no knowledge 
or intuition.”247  Rokossovskiy may well have thought Kirponos an upstart, but 
professional standards mattered as much as personal enmity. 
 
At times, Rokossovskiy was harsh and demanding 
because often the Great Patriotic War demanded no less.  
However, such occasions were usually a reflection of 
poor performance and standards of leadership by 
subordinates not a habitual, daily method of command.  
Rokossovskiy found coarse, crude behaviour demeaning 
and insulting whether directed at him or others.  A 
powerfully built athletic officer, Rokossovskiy had all the physical attributes to 
intimidate, threaten and beat up others in an authoritarian style of leadership.  The 
fact that he chose not to ‘lead’ in this way is indicative of his personality and 
marks him down as a distinctly unusual Red Army commander.  In contrast, the 
consequences of Rokossovskiy’s displeasure were usually glacial and concise 
rather than volatile and prolonged.  This personal example of leadership 
influenced his army commanders in a powerful way.  It set the standard. 
 
There is no evidence to suggest that Rokossovskiy, unlike many Soviet officers, 
ever ranted, raged, threatened or physically beat officers, senior or junior.  Indeed, 
quite the opposite, virtually all who served under Rokossovskiy comment upon 
his kulturnost, civility, ability to listen and calmness, especially when under 
pressure.  Rokossovskiy was an 
authoritative leader, not an 
authoritarian commander, but 
possessed a fierce sense of duty.  
He would not tolerate abdication 
of duty, incompetence or lack of 
professionalism.  He was a career 
soldier and officer, who 
maintained the highest standards, set a personal example to those in close 
 
Figure 73: Rokossovskiy 
(theeasternfront.co.uk) 
 
Figure 74: Rokossovskiy and Batov, 1944 
(Kardashov, 1980) 
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proximity to him and expected other senior officers to do the same.  It was his 
vocation and their duty.   
 
If Rokossovskiy felt operations were not being conducted professionally he could, 
on isolated occasions, be harsh.  On 6th August 1943, Rokossovskiy made it clear 
in unambiguous tones that he was distinctly unimpressed with the performance of 
2nd Tank Army and 3rd Guards Tank Army.  He noted the enemy was withdrawing 
and that despite favourable terrain, his orders from the previous three days had not 
been fulfilled and that operations had been poorly executed.  In future, any 
uncoordinated and isolated attacks would no be tolerated.  He categorically 
demanded fulfilment of their mission and that anyone guilty of poorly conducted 
operations would be in front of a military tribunal.248   
 
Equally, on the evening of 6th July 1943, Rokossovskiy instructed all his army 
commanders at Kursk to remind their troops of Stalin’s Order No:227 that 
demanded not a step back.  It was mentioned three times in a short directive 
urging all to do their duty in the face of the massive German onslaught.249  
Rokossovskiy had high standards and expectations but for him, if not other Soviet 
commanders, this was an unusual style of leadership.  In short, he could mix and 
match his styles of leadership according to his judgement of the situation.  The 
authoritarian style was not his normal method of leadership but it was a weapon to 
be used if he felt it was necessary. 
 
Rokossovskiy’s insistence on high standards of 
personal conduct by all officers, regardless of rank, 
was revealed in late September 1942.  As the 
newly appointed commander of the Don Front, 
Rokossovskiy arranged to meet with Lieutenant-. 
General Rodion Yakovlyevich Malinovskiy (1898-
1967),250 66th Army’s commander.  Rokossovskiy 
 
Figure 75: R.Y. Malinovskiy 
(www.ets.ru) 
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“was somewhat surprised that the Army Commander had chosen to go visiting the 
troops when he knew that I was due to arrive.”251  Rokossovskiy searched for 
Malinovskiy, 
“I visited the divisional and regimental command posts, worked my way 
down to the battalion CP, but still could not locate the Army Commander.  
He was with one of the companies, they told me.  That day plenty of 
artillery and mortar fire was being exchanged.  To all appearances the 
enemy was preparing a sally to repay the attack carried out by the Army 
the previous day.  I decided to visit the company out of sheer curiosity and 
see what the Army commander was doing.  Now walking full height along 
communication passages, now half crawling along crumbling trenches, I 
finally reached the frontline.  There I saw a short, stocky general.”252 
 
It was Malinovskiy and Rokossovskiy had made his point.  Rokossovskiy was by 
instinct an authoritative, not an authoritarian leader, but although he was prepared 
to tolerate mistakes, encourage initiative and listen to the views of others, this was 
a matter of considered choice, not emotional necessity.  In short, despite being an 
unusually thoughtful and restrained commander by the standards of the Red 
Army, he was no soft touch.   
 
Command By Committee 
Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership contained many democratic elements and his 
commitment to consult his senior officers, as well as delegate, is beyond question, 
but this was not command by committee, nor was he simply primus inter pares.  
Rokossovskiy chose to invite his commanders to give their opinion, they were not 
entitled to give them or foist them upon him.  It was a considered piece of 
authoritative leadership, not the passing of responsibility, or a symptom of a 
clever but weak leader.  On 17th January 1943, during Operation Kol’tso, several 
army commanders requested an operational pause.  Rokossovskiy immediately 
intervened: “there will be no pause, it is only with that condition that I am 
prepared to continue the discussion.”253
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discussion about the best way to continue the assault, as long as everyone 
understood that the attack would continue, without a pause.   
 
At first sight, Rokossovskiy’s intervention appears authoritarian, but upon closer 
examination, it reveals Rokossovskiy’s authoritative style of leadership, as well as 
his perception of the realities of operational, not tactical command.  Operation 
Kol’tso, repeatedly delayed, was planned as a seamless, crushing operation, 
designed to capitalise upon the physical and moral duress of freezing, starving 
German troops.  Rokossovskiy knew that the Wehrmacht had effectively 
abandoned Sixth Army in order to pin down Soviet forces, namely his Don Front, 
that could be used elsewhere on the Eastern Front.254  No doubt aware of 
Moscow’s strategic priorities, Rokossovskiy intervened to maintain the 
operational integrity of Operation Kol’tso, dismissing the mainly tactical 
considerations of his army commanders.   
 
In short, a tactical pause risked making Kol'tso two successive operations, instead 
of one crushing blow.  It was the commander’s decision: a fundamental decision 
that shaped the character of Kol’tso because it set out the operational path.  
Rokossovskiy was content to grant his senior officers considerable tactical 
discretion in the execution of his operational plan.  Rokossovskiy was an 
authoritative, occasionally democratic leader, because he chose to be, not because 
he was compelled to be.  None who served under him was in any doubt about who 
was in charge.  Furthermore, it is unlikely that any commander, who defied 
Zhukov in November 1941 and who, in May 1944, thrice defied Stalin, in public, 
in front of witnesses, over the planning of Operation Bagration, was an unwitting 
victim of command by committee.   
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Rokossovskiy and Zhukov: Authoritative and Authoritarian Leadership 
In terms of their birth, age and experience, Rokossovskiy and Zhukov were 
remarkably similar: both were born in December 1896, both served for a similar 
length of time, in a similarly distinguished manner during World War One, both 
were cavalrymen and both joined the Red Army 
at roughly the same time, although their paths 
did not cross during the Russian Civil War.  
However, for all their superficial similarities, 
their manner, character, operational methods and 
above all, their leadership styles could not have 
been more different.  As mutual acquaintances, 
in 1924, Rokossovskiy and Zhukov had both 
attended the Higher Command Cavalry Course in 
Leningrad, while Rokossovskiy had been 
Zhukov’s commanding officer, from 1930-1932, 
at 7th Samara Cavalry Division.  Indeed, although 
direct contemporaries, until the Purge of 1937 
Rokossovskiy had always outranked Zhukov. 
 
It is partly for this reason that during the Great Patriotic War, Rokossovskiy and 
Zhukov had a rather strained personal relationship.  Rokossovskiy’s imprisonment 
of August 1937-March 1940 witnessed Zhukov’s rapid rise.  In August 1937, 
Rokossovskiy was a corps commander, Zhukov a divisional commander.  In 
March 1940, when Rokossovskiy was released and resumed command of 5th 
Cavalry Corps, in the Ukraine, Zhukov was now the commander of the Kiev 
Special Military District, hero of Khalkin-Gol in August 1939, and soon, in 
January 1941, to be Chief of the General Staff. 
 
 
Figure 76: Rokossovskiy and 
Zhukov, 1944 
(Rokossovskiy, 2002) 
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Naturally, the personality of an individual influences his or her style of leadership 
and Rokossovskiy and Zhukov were no exception to this rule.  Indeed, it is in the 
nature of their personalities that we find the origins of the vast contrast between 
the leadership styles of Rokossovskiy and Zhukov.  Zhukov was, by instinct, an 
authoritarian leader, a brutal, yet able commander, and utterly merciless about 
casualties.  Zhukov had plenty of ability, but used his rank and abrasive 
personality to intimidate and threaten.  He was feared as 
well as respected, grudgingly admired for his relentless 
dedication, but not for his callous, ruthless leadership.  
Zhukov was notoriously abrupt and profane with 
subordinates, indeed, habitually unjust.  A physically 
powerful and impatient individual, Zhukov did not 
spare himself or anybody else, leaving subordinates, 
senior and junior, in no doubt as to what was required: 
excellence, unstinting effort and unquestioning compliance or face the 
consequences of his displeasure.   
 
Zhukov was an authoritarian leader who set a relentless pace that subordinates 
complied with and matched unless they were prepared to face the consequences of 
his wrath.  On 17th September 1941, as commander of the Leningrad Front, 
Zhukov issued Order No.  0064, which stated that “all commanders, political 
officers and rank and file who leave the line of defence without prior written 
instruction of the Front or Military Council are to be shot on sight.”255  In 
summary, 
“Zhukov was an energetic but stubborn commander.  He approached war 
with dogged determination.  His force of will, tempered with occasional 
ruthlessness and utter disregard for casualties, carried Soviet forces through 
their trials in the initial period of the war and ultimately to victory........He 
demanded and received absolute obedience to orders, he identified and 
protected key subordinates, and, at times, he stood up to and incurred the 
wrath of Stalin.  There was little finesse in his operations, and he skilfully 
used the Red Army as the club it was to its full operational effect.  His 
 
Figure 77: G.K. Zhukov 
(t2w.com.br) 
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temperament was perfectly suited to the nature of the war on the Soviet-
German front, and Stalin knew it.”256 
 
Rokossovskiy, at least Zhukov’s equal as a field commander, practised an entirely 
different style of leadership, one that cultivated, rather than intimidated the scarce 
talent around him.  As an authoritative leader Rokossovskiy set high standards but 
used personal example, ability and character to establish a deep, genuine authority 
over his fellow officers.  As an authoritarian leader Zhukov used his power to 
extract every ounce of commitment from his subordinates and troops, but they 
were expendable, assets to be directed, used and discarded in pursuit of victory.  
In the words of one commentator, 
“he had a reputation for utter determination and ruthlessness in achieving 
his objectives, regardless of the cost in human lives, and for demanding 
instant and absolute obedience to orders.”257 
 
In late November 1941, during the defence of Moscow, Rokossovskiy and 
Zhukov had an infamous row when Rokossovskiy subverted the chain of 
command by appealing over Zhukov’s head, to Shaposhnikov, the Chief of the 
General Staff, for permission to carry out a 
limited tactical withdrawal to the Istra reservoir, 
north-west of Moscow.  Rokossovskiy’s aim was 
to incorporate the reservoir into the line in order 
to create depth and reserves.  It was an act of 
remarkable temerity and insubordination by 
Rokossovskiy.  A few hours later, Rokossovskiy 
received permission, and, “knowing Marshal 
Shaposhnikov from my service before the war, I 
was quite sure that his reply had been cleared with 
the Supreme Commander, or at the very least he had been informed of it.”258   
 
Marshal M.E. Katukov, at that time commanding 1st Guards Tank Brigade under 
Rokossovskiy, confirmed that on the night of 26th November 1941, Rokossovskiy 
 
Figure 78: B.M. Shaposhnikov 
(wpcontent.answers.com) 
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ordered his brigade to withdraw to the eastern bank of the River Istra and to 
establish a second echelon in order to give 16th Army some tactical depth.259  In 
response, Zhukov sent Rokossovskiy a livid, raging telegram: “I am the Front 
Commander!  I countermand the order to withdraw to the Istra Reservoir and 
order you to defend the lines you occupy without retreating one more step.  
General of the Army Zhukov.”260  Rokossovskiy obeyed the order. 
 
It is likely that their awkward personal relationship and incidents such as Istra 
were partly the product of Rokossovskiy’s personal jealousy and a pronounced 
desire for autonomy.  They were also the product of Zhukov’s irascible and proud 
personality,261 as well as mutual exhaustion, at a time of extraordinary stress.  Yet, 
their cool, formal relationship was also influenced by a more basic, fundamental 
clash of personalities and leadership styles that would have caused friction 
between them, regardless of their complex personal history.  262 
 
Historical attention has emphasised the overt clash at Istra, between Rokossovskiy 
and Zhukov, but in doing so it has perhaps over-shadowed the significance of 
Rokossovskiy’s personal commentary upon the episode.  In his memoirs, 
Rokossovskiy wrote, “believe an old soldier: there is nothing a man prizes more 
than the realization that he is trusted, believed, relied upon.  Unfortunately, the 
commander of the Western Front did not always take this into account.”263  
Rokossovskiy records his respect for Zhukov’s abilities, before acknowledging 
that there was friction between them.  In Rokossovskiy’s opinion, “the crux of the 
matter, apparently, was that we had different views on the extent to which a 
commander should assert his will and the manner in which he should do it.”264  
These passages represent the difference between Rokossovskiy, an authoritative 
leader and Zhukov, an authoritarian commander, the difference between 
Rokossovskiy’s philosophy of leadership and command with the wider culture of 
Stalin’s Red Army, personified in the shape of Zhukov.  Two of the Red Army’s 
leading commanders had very different styles of leadership. 
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Zhukov was frequently unjust in his condemnations of field officers, of any rank, 
either in person or by telephone.  Indeed, Rokossovskiy wrote that, 
“wishful thinking is never enough for success in battle.  However, during 
the battle of Moscow, Zhukov himself often forgot this.  Insistence on the 
highest standards is an important and essential trait for any leader.  But it 
is equally essential for him to combine an iron will with tactfulness, 
respect for subordinates and the ability to rely on their intelligence and 
initiative.  In those grim days our Front commander did not always follow 
this rule.  He could also be unfair in a fit of temper.”265 
This passage tells us as much, in fact more about Rokossovskiy’s style of 
leadership than it does of Zhukov.  One might be inclined to explain away 
Zhukov’s crude, authoritarian style, as the product of the immense pressure he 
was under, but he was equally brutal under more benign circumstances. 
 
In June 1944, accompanied by Rokossovskiy, Zhukov visited 65th Army’s 
frontline as it was preparing for Operation Bagration.  A corps commander, given 
insufficient warning, was late in arriving to brief Zhukov.  After he arrived, 
Zhukov simply ignored his explanation and abused him, before marching off to 
44th Guards Division’s sector “under the command of Colonel P.G. Petrov, a 
skilful and competent officer but a man with a difficult past……..yet now, in the 
presence of the Marshal, Petrov lost his aplomb somewhat.  His report on the 
situation was confused.”266  After further humiliations, Zhukov peremptorily 
ordered that the corps commander be removed and Petrov sent to a penal 
battalion, virtually a death sentence.  In Batov’s words, “finally at 
Rokossovskii’s(sic) insistence, he agreed to lower the punishment: I.I. Ivanov was 
sharply reprimanded and the division commander was relieved of his duties.  P.G. 
Petrov left us the following day.”267  A few weeks later, Petrov was killed leading 
3rd Army, part of Rokossovskiy’s 1st Belorussian Front, over the River Drut.  He 
was posthumously made a Hero of the Soviet Union.  However, Zhukov was far 
from finished with Batov. 
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By early July 1944, the Belorussian Operation was moving well and Batov’s 65th 
Army had distinguished itself in 1st Belorussian Front’s Bobruisk Operation (24th-
29th June 1944).  Its new objective was Baranovichi, a significant rail and road 
junction.  Now “for the first time in several days we were able to take care of our 
personal appearance.  We had just managed to shave and clean our shoes when 
some cars screeched to a stop in front of our hut.”268  Zhukov, instead of 
congratulating Batov on 65th Army’s outstanding performance in Operation 
Bagration, tore into Batov and his chief political officer Radetskiy, berating them 
for shaving with aftershave with Baranovichi not taken.  The tirade was relentless 
and Zhukov refused to listen to any information that did not suit his ugly mood, 
ripping into those who reported it.  Finally, “this intolerable scene ended with 
Zhukov ordering Radetskii(sic) to go into Baranovichi and not come back until 
the town was captured.  Kicking the stool out of his way, Zhukov left, slamming 
the door behind him.”269 
 
This incident does not present Zhukov in a favourable light and Batov was not 
exactly an objective witness, but it bears all the hallmarks of Zhukov’s personality 
and style of leadership.  It had absolutely nothing in common with 
Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership, something that contributed to Batov’s dismay.  
Batov a tough, well-respected officer in command of 65th Army was shocked by 
Zhukov’s behaviour because he was used to an entirely different style of 
leadership.  In response to Zhukov’s desire to sack Ivanov, a veteran corps 
commander and more or less pass a death sentence on Petrov, by sending him to a 
penal battalion, Batov commented, 
“there was a definite line of conduct followed in our Army: one does not 
dismiss a commander indiscriminately for an error; one tries to improve 
him.  This line was firmly followed by the Army commander and 
members of the military council.”270 
 
It is unlikely that Batov, who served under Rokossovskiy’s command between 
July 1942-May 1945, was pursuing a leadership policy dramatically at odds with 
the style of leadership and culture adopted by Rokossovskiy.  Indeed, the whole 
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tone of the report and Rokossovskiy’s persistent intervention with Zhukov on 
behalf of Ivanov and Petrov, suggest Batov’s line was more or less the leadership 
culture he was accustomed to, not the one he was subjected to by Zhukov.   
 
Figure 79: Zhukov, Batov and Rokossovskiy, 1944 
(Rokossovskiy, 2002) 
 
A shocked Batov remarked, “in all my long Army service I had never experienced 
such humiliation.”271  Batov was a veteran of the Russian Civil War and the 
Spanish Civil War as well as the Eastern Front.  He was a tough, resilient and 
imaginative officer, but he was disturbed by Zhukov’s ranting antics.  “I was left 
alone.  The troops did not worry me.  Combat operations were proceeding 
normally.  I couldn’t find peace of mind, though.  Was this the type of leadership 
that we army commanders expected from a major military leader.”272 
 
In a similar way Konev “was often harsh with 
subordinates, vain and prone to jealousy of his peers”273 
while Grigorenko relates that “those who fought under him 
all commented upon his temper.”274  Few subordinates 
ever complained about Rokossovskiy, in the same way as 
they did about Konev or Zhukov.  Indeed, “one gains the 
impression from numerous memoirs that Rokossovskii(sic) 
was one of the most respected and liked senior officers in 
the Red Army.  The way in which dozens of memoirists recall with sympathy 
their service or their encounters with Rokossovskii has a warmth that seldom 
 
Figure 80: I. Konev 
(commons.wikimedia.org)) 
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appears in descriptions of other military leaders.  What apparently impressed them 
first and foremost was Rokossovskii’s ‘kul’ternost’-culture, good manners, 
civility - a relatively rare commodity among senior officers during the war.”275 
 
The contrast with Zhukov and Konev’s intemperate rages and the general culture 
of the Red Army’s leadership is quite stark: Rokossovskiy was a different kind of 
leader, with a different style of leadership.  Naturally, Rokossovskiy’s long 
association with many senior officers greatly facilitated his style of leadership and 
their bond with him, but Rokossovskiy’s personal example also impressed those 
of relatively short acquaintance who were clearly used to a very different style and 
culture.  In 1965, Rokossovskiy was given a remarkable testimonial by Mikhail I. 
Kazakov,276 a senior staff officer, in the Voronezh and Bryansk Fronts as well as 
commander of 10th Guards Army in 1944.  In June-July 1942, Kazakov observed 
with dismay, the ritual search for scapegoats, following the initial German 
successes in Operation Blau. 
“At the time of all this confusion I was still with the Briansk Army Group.  
Its commander at the time was Lieutenant-General K.K. Rokossovskii.  I 
worked under Konstantin Konstantinovich for a very short time, but I 
remember those eight or ten days in which I had the opportunity to be 
close to him.  What particularly impressed the generals and officers of 
Army Group Headquarters was the attention he paid to the views of his 
subordinates.  A highly civilized man, he knew how to listen patiently to 
everyone.  He recognised instantly the essential point of ideas expressed 
by others and utilized the knowledge and experience of the collective as a 
whole in the common cause.  It can truly be said that in a very short period 
Rokossovskii was able to win over all his new officers.  We liked his calm 
efficiency very much.”277   
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Kazakov’s view of the inter-relationship between Rokossovskiy’s authoritative civility 
and professional competence was endorsed by Ivan M. 
Christiyakov, 21st Army’s commander at Stalingrad 
and in the February 1943 offensive.  In his memoirs 
Christiyakov commented as follows, 
“In general, one must say that every time I met 
with Rokossovsky,(sic) I felt a sense of 
enthusiasm.  Konstantin Konstantinovich always 
listened to to his colleagues with great 
attentiveness and was demanding but just.  He 
never demeaned the dignity of his subordinates and never raised his voice.  It 
is understandable that not all people possessed that quality.”278 
 
This endorses Batov’s summary of Rokossovskiy as thoughtful, considerate, sociable 
and unpretentious279as well as a highly demanding professional.  Rokossovskiy was a 
self-contained man, correct and polite in his dealings with others, although, if necessary 
his demeanour was glacial.  Rokossovskiy detested crude hot-headed behaviour, would 
not condone it in his own officers and found it unbecoming in any officer.  In short, he 
could not have been more different from Zhukov and Konev.   
 
Calmness Under Pressure 
Rokossovskiy was blessed with a remarkably even temperament, in a way that Zhukov, 
for all his considerable talent, was not.  A calm demeanour, and above all, calmness 
under pressure were among the most abiding characteristics of Rokossovskiy’s style of 
leadership.  It is he not Zhukov or Konev that meets Clausewitz’s notion “that strength 
of character does not consist solely in having powerful feelings but in maintaining one’s 
balance in spite of them.”280  In recent years, emotional intelligence and its relationship 
with effective leadership has become an area of substantial research.281  It is argued 
“that the most effective leaders are alike in one crucial way: they have a high degree of 
what has come to be known as emotional intelligence.”282 According to Goleman 
emotional intelligence is associated with five components: self-awareness, self-
regulation, motivation, empathy and social skills.   
 
Figure 81: I.M. Christiyakov 
(Rokossovskiy, 1985) 
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Firstly, self-awareness is the capacity to understand your emotions and their impact on 
other individuals.  It is associated with those who are self-confident, but not arrogant.283  
In short, they are confident in their own abilities but not unduly narcissistic.  Personal 
conduct, a considered aspect of Rokossovskiy’s leadership, 
was enhanced by his professional appearance.  At 6’ 4’’284, 
physically fit and impeccably turned out Rokossovskiy looked 
the part and played the part, but it was not an act.  As his 
experiences in World War One, the Russian Civil War, the 
Purge, Barbarossa and the defence of Moscow indicate 
Rokossovskiy was an extremely tough, resilient soldier.   
 
Rokossovskiy’s pride in his own appearance and vocation did 
not mean he was particularly vain.  By all accounts he was a 
modest, personable individual who disliked ostentatious 
display or conceited self-importance.  In February 1943, 
Rokossovskiy was distinctly unimpressed with new uniforms 
adorned with gold braided shoulder straps in place of collar 
tabs.  It was designed to bolster the dignity and standing of the Red Army officer.  One 
has the impression Rokossovskiy thought this a matter of who you were, what you did, 
the decisions you made and how you conducted yourself, rather than what you wore.  A 
triumph of style had little meaning if there was no substance.285 
 
Rokossovskiy felt 3rd Army’s Lieutenant-General Alexsandr V. Gorbatov “led a 
Spartan life and, like Suvorov, spurned comfort and took his meals from the 
ranks’ kitchen.  His Suvorov principles served him well 
in combat, but on occasion he took them too 
literally.”286  Gorbatov had also been in the Gulag and, 
like Rokossovskiy, “he believed above all in 
suddenness, speed and far-reaching thrusts into the 
enemy flank or rear.”287  Yet, Rokossovskiy and 
Gorbatov had a curious relationship, professional but 
 
Figure 82: Rokossovskiy 
(Rokossovskiy, 2002) 
 
Figure 83: A.V. Gorbatov 
(Rokossovskiy, 1985) 
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distant, tinged with antagonism.  In autumn 1943, Gorbatov complained to 
Rokossovskiy and Stavka that his 3rd Army was not being used properly on 
secondary lines of attack in Belorussia.288  It is difficult to say whether this 
confirmed or created Rokossovskiy’s opinions of Gorbatov, but between the lines, 
one has the feeling that Rokossovskiy thought Gorbatov precious and ostentatious 
in his Suvorian purity.  Conversely, Rokossovskiy was mightily unimpressed by 
one of his officers kitting out field quarters in a lavish manner, replete with 
carpets and furniture at Kursk.  Rokossovskiy kicked him out to teach him the 
meaning of humility and service.289 
 
Rokossovskiy would not have used the term ‘emotional intelligence’ but he possessed 
considerable emotional intelligence and deployed such skills, instinctively, as a natural 
part of his leadership style.  Firstly, in terms of self-awareness, Rokossovskiy wanted 
glory and honour but he was not irrationally narcissistic.  Furthermore, Rokossovskiy 
retained the self-confidence to use his own judgement, regardless of the poisonous 
environment of command, created by the Purges, political commissars in 1941-43 and 
SMERSH.  In preparing for the German invasion, his first encounter with the 
Wehrmacht in the Ukraine, challenging Zhukov in November 1941,290 pre-empting the 
Germans at Kursk in July 1943 and defying Stalin in May 1944, Rokossovskiy 
repeatedly demonstrated the self-confidence to maintain the courage of his convictions.   
 
Secondly, such individuals display a high degree of self-regulation.  They are calm and 
controlled with the capacity to manage their emotions.  They are trustworthy characters 
of considerable integrity, flexible and open to change.  This is clearly a characteristic 
that can be associated with Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership.  Rokossovskiy’s 
calmness under pressure was remarkable and significantly influenced those under his 
command.  Rokossovskiy’s restrained manner meant he was a cool, even aloof decision 
maker, who accepted the death of thousands of men as the price of victory and the 
defeat of Nazi Germany.   
 
Yet, he did not slaughter his men in a careless, callous manner.  He did not exercise 
command through fear, although naturally, his position gave him considerable power, 
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but in an authoritative, restrained manner.  If a decision had to be taken quickly, it 
would be taken, if the situation permitted a more considered approach, it would be 
utilised, with opinions sought, noted and considered.  This established the highest 
standards of personal conduct for his officers.  Marshal V.I. Kazakov, Rokossovskiy’s 
long serving artillery chief from August 1941-November 1944 felt, 
“this was the great merit of K.K. Rokossovskii(sic), who in the most difficult 
situations did not lose his presence of mind, invariably remained unperturbed 
and remarkably cold-blooded.  Those around him were infected by his calm 
and felt themselves assured.  In his presence it was perfectly impossible to 
manifest signs of disquiet, or even worse, loss of bearing.  One would simply 
have been ashamed.”291 
 
Thirdly, motivation is the natural inclination to pursue objectives with a determination 
and persistence that goes beyond status or financial reward.  It is driven by the desire to 
achieve and a belief in the inherent value of the activity.  Individuals cast in this mode 
are extremely resilient in the face of setbacks.  The connection with Rokossovskiy’s 
personal resilience in 1918-1919, the Purges, 1941, especially the battle of Moscow, is 
indicative of the fact that for Rokossovskiy personal honour, stoicism in the face of 
adversity and commitment to the duties of a professional soldier were central elements 
of his personality, and his style of leadership.  He was deeply ashamed in October 1941 
when forced to leave behind an old man in order to escape encirclement.292 
 
In 1917, as the Tsarist Empire approached the knackers’ yard of history, these 
sentiments, Rokossovskiy’s personality and dislike of ostentation meant that in a world 
where choices had to be made, he chose the Reds.  In simple terms, he had more in 
common with them and there was little attraction in the Whites for Rokossovskiy.  
These factors combined throughout his career with ambition, resilience, and 
determination to make a formidable Soviet military leader.  Rokossovskiy does not 
appear to have been a fervent party member in the same overt way as Konev, 
293Malinovskiy294 or Sokolovskiy.295  Yet, he clearly sympathised with the Red cause, 
and committed himself to it, for better or worse.  In a civil war notorious for mass 
desertion, Rokossovskiy remained loyal to the Red Army, in very, very trying 
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circumstances and was thought sufficiently reliable in the mid 1920’s to be a dual 
commander-commissar.   
 
Rokossovskiy’s refusal to abandon 3rd Army in December 1918-January 1919 is 
indicative of several themes.  Although Rokossovskiy was a soldier first and party man 
second, his allegiance to the Reds was not merely a matter of opportunism, or simply 
wanting to be on the winning side.  Rokossovskiy’s remarkable physical and mental 
resilience in the face of appalling conditions and apparent catastrophe.  As a testimony 
to, and reward for, exemplary service, on 7th March 1919, Rokossovskiy was permitted 
to officially join the Communist party.296  Rokossovskiy’s loyalty in the most trying 
circumstances, in 1918-1919, rather highlights the shattering absurdity of his arrest in 
1937.  It was the Party that abandoned him. 
 
Fourthly, leaders with high emotional intelligence are naturally empathetic, in that they 
understand the emotional characteristics of others and amend their leadership 
accordingly.  It makes them experts at creating and leading balanced teams in a 
constructive, creative manner.  Rokossovskiy seems to have instinctively understood 
that good officers and soldiers would grasp the opportunity to show their abilities and 
revel in the trust conferred on them.  Indeed, it was a major difference between his style 
of leadership and that of Zhukov.  This was a radical philosophy in a Red Army reeling 
from the physical and psychological impact of the Purges.   
 
Finally, emotionally intelligent leaders have excellent social skills.  They are naturally 
adept at all forms of communication, in the broadest sense of the word, making them 
persuasive and authoritative in their leadership.  Rokossovskiy’s refined social skills, in 
contrast to the harsh, brutalising approach of Stalin, Zhukov and Konev have been well 
documented.  In summary, Rokossovskiy’s ability to create and sustain such an 
effective senior command team was at the heart of his leadership style.  Rokossovskiy’s 
high personal standards did not inhibit a sense of humour that possessed a sense of the 
ridiculous.  In December 1942, during an attack on the outer ring of German 
encirclement at Stalingrad, Rokossovskiy asked Batov how 65th Army’s troops were 
progressing.  On all fours, Batov replied.  Rokossovskiy felt “disappointing though the 
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report was, I was struck by the Army Commander’s wry humour.”297  Rokossovskiy 
ordered Batov to suspend the assault, assume the defensive and keep the Germans on 
their toes by raiding.   
 
In late June 1943, Rokossovskiy was nearly killed by a Luftwaffe air raid.  The 
small cottage Rokossovskiy used as his headquarters was destroyed and his sentry 
killed.  By pure chance, Rokossovskiy had gone to eat in the senior officers’ mess.  
Rokossovskiy noticed Orel, his armoured commander wandering around looking 
dazed and confused, observing the wrecked trench in which he should have taken 
cover.298  Rokossovskiy asked him with a grin, why he was not where he should 
be.  Orel replied the trench was freezing and felt like a grave, so if the Luftwaffe 
were going to kill him, he might as well be warm.299   
 
In July 1945, Field Marshal Montgomery made Rokossovskiy a Knight of the 
Bath and presented him with the Order of the British Empire.  In an informal 
photograph taken in Berlin, just after the ceremony, a smiling Marshal Sir 
Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy, KB, OBE, Hero of the Soviet Union, 
Order of Lenin, is saluting the insignia of the Knight of the Bath, aware, no doubt, 
of the irony of a Bolshevik, Red Army commander being honoured by King 
George VI in this way.   
 
 
Figure 84: Zhukov, Rokossovskiy, Sokolovskiy and Vasilevskiy 
at the awards ceremony in Berlin, 1945 
(Bellamy, 2007) 
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In summary, Rokossovskiy had definite values that informed his style of 
leadership.  In the end, like all leaders, he had to get results; the task had to be 
achieved.  However, Rokossovskiy’s behaviour and the standards he demanded 
indicate that he had a wider understanding than many Soviet commanders of the 
interaction between tasks, relationships, values, personal example and leadership.  
In the words of Marshal Katukov writing of the time he served under 
Rokossovskiy at Moscow in November 1941, 
“I have reflected many times on why all who knew Rokossovskiy in one 
way or another had unlimited regard and respect for him.  And only one 
answer suggests itself: reserved, demanding, Konstantin Konstantinovich 
respected people regardless of their rank and status.  This was the main 
thing that drew people to him.”300 
 
Dynamism and Vitality: Leading From The Front 
Rokossovskiy set a personal example that strongly influenced his senior officers.  
However, it did not involve obvious, but unnecessary, displays of personal bravery at 
the front.  Indeed, Rokossovskiy had firm views on the subject.  He declared, “I am no 
advocate of bravado or senseless bravery.  They serve no purpose and fall short of the 
code of behaviour of any self-respecting commander.”301 If necessary, Rokossovskiy 
would lead from the front.  During the Yartsevo battles of July 1941, Rokossovskiy and 
his artillery chief, General Ivan Kamera, stopped a panic stricken rout by standing full 
height, in the trenches, firing at German aircraft.302 A man with Rokossovskiy’s fighting 
record and decorations for bravery did not need to prove his courage, but during 1941 
there was distinct pressure on commanders to display overt proletarian Socialist bravery 
in the face of the enemy, such was the psychological environment of command.   
 
Rokossovskiy fought with all his heart, but mainly with a calm, detached head.  
Rokossovskiy wanted his commanders to use their discretion, and show that they had 
the ability to do their job.  Army commanders of initiative and imagination, willing to 
take risks such as Batov, Chernyakhovskiy, Pukhov, and Fedyuninskiy thrived under 
Rokossovskiy’s command.  Old school Bolsheviks and stolid, authoritarian 
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commanders who did everything by the book, squashed initiative and slaughtered their 
troops did not.   
 
One should not assume Rokossovskiy’s calm nature meant he 
was less effective in getting things done.  Rokossovskiy was 
capable of dynamic, aggressive command if the situation 
demanded it.  In short, as at Yartsevo in July 1941, he had the 
ability to adapt to circumstances as he found them.303 It 
prevented the Germans from encircling Smolensk.  304  So, 
although Rokossovskiy preferred time to prepare an 
operation, as Yartsevo and Moscow demonstrated, he was more than capable of highly 
energetic, improvised leadership.  Indeed, from July-November 1941, Rokossovskiy did 
little more than improvise defensive operations in the face of overwhelming German 
combat power.  Furthermore, in comparison with many senior commanders, especially 
Vatutin, Rokossovskiy’s intelligent use of his staff and his confidence in the ability of 
his chief of staff and field commanders to get things done, meant Rokossovskiy’s 
operational command was highly efficient.  It was this, in combination with delegation 
and the judicious use of initiative that instilled the dynamism and speed into 
Rokossovskiy’s conduct of operations. 
 
Rokossovskiy was calm, he was not casual.  Bagramyan305 suggests that Stalin 
described Rokossovskiy as a real Felix, a reference to 
Feliks Dzerzhinsky (1877-1926)306 the original head of the 
Cheka, and, ironically, a man with Polish connections.  
Stalin’s comparison of Rokossovskiy with Dzerzhinsky 
seems bizarre, even malicious, given Rokossovskiy’s 
experiences with the Cheka’s bastard child, the NKVD.  
Yet, upon closer inspection, it is possible that Stalin’s 
reference to Dzerzhinsky was not uncomplimentary.  In 
comparison with his odious successors, Genrikh Yagoda, 
Nikolay Yezhov and Lavrentia Beria, Dzerzhinsky was a paragon of ruthless but 
dedicated Bolshevik endeavour, a man who had helped to save the Revolution when it 
 
Figure 85: I.I. Fedyuninskiy 
(samsv.narod.ru) 
 
Figure 86: F. Dzerzhinskiy 
(imageforum2.afp.com) 
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was weak and surrounded by predatory Capitalist enemies.  In the wake of his death, in 
July 1926, Dzerzhinskiy was eulogised in glowing terms.  In short, 
“Dzerzhinsky displayed superhuman energy: day and night, night and day, 
without sleep, without food, and without the slightest rest he stayed at his post of 
duty.  Hated by the enemies of the workers, he won even their respect.  His 
princely figure, his personal bravery, his penetrating comprehension, his 
directness, and his exceptional nobility, invested him with great authority.”307  
 
During and after the Great Patriotic War, until his death in August 1968, 
Rokossovskiy’s personal reputation soared.  In 1956, Khrushchev singled him out as 
having been unjustly treated in the Purges.308  Certainly, in 1941, particularly during the 
battle of Moscow, Rokossovskiy was tested to the point of utter exhaustion, but 
survived.309  In some ways, Rokossovskiy, allowing for bombastic exaggeration, was 
regarded, like Dzerzhinsky, as a man of integrity, ability and honour.  This, in turn, 
‘invested him with great authority’ and gave him a moral, as well as very real, 
command over his subordinates, junior or senior.  In the decades since the end of the 
Cold War, in the new Russia, Rokossovskiy star has continued to rise and he has been 
called Narodny Marshal ‘the People’s Marshal.’310  
 
Dignitas: The Source of Rokossovskiy’s Authority 
The relationship between power and authority is a complex and interactive one, 
especially in relation to leadership.  Indeed, according to a distinguished theorist of 
leadership theory, Peter G. Northouse “in discussions of leadership, it is not unusual for 
leaders to be described as wielders of power, as individuals who dominate others.”311  
Equally, there are two forms of leadership, commonly known as assigned and emergent 
leadership.  In essence, some leaders draw power from the formal status of the position 
they hold, rather than the quality of leadership they display.312  In contrast, an assigned 
leader may have far greater authority than the formal leader, because the quality of their 
leadership, and, crucially, the response of their followers, confers upon them the natural 
authority of a leader, without resort to formal power.  Ironically, the actual power of a 
leader who emerges is often greater than those to whom power is formally assigned.   
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These issues are related to themes discussed in modern leadership theory, in particular 
the ideas of French and Raven, first raised in 1962313 concerning the five sources of 
power.  These were referent power, expert power, legitimate power, reward power and 
coercive power.  314 Referent power is based upon followers close identification with the 
leader315 who is often perceived to have special, particularly admirable personal 
qualities.316  A leader’s expert power is derived from the perception of competence 
associated with a high degree of ability or knowledge.317  Legitimate power is conferred 
with the formal status associated with rank or position.318  It is a product of social 
conditioning and the habits developed from childhood which lead us to acknowledge 
the inherent authority of certain individuals.319  The notion of reward power is drawn 
from leaders having the opportunity to directly reward or withhold recognition of 
subordinates.320  It is an important source of direct and indirect power if the perceived 
reward is valuable.321  The fifth source of power is coercive power.  Coercive power is 
generated from a leader’s ability to punish others.322  It is also argued that, “coercive 
power stems from the capacity to produce fear in others.”323  
 
During the Great Patriotic War, the senior commanders of the Red Army were 
constantly mindful of the pernicious influence of political commissars and later 
SMERSH.  Yet, at the same time, especially in the wake of Stalin’s abolition of dual 
command between political commissar and military profession, on 9th October 1942, 
high ranking commanders, such as Rokossovskiy, enjoyed considerable power as a 
result of their position and rank.  It was well known that high rank was a powerful 
indicator of Stalin’s favour, particularly in the period 1942-44, when Stalin was more 
inclined to listen to his military commanders.  Naturally, all senior commanders knew 
the fragility of their position vis-à-vis Stalin, but many, in particular Zhukov, 
Sokolovskiy and Konev exploited the authoritarian culture of Stalin’s state and Red 
Army, to dispense leadership, based almost exclusively on coercive power, supported 
by a harsh interpretation of legitimate power, although in Konev and Zhukov’s case this 
was at least bolstered by high degree of ruthless professional expertise or expert power.  
This is not a mitigating caveat one can apply to Sokolovskiy. 
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Yet, this was not true of Rokossovskiy.  Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership was not 
dependent on the brutal exercise of power, but his authority, his reputation.  In essence, 
Rokossovskiy leadership and power was based primarily on referent and expert power 
endorsed by the formal staus of his rank and ability to reward subordinates for 
outstanding performance.  It is also clear that while Rokossovskiy was far from a ‘soft 
touch’ and a demanding military professional, coercive power was not the dominant 
characteristic of his style of leadership.  It is this contrast that marks out Rokossovskiy 
from his contemporaries and the prevailing leadership culture of the Red Army.   In 
short, Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership had what the Romans called ‘dignitas.’   
 
The dignitas of a Roman aristocrat concerned his personal standing among his peers and 
community, reflecting the perceived worth of his ability, deeds and character, both 
martial and civic.  Naturally, such issues were and are intangible, but also very real, 
then as now.324 There is little doubt that Rokossovskiy had great dignitas and standing 
within the Red Army.  In December 1942, when asked to choose between Rokossovskiy 
and Yeremenko, as to who would command Operation Kol’tso and accomplish the 
destruction of the Sixth German Army at Stalingrad, Stalin chose Rokossovskiy, 
because he felt Rokossovskiy had greater authority than Yeremenko.  325   
 
Batov viewed Rokossovskiy as considerate, thoughtful, sociable and unpretentious, but 
also a brilliant general who always encouraged initiative and quick wit.  Marshal of 
Aviation Aleksandr Yevgen’evich Golovanov (1904-1975)326 considered Rokossvsky 
the brightest general in the Red Army, V.I. Kazakov remarked upon the power of 
Rokossovskiy’s personal example, while M.I. Kazakov, noted his unusual ability to 
listen, a commander of civility, who could incisively analyse his subordinates’ ideas.  
Bagramyan acknowledged him as a master of tactics.  In conjunction with 
Shaposhnikov’s 1937 endorsement, it is clear Rokossovskiy was seen, by his 
contemporaries, as an outstanding commander.   
 
In summary, Rokossovskiy had great dignitas and standing within the Red Army.  There 
was a powerfully interactive relationship between Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership 
and his dignitas.  The style of leadership Rokossovskiy adopted built upon his dignitas, 
212 
 
which in turn bolstered his style of leadership.  It was Rokossovskiy’s dignitas, his 
reputation, borne of his character, ability and outstanding record as a field commander 
that enabled him to practise a style of leadership, as unusual as it was effective, in 
Stalin’s Red Army.  It was his dignitas, and perhaps above all, his ability to 
communicate what it meant to be a senior officer that gave Rokossovskiy considerable 
moral authority over his subordinates. 
 
Caring For The Men and Getting the Job Done: Casualties 
It is a fact that many Soviet commanders shared Stalin’s callous attitude towards 
casualties.  Soldiers were expendable assets to be utilised in achieving tactical and 
operational goals in pursuit of strategic objectives.  The end justified the means.  
Rokossovskiy’s forces suffered shocking casualties, but he did not earn a reputation as a 
commander who slaughtered his own troops, with equanimity, in order to attain the 
victor’s laurels.  On the contrary, 
“as the analysis of the documents, publications, and memoirs demonstrate, a 
considerable number of senior commanders, including the well-known G.K. 
Zhukov, I.S. Konev, N.F. Vatutin, F.I. Golikov, A.I. Eremenko, G.I. Kulik, S.M. 
Budenny, K.E. Voroshilov, S.K. Timoshenko, R.Ia. Malinovsky, V.D. 
Sokolovsky, V.I. Chuikov and some of lower ranks, who considered soldiers as 
‘cannon fodder’ fought with maximum losses.  On the other hand, K.K. 
Rokossovskiy, A.A. Grechko, A.V. Gorbatov, E.I. Petrov, I.D. Cherniakhovsky, 
and several others fought with minimum casualties but still at the required 
professional level.  Unfortunately, the latter were in a minority.”327   
 
Therefore, among the truly senior commanders, of the Great Patriotic War, 
Rokossovskiy is singled out.  In November 1941, Rokossovskiy was ordered by 
Western Front to attack the German forces in Volokalamsk.  He “was unable to 
fathom the Commander’s reasoning in issuing the order.  Our strength was 
minimal, and the enemy himself was poised for the attack.”328  On 14th 
November 1941, Rokossovskiy was remarkably frank with his staff about their 
orders but also aware of the operational thinking behind it.  Rokossovskiy told 
them that, 
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“Seriously speaking, we are, of course, not in a position to advance 
attacking………In the Staff of the Front this is perfectly understood.  
However, it is necessary to hold…while the operational-strategic 
reserves are in the process of preparation.  This is the point of the 
counterstrike against Volokalamsk.”329 
The attack on 16th November 1941 was initially successful, but subsequently 44th 
Cavalry Division, suffered heavy casualties.  In April 1943, Rokossovskiy 
recommended 70th Army’s commander Tarasov be sacked and other senior commanders 
warned as a result of a failed attack, which suffered massive casualties, especially 
officer casualties.  One regiment, the 278th Rifle Regiment, lost all its battalion 
commanders, political deputies and the majority of its company and platoon 
commanders, because its commander, Colonel Sedlovskiy, had ordered the regiment’s 
entire officer corps, virtually without exception, into the frontline.330  It was effectively 
decapitated and rendered leaderless, in one battle. 
 
A successful field commander is always a determined commander, but it is 
difficult to envisage Rokossovskiy accepting the stubborn, bloody-minded 
slaughter that Zhukov and Konev tolerated in Operation Mars, the failed attempt 
to destroy German Army Group Centre, in November 1942, or that Zhukov 
demanded on the Seelow Heights, in April 1945.  In September 1941, Zhukov was 
heavily criticised by Stavka for his conduct of the Yel’nia Operation.  It reveals 
Zhukov’s callous strength of will.  Zhukov was exceptionally intolerant of the 
mistakes of others but less than perfect in his own conduct of operations.  The 
Stavka directive, written by Shaposhnikov, commented as follows, “the recent 24th 
and 43rd Armies’ offensive did not provide completely positive results and led 
only to excessive losses both in personnel and in equipment.”331  
 
Rokossovskiy believed that, “one must fight to the death and die intelligently only when 
this achieves a major goal and only in the event that this, the death of a few which 
prevents the loss of the majority, ensures overall success.”332  It is difficult to see the 
man who twice offered Sixth German Army honourable surrender at Stalingrad,333 
enjoying the spectacle of Cossacks slaughtering and mutilating German troops with 
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sabres, as Konev tolerated at Korsun, in February 1944.  Similarly, it is hard to imagine 
Rokossovskiy conducting Operation Suvorov, in October 1943, with the slaughter 
bereft of imagination that Sokolovskiy enforced as commander of the Western Front.334  
Nor, is it easy to see Rokossovskiy grinding his way through Budapest, in January 1945, 
with the same blind stubbornness of Malinovskiy.335 
 
In early October 1942, as the Don Front’s commander, Rokossovskiy found himself in 
the Stalingrad region, north-west of the city.  Rokossovskiy was ordered by Stavka to 
prepare an operation against German forces north of Stalingrad, in the Orlovka salient.  
In his report of 9th October 1942, Rokossovskiy clearly indicated that he did not 
consider the operation a good idea.  The Germans had deep defences that they had 
occupied for several weeks and held high ground that enabled them to observe Soviet 
preparations.  Furthermore, the divisions of 1st Guards Army, 24th Army and 66th Army, 
earmarked for the attack were severely depleted after months of fighting.  In 
Rokossovskiy’s opinion they did not have the strength or fighting spirit to achieve the 
breakthrough.  He concluded that unless substantial reinforcements were allocated the 
operation was not sustainable, before dutifully laying out an operational timetable.336  In 
October 1942, this was a remarkably candid document for a Soviet operational 
commander to write.  Nevertheless, Rokossovskiy was ordered to prepare an operation 
and submitted his operational plan on 15th October 1942.  The operation was scheduled 
for 20th-23rd October 1942.337  It failed, as Rokossovskiy had predicted.338   
 
Nevertheless, Rokossovskiy was fortunate in that he never faced a situation where he 
had few alternatives but a ghastly pyrrhic victory.  He was not cornered in Leningrad, 
trapped in Stalingrad or Budapest, nor confronted with the massive defences 
encountered by 3rd Belorussian Front, in East Prussia, especially around Konigsberg.  
Nor was Rokossovskiy ever confronted with an objective like Berlin.  Yet, 
Rokossovskiy endured fierce engagements, in terrible weather on dreadful terrain, and 
in the Belorussian marshes he did not get dragged into a protracted attritional and 
positional struggle.  Rokossovskiy did not waste lives through a bloody-minded refusal 
to accept that his operational plan had not worked.  Nor did Rokossovskiy value 
attrition as a weapon for its own sake.   
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Rokossovskiy was not cut from the same savage hue as Stalin, Zhukov and 
Konev, merciless and virtually without compassion.  If the demands of the 
military situation did not require it, Rokossovskiy did not revel in revenge and 
slaughter.  According to Richard Woff,  
“there were times during the war when, amid the destructive urge for bestial 
vengeance on both sides, Rokossovskiy displayed humanity and compassion 
for the suffering of the once powerful adversary, and the hapless German 
population.”339   
Equally, although there is no evidence that Rokossovskiy approved of penal 
battalions, he did not openly disapprove of them, and although he was dismayed 
at the wastefulness of Stalin’s Red Army, unlike the equally talented, but ill-fated 
Vlasov, Rokossovskiy did not take an open stand.  It would not have been 
successful.   
 
Rokossovskiy was more humane than many other Soviet commanders, but he 
should not be seen as some kind of chivalric Bolshevik.  He had no qualms, on 
29th June 1944, in unleashing the entire 16th Air 
Army, on a pocket of encircled German troops, 
near Bobruisk.  Similarly, he unleashed Don 
Front’s artillery on German troops who refused to 
surrender at Stalingrad.  Equally, there is also the 
question of East Prussia.  In January-February 
1945, Red Army soldiers in Rokossovskiy’s 2nd 
Belorussian Front, as well as 3rd Belorussian 
Front, unleashed mayhem upon the German population.  The conduct of 3rd 
Guards Cavalry Corps in East Prussia is reputed to have been appalling but 
militarily, on 21st January 1945, it smashed the key German defensive zone, 
south-eastern Prussia, at Allenstein.  Rokossovskiy specifically commended its 
performance to Stavka.340  However, there seems very little evidence in 
Rokossovskiy’s character and conduct to support the notion that rape happened in 
East Prussia because “in Rokossovskiy’s mob, Rokossovskiy permitted it.”341 
 
Figure 87: Rokossovskiy, 1944 
(Rokossovskiy, 2002) 
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Rokossovskiy’s life and career had exposed him to tragedy, savagery and the 
sheer havoc that war and revolution had inflicted upon millions of people.  In East 
Prussia, Rokossovskiy understood the rage of the Red Army’s soldiers and 
probably he thought that retribution had a higher moral authority than a planned 
systematic, racial war of annihilation.  In the East Prussian Operation, on 19th 
January 1945, Rokossovskiy’s forces liberated some 15,000 Soviet prisoners of 
war.342  It is almost certain that their conditions and health were truly ghastly.  
This does not mean that he approved of or condoned some of the appalling 
depravity displayed by some Soviet troops.  In fact, even though the extent of the 
mayhem was well known among senior commanders, political and military, in 
Moscow and East Prussia, Rokossovskiy was the only commander who even 
attempted to do something about the carnage.  He issued Order 006, instructing 
Soviet troops to turn their anger on German troops not civilians.343  If 
Rokossovskiy did relatively little to actively enforce it, given 
his primary operational responsibility to destroy the German 
forces in East Prussia, at least he did something.  In contrast, 
when informed that Soviet soldiers were committing terrible 
crimes Vasilevskiy responded with “I don’t give a fuck.  It is 
now time for our soldiers to issue their own justice.”344    
 
Naturally, in a national struggle for survival, Rokossovskiy was primarily 
motivated by the military task of destroying the enemy.  Rokossovskiy was a 
professional officer with the highest possible standards, who demanded an 
absolute commitment to duty.  Of course, he was prepared to pay the butcher’s 
bill of death, in order to achieve objectives and he could be harsh, in the face of 
incompetence.  Yet, the historical record demonstrates that Rokossovskiy had a 
natural awareness of the importance of effective relationships in achieving 
military objectives.   
 
In short, more than any other leading Soviet commander, Rokossovskiy 
instinctively understood the interactive relationship between caring for the men 
 
Figure 88: A.M. 
Vasilevskiy 
(ets.ru) 
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and getting the job done.  Rokossovskiy knew that effective relationships 
characterised by trust, delegation and confidence made it more likely, not less, 
that the task would be achieved.  It was this that made his style of leadership so 
unusual by the standards of a Soviet political and military leadership that had little 
use for anything other than task fulfilment, regardless of the cost.  It is perhaps 
ironic, that indirectly, it was Zhukov, of all people, who confirmed that 
Rokossovskiy had the ability to care for the men and get the job done.  According 
to Kardashov citing Zhukov, 
“Rokossovskiy was a very good boss.  A brilliant knowledge of the military 
life he had a clear mission, sensible and tactically proven in executing his 
orders.  To subordinates he showed concern, was consistently loyal and 
polite, but nobody else valued or was as skilled in developing units and 
subordinates under his command.  To many he gave valuable time to study, 
to learn.  I have not yet spoken about his unusual sincerity - they all knew 
his reputation and they were few who didn’t want to serve under his 
command.”345 
 
The Warsaw Uprising 
However, one cannot avoid the fact that on the face of it, Rokossovskiy’s 1st 
Belorussian Front appeared, in August-September 1944, to acquiesce in the 
horrific annihilation of the Warsaw Uprising.  The Warsaw Uprising began on 2nd 
August 1944 and ended on 11th October 1944, in scenes of terrible destruction.  
The people and the city were massacred, while Rokossovskiy’s 1st Belorussian 
Front watched from the eastern bank of the Vistula, unable they claimed, 
unwilling said others, to end the bloodletting.  In response to accusations that the 
Red Army rested, while the Warsaw insurgents were slaughtered, the Soviet 
official history of the Great Patriotic War argued, 
“on August 1st , troops of the left flank of the 1st Belarussian Front 
approached Warsaw from the south-east.  In approaching Praga, the 2nd 
Tank Army met with fierce enemy resistance; the approaches to Praga had 
been heavily fortified……..it was also here that the Germans concentrated 
a heavy striking force of one infantry and four Panzer divisions, which 
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struck out at the beginning of August and drove the 2nd Tank Army away 
from Praga, before the bulk of our troops had time to approach this 
Warsaw suburb.”346 
 
Yet, even if the Red Army and, more specifically, 1st Belorussian Front had been 
in excellent condition, Stalin would not have allowed it to intervene on behalf of 
the insurgents.  Stalin was never going to allow Bor-Komarowski and the London 
Poles to present themselves as the heroic liberators of Warsaw.  Stalin and 
Rokossovskiy understood that without the Red Army’s support, the uprising was 
probably doomed; without it the rising would succeed.  If it succeeded, the 
prestige of the London Poles would present Stalin, who had his own plans for 
Poland, with a serious political problem.   
 
If one is to sustain an argument that Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership was not as 
savage or inured to casualties as the likes of Zhukov and Konev, then his attitude 
to the uprising and the validity of his arguments, justifying the inability, not the 
refusal, of 1st Belorussian Front to intervene, is of considerable influence.  In the 
opinion of one commentator, “in his memoirs Rokossovskiy (sic) adopted a 
laconic, at times derisive attitude towards the uprising.”347  Rokossovskiy did 
regard the timing of the uprising as an act of gross, irresponsible stupidity: 
“frankly speaking, the timing of the uprising was just about the worst possible in 
the circumstances.  It was as though its leaders had deliberately chosen a time that 
would ensure its defeat.”348 
 
On 26th August 1944, after official celebrations in Lublin, a city that on 21st July 
1944, Stalin explicitly stated that he wanted captured for purely political 
reasons,349  Rokossovskiy gave an interview to the British journalist, Alexander 
Werth.  Rokossovskiy criticised the timing of the uprising, and its leaders, while 
seeking to explain that 1st Belorussian Front was in no position to intervene.  
Werth pointed out that on 2nd August 1944, Pravda had given the distinct 
impression that the fall of Warsaw was inevitable and that “the talk in Moscow 
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was that Rokossovskiy was going to capture Warsaw on August 9 or 10.”350  
Rokossovskiy told Werth, 
“let’s be serious.  An armed insurrection in a place like Warsaw could only 
have succeeded if it had been carefully co-ordinated with the Red Army.  
The question of timing was of the utmost importance.  The Warsaw 
insurgents are badly armed, and the rising would have made sense only if 
we were already on the point of entering Warsaw.  That point had not been 
reached at any stage, and I’ll admit that some Soviet correspondents were 
much too optimistic on the 1st August.  We were pushed back.”351 
Rokossovskiy was unusually scathing about the irresponsibility, as he saw it, of 
the uprising’s leaders. 
“Bor-Komarowski and the people around him have butted in kak ryzhy v 
tsirke - like the clown in the circus who pops up at the wrong moment and 
only gets rolled up in the carpet……if it were only a piece of clowning it 
wouldn’t matter, but the political stunt is going to cost Poland hundreds of 
thousands of lives.  It is an appalling tragedy and now they are trying to 
put the blame on us.”352 
After this somewhat ritualistic denunciation of Bor-Komarowski and London, 
Rokossovskiy defended the Red Army’s inaction on purely military grounds.  He 
was very annoyed by suggestions that 1st Belorussian Front was refusing to 
intervene, rather than being incapable of an assault, across the Vistula.  Naturally, 
Rokossovskiy had a vested interest in protecting his reputation, but in operational 
terms as Alexander Werth observed, “the really crucial question is whether the 
Russians could have forced the Vistula at Warsaw in either August or 
September.”353 
 
It is around this matter that Rokossovskiy’s reputation and integrity revolve.  On 
26th August 1944, Rokossovskiy told Werth that “after several weeks’ heavy 
fighting in Belorussia and eastern Poland we finally reached the outskirts of Praga 
about the 1st of August.  The Germans, at this point, threw in four armoured 
divisions, and we were driven back.”354  He claimed that 1st Belorussian had been 
driven back nearly 100 kilometres.  In 1944, he argued “the military situation east 
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of the Vistula is much more complicated than you realise.  And we just don’t want 
any British or American planes mucking around here at the moment.”355 
 
The historical evidence does support Rokossovskiy’s arguments.356  The 
operational situation, east of the Vistula, was a delicate one.  Norman Davies, who 
cannot be considered a sympathetic commentator, acknowledges, 
“the German counter-attack east of the Vistula by four panzer divisions 
had proved surprisingly effective.  When launched on 2nd August, it was 
conceived as a last minute move to staunch the gaping wound caused by 
Operation Bagration and the collapse of Army Group Centre.  But instead 
it made headway, and Rokossovskiy, who had literally been within sight 
of Warsaw, was pushed halfway back to the Bug.”357 
The German counter-attack complicated an already dynamic operational situation.  
On 2nd August 1944, 1st Polish Army suffered heavy casualties in attempting to 
cross the Vistula at Pulawy.  It was clinging on.  Furthermore, less well known but 
equally significant, one hundred kilometres east of Warsaw, 65th Army was 
fighting through a major German tactical ambush in the Belorussian forest.358   
 
Equally, the right-wing of 1st Belorussian Front had been in action since 24th June 
1944, and was still heavily engaged.  It was struggling to support the left-wing 
and thus spread German combat power.  The left-wing had only been in action 
since 18th July 1944, but on 2nd August, its spearhead, 2nd Tank Army was 
thumped, east of Warsaw.  359  Simultaneously, 8th Guards Army was engaged in a 
bitter struggle for the Magnuszew bridgehead, upon which future combat 
operations in Poland were vital.  In short, the military situation was complicated.  
As Rokossovskiy commented “if the Germans had not thrown in all that armour, 
we could have taken Warsaw, though not in a frontal attack; but it was never more 
than a 50-50 chance.”360 
 
Werth conceded Rokossovskiy’s argument that 1st Belorussian was in no position 
to bounce the Vistula, enter Warsaw and defeat the Germans in a major urban 
battle.  Similarly, Davies agrees that “in the first week of August there was little 
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chance that Rokossovskiy could have easily crossed the Vistula in force.”361  It is 
perhaps ironic that the most authentic confirmation of the veracity of 
Rokossovskiy’s comments came from the German high command.  General von 
Tippelskirch declared, “the Warsaw Rising started on August 1st, at a time when 
the strength of the Russian blow had exhausted itself.”362  In a similar vein, Werth 
quotes Guderian as reporting, “the German 9th Army had the impression, on 
August 8th that the Russian attempt to seize Warsaw by a coup de main had been 
defeated by our defence, despite the Polish uprising, and that the latter had, from 
the enemy’s point of view, begun too soon.”363  In short, after six weeks of 
fighting, Rokossovskiy’s 1st Belorussian Front was in no position to force the 
Vistula and fight an urban battle for Warsaw against a prepared enemy.  It was not 
an act of indifference by Rokossovskiy, but an enforced operational pause.   
 
There seems little doubt that Stalin cynically exploited 1st Belorussian Front’s 
operational difficulties in order to secure the destruction of the Polish insurgents.  
However, as early as 8th August 1941, Rokossovskiy submitted an operational 
plan for the invasion and liberation of Poland.364  The plan endorsed by Zhukov, 
proposed to drive the Germans from Poland, liberating Warsaw in the process.  It 
is clear evidence of 1st Belorussian Front’s relative recovery and Stalin’s true 
priorities.  Yet, subsequently, Davies is critical, by implication, if nothing else, of 
Rokossovskiy’s failure to support 1st Polish Army’s attempt to cross the Vistula.  
The battle of the Chernyakhov Bridgehead (15th-23rd September 1944) cost 1st 
Polish Army 4,938 dead.365  It was the closest the insurgents came to a physical 
link with the Red Army.  The attack failed because there was no surprise, 
extensive German defences and 1st Polish Army’s inexperience.  The 1st Polish 
Army had been under Rokossovskiy’s command since the spring of 1944 and had 
experienced problems, real or otherwise, in May 1944366 and in June 1944367 with 
its battle training and fitness for combat.   
 
However, Davies implies that 1st Polish Army might have succeeded if 1st 
Belorussian Front had provided more support.  It is implied that the scale of 
Soviet artillery, sapper and air support368 indicates that this was not a rogue Polish 
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operation, borne of national sentiment, but one launched with the tacit approval of 
Rokossovskiy, and by implication Stalin.  Nevertheless, “Rokossovskiy did not 
attempt to use any Soviet combat troops and the First Byelorussian Front did not 
alter the essential defensive stance which it had been ordered to assume in late 
August.”369  As Davies indicates the origins of such political and military 
tokenism lay, no doubt, in the Kremlin.  However, while acknowledging the 
reality of Rokossovskiy’s impotence in the face of Stalin, SMERSH and the 
NKVD, he virtually implicated Rokossovskiy as guilty by association, a man who 
either lacked the courage of his own convictions, or the courage of his Polish 
antecedents, who fought for Polish freedom in the nineteenth century.  In Davies’ 
words, “why at a time when no other major fighting was in progress, did 
Rokossovskiy not put a greater share of his massive resources at Bering’s 
disposal?  One cannot know, but certainly much more could have been done.”370  
 
Can the implication that Rokossovskiy simply sat on his hands, while Warsaw 
burned, be justified?  As Davies acknowledges, one cannot know.  Similarly, by 
his own account, Stalin kept his commanders on a tight rein.  In such a delicate 
political situation, the penalties for open insubordination or tolerance of an 
incremental Soviet military involvement, by Rokossovskiy, would have been 
severe.  No sane man could have been expected to run such a risk, nevermind one 
with Rokossovskiy’s Polish and Gulag background.  Indeed, Davies himself 
suggests that Lieutenant-General Serov of the NKVD, “though a mere lieutenant 
general, he could have obtained the authority to arrest Marshal Rokossovskiy at 
any time.  Rokossovskiy could never have ordered the arrest of a senior political 
officer.”371 Rokossovskiy’s operational plan of 8th August 1944 had already 
placed him in a vulnerable position.372  Its potential implications cannot have been 
lost on Stalin.  It is impossible to know if Rokossovskiy’s plan was aimed at 
helping the rebels, or, whether any benefit to Warsaw was just incidental, if 
helpful to the plan’s success.  Certainly, it was not a specific objective.  
Nevertheless, it was the only attempt to reconcile Soviet military strategic and 
operational interests, with those of Warsaw. 
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The dormant proximity of Rokossovskiy’s 1st Belorussian Front as the fighters of 
Warsaw were slaughtered has tarnished Rokossovskiy reputation.  However, the 
historical record does support Rokossovskiy’s claim that, in early August 1944, 1st 
Belorussian Front was in no condition to intervene on behalf of the rebels.  It is of 
course true, that fresh or tattered, Stalin’s policy would have prevented 1st 
Belorussian Front’s intervention.  In a sense, 1st Belorussian Front’s operational 
exhaustion saved Rokossovskiy from an appalling moral dilemma.  If 1st 
Belorussian Front had been fresh, then Rokossovskiy, whose Polish links were 
well known, may have faced a confrontation with his conscience, or Stalin.  As 
Rokossovskiy’s defiance of Stalin over the planning, in May 1944, of Operation 
Bagration, indicate, Rokossovskiy was no sycophantic apparatchik, but from a 
personal perspective, one must conclude that he was fortunate in the exhaustion of 
his troops. 
 
Summary  
Rokossovskiy was not a scholar of military leadership.  He received no formal 
officer training, of any kind, until 1928-29.  373 There is little to suggest that he 
saw himself as anything other than a “natural” leader.  Yet, he had a wealth of 
knowledge and experience.  It is the argument of this thesis that Rokossovskiy’s 
style of leadership and command was genuinely distinctive in character.  It was 
very different from that of his leading Red Army contemporaries.  Indeed, 
Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership implicitly rejected the prevailing authoritarian 
leadership culture of Stalin’s Red Army.  This made him a very radical exception 
to the rule. 
 
Rokossovskiy was an authoritative, not authoritarian commander, a man who 
could switch between different leadership styles by instinct and considered 
reflection, not the contrived application of method, regardless of the situation.  
Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership was flexible, imaginative, creative and 
occasionally democratic.  It encouraged delegation, the use of initiative, team 
leadership, consultation and discussion in the preparation and execution of 
operations.  It is a fact that Rokossovskiy tolerated mistakes, to encourage 
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creativity and initiative, in a way that Zhukov,374 Konev,375 Sokolovskiy,376 
Yeremenko377 and Malinovskiy.378 either could not or would not.   
  
Rokossovskiy was a very senior commander, in charge of huge formations.  There 
was a limit to his direct influence on all his subordinates.  Nevertheless, 
Rokossovskiy thought carefully about what he wanted from senior officers.  In a 
Stalinist political and army culture, where initiative and independent thinking had 
been murderously suppressed, Rokossovskiy understood that good officers thrived 
on confidence and trust, namely, the chance to use their initiative and professional 
expertise.  By the standards of Stalin’s Red Army, Rokossovskiy was an unusual, 
quietly unorthodox, senior officer.  He was adept in both leadership and 
command, but rejected the authoritarian style of leadership that was common to 
other senior commanders.  This made him a distinct, quietly uncompromising 
exception to the rule.   
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PART TWO: OPERATIONAL COMMAND 
Introduction 
The second part of this thesis will analyse Rokossovskiy’s conduct of operations, 
examine his operational style and identify distinctive hallmarks of his operational 
art.  It will examine Rokossovskiy’s attitude towards the planning and preparation 
of operations.  It will discuss broad front deployment, deception, localised 
concentration of force, holding and shock forces and simultaneous general 
assaults, all common themes in his operations.  Rokossovskiy’s imaginative, if 
generally orthodox approach, to deep battle and his more distinctive deep 
operations will be analysed.  It will discuss the forms of deep operation that 
Rokossovskiy used, as well as other aspects of command such as operational 
synchronisation, harmonisation of attrition and manoeuvre and operational 
momentum.   
 
Rokossovskiy’s conduct of deep operations and his use of mobile groups will be 
discussed, as will his intellectual judgement, his ability to make the correct, 
instinctive decisions.  In addition, Rokossovskiy’s operational temperament will 
be discussed in terms of the manner in which it influenced his conduct of 
operations.  Rokossovskiy’s personal style of leadership was authoritative in 
character and distinctly unorthodox in terms of the Red Army’s leadership culture, 
but his actual conduct of operations had far more in common with the traditions of 
Russian-Soviet operational art.  Indeed, far more than some of his more celebrated 
overtly Soviet, contemporaries such as Zhukov.  However, to begin our 
examination of Rokossovskiy’s operational command in the Great Patriotic War, 
it is necessary to analyse the origins of Soviet military thinking in the period 1905 
to 1936. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
THE ORIGINS OF SOVIET MILITARY THINKING:  
THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL AND DEEP BATTLE (1905-36) 
The Red Army’s military success in the Great Patriotic War owed much, although 
far from everything, to Tsarist and Soviet military thinking in the period 1905-36.  
The origins of Rokossovskiy’s operating art, the concepts of deep battle and deep 
operations, lay in this era of military thought.1  In short, the period 1905-36 was a 
formative period for both the Red Army and Rokossovskiy.  It laid the 
foundations of Soviet operational thinking and influenced the way Rokossovskiy 
thought and acted as an operational commander on the Eastern Front. 
 
The Russian Civil War 
The Red Army was born on 28th January 1918 when a decree, signed by Lenin, 
announced the creation of the ‘The Workers and Peasants Red Army.’2  By 
summer 1918, it was a regular military force designed to fight a conventional civil 
war.3  This was a pragmatic response, endorsed by Lenin and enforced by 
Trotsky, to the threat posed by counter-revolutionary White forces.  It was a 
decision that angered many radical Bolsheviks who mistrusted the whole idea of 
organised state armed forces, while harbouring illusions about partisan 
revolutionary forces.4  The Russian Civil War (1918-21) was a truly savage war.  
It brought utter misery to millions as Russia teetered on the edge of political, 
social and economic disintegration.5  However, in terms of the numbers involved, 
as well as the easily penetrated and shallow fronts, the Russian Civil War was 
very different from the First World War.  Breakthroughs were achieved with 
relative ease and cavalry played an important role,6 ranging far, wide and deep.7 
 
A tendency to overplay the significance of the Civil War and the prowess of the 
Red Army, were marked characteristics of Soviet military thought during the 
inter-war years.  Its brightest thinkers were not immune.  In 1932, Georgiy 
Samoylovich Isserson (1898-1975), a genuinely innovative military thinker, 
argued that the Russian Civil War “undoubtedly marked the beginning of a new 
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era in the history of military art, and sharply changed the 
entire nature of armed conflict.”8  The Russian Civil War 
did stimulate military thinking, especially the war with 
Poland in 1920, but the localised peculiarities of the war 
were too great for such grandiose conclusions about the 
general nature of war.  It was too easy to breakthrough, the 
small force to space ratio and the fighting techniques too 
dissimilar to the general fighting characteristics of the era, 
the ‘mechanised’ warfare of the western front in World War One, to be of 
sustained significance.9 
 
The revolutionary ardour of the Red Army was dealt a sharp lesson in military 
reality during the Polish-Russian War of 1920.  In particular, the Red defeat 
outside Warsaw, in August 1920, exercised a sustained influence on Soviet 
military thinking.  The controversy surrounding 1st Cavalry Army’s failure to 
support Tukhachevskiy’s Western Front’s advance on Warsaw has rather 
obscured other significant lessons of the Polish War.10  Polish nationalism and 
Pilsudski’s skilful command contributed to the Red 
defeat, but should not disguise the collapse of the 
Western Front’s supply lines.  Soviet supplies and 
reserves did exist but Tukhachevskiy’s logistical 
rear was so badly organised in the forests of 
Belorussia, that they could not be deployed at the 
height of the fighting, east of Warsaw.11  
Tukhachevskiy’s gamble, that speed would 
outweigh logistic frailty, was proved wrong.12   
 
The Red failure at Warsaw, in 1920, was extensively debated during the inter-war 
years.  The debate confirmed in Soviet minds the pivotal importance of the rear in 
nourishing sustained offensive operations, the dangers of pushing an operation 
beyond its natural limits13 and the need for operational co-ordination between 
separate, but linked formations.  These were central themes of inter-war thinking 
 
Figure 89: G.S. Isserson 
(commons.wikipedia.org) 
 
Figure 90: M. Tukhachevskiy 
(pwhce.org) 
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and operational command during the Great Patriotic War.  It is an irony of history 
that these themes of operational synchronisation, logistical exhaustion and 
pushing an offensive beyond its capacity to sustain itself would recur, during the 
advance of Rokossovskiy’s 1st Belorussian Front, on Warsaw, in July 1944. 
 
Ideology and Inevitability 
In 1921, the Soviet government was committed to international revolution and 
aspired to transform the political, economic and social world of the early 
twentieth century.14  War was not the only means, or indeed, the preferred means 
of promoting revolution, but, given the fundamental political, economic and social 
differences between capitalist and socialist societies, there could be no peaceful 
coexistence.15  The Soviet leadership assumed that the 
capitalist west planned to destroy the infant socialist 
state.  Western interventions on behalf of the Whites 
during the Civil War only fuelled the paranoia of Soviet 
leaders possessed of an ideological belief that the future 
was theirs, if only capitalism could be prevented from 
destroying it.  These were powerful and widely shared 
sentiments long before “in early 1927 Soviet political 
leaders began warning their citizens that encircling 
imperialist nations were about to start the long 
anticipated assault on the socialist homeland.”16  War was inevitable.  Therefore, 
Soviet military thinking during the inter-war years was not some esoteric and 
indulgent academic debate, but an attempt to prepare the Red Army for war. 
 
Total War and Mass Armies 
The war would be a “protracted and cruel contest, putting to the test all the 
economic and political foundations of the belligerent sides.”17  In short, a war of 
ideological totality, a struggle to the death involving the sustained mass 
mobilisation of peoples, armies and economies.18  The Red Army assumed that a 
mass army was both necessary and desirable.  The notion of a mass army became 
 
Figure 91: V.I. Lenin 
(upload.wikimedia.org) 
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a central pillar of Soviet military doctrine and this heavily influenced the 
development of military thought at the strategic, operational and tactical level.  
However, while quantity was seen as having a quality of its own, it was no 
subsitute for what an operational commander did with the mass army at his 
disposal.  In World War Two, several Soviet commanders displayed a shocking 
disregard for their men, relying on numbers to achieve victory without undue 
regard for casualties.  Mass was an end in itself.19  However, for Rokossovskiy 
mass was always a means to an end.  It enabled his formations to deploy 
simultaneously, in breadth and depth, a key aspect of Soviet inter-war thinking.  
In short, Rokossovskiy used mass as a springboard for his operational art, not as 
an attritional bludgeon.  In fact, Rokossovskiy had a pronounced dislike for purely 
attritional operations based on mass.  On occasions, such as Operation Kutuzov, 
in late July 1943, Rokossovskiy was compelled to rely on mass to force the 
Germans back, but in general, the historical evidence indicates that he did 
everything he could to avoid protracted attritional encounters. 
 
Red Inheritance and Tsarist Legacy 
During the Soviet era, the Red Army and its political masters were reluctant to 
admit that many of its best thinkers, in the 1920s and 1930s, were ex-Tsarist 
officers.20  Tsarist officers played an important role during the Civil War21 and in 
the doctrinal debates of the 1920’s.22  The concept of the Front or group of 
armies, often assumed to be a Soviet idea, actually appeared for the first time in 
the Russian war plan of 1900.23  The Red Army refined operational art and 
resolved many Tsarist terminological muddles, but its initial appreciation of the 
operational level, the intellectual cornerstone of its victory in the Great Patriotic 
War, lay in the Tsarist analysis of the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. 
 
The Russo-Japanese War of 1905 saw “the appearance of the first modern 
operations”24 and is of considerable importance in explaining why Red Army 
commanders, like Rokossovskiy thought and fought the way they did on the 
Eastern Front.25  At Sha-Ho River in October 1904, nearly 400,000 men fought 
for two weeks on a front of 90 miles to a depth of 20 miles.  It was an indecisive 
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encounter that cost both sides nearly 40,000 casualties.26  At Mukden, in 
February-March 1905, three Russian armies under Kuropatkin, numbering in total 
300,000 men, faced five Japanese armies, numbering 280,000 men.  The fighting 
lasted nineteen days, covering a front of 80 miles and a depth of 20 miles.  This 
was such a huge battle, that no Russian commander recognised it for what it really 
was: a series of co-located tactical battles, all part of one huge operation.  Russian 
reserves marched hither and thither trying to exploit tactical opportunities that 
emerged and then disappeared before they arrived.27 
 
In terms of scale, duration, troop numbers and casualties, Sha-Ho and Mukden 
were unprecedented military events.  In 1907, Major (later General) Aleksandr 
Svechin, (1878-1938) argued that conventional military labels such as strategy 
and tactics were incapable of explaining Sha-Ho and Mukden.28  How could 
tactics, the art of manipulating formations on the field of battle, within sight of the 
commander, accurately reflect or cope with the simultaneous engagement of 
hundreds of thousands of men, over vast distances.  Similarly, strategy, the use of 
armed forces in pursuit of national war aims, not their command in battle, was 
also a misleading term.29  Therefore, Svechin labelled Sha-Ho and Mukden as 
engagements fought at the operational level, namely the Sha-Ho Operation and 
the Mukden Operation, not battles.30  The operational level was to occupy an 
intermediate position, between strategy and tactics, the level of command at 
which Rokossovskiy excelled on the Eastern Front.  This was simply a 
measurement of the increased physical scale, duration and numbers seen at Sha-
Ho and Mukden.  It was not the same as operational art. 
 
The transformation of the spatial dimensions of the battlefield witnessed in the 
Russo-Japanese War had revolutionary implications for command.  An individual 
commander simply could not control such vast armies.31  Once an engagement 
began, a commander was effectively redundant, a phenomenon that continued in 
to World War One.  In the wake of the Russo-Japanese War, a minority of 
Russian military intellectuals such as Svechin, Neznamov and Miknevich 
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discussed the concept of the operation and the operational level, but it was “during 
World War One that the modern operation truly came into its own.”32 
 
World War One: The Brusilov Offensive 
In terms of numbers, length and depth of front, duration, firepower and casualties, 
the operations of World War One were an unprecedented military event.33 The 
Imperial Russian Army of World War One has not enjoyed a good historical 
reputation and has been associated with the image of massive casualties suffered 
by men advancing into battle without weapons or boots.  Yet, in June 1916, 
General Alexei Brusilov’s34 South-Western Front inflicted a stunning defeat upon 
the Austro-Hungarian forces and carved a highly significant place in Soviet 
military thinking.  It was a victory that had a profound influence upon 
Rokossovskiy’s operational style. 
 
By spring 1916, most Russian commanders assumed that a breakthrough could 
only be achieved through massive amounts of firepower, concentrated on a 
narrow sector.  However, while enemy forces, directly opposite, were smashed, 
the narrow frontage of the attack did not touch other enemy formations that 
subsequently ravaged the flanks of any attacking force.35  Furthermore, as it was 
difficult to conceal the assembly of such a massive breakthrough force, sensible 
defensive commanders simply withdrew from the frontline, leaving a skeletal 
covering force, with heavy firepower, that could be quickly reinforced.  Yet, to 
attack on a front broad enough to secure immunity from flanking fire, appeared to 
rob the assault of the concentration of force and firepower that was assumed to be 
a pre-requisite of any breakthrough.  In short, breadth of assault and concentration 
of firepower were assumed to be incompatible.   
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However, Brusilov that argued breadth of assault and concentration of force were 
compatible, indeed essential, in creating a sustainable breakthrough.36  Brusilov 
believed that a broad front deployment would spread the enemy force, and, by 
compelling it to defend a wider frontage, reduce the depth and density of the 
enemy defences.37  A meticulous deception plan38 would disguise the location of 
the main Russian concentrations and create surprise.  
Subsequently, a simultaneous assault across the entire 
front, would, in conjunction with deception, undermine 
the enemy’s ability to determine “where the main blow 
will be launched against him.”39  Tactical reserves, 
secretly positioned behind the main Russian 
concentrations, would ensure that any breakthrough was 
rapidly developed, denying the enemy time to react.  
Brusilov did possess a mass army, 573,000 men, but did 
not have an enormous advantage over the Austrians, who fielded 473,000 men.40  
Nevertheless, it was certainly a force of sufficient size to make breadth of assault 
and simultaneous concentration of force a viable proposition.  Brusilov’s insight 
into the tactical problems of World War One enabled him to use his forces in a 
very different way from any other Russian commander.  Indeed, “Brusilov’s 
formula was certainly novel for its time.”41 
 
On 4th June 1916, Brusilov’s South-Western Front launched a simultaneous attack 
with four armies, on a broad front of 350 miles.  It was astonishingly successful.42  
By 11th June 1916, Russian forces had advanced between thirty and ninety miles, 
a figure without precedent in World War One.  It was only Russian exhaustion 
and the rapid deployment of German reserves that prevented an Austrian strategic 
collapse of calamitous proportions.  It has been argued that Brusilov missed an 
opportunity to destroy the Austrians and that “Brusilov’s hesitation at this point 
shows that he had little in common with the romanticized fighting general image 
which he and successive generations of Soviet and Western historians have 
constructed.”43  This seems unduly harsh, particularly as “unfortunately for the 
Russians, Brusilov lacked the means to exploit his success properly.”44  Brusilov 
 
Figure 92: A. Brusilov 
(ars.punt.nl) 
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did not have reserves of the strength and mobility required to crush the Austrians, 
but he did effectively destroy the Austro-Hungarian Army as an attacking force 
for the remainder of World War One.45 
 
 
Figure 93: The Brusilov Offensive 
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Strategic Theory of Successive Operations: Reaction To World War One 
In the wake of World War One, the Red Army concluded that modern states 
possessed such enormous social, economic and military resources that they could 
not be defeated in a single battle or campaign.46  It was just not possible, short of a 
catastrophic implosion in the will to fight, to end a war quickly.  As World War 
One demonstrated even weaker belligerents such as Russia carried on fighting 
until 1917, despite massive defeats and losses.  It took years, not days, weeks or 
months to achieve victory. 
 
The era of the Clausewitzian battle of annihilation or the decisive Napoleonic 
campaign were over.  Svechin believed “under our conditions Napoleon would 
have had to conduct successive operations with increasing difficulty against new 
forces massed by the state.”47  Nevertheless, war was not going to go away, 
indeed, Soviet ideology suggested it was inevitable and likely to be a protracted 
total war, a matter of survival or annihilation.  In response to these developments 
the Red Army began to develop a strategic theory of successive operations.  This 
argued that in conditions of total war, against fully mobilised states, strategic 
victory in war could only be achieved through the cumulative impact of 
successive operations.  In short, victory in war required a series of battles, 
operations and campaigns, organised into a coherent strategic plan. 
 
The strategic concept of successive operations quickly established itself amongst 
leading Red Army officers.  In 1922, the Red Army’s commander-in-chief Sergey 
Sergeyevich Kamenev (1881-1936)48 stated that “in 
the warfare of modern huge armies, the defeat of the 
enemy results from the sum of continuous and planned 
victories on all fronts, successfully completed one 
after the other and inter-connected in time.”49  In a 
similar vein, in 1927, Svechin noted that in historical 
terms it was actually decisive battles and campaigns 
that were aberrations.  Indeed, “normally, this path to 
an ultimate aim is broken up into a series of operations.”50  In addition, 
 
Figure 94: S.S. Kamenev 
(upload.wikimedia.org) 
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Varfolomeyev believed that “the path to victory under modern conditions lies in 
the zig zag of an entire series of operations, successively developing one after 
another, united by the commonality of the ultimate aim, each one achieving a 
limited intermediate aim.”51 
 
Strategy of Destruction or Strategy of Attrition 
There was fierce disagreement about the best way to implement successive 
operations in the field.  Should the Red Army pursue the defeat of the enemy, by 
successive operations, through a rapid strategy of destruction, or a more deliberate 
and considered strategy of attrition?  These labels, 
associated with Tukhachevskiy and Svechin 
respectively,52 as well as the vitriolic debate, have 
obscured the influence of this discussion upon Soviet 
operational thinking.  Tukhachevskiy argued for a 
rapid strategy of destruction; Svechin advocated a 
strategy dominated by cumulative attrition.  
Tukhachevskiy concentrated on military factors 
whereas Svechin’s strategic thinking incorporated political, economic and social 
factors.  Svechin accused advocates of the strategy of destruction of blind 
inflexibility in their obsession with the rapid destruction of the enemy armed 
forces.  Tukhachevskiy and his supporters castigated Svechin’s flexibility as 
hesitant indecision.  Tukhachevskiy was a firm advocate of the offensive while 
the more cautious Svechin argued that “war unfolds not in the form of a decisive 
blow, but rather as struggles for positions on the military, political, and economic 
front from which the delivery of this strike would ultimately be possible.”53 
Svechin was prepared to consider a strategic withdrawal in to the Russian interior.  
Tukhachevskiy was dogmatically committed to relentless attack.  However, 
Svechin was also guilty of overestimating the political, social, economic and 
psychological capacity of the Soviet state and people to sustain a war of 
attrition.54  The debate was settled, in Tukhachevskiy’s favour, during the 1926 
Congress of the Red Army’s Military-Scientific Society.55  Therefore, from the 
1920s, the Red Army was doctrinally committed to the idea of defeating the 
 
Figure 95: M. Tukhachevskiy 
(dtirp.dtra.mil) 
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enemy through the massive offensive application of military force.56  The 
remaining inter-war years were marked by the Red Army’s search for the tactical 
and operational methods required to conduct offensive attacks that would defeat 
the enemy in a series of successive operations.   
 
The Evolution of Deep Battle 
The Red Army’s path from intellectual inspiration to deep battle and deep 
operations was not a seamless process.  It is occasionally, perhaps inadvertently, 
presented as an organised progression from vision to reality.  One commentator 
concedes that “the theory of Deep Operations crystallized in its final written form 
only in the first half of the 1930’s” but also suggests “the Russians possessed a 
coherent concept of advanced operational manoeuvre as early as 1928.”57  The 
war scare of 192758 and the Five Year Plan did put the Red Army at the centre of 
the Soviet Union’s planning.  However, to claim that, 
“the amazing pace, relative smoothness and advanced quality of weapon 
system which characterized the formation of Soviet armoured troops, 
aviation and combat support arms during the first half of the 1930’s proves 
beyond any doubt that in the Soviet case the build-up of forces was 
initiated by a fully formed operational theory”59 
seems an unnecessary exaggeration.  The Red Army grabbed armour, artillery, 
airpower and other modernised weapons.  It was guided, in a general sense, by the 
ideas of the 1920’s60 but not a definite plan.  Armour was central to deep battle 
and deep operations, yet, in 1928, 
“when Tukhachevskii, now the chief of staff, submitted his thinking on the 
military plan (which he envisaged as a four year plan), he listed rifle forces 
armed with strong artillery, strategic cavalry, and aviation as the decisive 
forces in future conflict.  Armor forces or tanks were not even 
mentioned.”61 
Therefore, “in 1929 deep battle was but a promise whose realization depended on 
economic reforms and industrialisation.  Moreover, deep battle was only a tactical 
concept.”62  Indeed, the term deep battle was not even used by Tukhachevskiy 
until March 1930.63 
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The Soviet Field Regulations of 1929 were an important staging point in deep 
battle.  Brusilov’s broad front was complemented by Tukhachevskiy’s belief in 
the “greatest possible contact area between the two forces”64 and tentatively raised 
the idea of simultaneously suppressing the enemy’s defences, in breadth and 
depth, rather than consecutively as Brusilov had 
done.  The death of Triandafillov, in July 1931, was a 
serious blow to the Red Army.  However, although 
the paper distributed among the Red Army high 
command, in summer 1932, carried Yegorov’s 
signature, as Chief of Staff, the ideas were 
Triandafillov’s.65  The paper confirmed 
Triandafillov’s belief that recent technological 
development, 
“enables us to strike the enemy simultaneously throughout the entire depth 
of his position, as opposed to current forms of battle and attack, which 
may be characterized as the consecutive suppression of the successive 
parts of the battle order.  The means are used so as to paralyse the fire of 
all defensive weapons, regardless of the depth of their deployment, to 
isolate one enemy unit from another, to disrupt co-operation between 
them, and to destroy them in detail.”66 
 
This was the tactical idea of deep battle, put forth in 1932.  It confirmed the Red 
Army’s belief that the key development was the ability to strike simultaneously, 
in breadth and depth, over the enemy’s entire tactical defence zone.  In contrast, 
Brusilov struck simultaneously in operational and strategic breadth, but not in 
depth.  This passage also confirms that the Provisional Field Regulations of 1929 
were not an early statement of deep battle.   
 
In 1933, Yegorov’s report and Triandfillov’s thoughts formed ‘the basis for the 
Provisional Instructions For Organising The Deep Battle.’  This was the Red 
Army’s first manual on the subject.67  The purpose of the Provisional Instructions 
 
Figure 96: V.K. Triandafillov 
(commons.wikipedia.org) 
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was to establish the main themes of deep battle and establish a common 
understanding of the new tactical approach.68 
 
The aim of deep battle was defined as the “almost simultaneous neutralization of 
the defensive zone in all its depth.”69  It was roughly 10-12 kilometres deep and 
was to be penetrated on selected, specific axes.  It was to be a simultaneous attack 
across the whole front, over the entire depth of the enemy’s tactical position, 
using artillery, airpower, airborne forces and armour, supporting a rapid infantry 
assault, while long-range DD tanks, airpower and airborne troops pre-empted and 
disrupted counter-attacks by enemy tactical reserves.70   
“The manual then proceeded to provide detailed instructions for 
organizing, deploying for, and implementing deep battle.  Every specific 
element of the new doctrine, from the types and number of tanks, their 
organizational structure and cooperation with other forces, to the precise 
timing of each phase of the attack was provided for.”71 
The Provisional Instructions of 1933 represent a key point in the Red Army’s 
intellectual and material development and formed the basis of Order No: 100 
issued in November 1933, “naming deep battle as the official doctrine of the Red 
Army.”72  The Red Army now began a more sustained examination of the more 
ambitious concept of deep operations.73 
 
Yet, the translation of theory into practice was a sobering experience.  As early as 
October 1931, Tukhachevskiy acknowledged “these new forms of battle are very 
complex.  They raise anew the questions of command and control, the nature of 
battle training, and to a significant degree ‘twist the brain.’”74  After the exercise 
of autumn 1933, “Tukhachevskii (sic) could bluntly conclude that the army had 
not yet learned how to organize deep battle.”75  As early as 9th December 1932, 
Aleksandr Ignatyevich Sediakin (1893-1938)76, the Chief of Military Training 
argued “on maps, plans, on paper, and in exercises where there is no opponent, 
everything turns out well for us.”77  The Kiev and Belorussian exercises of 1935 
and 1936 respectively, showed the Red Army had improved its organisation but 
there was also a degree of contrived ritual that contradicted reality.  In fact, many 
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of the problems of deep battle were not successfully resolved until the Great 
Patriotic War.   
 
The Flaws of PU-36 
The Provisional Field Regulations of 1936 represent the clearest expression of the 
Red Army’s inter-war thinking on deep battle, but it is a fact, ironically concealed 
by Stalin’s Purge, that Polevoy Ustav PU-36 contained significant flaws and 
proved a poor guide to battlefield success in World War Two.  The deep battles 
fought by Rokossovskiy had the same objectives as the inter-war years, but were 
executed in a very different way.  In short, it is tempting to believe that without 
Stalin’s Purge, fighting on the basis of PU-36, the Red Army could have met the 
Wehrmacht on something like equal terms in June 1941.  Yet, the historical 
evidence does not support this conclusion, although as Rokossovskiy showed in 
the Great Patriotic War, the actual concept of deep battle remained valid. 
 
In practice, when following the standard procedure for armoured attack laid down 
in PU-36,78 Soviet armoured formations in the Great Patriotic War endured 
massive losses.  Armour barely penetrated the German frontline, never mind 
carrying the attack through to the interface of the enemy’s tactical and operational 
defence zones.  Similarly, the airborne desant, a pivotal aspect of 
Tukhachevskiy’s vision also proved flawed.  It was designed to achieve 
simultaneity in depth as well across the front, but although tried on six occasions, 
the last in November 1943, it proved ruinously expensive.79  Furthermore, the Red 
Army’s inter-war thinking on the density of artillery fire required to create a 
breakthrough on the main axis proved very inaccurate.  The theory and practice of 
the artillery offensive, first promulgated in 1942, had the same objectives but was 
a significant revision of Soviet artillery tactics in deep battle.   
 
In short, it seems unreasonable to suggest that “although it focused exclusively on 
the tactical level, the Field Service Regulations, written under Tukhachevskii’s 
(sic) supervision, succeeded in delivering the essence of the operational theory.”80  
Deep battle was the tactical aspect of an operational concept, so naturally it 
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reflected a wider operational consciousness, but as an expression of the essence of 
the idea, it might be argued that given its flaws revealed on the Eastern Front 
during the Great Patriotic War, PU-36 misrepresented rather than clarified the 
essence of Soviet operational theory.  The Field Regulations of 1936 conveyed a 
general idea of deep operations, but the significant doctrinal revisions announced 
by Defence Commissar Timoshenko in December 1940, suggest the Red Army 
knew its operational thinking, if not its tactical doctrine, required significant 
revision. 
 
Summary 
To the Red Army battle was a tactical concept.  The Provisional Field Regulations 
of 1936 focused on operational breadth of assault but only in tactical depth.  
Therefore, PU-36 was essentially a manual on tactical attrition to be achieved by 
deep battle.  It looked forward to deep operations and was associated with the 
“deepening idea.”81  However, PU-36 is of limited use as a yardstick of 
Rokossovskiy’s style of operations, because the Field Regulations of 1936 had 
relatively little to say on the practice of operational art.  As a front commander, an 
operational perspective on questions of breadth, depth and simultaneity were 
central to Rokossovskiy’s style.  Rokossovskiy’s interest in deep battle was 
dominated by its ability to serve the needs of the wider operation.  Deep battle and 
deep operations were clearly connected but it would be a mistake to see them as 
two versions of the same thing.  The objectives were different, linked and 
complementary as part of an operational whole, but different.  It is to this level of 
command, the operational level and Rokossovskiy’s experiences in the Great 
Patriotic War that this thesis will now turn.
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CHAPTER 5:  
THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF COMMAND 
In the last twenty years modern scholarship has confirmed beyond reasonable 
doubt that the Red Army was not an inferior copy of the Wehrmacht.1  The Red 
Army may not have matched the tactical prowess of the Germans, but, at the 
operational and strategic level, between October 1942-May 1945 it frequently out-
thought and eventually defeated the Wehrmacht.2  It might be argued that, with 
the possible exception of the Normandy landings, this was not an achievement 
matched by the western allies, at least on the ground.3  During the period October 
1942 - May 1945, operational art and deep operations, distinctly Soviet creations, 
became synonymous with operational commanders such as Rokossovskiy, in 
charge of operational formations known as Fronts, a Tsarist concept developed 
and refined by the Red Army.  By May 1945, Rokossovskiy was the Red Army’s 
most experienced and arguably most successful Front commander, highly 
respected by his contemporaries and the Wehrmacht.   
 
The Operational Implications of Successive Operations 
The theory of successive operations was a strategic theory, but it had significant 
operational and tactical implications for how Rokossovskiy fought in the Great 
Patriotic War.  In World War One, the armed forces of belligerent states drew 
their power from the mobilisation of the home front.  In a similar way, the Red 
Army argued that in the field, mass armies were dependent upon, and drew their 
strength from, the vast organisational system in their operational rear.  It was this 
system of command, control, communications, supplies and infrastructure such as 
railways, roads and bridges that maintained a mass army.  It also gave direction 
and flexibility to the conduct of operations.  A mass army relied on effective 
organisation from the operational rear to function as an effective military force.  
Furthermore, it was this systemic infrastructure that enabled a mass army to shrug 
off tactical, even operational defeats, because the system of command, supply and 
communications ensured the defender could deploy reserves and firepower 
quicker than an attacker. 
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The Red Army’s leaders were fully aware that individual battles and operations 
were of limited value.  In 1924, Mikhail V. Frunze 
(1885-1925)4 argued victory “cannot be achieved in a 
single blow”5 while in 1926, Triandafillov claimed “the 
experience of recent wars showed that it is impossible to 
achieve the enemy’s major defeat by a single 
operation.”6  Similarly, Nikolay Nikolayevich Movchin, 
a Red Army staff officer, believed the operational 
resilience of a mass army meant “in modern war it is 
impossible to destroy the enemy’s entire army with a single blow, no matter how 
powerful it is.”7  As early as 1922, even the aggressive Tukhachevskiy conceded 
that “the nature of modern weapons and battle is such that it is an impossible 
matter to destroy the enemy’s manpower in one blow in a single day.  Battle in 
modern operations stretches out into a series of battles not only along the front but 
also in depth.”8   
 
Successive operations were a requirement of victory at the operational and tactical 
level.  A mass army could absorb isolated tactical defeats and the strategic defeat 
of a mass army in one blow was seen as nonsensical.  Therefore, the Red Army 
concluded that the key to victory in modern war lay at the operational level, the 
level at which Rokossovskiy exercised command in World War Two.  Successive 
victories on an operational scale could not be ignored and a series of operational 
defeats would eventually produce a strategic crisis for even the most powerful 
adversary.  Brusilov had proved that in 1916, but his inability to disrupt the 
underlying operational system that replenished the Austro-Hungarian Army 
enabled it to survive.  In short, operational victory required the disruption or 
destruction of the enemy’s operational infrastructure or system.  This system was 
located in the enemy’s operational rear. 
 
 
Figure 97: M.V. Frunze 
(Marxists.org) 
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Successive Operations and the Idea of Depth 
Therefore, it was the operational implications of successive operations that 
stimulated the Soviet obsession with tactical and operational depth,9 before and 
during the Great Patriotic War.  It was no coincidence that Soviet tactical and 
operational concepts became known as deep battle and deep operations.  Mass 
armies were highly dependent upon effective systemic organisation between the 
rear and the front.  If the mass of the army could be separated from its brain, then 
without a functioning system of organisation, the mass army would cease to 
function effectively and collapse under its own weight.  This was a well 
established tradition in Russian military thinking.  In the Russo-Turkish War of 
1877, 
“Constantinople had to be seized and quickly.  The Russian plan aimed at 
nothing less than the swift and utter defeat and dismemberment of the 
Ottoman Empire by striking at its heart and brain.”10 
The key to operational victory lay in the ability to invade the enemy’s operational 
rear11 and disrupt the system that was the foundation of a mass army.  Soviet 
military thinkers began to describe this as operational shock.12  
“The notion of operational shock delineates in practical terms a 
consequential state of a fighting system that can no longer accomplish its 
aims.  This effect, which derives from physical and psychological factors 
alike, is developed through a process in which the operational manoeuvre 
serves as the dominant executing element.” 13 
It was to be achieved through a combination of deep battle and deep operation.   
 
Soviet thinkers argued that the interaction of tactical losses at the front, with deep 
operational manoeuvre against the system, could achieve operational victory.  The 
enemy, rendered incapable of achieving his own mission, would lose the ability to 
prevent the Red Army securing its own operational objectives.  Operational 
victory was to be achieved by a series of successes at the tactical and operational 
level.  Indeed, in a sense, a single operation, commanded by Rokossovskiy, during 
the Great Patriotic War, contained two successive operations within it, namely the 
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tactical deep battle or breakthrough operation, followed by operational 
manoeuvre, the deep operation. 
 
The concept of successive operations dominated Soviet strategy and operational 
art between 1942-45.  It was emphatically endorsed by the course of the Great 
Patriotic War.  Rokossovskiy played a critical role in the battles of Moscow, 
Stalingrad and Kursk, battles that Russians call operations, as well as in the 
Belorussian Operation in June-July 1944 and East Prussia in January 1945.  These 
were significant operational victories, but individually none were decisive.  
Nevertheless, in a cumulative sense, these and other operational victories played a 
critical role in imposing an unsustainable rate of strategic attrition upon Nazi 
Germany.  The Berlin Operation was not the catalyst of Soviet victory, but its 
confirmation, a validation of the theory of successive operations.14 
 
The Theory of the Front As An Operational Force 
During the inter-war years, Red Army thinking was dominated by the idea that an 
individual army was a genuine operational formation.  The main reason for this 
was Triandafillov’s influential advocacy of the Shock Army.15  Triandafillov 
argued that a shock army was capable of conducting both deep battle and deep 
operations, within one seamless operation.  Although, Triandafillov’s shock army 
evolved and changed, it retained this central principle.  It dominated the 
framework of debate on deep battle and deep operations.  Indeed, “the idea of the 
shock army was quickly adopted by other theorists and its composition was 
continuously debated throughout the 1930’s.  However, for a variety of reasons, 
the shock army, as originally conceived, never lived up to its initial promise.”16 
 
A significant shortcoming of Triandafillov’s Nature of Modern Operations was 
“that practically speaking, in it the operation was examined basically only 
on an army scale ( only successive operations of a shock army); it did not 
raise its concrete analysis and generalization to operations on a front scale.  
Even the very term ‘front operation’ was absent from it.”17 
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Indeed, only Varfolomeyev in the 1930s with his hybrid idea of the shock front 
and Movchin, in 1928, seriously discussed front level operations.  Varfolomeyev 
was the main dissenter to the orthodox idea of the shock army as an authentic 
operational force.  Yet, ironically, his 1933 book Udarnaya Armiya, (The Shock 
Army) has ensured that he is as closely associated with the idea as Triandafillov.18  
However, Varfolomeyev rejected the idea that the shock army was capable of both 
deep battle and deep operations.  Varfolomeyev’s shock army was envisaged as a 
specialist deep battle force, supported by a mobile second echelon, capable of 
sustaining the offensive into operational depth.  This was easily, if not openly, 
incorporated into the front level concept of deep operations adopted by the Red 
Army between 1942-45.  19  In a similar way, Isserson’s shock army which had 
two echelons, an attack echelon and a development echelon, the latter designed to 
develop the offensive to operational depths, laboured under the label shock army, 
when at 350,000 “such a formidable combination of men and materiel compared 
favourably in size to some of the wartime fronts a decade later.”20  In retrospect, 
Varfolomeyev and Isserson were talking about operations by fronts, not armies. 
  
The original notion of the shock army was utterly overthrown in World War Two.  
In July 1942, on the Bryansk Front, Rokossovskiy inherited the wreckage of 
Lizyukov’s 5th Tank Army.  This new force, created on 26th May 1942,21 had 
deployed and attacked in the style of an inter-war shock army.  Its aim was to 
breakthrough the left wing of the German armies that had just launched Operation 
Blau, the 1942 German summer offensive.  The 5th Tank Army was smashed to 
pieces.22  In the wake of this disastrous operation 5th Tank Army was disbanded.23  
In November 1942, a new 5th Tank Army24 was used in a similar way during 
Operation Uranus, the Stalingrad counter-offensive, with mixed results.  A 
subsequent attack by 5th Tank Army, on the river Chir, south-west of Stalingrad, 
in December 1942, was also disappointing.25  In short, Triandafillov’s inter-war 
vision of the Shock Army, proved a distinct failure in practice.   
 
The shock army evolved into a specialist deep battle formation such as 
Fedyuninskiy’s 2nd Shock Army, part of Rokossovskiy’s 2nd Belorussian Front in 
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1944-45.26  These were not designed to conduct both deep battle and deep 
operations.  This should have caused significant doctrinal and structural problems 
for the Red Army.  If shock armies were incapable of deep operations, an 
orthodox Soviet army was unlikely to succeed.  The fact that this potential crisis 
in Soviet operational art did not emerge indicates that Triandafillov’s direct 
contribution to the Red Army’s victory in the Great Patriotic War can be 
exaggerated.  Equally, such a theory neglects the significance of Marshal Semyon 
Konstantinovich Timoshenko’s address on 31st December 1940. 
 
Marshal Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko (1895-1970)27 was not a renowned 
theorist and his reputation as a field commander 
suffered for his perceived failures against the 
Wehrmacht, especially at Khar'kov in May 1942.  
In 1943-45, Timoshenko was pensioned off, 
returning periodically as a Stavka representative on 
minor operations.28  Nevertheless, on 31st 
December 1940, Timoshenko addressed the Red 
Army’s problems with deep battle and deep 
operations, as well as the weaknesses graphically revealed in the Soviet-Finnish 
War of November 1939-March 1940.29  Timoshenko’s speech of December 1940 
“resembles a mini-ustav (regulation) on the conduct of operations.”30 
 
Timoshenko fundamentally altered the relationship between the front and army in 
Soviet doctrine.  He argued that while the shock army retained its ability to 
penetrate the enemy’s tactical zone, “developing success at this depth (turning it 
into a complete operational penetration and achieving a strategic effect) remains, 
even at present a serious problem.”31  In an intervention that influenced the Red 
Army’s conduct of operations in the Great Patriotic War to a far greater extent 
than Triandafillov and Tukhachevskiy, Timoshenko defined the army as a tactical 
formation and the front as an operational formation.  He argued, 
“recent war experience demonstrated that under conditions of continuous 
fronts, outfitted with modern means of armed struggle, an army loses its 
 
Figure 98: S.K. Timoshenko 
(northstarcompass.org) 
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meaning as a self-contained operational entity.  Even the shock army with 
maximum combat composition has lost its independence in achieving 
large operational objectives, and more so with respect to strategic 
objectives.  An army is part of a front, and only within the framework of a 
front operation, in co-operation with other armies, does it carry out its 
operational activity with maximum effectiveness.”32 
Timoshenko also endorsed the Brusilov Offensive33 while arguing that a “modern 
operation develops most fully on an operational scale.”34   
 
This was a definitive statement of Soviet military thinking.  Its impact was hidden 
by the disastrous events of June 1941-October 1942, but its influence upon 
Rokossovskiy’s operations of 1943-45 should not be underestimated.  The ideas 
of the inter-war years were no doubt of inspiration to Rokossovskiy and provided 
a yardstick by which to formulate his own ideas.  Nevertheless, Rokossovskiy’s 
style of operations was influenced by Brusilov and Varfolomeyev, as well as 
Timoshenko’s address.  However, despite paying him an official tribute in his 
memoirs,35 Rokossovskiy was not a disciple of Triandafillov.   
 
The Place of Operational Art 
Nevertheless, having worked out what was required to achieve victory in modern 
war, the Red Army had to devise a way to make successive operations successful 
ones.  This acted as the link between successive operations and operational art.  
Indeed, “Movchin believed that the theory of consecutive operations served as the 
theoretical foundation and most important part of operational art.”36   
 
The First World War endorsed Svechin’s pre-war thesis on the emergence of the 
operational level of war.  During the inter-war years and throughout the Great 
Patriotic War, the Red Army came to regard battle as a tactical episode contained 
within an operation.  A series of inter-connected operations was a campaign and a 
series of inter-connected campaigns was strategy.  It was the task of strategy to 
determine the aims of operational planning, while operational planning created a 
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set of tactical missions.37  As Svechin remarked, “tactics makes the steps from 
which operational leaps are assembled: strategy points out the path.”38 
 
Operational art, a phrase accredited to Svechin in 1923,39 was the creative 
intellectual process of planning, initiating and executing a sequence of actions and 
battles that would achieve operational success.  It was the task of operational 
commanders such as Rokossovskiy to conceive, organise and link tactical battles 
into a coherent operational whole.  This was the essence of operational art.  In 
contrast, the term operational level related to a physical measurement of the scale, 
duration and numbers involved in a military action.  Naturally, the two were and 
are related to each other, but they are not the same.  Indeed, just because one is 
operating at the operational level in a physical sense does not automatically mean 
that one is engaged in operational art in a cerebral sense.  Equally, it would be a 
mistake to assume that Svechin’s use of the term ‘operational art’, in 1923, 
immediately clarified the Red Army’s understanding of operational art and its 
place in Soviet military doctrine. 
 
In fact, “the study of the literature of the 1920’s shows that right up until 1926 the 
formula ‘strategy-tactics’ remained unchanged.  Moreover, as Tukhachevskiy 
noted, the terms ‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’ were treated differently by everyone, and 
often contradictorily.”40  The study of operations was often smothered by its 
inclusion in strategy courses or by terms such as the ‘tactics of mass armies’ and 
‘strategic art in an operation.’41  In short, “the inclusion of the theory of 
operations, now in strategy, now in tactics, and the mixed nature of the terms 
which designated this theory created more than a few difficulties and resulted in 
lively arguments.”42   
 
Terminological muddle had plagued the Tsarist and Red Army study of the 
operational level.  It was this debate that defined the environment in which 
Rokossovskiy matured from junior to senior officer and the way he approached 
the conduct of operations.  Indeed, “without resolving these problems, the further 
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development of Soviet military theory, in general, would have been impossible.”43  
Finally, in 1928, Varfolomeyev concluded, 
“the study of the operation has gone beyond the framework of tactics, the 
lot of which was the study of a single battle, but not a group of them.  The 
modern operation, in grouping battles, is a complex act; meaning the 
totality of manoeuvres and battles in a given sector or theatre of military 
activities, directed at achieving the overall final goal in a given period of a 
campaign.  The conduct of operations is beyond tactics.  It has become the 
lot of operational art.  Thus the former two-part formula, ‘tactics-strategy’ 
has now turned into a three part formula: tactics/battle- operational 
art/operation-strategy/war.”44 
  
In one sense, the difference between the tactical and operational level could be 
assessed by numbers, the size of the battlefield and the duration of an 
engagement.  However, in the related, but more intangible question of the 
difference in command at the tactical and operational level, matters were more 
complex.  This demanded a clear understanding of the difference between tactical 
command in battle and operational art in control of operations.  Yet, if one 
believed, as German commanders did, that operational art at the operational level, 
if recognised at all, was simply tactical activity on a grander scale, then 
commanders could continue to pursue the idea of the decisive single battle or 
engagement of annihilation.   
 
.  Naturally, if it was possible to destroy the enemy in a single, gigantic battle of 
annihilation, this raised serious questions about the Soviet doctrinal idea of 
achieving the same objective, by means of a more prolonged series of linked 
tactical actions or successive operations.  In turn, this rejection of successive 
operations would have made operational art redundant, as it did for the German 
Army. 
 
Yet, as Kuropatkin found out in 1905, at Mukden, along with countless 
commanders in World War One, the normal principles of tactics just did not work 
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at the operational level.  Red Army theorists argued that at a certain, intangible 
point battles became operations and had to be controlled by operational, not 
tactical principles.  This required an operational plan, linking different tactical 
actions or battles, into one operational whole.  This was operational art.  In 
summary, the resolution of the terminological confusion and the establishment of 
a consensus about the nature of operational art, just as Rokossovskiy went to the 
Frunze Academy in 1928-29, was a key development in Soviet operational 
thinking.  It defined the way in which Rokossovskiy conceived, planned and 
executed operations on the Eastern Front. 
 
The Role of the Front 
In the aftermath of the chaotic improvisations of June-December 1941, the Soviet 
war effort was organised in an increasingly effective manner that linked grand 
strategy, strategy, operations and tactics into a coherent whole.  The State Defence 
Committee or GKO led by Stalin, directed Soviet grand strategy, formulating 
political objectives and policy, while overseeing the Soviet war effort.  The Stavka 
or Supreme Military Headquarters, having absorbed the General Staff, advised 
Stalin and formulated Soviet military strategy.45  Naturally, no senior commander 
harboured any doubts about who was ultimately in charge, but between October 
1942-November 1944, Stalin proved himself a surprisingly good listener, capable 
of listening to advice,46 counter-arguments and occasionally defiance,47 before 
making decisions.  Stavka broke up the Red Army’s overall strategy into 
operations and tasked individual front commanders, such as Rokossovskiy, with 
carrying out operations in pursuit of objectives that were complementary to the 
wider strategic plan. 
 
In line with Timoshenko’s instructions in December 1940, the Red Army’s main 
operational fighting force was the front, the Russian term for a grouping of 
armies.  A Soviet front is often, perhaps mistakenly, directly compared with the 
western idea of an army group.  Naturally, they had a certain amount in common 
but were not the same.  Soviet fronts were more task orientated and more 
numerous.  They were generally operational formations, not strategic formations 
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and it was not until the later stages of the war that fronts assumed the massive 
quasi-strategic roles of German Army Group North, Centre and South between 
1941-44. 
 
Fronts did have an organisational role but they were primarily fighting 
formations.  Their mission-dominated nature is revealed by their dramatic changes 
in size, in accordance with operational and strategic priorities.  In July 1943, 
Rokossovskiy’s Central Front fielded 711, 57548 at Kursk, while in June 1944 
Rokossovskiy’s 1st Belorussian Front was over 1.25 million strong,49 because of 
its pivotal status in the key Red Army operation of 1944.  In contrast, a relatively 
minor front such as 2nd Belorussian in June 1944 had just over 300,000 men,50 
smaller than some German armies.  A front was too big to be a tactical formation, 
but was insufficiently independent of Moscow to be considered a strategic 
formation.  It was, in short, an operational formation. 
 
Equally, a Soviet army was a tactical formation, not an operational unit.  No 
Soviet army ever matched Sixth German Army at Stalingrad, which at nearly 
270,000 strong in November 194251 was actually bigger, if in other senses 
weaker, than Rokossovskiy’s 220,000 Don Front, in January 1943.  A Soviet army 
was notably strong if it numbered over 100,000, others such as 51st Army in 
December 1942, mustered only 34,000,52 while south of Stalingrad, 28th Army 
had just 44,000 men.53  In a similar, if confusing way, a Soviet tank army was 
approximately the equivalent of a German panzer corps, while a Soviet armoured 
corps or rifle corps, was roughly the size of a German panzer or infantry division. 
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CHAPTER 6:  
FROM CONCEPTION TO EXECUTION: 
ROKOSSOVSKIY’S OPERATIONAL ART 
The Tasks of the Front Commander 
In 1949, the most important tasks of operational art were defined as, 
“developing a plan of operations; determining forms and methods and 
employing and leading large operational formations in an operation; 
determining methods and means of cooperation among different combat 
arms within the framework of an operation; determining the nature and 
sequence of cooperation among large operational formations participating 
in the operation; implementing all prepared measures for organizing the 
operation and its support; and executing the operation and leading forces 
during the operation.”1 
Rokossovskiy was an accomplished commander of operations, but the extent to 
which his style was influenced by the period before an operation began is 
frequently overlooked.  Yet, he placed considerable emphasis upon it.  Indeed, 
creative thinking and meticulous preparations were essential characteristics of 
Rokossovskiy’s operational art. 
 
It was Rokossovskiy’s job to establish the basic concept of an operation followed 
by a formal operational plan.  As a front commander, all Rokossovskiy’s creative 
planning was guided by the operational objective.  Rokossovskiy closely adhered, 
consciously or not, to Tukhachevskiy’s belief that “one cannot afford to have a 
plan which does not link the beginning and the end.  And to link the beginning 
and the end one must visualize the sequence of disruption.”2  It was a demanding 
task that covered the whole process of conceiving, planning and executing an 
operation.  It required a plan that blended all phases of an operation linking 
tactical attrition and operational manoeuvre.  Operational art also required the 
sustained co-ordination of all units under Rokossovskiy’s command.   
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This was the creative and practical expression of what Svechin called the 
operating art.  There was no manual for the conduct of operational art, indeed it 
would have been a contradiction in terms, for in its truest sense operational art 
was creative and relied upon what the Red Army called tvorchestvo.3  Naturally, 
Rokossovskiy’s military style and operating art were influenced by many ideas, 
several of which pre-dated the Red Army.  It was precisely because there was no 
specific manual of operational art that Rokossovskiy had his own distinct style of 
operations, one that was very different to that of Zhukov.  The passage of time 
and the acquisition of experience brought to operational art certain methods and 
procedures that appeared to facilitate success, but for Rokossovskiy, these acted 
as a springboard for creative thought, not a substitute for it. 
 
Once the basic concept of an operation had been established, it was 
Rokossovskiy’s job to to select the form of operation and the most suitable axis 
for the main blow.  This was a key task for 
“determining the direction of the main blow, the composition of forces and 
assignment of tasks to the striking groups and the armies which operate in 
secondary directions, constitutes the essence of the decision of the Front 
commander and represents the basis for planning of an offensive 
operation.”4 
These decisions, in turn, dominated the tactical planning of individual armies.  If 
an operation was poorly conceived at the operational level, it was highly unlikely 
that any degree of tactical brilliance could rescue it. 
 
It was Rokossovskiy’s task to foresee, anticipate and avoid operational problems 
in both the planning and execution of operations.  Indeed, in December 1940, 
Timoshenko argued, “the art of control of a modern operation consists of the 
ability of higher command personnel and staffs to anticipate the course of an 
operation.”5  Therefore, the purpose of a Soviet operational plan was not simply to 
inform subordinate commanders and units of their mission, but to maximise the 
chances of an operation succeeding before it began.  It was argued that creative 
foresight, married with intellectually able and experienced commanders, could 
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foresee and avoid obstacles, rather than stumble across them and be forced to 
improvise.  In short, a Front commander was expected to “load the dice” before 
an operation.  It required a careful balance between creative foresight and 
unnecessarily rigid prescription.  This was one of Rokossovskiy’s greatest 
qualities as a commander, namely his ability to foresee potential problems but 
retain flexibility in his conduct of operations.  If problems had been correctly 
foreseen and anticipated, the power and momentum of a Red Army offensive such 
as that of Rokossovskiy’s 1st Belorussian Front in June 1944, was awesome.6 
 
However, if something was missed or the planning was infected with wishful 
thinking, the strengths of the Soviet system were also its weaknesses.  An 
operational commander blindly dominated by the plan, rather than guided by it, 
imposed an inherent inflexibility that undermined the true spirit of operational art.  
Blind, obstinate determination to make a plan work, regardless of the casualties, 
was a hallmark of many Soviet commanders, but not Rokossovskiy.  As we have 
seen, Rokossovskiy consistently emphasised creative planning, creative foresight 
and the use of initiative.7  Yet, he was prepared to radically alter an operation if 
the realities of the situation on the ground were at odds with those foreseen in the 
operational plan, for example in the Chernigov-Pripyat Operation of August 
1943.8  In short, Rokossovskiy’s pre-operational creativity often expressed itself 
as flexibility during an operation.  He was guided by a plan, not a slave to it.  This 
combination of effective operational planning in concert with flexible execution 
became a hallmark of Rokossovskiy’s operational art. 
 
As Timoshenko indicated in December 1940, as a front commander “it is 
necessary to assign partial missions to armies and organize operational co-
operation among them.”9  Rokossovskiy had to create an operational concept in 
his own mind and envisage the sequence in which units would be committed as 
well as the manner in which they were to be linked in order to achieve operational 
objectives.  Equally, as a front commander Rokossovskiy could not afford to 
concentrate on either deep battle or deep operations at the expense of the other, for 
both were essential to the overall success of an operation.  They were two phases 
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of one operation and the ability to foresee and actively harmonize the tactical 
attrition of deep battle with the operational manoeuvre of deep operations was an 
essential aspect of operational art.   
 
As an operation moved from the conceptual to the preparatory stage, it was 
Rokossovskiy’s task to produce a formal operational plan.  The operational plan 
“always expressed precisely the aim, missions, and concept of the operation, 
methods for routing the enemy, the sequence for completing combat 
missions (immediate and subsequent), composition of groupings, and their 
operational formation.”10   
It formally expressed the operational commander’s thoughts.  Rokossovskiy’s 
operational directives followed a certain pattern.  They were detailed documents, 
often running to three or four pages.  The front’s individual armies were dealt 
with in sequence with each given a date and time of attack.  The directive usually 
indicated which army or armies were to inflict the main blow and which were to 
carry out secondary attacks or holding actions.  In presenting the deep battle phase 
of an operation Rokossovskiy’s directives contained targets or lines to be 
achieved or reached on certain days.  Therefore, the deep battle phase of an 
operational directive was quite detailed with a deliberate time schedule.  However, 
deep operational objectives were specific in terms of target but with no detailed 
time schedule other than perhaps a number of days or date by which the objective 
was to be achieved.  However, in keeping with Rokossovskiy’s desire to foster the 
use of independent initiative, there was no prescription as to how these objectives 
were to be achieved. 
 
The operational directive for Operation Kutuzov was issued on 12th July 1943 to 
48th, 13th, 70th 2nd Tank Army and 16th Air Army.  It covered each army, the date 
of attack, 15th July 1943, and the objectives to be achieved.  It ordered 13th Army 
to strike the main blow with 70th Army providing a secondary attack.  The 48th 
Army was allocated the holding role.  All armies were given axes of attack.  The 
directive then conveyed the operational objectives to be achieved, particularly by 
2nd Tank Army working in co-operation with 13th Army.  Finally, the directive 
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outlined the role of 16th Air Army in the deep battle and in support of 13th Army 
and 2nd Tank Army’s deep operations.  It had specific instructions to prevent the 
enemy withdrawing north and north-west.11 
 
The operational directive issued on 14th August 1943 was similar in style.  It was 
issued to 65th Army, 2nd Tank Army and 16th Air Army.  The 65th Army was to 
strike the main blow and break the enemy front at Sevsk.  This was followed by a 
list of specific objectives to be reached on the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and 
sixth days.  The deep operation objective was Novgorod-Severskiy on the River 
Desna.  The 65th Army was informed that 48th Army would play the holding role 
and that it was to cooperate closely with 2nd Tank Army.  The 2nd Tank was given 
a list of objectives to be achieved on the first, second and third days of the 
operation but its main focus was the deep operation: taking Novgorod-Severskiy, 
crossing the River Desna and establishing a bridgehead.  The 16th Air Army was 
to support 65th Army in the breakthrough battle, before switching to support 2nd 
Tank Army’s deep operation.12 A separate directive ordered 60th Army to put in a 
secondary attack in order to support the 65th Army.  It was not the main blow, but 
it was more than a holding role.  The directive outlined the objectives to be 
achieved on the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth days of the 60th Army’s 
operation.13  Similarly, the extensive operational directive issued by Rokossovskiy 
on 17th December 1944, for the 2nd Belorussian Front’s East Prussian Operation, 
used the same method.14 
 
By 1943-44, Rokossovskiy’s planning habits and his natural, if unusual; 
inclination to delegate enabled him to pass on many of the mundane mechanics of 
an operation, leaving him to concentrate on the key operational decisions.  Yet, 
Rokossovskiy did not relinquish the essential, creative aspects of operational art, 
namely, the creation of an operational concept to inform the plan of operations, 
determining the direction of the main blow, the initiation of the operation and the 
transition from deep battle to deep operations 
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Meticulous Preparations 
Rokossovskiy incorporated one of Brusilov’s less obvious, but highly important 
traits into his own operational command, namely meticulous preparations.  In 
June 1916, Brusilov’s sustained preparations played a critical role in enabling him 
to breakthrough the Austro-Hungarian forces.  Yet, significantly, Brusilov’s later 
attacks, ordered by the Russian high command and not marked by the meticulous 
preparations of the earlier offensive, were bloody failures.  The desire for time to 
prepare properly and thus foresee potential difficulties and opportunities was a 
consistent theme of Rokossovskiy’s memoirs.  Rokossovskiy’s emphasis on time 
for preparation frequently clashed with Stavka’s demands for almost continuous 
operations, especially in the period November 1942-December 1943.  As 
Rokossovskiy commented,  
“unfortunately, it occasionally happened that the higher echelons issued 
orders and directives without due account of the time factor or the state of 
the troops designated to carry them out.”15  
Indeed, he repeatedly criticized Stavka’s insistence on launching inadequately 
prepared operations.  He disliked improvised operations of an entirely ad hoc kind 
and frequently blamed insufficient time for preparation if an operation failed to 
achieve all its objectives.   
 
This might be interpreted as Rokossovskiy trying to explain failure.  However, 
although Rokossovskiy experienced setbacks and operations that did not fulfil 
their promise, he never presided over an operational defeat, in the same way as 
Zhukov and Konev, in Operation Mars, during December 1942.16  Equally, 
although he disliked improvised operations, Rokossovskiy was very good at them.  
During the Moscow defensive operation at Volokalamsk (17th –30th October 
1941), and at Moscow (15th November-4th December 1941), Rokossovskiy 
distinguished himself in defensive operations marked by weeks of shattering, 
constant improvisation and the incessant juggling of inadequate forces.17  Finally, 
in January 1945, Rokossovskiy’s brilliant improvisation in the face of Stavka’s 
sudden alteration of 2nd Belorussian’s mission,18 ensured the East Prussian 
Operation was a triumph of operational art, if not humanity, that actually drew 
272 
 
praise from the Wehrmacht.19  In short, Rokossovskiy was not some perfectionist 
who had been denied time to refine his own operational masterpiece. 
 
If time permitted, Rokossovskiy always rehearsed the sequence of operations with 
his commanders.20  As a result he could rely on their initiative to get the job done 
without becoming consumed in tactical details.  Therefore proper preparations 
were inextricably linked to delegation, a form of command that Rokossovskiy 
practised in a way that no other senior Soviet commander did during the Great 
Patriotic War.  This link between time for preparations and delegation was 
important in several ways for Rokossovskiy’s style of operational command.  
First, it left Rokossovskiy free to concentrate on the overall synchronisation of an 
operation.  Second, the efficient exercise of their missions by tactical commanders 
generated operational tempo and momentum.  Third, Rokossovskiy was able to 
focus on the timing of the insertion of a mobile group, a key point in the transition 
from deep battle to deep operations.  Fourth, it enabled him to exercise creative 
foresight during an operation, as well as before it, thus permitting his forces to 
foresee and prepare for trouble if it could not be avoided, or, anticipate and by-
pass trouble, thus preserving operational momentum. 
 
As part of Operation Uranus, in November 1942, Rokossovskiy’s Don Front 
contributed to the encirclement of Sixth German Army in Stalingrad.  He believed 
that good preparations “to a large degree predetermined the success of the 
operation.”21  Subsequently, in December 1942, Rokossovskiy’s Don Front was 
charged with the final annihilation of the Sixth German Army.  It was a key 
operation with the eyes of the world, as well as Stalin, fixed on Stalingrad.22 
Rokossovskiy prepared Operation Kol’tso meticulously and although “Moscow 
kept hurrying us to start the offensive”23 he insisted, even in the face of Stalin’s 
objections, that the operation was meticulously prepared.  Indeed, “time and time 
again Stalin urged rapid ‘liquidation’ on the Stavka officers and Front 
commanders, and in early December he became utterly demanding in this 
matter.”24  Rokossovskiy argued “after visiting several sectors, I saw that without 
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special preparations we could hardly count on success in the offensive.  I reported 
this to Stalin.”25 
   
Rokossovskiy curtailed pointless, inadequately prepared assaults because “the 
constant offensive operations had taken a great toll of the troops.”26  Nevertheless, 
Stalin insisted on “the systematic harassment of the encircled troops by air and 
ground attacks, denying the enemy any breathing space by night or by day.”27  
The Soviet high command was impatient but the sustained tenacity of German 
resistance during Operation Kol’tso (10th January 1943-2nd February 1943), 
indicates the quality of Rokossovskiy’s judgement.  This was not a simple 
mopping up operation and without meticulous preparation the Don Front may 
have been embarrassed by Sixth German Army.28 
 
On 12th July 1943, Stavka launched Operation Kutuzov, the Soviet counter- 
offensive at the northern end of the Kursk salient.29  The Central Front’s 
successful defensive operation at Kursk was pivotal to Stavka’s overall plan30 but 
it was given just three days to make the transition from defence to counter-
offensive.  On 12th July 1943, the counter-offensive began led by Bryansk and 
Western Front,31 followed, on 15th July 1943, by Rokossovskiy’s Central Front.32  
On 5th August 1943, Operation Kutuzov officially liberated Orel but it was a slow 
grinding offensive that laboured forward in the face of skilful German defences33 
and massive Soviet casualties.  In the opinion of some, “Operation Kutuzov was a 
perfect example of the newly sophisticated Soviet way of warfare.”34  However, 
Rokossovskiy felt “once again undue haste was displayed; as a result the attack on 
the decisive sectors was launched without adequate preparation.”35  
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Figure 99: Operation Kutuzov:Soviet Counter-Offensive in July-August 1943 
(Glantz and House, The Battle of Kursk, 1999, p.231.) 
 
Rokossovkiy’s sustained commitment to meticulous preparations is clearly 
revealed by the manner in which he prepared 1st Belorussian Front for Operation 
Bagration.  The extensive, but carefully planned aerial reconnaissance of 16th 
Army was extremely beneficial, 
“the resulting photographs of the German defences were quickly 
transferred to maps, duplicated and sent to the forces.  As a result the 
depth of the enemy defense, the nature of defensive structures, the 
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condition of crossing sites, the location of reserves, etc.  were accurately 
determined.”36 
Hundreds of day and night reconnaissance raids were conducted to establish a 
ground force perspective of the German defences.  The preparation time was also 
used for “Staff exercises and war games on the theme ‘The Penetration of an 
Enemy Defense and Supporting the Commitment of Mobile Forces in Battle’ 
were held at front headquarters and in the armies in early June.”37  Extensive 
preparations were made regarding command and control as well as training troops 
to deal with difficult terrain in order to sustain operational momentum. 
“The infantry practised swimming, overcoming water obstacles using 
available means and without them, the erection of assault bridges, and the 
use of inflatable boats in specially allowed sectors in the immediate rear.  
During the preparation, great attention was focused on training individual 
soldiers and entire sub-units in overcoming swampy sectors, orienting 
themselves in the forests.”38 
Soviet tank troops were specifically trained in fighting in marshes, in close co-
operation with combat engineers, in night fighting, building corduroy roads out of 
logs and in using various tools for overcoming ditches and streams.  There was a 
staggering attention to detail with specific infantry and engineers assigned to train 
and fight with specific tank and self-propelled artillery units.  Similarly, intense 
training programmes were designed for engineers,39 artillery and airpower.40   
 
The East Prussian Operation of January 1945 was also marked by meticulous 
preparation.  As early as 5th December 1944, Rokossovskiy had an extensive 
analysis of German defence lines.  This provided him with substantial detail of the 
German positions, forces, defensive sectors, lines and troop densities in the 
region.41  On 14th December 1944, Rokossovskiy issued instructions to the staff of 
2nd Belorussian Front concerning the preparation of troops and staff for the East 
Prussian Operation.  He ordered constant reconnaissance with systematic and 
through recording of observations.  Troops were to be trained for night operations 
and maskirovka was to be checked everyday.  All commanders were to have 
thought about and decided upon the location of observation, communication and 
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command points by 1st January 1945.  Similarly, all questions of communication, 
co-operation and co-ordination within and between all units at all levels were to 
be carefully examined and resolved.  Finally, commanders were to study and 
familiarise themselves with the German tactical and operational battle order.42   
 
Rokossovskiy’s emphasis on meticulous preparations was not an idiosyncrasy of 
temperament, but an expression of his operational art.  It reflected Rokossovskiy’s 
extremely broad interpretation of the role of time in operational art.  In 
Rokossovskiy’s style of operations the apparent, but in reality, false anomaly of 
patient, meticulous preparations was followed by operations of great power and 
speed.  Time invested in preparation was time gained in operations.  It was 
meticulous preparation that enabled Rokossovskiy to create operations that 
erupted upon the enemy with sufficient momentum to achieve operational 
objectives deep in the enemy rear.  To Rokossovskiy, undue haste in preparation 
was simply a false economy, one that would undermine operational momentum as 
logistic reality clashed with the overall operational imperatives of the front 
commander.  In short he understood that, 
“if advancing forces disregarded the disposition and organization of their 
rear area during an operation, they could, in turn, find themselves in a 
critical or even catastrophic position, fraught with the danger of 
obliteration of all their previous successes.”43 
Rokossovskiy’s prioritisation of time for preparations should not be seen as 
evidence that he was a cautious commander.  In fact, he was often bold, 
particularly during an operation.  Rokossovskiy recognised the operational 
dilemma posed by trying to deny the enemy time whilst attempting to refresh 
exhausted Soviet troops.  Yet, as far as Rokossovskiy was concerned adequate 
preparation, good planning and realistic objectives pre-empted the problem of 
operational exhaustion.  It was not a question of hesitancy, indecision or 
unnecessary caution.  In October 1965, Golubev’s retrospective article on deep 
operations, clearly endorsed Rokossovskiy’s judgement in time for preparations.  
It argued that, 
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“it was indisputably proven that large modern operations required careful 
materiel-organized preparation, that it was impossible to conduct them 
continuously, that between them interruptions no less protracted than the 
operation itself were unavoidable, and that these interruptions would be 
filled with preparations for new operations.”44 
 
The Use of a Broad Front 
The keystone of Brusilov’s success in 1916 was his decision to deploy and 
subsequently attack on a broad front.  In the wake of his success “the notion of a 
broad front offensive quickly became official army policy and its utility was never 
seriously questioned by any of the major theorists.”45  It became an enduring 
theme in Red Army thinking long before Timoshenko’s endorsement of Brusilov 
in December 1940.  In summary, “Varfolomeyev believed as had Triandafillov, 
that in order to achieve decisive success, an operation must be launched along a 
sufficiently broad front.”46 In a similar vein, Tukhachevskiy believed “in the 
greatest possible contact area” with the enemy.47  The overwhelming majority of 
Soviet wartime operations incorporated the idea of a broad front, at both the 
tactical and operational level.  Certainly, it was a feature of Rokossovskiy’s 
operational art. 
 
In his study of the German defeat in the east, Ziemke, the American military 
historian concluded that,  
“Of course, Soviet protests to the contrary not withstanding, the broad front 
offensive was at best a modified linear method of warfare.  It required mass 
troops, repeated frontal encounters and an enemy willing,  
as Hitler was, to respond with a linear defence.”48   
The Soviet inclination to deploy and attack on a broad front, is often cited as 
evidence of the Russian steamroller, grinding its way to victory through frontal 
assaults, reliant on numbers and a callous disregard of casualties to achieve 
victory over smaller, more tactically adept opponents.  In short, the broad front is 
presented as an end in itself, not a means to an end.  Therefore,  
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“despite the smokescreen of high-flowing theorizing which the Russians 
have thrown around the basic two elements, the single or salient thrust and 
the broad front offensive, both can be most simply and, it appears be most 
logically be explained in terms of shortcomings.”49 
 
At best, this statement misunderstands the Red Army’s operational use of the 
broad front.50  At worst, it wilfully misrepresents the Soviet approach for “Soviet 
practice in the Soviet-German war supports their doctrine of a wide frontal 
offensive containing one or few main blows.”51  In either case, this statement fails 
to understand the link between the broad front and the Soviet obsession with 
depth.  The aim of a broad front deployment was to spread the enemy forces, thus 
reducing the depth and density of the enemy’s defences.  In conjunction with a 
deception plan, this denied the enemy the ability to discern the main blow, forcing 
the enemy commander to defend his entire frontage on the basis of guesswork 
rather than considered judgement.  In turn, by reducing the density and depth of 
the enemy’s tactical defences, the Red Army increased the chances of turning a 
rapid breakthrough into a deep operational victory. 
 
Figure 100: Red Army frontal blow operation according to pre-war concepts. 
(Soviet Military Encyclopaedia, Abridged English Version, Vol. 2, 1993, p.373.) 
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Some Soviet commanders did extract ghastly victories, with little manoeuvre and 
just bloody numbers.52  However, Rokossovskiy’s style of operations was more 
consistent with the fact that “in most cases in which a wide front was attacked, 
only the key sectors were penetrated as the Soviets concentrated their major effort 
there, exercising elsewhere a keen conservation of force.”53  Rokossovskiy’s style 
of command did utilise the broad front, but unlike Brusilov, on an operational 
rather than strategic level.  For example.on 10th January 1943, at the launch of 
Operation Kol'tso, Rokossovskiy’s forces attacked simultaneously around the 
entire 150 kilometres of the Stalingrad pocket.54   
 
Similarly, in the Lublin-Brest Operation of July 1944, the left-wing of 
Rokossovskiy’s 1st Belorussian Front deployed on a front of 200 kilometres,55 
while in the East Prussian Operation of January 1945, 2nd Belorussian deployed 
on a frontage of approximately 140 kilometres.56  Rokossovskiy’s use of the broad 
front was an operational device, a means to an end, designed to create the right 
conditions for a tactical breakthrough from which to launch a deep operation.  
Once a breakthrough was achieved, the apparent flat uniformity of 
Rokossovskiy’s broad front was quickly replaced by forces striking fast and deep 
to secure operational objectives in the enemy rear, while others moved at a 
steadier pace mopping up resistance, securing objectives and supply lines.  These 
were not the actions of a commander committed to a slow, attritional advance on a 
broad front.  As the historical record demonstrates, when the opportunity arose, 
Rokossovskiy quickly launched deep operations based on manoeuvre.  A uniform 
broad front was only a feature of his style of command in the initial stages of an 
operation.   
 
In summary, Rokossovskiy used the broad front as a means to an end, and his 
style of operations was marked by a desire for rapid attrition and deep operational 
manoeuvre, not a uniform advance on a broad front of operational scale.  Indeed, 
Rokossovskiy positively disliked prolonged attrition and throughout his active 
command on the Eastern Front seized every opportunity to avoid or escape from 
such operations.  Finally, if commanders such as Rokossovskiy were prepared to 
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accept the idea of a broad front offensive as an end in itself, why did he and they, 
spend so much time before an operation trying to deceive the enemy. 
 
Rokossovskiy and the Conduct of Maskirovka 
The Soviet inclination to deploy on a broad front interacted with maskirovka.  
Maskirovka was a combination of deception, disinformation, security and 
camouflage.57  It involved a concerted attempt to confuse the enemy by playing to 
his expectations or by deliberately misleading him.  It was also part of the Red 
Army’s desire to manipulate combat conditions before an operation.    The 
commitment to deploy on a broad front deliberately spread the enemy deployment 
while presenting him with a multitude of potential threats making the main strikes 
impossible to discern.  Polevoy Ustav 1936 argued that the “concealment of 
preparations is one of the most important conditions of success,”58 while the 1944 
Field Regulations viewed maskirovka as a mandatory form of combat support.59  
It was practised at the strategic, operational and tactical level, by all Soviet 
formations, and was closely associated with the achievement of surprise and the 
acquisition of the initiative.60  It was central to any Soviet commander’s approach 
and Rokossovskiy was no exception to this rule. 
 
In October 1942, as part of Operation Uranus, Rokossovskiy’s attempt to deceive 
Paulus, Sixth German Army’s commander was a pivotal part of his plan.  In order 
“to convince him that our intention was to attack in the sector between the Don 
and the Volga we were especially active there.”61  There is little doubt that at 
times, Soviet maskirovka became rather formulaic.  Naturally, certain standard 
procedures had to be implemented62 and Rokossovskiy used them, but also had an 
eye for more imaginative maskirovka.  He insisted the Germans were confronted 
with random and unpredictable actions that did not conform to patterns of 
behaviour.  In December 1942, during preparations for Operation Ko'ltso, 
Rokossovskiy noticed that the Germans used Soviet artillery tactics to predict 
Soviet assaults.  Rokossovskiy ordered his officers to mix it up: attacks were to be 
at night and during the day, with and without artillery support, short and 
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prolonged artillery barrages, some attacks were to bite and hold, while others were 
to probe deeper taking on the character of an extended reconnaissance.63  
 
At the tactical level, maskirovka was primarily physical, involving dummies and 
other artificial constructions.  It also involved the physical camouflage of units 
and covering the tracks of Soviet forces.  By 1943-44, extensive Soviet manuals 
covered the procedures and techniques of maskirovka.  64  It was the front Chief of 
Staff’s task to devise, oversee and implement tactical maskirovka.  However, at 
the operational level, maskirovka played a more subtle but highly significant role 
in operational art.  At this level, maskirovka involved the psychological 
undermining of the opponent and the insertion of doubt into the mind of the 
enemy commander.  In 1941-43, German army commanders could absorb the 
limited impact of tactical surprise, but operational surprise presented problems of 
a more substantial nature.  In 1942-43, German commanders relied on deep 
defences, superior mobility and tactical prowess, as well as operational reserves, 
to negate Soviet maskirovka and their own lack of intelligence.  However, in late 
1943-44, as German reserves dwindled and the deep nature of their defences 
diminished, greater numbers of German troops were forced into the forward 
tactical zone.  This lack of depth made German formations susceptible in both a 
physical and psychological sense, to maskirovka.   
 
The psychological implications of this situation on German commanders and 
troops were profound.  If any tactical setback had the potential to shatter the entire 
operational position, German commanders had to cover their entire frontage, thus 
robbing themselves of the depth that curtailed previous Soviet deep operations.  
All German tactical and operational commanders recognised the dangers of 
covering an entire front.  Indeed, since World War One, German doctrine had 
emphasised strongpoint defence, constructed in depth, with the ability to absorb a 
blow, followed by rapid counter-attack.  This was the anti-thesis of a linear 
defence, pre-occupied with holding the line.  However, from autumn 1943 lack of 
manpower, lack of depth and prepared defensive positions plagued German 
commanders.  As a result German commanders became more reliant on 
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intelligence.  This made them vulnerable to disinformation and deception.  In 
particular, German commanders were increasingly anxious to repel Soviet assaults 
and launch immediate counter-attacks rather than absorb the blow.  In this sense 
the loss of the Dnepr and the penetration of the Panther Line, in autumn 1943, 
were critical strategic reverses.  The more creative Soviet operational commanders 
such as Rokossovskiy thrived on this situation. 
 
In the 1930’s a leading Soviet theorist, A.M. Vol’pe, argued that secrecy, rapidity 
and misleading the enemy were the essential components of maskirovka.  
Furthermore, Vol’pe considered misleading the enemy to be “the most delicate of 
maskirovka means requiring ‘the genius of a commander.’”65  It is by this standard 
that Rokossovskiy’s creative maskirovka should be assessed.  Rokossovskiy knew 
it was extremely unlikely that a German commander would have no warning of a 
major Soviet operation.  Yet, more significantly, he seems to have understood, 
that from a psychological perspective, this presented considerable opportunities.  
Active disinformation about a forthcoming operation could be more beneficial 
than complete secrecy.  Naturally, it was essential to conceal the main blow and 
the breakthrough zones but the passage of credible, but misleading information 
was a deadly psychological weapon.  Disinformation could induce a false sense of 
security by encouraging an inclination to concentrate on ‘known’ information, to 
the neglect of less tangible but potentially significant indicators.  During the 
Belorussian campaign of autumn 1943-spring 1944, German commanders often 
pounced on any overt sign of activity by Rokossovskiy’s forces.  Rokossovskiy 
manipulated this impetuosity in order to conceal his own operational plans, often 
quite deliberately using diversionary attacks that were seized upon by German 
commanders keen to believe that they had the situation under control.  Of course, 
if the enemy commander believed he had the situation under control, the 
psychological impact of an operation delivered from an unexpected direction 
could be shattering. 
 
Therefore, maskirovka was a central feature of Rokossovskiy’s style of command 
and played a particularly important role in several of Rokossovskiy’s Belorussian 
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operations in the autumn of 1943.  Rokossovskiy’s appreciation of the finer 
psychological aspects of maskirovka is revealed by his reaction to intelligence 
reports in late June 1943.  The 16th Air Army believed it had identified a 
substantial concentration of German armour in the Orel region.  Air Marshal 
Rudenko, 16th Air Army’s commander, suggested an air strike.   
 
In Rudenko’s words, 
“General Rokossovsky(sic) listened attentively and then said: ‘well, say we 
shake up these two divisions, and so tell the enemy we 
know much about him.  He’ll restore their combat power 
and hide them so that our recce will never find them.  
What we want now’ he continued his argument, ‘is to 
make believe we know nothing and at the same time to 
find out his strength and plans.  And so we shouldn’t 
alarm the Germans.  Let them attack and then, if you 
want to, take a smack at those groves.  Only it’s hardly 
likely that you’ll find any tanks there.  You have to watch their movement 
and then shower them with bombs.”66  
This leaves one in no doubt that Rokossovskiy possessed a shrewd intellect and an 
astute appreciation of the psychological dimension of maskirovka at the 
operational level. 
 
As we have seen Rokossovskiy’s Belorussian campaign of October 1943-April 
1944 have been overshadowed by Kursk in July 1943 and the crushing Soviet 
victory in the Belorussian Operation of June-August 1944 as well as Soviet 
historiography’s concerted efforts to disguise the true scope and success of 
Rokossovskiy’s operations.  However, the Belorussian campaign was also notable 
because it witnessed Rokossovskiy’s progression from a single main blow 
towards active diversionary operations using the idea of two main blows within a 
broad front, a theme that began as Rokossovskiy entered Belorussia in 1943 and 
reached its zenith in Operation Bagration during June-July 1944.These 
 
Figure 101: S.I. Rudenko 
(Rokossovskiy, 1992) 
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developments were intimately linked with Rokossovskiy’s more creative and 
sophisticated approach to maskirovka. 
 
This process began on the eve of the Chernigov-Pripyat Operation of August 
1943.67  In its original form the main blow of the Chernigov-Pripyat Operation 
was to be inflicted by 65th Army and exploited by 2nd Tank Army.68  However, in 
an unusual move, given that it was involved in the same operation, on 14th August 
1943, Rokossovskiy also issued a specific operational directive to 
Chernyakhovskiy’s 60th Army.  The 60th Army’s prominent role in the subsequent 
Chernigov-Pripyat Operation is often portrayed as an exceptional example of 
brilliant improvisation in the face of unforeseen events.  There is no doubt that 
Rokossovskiy’s agile response to 65th Army and 2nd Tank Army’s failure was an 
object lesson in flexibility.  However, the separate operational directive of 14th 
August 1943 indicates that Rokossovskiy did not see 60th Army’s attack in the 
Chernigov-Pripyat Operation as simply a holding role.  Rokossovskiy ordered the 
60th Army, at the southern end of the Central Front, to launch a secondary attack, 
not just a holding operation.  After listing its tactical objectives for the first six 
days, again Rokossovskiy specifically stated that this was to be an active 
secondary attack.69      
 
On the Central Front’s northern sector, on 26th August 1943, 65th Army and 2nd 
Tank Army found themselves facing deep German defences manned by reserves 
that had been smartly deployed in expectation of a Soviet attack.70  As 65th Army 
and 2nd Tank Army ground their way forward71 further south, on 29th August 
1943, Chernyakhovskiy’s 60th Army discovered a weakness in the German line, 
moved through it and into open country.72  On 30th August 1943 Rokossovskiy 
shifted the entire Central Front’s main effort to the south in support of 60th Army, 
thereby turning an auxiliary effort into the main blow.73  It was a resounding 
success, injecting tremendous momentum into the Central Front’s offensive.  As 
the Germans rushed reserves south, to curtail 60th Army, this released the pressure 
further north, enabling 65th Army and 2nd Tank Army74 to make greater progress.75  
In the face of the two Soviet efforts, the German line was stretched to breaking 
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point, enabling the Central Front’s central armies, 13th and 61st Armies, to pick up 
the baton, crash through the weakened centre and bounce the Dnepr76 on 22nd 
September 1943.77This operation seems to have had quite an impact on 
Rokossovskiy’s future planning and his attitude to maskirovka.  It clearly revealed 
the vulnerability of a single strike to a counter-concentration and the inadequacy 
of a passive auxiliary strike.  Rokossovskiy concluded “as we were striking on a 
comparatively narrow front the enemy had ample opportunity to rush in troops 
from other sectors.”78  
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Figure 102: The Chernigov-Pripyat Offensive 
(Stephen Walsh) 
 
The subsequent operations of autumn 1943 reveal the sheer creativity of 
Rokossovskiy’s operational command and his mastery of maskirovka.  In all 
respects, Rokossovskiy’s ability to create “unpleasant surprises”79 for the German 
forces in Belorussia reveals the extent to which Rokossovskiy incorporated 
maskirovka and the achievement of surprise into his style of operations.  This was 
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a considerable achievement as Belorussia was dominated by rivers, marsh and 
forest.  It appeared unsuitable for manoeuvre warfare and ideal for defensive and 
positional war.  The Second German Army had extensive defensive positions 
including the Panther position, envisaged, perhaps wistfully, by many German 
commanders, as a strategic bulwark that would stabilise the German position on 
the Eastern Front.   
 
However, Rokossovskiy realized that in the absence of substantial reserves, 
Second German Army was relying upon Belorussia’s natural defensive assets to 
bolster frontline German defences.  Equally, Rokossovskiy recognised that 
difficult terrain also undermined the mobility of Second German Army’s defence.  
It was primarily an infantry force denuded of armour due to greater German 
priorities in the Ukraine and an expectation that the Belorussian environment 
would undermine the speed and depth of Rokossovskiy’s operations.  
Nevertheless, if a significant tactical breakthrough was achieved and exploited, 
Second German Army would struggle to respond in an agile manner. 
 
Therefore, Belorussia confronted Rokossovskiy with the possibility of positional 
and attritional war.  Yet, Rokossovskiy did not grind his way through Belorussia.  
The fact that he was able to devise operations characterised by agility and 
manoeuvre is a testimony to his creativity as an operational commander.  In 
particular, Rokossovskiy used active maskirovka, taking massive but considered 
risks, in order to deceive Second German Army as to his intentions, before 
completely wrong footing them.  In short, Rokossovskiy’s style of operations in 
autumn 1943 was notable for its aggressively creative maskirovka, in search of 
surprise, designed to create the opportunity for manoeuvre.   
 
By early October 1943, after the successes of September 1943, Rokossovskiy’s 
Central Front was losing momentum.  All attempts to expand bridgeheads over 
the Dnepr and the Sozh met fierce resistance.  In particular, Batov’s 65th Army 
was stuck in an attritional slogging match and mired in the marshy and wooded 
terrain, between the Sozh and the Dnepr.80  In response, Rokossovskiy created a 
287 
 
daring plan to restore fluidity to operations in which maskirovka played a crucial 
role.  The plan was to withdraw the main forces of 65th Army from the western 
bank of the Dnepr, to the eastern bank, before quickly re-deploying them south, 
for a more dynamic operation across the Dnepr, on Central Front’s southern wing.  
In order to preserve operational secrecy, Rokossovskiy ordered a single corps of 
65th Army81 to remain on the western bank “with the task of continuously 
harassing the nazis in order to divert their attention.”82   
 
The plan was brilliantly successful, helped by the fact that on 12th October 1943, 
Rokossovskiy had deliberately ordered 3rd Army and 50th Army, on the northern 
wing of Central Front, to launch a diversionary attack.  Rokossovskiy knew that 
these two armies lacked the resources to sustain an offensive “but it was in the 
common interest, and certain quite conscious sacrifices had to be made.”83  As 
Rokossovskiy had anticipated, Central Front’s rapid change of direction to the 
north, caught Second German Army on the hop.  Indeed, “as we foresaw, the 
offensive of the 50th and 3rd Armies scored some initial success.  On the third day, 
however, the enemy threw in additional forces, counterattacked and forced our 
units back to their initial positions.”84  This was exactly what Rokossovskiy 
wanted to achieve. 
 
As Second German Army pounced on the Central Front’s northern armies, further 
south Rokossovskiy unleashed his operational masterstroke.  This turned what 
appeared to be a tactical setback into an operational victory.  On 15th October 
1943, 65th Army crossed the Dnepr and moved on Gomel, Second German 
Army’s key systemic centre.  In a matter of hours, German troops in the north that 
had been counter-attacking 3rd and 50th Army rapidly disengaged, relieving the 
German pressure in the north, but too late to do anything about 65th Army’s move 
across the Dnepr in the south.   
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Figure 103: The Dnepr Bridgehead: October-November 1943. 
(Ziemke,Stalingrad to Berlin, 1987, p.190.) 
 
By any standards this was a brilliantly creative operation that highlights 
Rokossovskiy’s ability to use maskirovka to inject manoeuvre into a stagnant 
operational situation.  Rokossovskiy had reclaimed the initiative from Second 
German Army and denied it the opportunity to withdraw behind the Panther Line.  
In Rokossovskiy’s words, 
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“taking into account the difficult terrain,criss-crossed by large rivers, and 
the strongly fortified enemy defence lines, including the vaunted Eastern 
Wall, possession of a bridgehead 40km in frontage and 20km in depth on 
the western bank of the Dnieper was a major achievement for the troops 
on the left wing of our Front.  It overhung the whole of the enemy’s 
Gomel group, compelling him to bring up forces from other sectors of the 
front, and thus weakening his defences there.”85 
 
Ziemke concluded that by the end of November 1943 “the distinguishing aspect of 
the Belorussian Front’s three month fall campaign was its drab pointlessness.  It 
had operational, even strategic, possibilities but the indications are that the Stavka 
could not have exploited these and, in fact, had not wanted to do so.”86  It is 
significant that Ziemke refrains from criticism of the tactical and operational 
handling of the Soviet forces in Belorussia.  Rokossovskiy’s forces crossed the 
Desna, bounced the Dnepr, crossed the Sozh87 and broke the Panther position.  In 
short, Rokossovskiy out-thought, out-manoeuvred and out-fought Second and 
Ninth German Armies.  The Belorussian campaign refined his operational style 
and evolved his thinking on maskirovka.  By the end of November 1943, 
“after nearly three months the Ninth and Second Armies once more held a 
continuous front.  They had eluded a succession of dangerous thrusts, 
often just in the nick of time.  The price was high.  Half of the Dnepr 
bridgehead was lost and with it a 100 mile stretch of the river.  In the south 
a 60 mile gap yawned between the flanks of Army Group Centre and 
South.”88 
Therefore, in the autumn of 1943, Rokossovskiy’s style of operations was notable 
for its use of maskirovka in order to generate opportunities for manoeuvre.  There 
was great emphasis upon active measures to divert enemy formations and lure the 
enemy into counter-attacks against minor tactical probes dressed up to look like 
the initial stages of significant operational breakthroughs.  Rokossovskiy’s 
maskirovka moved from the passive to the active use of the front’s forces in order 
to positively deceive the enemy rather than simply relying on concealment to hide 
the main blow. 
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This commitment to tactical and operational maskirovka continued into 1944 
through Rokossovskiy’s extensive preparations for the Belorussian Operation in 
which he considered deception, disinformation and surprise as key parts of the 
operational plan.  In support of Stavka’s strategic deception89 programme, issued 
on 7th May 1944,90 Rokossovskiy’s 1st Belorussian Front prepared an operational 
maskirovka plan.  It concentrated on concealing the location of individual 
formations and confusing Ninth German Army as to 1st Belorussian’s main blow.  
In the Zlobin-Rogachev sector, where 1st Belorussian had attacked and failed 
during May 1944, 91 3rd Army and 48th Army made extensive and overt 
preparations for attack, real and false, in order to draw German attention to this 
area.  This was an area of promising defensive terrain, and, in a region where they 
had succeeded before, recently at that, the Germans were confident in their ability 
to dominate this sector.  Naturally, Soviet activity in this area, carefully balanced 
in order to maintain credibility, drew German attention.  The operational aim was 
to distract Ninth German Army and persuade it that it has the situation under 
control while concealing the movement of 28th Army, on 27th May 1944, into the 
southern breakthrough area, around Parichi.92  This was also supported by 
instructions issued by the General Staff to 1st , 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts, as 
well as 2nd Baltic Front to engage in simulated preparations for offensive 
operations.93 
 
A detailed maskirovka plan was developed.  It paid particular attention to night 
movement, monitoring rail and road traffic as well as the systematic provision of 
disinformation through dummy concentrations, false radio nets, artillery 
registration and reconnaissance.  It was meticulously planned, implemented and 
observed by 1st Belorussian Front’s staff.  Rokossovskiy paid tribute to Malinin, 
his chief of staff, for his tireless efforts.94  Similarly, Proshlyakhov, 1st 
Belorussian Front’s Chief of Engineers wrote a detailed pamphlet advising all 
tactical formations on ideas and procedures for concealment, deception and 
security.95  The 1st Belorussian Front’s efforts were successful.  By 22nd June 
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1944, Ninth German Army knew a major offensive was coming96 but German 
intelligence had failed to discern the organised presence of 28th Army. 
 
The success of 1st Belorussian Front’s attack on 24th June 1944 in the Parichi 
region vindicated Rokossovskiy’s foresight in anticipating the problem likely to 
be incurred at Rogachev.  If he had not insisted on two breakthrough zones and 
developed a highly creative maskirovka plan in order to maximise the chances of 
a breakthrough the Belorussian Front’s attack in Operation Bagration may not 
have developed the operational momentum that proved critical in the most 
impressive Red Army operation of the Great Patriotic War.   
 
Localised Tactical Concentration of Force 
Maskirovka was also connected to an operational commander’s ability to create 
massive localised concentrations of force, on selected breakthrough axes.  The 
ability to pit enormous strength against weakness enabled commanders such as 
Rokossovskiy to capitalise on opportunities created by maskirovka.  In 1916, 
Brusilov created massive localised concentrations of force, in selected 
breakthrough areas.  This was not particularly innovative, but Brusilov’s ability to 
make breadth of front simultaneously compatible with and indeed complementary 
to massive localised concentrations of force was highly significant.97   
 
This was not lost on Soviet inter-war thinkers, indeed, “the principle of maximum 
concentration of force at a single point in the context of an extended front and an 
overall scarcity of resources was as old as the Red Army itself.”98  In this sense, 
Rokossovskiy’s style of operations was no different from that of his 
contemporaries.  Indeed, the Polevoy Ustav of 1936 had emphasised,  
“to fight everywhere with the same force is impossible.  To obtain success it 
is necessary to gain a decisive superiority over the enemy on the main 
direction by means of regrouping of forces and means.  At secondary points 
only forces to cover the enemy are needed.”99   
In many respects, the whole purpose of a broad front deployment and maskirovka 
was to create massive localised concentrations of force designed to facilitate a 
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rapid breakthrough.  Rokossovskiy’s approach to the initial stages of an operation 
had much in common with Brusilov and the massive localised concentration of 
force prior to the assault was a theme of virtually every operational plan that 
Rokossovskiy devised.   
 
The Central Front’s defensive operation at Kursk clearly reveals Rokossovskiy’s 
inclination to concentrate tactical force within a broad front deployment.  
Rokossovskiy believed the main German blow would be directed against Central 
Front’s right wing.100  In response, “of the 41 rifle divisions located in the front’s 
first echelon, 29 were in 13th Army.  Whereas along a front an average of 7.5 
kilometres were allocated per division, in the 13th Army only 2.7 kilometres were 
so allocated.”101  Equally, “as is evident from the decision by the Central Front’s 
commander, the front’s main forces and weapons were concentrated on the axis of 
the assumed enemy main attack, that is, in the 13th Army’s sector.”102 
 
At Kursk, 13th Army deployed “114,000 men, 2,934 guns and mortars, 105 
multiple rocket launchers and 270 tanks and self-propelled guns”103  These forces 
were concentrated on a front of just 32 kilometres in breadth and up to 30 
kilometres in depth.  Naturally, Rokossovskiy benefited from the Red Army’s 
excellent intelligence for “the Germans did not succeed in concealing their 
offensive preparations”104 but acted upon it in a decisive manner.  The Central 
Front’s other formations provide a sharp contrast with 13th Army.  The 60th Army 
was 96,000 strong, but covered a frontage of 92 kilometres, while 65th Army 
numbered 100,000 with a front of 82 kilometres.105  Significantly, neither 60th or 
65th Army deployed a third echelon at Kursk, while the majority of their forces 
were deployed in the first echelon. 
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Figure 104: The Central and Voronezh Front Deployment at Kursk: July 1943. 
(Glantz and House, The Battle of  Kursk, 1999, p.82.) 
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Their deployments had greater breadth, less concentration of force and markedly 
less depth than the Central Front’s right-wing.  In contrast, 13th Army had a third 
echelon.  It also contained the greatest proportion of infantry divisions.106  In 
summary, at Kursk, Rokossovskiy decisively shaped the field, through a 
pronounced concentration of force.  As Rokossovskiy recalled, 
“we did everything to pack our troops as tightly as possible on the 
threatened direction, concentrating on a frontage of 95 kilometres, 58 
percent of our infantry divisions, 70 percent of our artillery and 87 per cent 
of our tanks and self-propelled guns.”107 
 
In his memoirs, Rokossovskiy criticised Vatutin’s failure to establish tactical 
concentrations of force within a broad defensive front.  At Kursk, the Voronezh 
Front, under Vatutin, did stop the German offensive in the south, but with great 
difficulty, after a 35 kilometre German advance.  It also received considerable 
support from Stavka’s reserve.  In contrast, Rokossovskiy’s Central Front “had 
got along without the GHQ Reserve, managing with our own forces.”108  In 
response to claims that Central Front had an easier task against the northern attack 
by Ninth German Army, Rokossovskiy argued, 
“obviously, the reason lies elsewhere: namely, the Central Front had 
deployed its forces better, concentrating them on the most threatened 
sector, and the enemy had been unable to overcome such a concentration 
of forces and materiel.”109   
 
Furthermore, the penetration of 6th Guards Army “was due basically to the fact 
that Vatutin (unlike Rokossovskii) had spread his forces more thinly over greater 
distances; local German superiority soon made itself felt very painfully.”110 
 
Rokossovskiy’s criticisms of Vatutin reflect Rokossovskiy’s perception of 
operational command.  To Rokossovskiy, a front commander should never 
authorise a uniform deployment across a broad front.  It represented an abdication 
of operational art and an inability, or refusal, to make decisions.  In 
Rokossovskiy’s view, operational command was defined by the need to make 
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decisions that involved prioritisation, reflected in tactical concentrations of force 
within a broad front, not indecision disguised by the deployment of a broad front, 
covering everything and nothing.  In effect, Rokossovskiy accused Vatutin of 
operational incompetence in one of the most significant Soviet operations of 
World War Two.111 
 
On 18th July 1944, Rokossovskiy’s 1st Belorussian Front launched the Lublin-
Brest Operation.112  The Lublin-Brest Operation reveals how the pattern of tactical 
concentration within a broad front permeated Rokossovskiy’s front operations and 
also dominated the deployment of individual armies.  The left-wing of 1st 
Belorussian Front deployed from east to west, consisted of 70th Army, 47th Army, 
8th Guards Army, 69th Army, 1st Polish Army and 2nd Tank Army, supported by 
6th Air Army.113  It was deployed on a broad front of approximately 200 
kilometres, but 70th Army alone covered 120 kilometres, concentrating most of its 
forces on its left flank, leaving minor formations and the Pripyat Marshes to 
defend the rest of the front. 
 
In the days before the Lublin-Brest Operation, 8th Guards Army was secretly 
deployed into the line.  It was to deliver the main blow on a breakthrough sector 
just 9 kilometres wide.  The 8th Guards Army’s three rifle corps each deployed on 
their own three kilometre sector.  These individual corps’ deployed three 
divisions, one behind the other. Therefore, an extraordinary tactical concentration 
in breadth was supported by substantial strength in depth.  The 8th Guards Army 
had 11th Tank Corps and 2nd Tank Army poised to move through as deep 
operational manoeuvre forces.114  The 8th Guards Army’s tactical concentration 
was supplemented by 69th Army to the south, which deployed its main forces on 
its right flank, adjacent to 8th Guards Army, with 7th Guards Cavalry Corps ready 
to exploit.  To the north of 8th Guards Army, 47th Army established tactical 
concentrations on its left to support 8th Guards Army, with 2nd Guards Cavalry 
Corps in operational reserve.115  Therefore, “in the 18 kilometer front penetration 
sector Rokossovskiy concentrated 70 percent of his rifle forces, 80 percent of his 
artillery, and all of his armor.”116 
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Figure 105: 1st Belorussian Front’s concentration of force prior to the Lublin-Brest 
Operation  
(Glantz, Soviet Military Deception, 1989, p.407.) 
 
In January 1945, Rokossovskiy’s 2nd Belorussian Front held a frontage of 250 
kilometres.  The Rozan bridgehead could not hold all of 2nd Shock, 48th Army and 
3rd Army.  The main blow was to be launched simultaneously, from the 
bridgehead117 and across the Narev river on a front of 50 kilometres.118  It was to 
be supported by a secondary assault, from the Serotsk bridgehead,119 to the south 
of Pulutsk, by 65th Army and 70th Army120 who together covered 25 kilometres.  
In contrast, 49th Army covered a 50 kilometre front, while on the extreme northern 
wing 50th Army held 100 kilometres.   
 
To the west of Rozan, with its right-wing straddling the Narev, Gorbatov’s 3rd 
Army made up of three corps, deployed six divisions on a front of 20 kilometres, 
with three divisions in the second echelon.  The 3rd Army’s three corps all 
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deployed their forces with two divisions in the line and one in reserve.  Its 
breakthrough zone was to be six kilometres wide, with its artillery deployed at a 
density of no less than 220 guns per kilometre.121  Its tactical success was to be 
transferred into deep operations by 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps.  On the left wing of 
the Rozan bridgehead, Gusev’s 48th Army was deployed on a 15 kilometre sector 
covered by three corps.  Yet, one half of 48th Army’s frontage was held by a 
single corps, 29th Rifle Corps, with the southern sector, identical in length to the 
northern sector, held by two corps, 52nd and 42nd Rifle Corps, each with two 
divisions up and one in reserve.  Its breakthrough zone was to be six kilometres 
wide with no less than 220 guns per kilometre.122 This meant four divisions were 
packed in on a 6 kilometre front, a massive localised tactical concentration of 
force double that of 48th Army’s right-wing.123Tactical success was to be turned 
into deep operational manoeuvre by 8th Guards Mechanised Corps whose initial 
positions straddled the boundary of 3rd and 48th Army. 
 
This concentration on 48th Army’s left-wing was supported by 2nd Shock Army’s 
right-wing.  Fedyuninskiy’s 2nd Shock Army held a frontage of approximately 20 
kilometres, east of Pulutsk, but concentrated two corps in the northern half, 
adjacent to 48th Army’s tactical concentration, with 8th Guards Tank Corps 
waiting to exploit.  Its breakthrough zone was also six kilometres with no less 
than 220 guns per kilometre.124  In contrast, only one regiment held the remaining 
10 kilometres of 2nd Shock Army’s southern sector.125  The 2nd Belorussian 
Front’s secondary attack, by 65th and 70th Army, was dominated by the more 
northerly of the two armies, namely 65th Army.  It deployed its three corps across 
its frontage with the result that nine divisions deployed in two echelons on a 12 
kilometre sector with 1st Guards Tank Corps poised for operational manoeuvre.126  
Its breakthrough zone was seven kilometres with no less than 210 guns per 
kilometre in support.127  In support, 70th Army deployed just two corps.  It was to 
act as a holding force with a three kilometre localised concentration of force 
containing no less than 210 guns per kilometre.128Rokossovskiy front level deep 
operational manoeuvre force, 5th Guards Tank Army, was deployed in positions 
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approximately fifty kilometres east of Pulutsk on the boundary of 65th Army and 
2nd Shock Army. 
 
 
 
Figure 106: 2nd Belorussian Front concentration of force prior to the East Prussian 
Operation of January 1945. 
(Glantz, Soviet Military Deception, 1989, p.513.) 
 
These massive, localised tactical concentrations, within 2nd Belorussian Front’s 
overall frontage of over 200 kilometres, reflected Rokossovskiy’s operational 
concept. It is clear that the desire to create massive localised tactical 
concentrations of force within a broad front was a pronounced characteristic of 
Rokossovskiy’s operational style.  It was also present in as Operation Uranus, at 
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Stalingrad, where 65th Army deployed on a front of eighty kilometres but with a 
breakthrough sector of only six kilometres.129 In this sense, Rokossovskiy’s 
operational art had much in common with Brusilov, but also with the orthodox 
practices of the Red Army.  A similar pattern would repeat itself with 
Rokossovskiy’s use of holding and shock forces, a concept endorsed by the Red 
Army, but also central to Brusilov’s method of operation. 
 
The Use of Holding and Shock Forces 
In Soviet inter-war thinking, at least in theory, all formations within a broad front 
deployment were divided into holding and shock forces, with different but 
complimentary tasks, designed to achieve operational success. The idea of holding 
and strike forces was central to Triandafillov’s thinking and that of many other 
Soviet theorists.130  Once again, the origins of a Soviet concept lay in the Tsarist 
era, particularly, the Brusilov Offensive.  In 1916, Brusilov attacked on a strategic 
width of front in order to achieve tactical success.  If all four armies in Brusilov’s 
South-Western Front were of equal status, the introduction of holding and strike 
forces, by the Red Army, was an important doctrinal innovation.  However, if 
Brusilov’s 8th and 9th Armies constituted the main effort, with 7th and 11th Armies 
in supporting roles,131there is a clear link between 1916, the inter-war years, the 
Great Patriotic War and Rokossovskiy’s style of operations. 
 
Figure 107: Holding and strike forces concept in a Front operation. 
(Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Abridged English Version, Vol. 2, 1993, p.373.) 
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These developments constitute an important point in Soviet military thinking 
because 
“probably the turning point between ‘broad front’ and ‘deep battle’ came 
when the need to reinforce the effort on the main axes led to a deliberate 
thinning out of the troops on other sectors until, diversions apart, they 
came to assume a holding role rather than an offensive one.  This 
conceptual change is perhaps the selection of main axes in advance rather 
than in response to the course of the battle.”132 
 
This difference in status was designed to facilitate the rapid acquisition of depth.  
The strike army was to acquire depth, while the holding army fulfilled the 
function of breadth, in order to fix and stretch the enemy defence, so as to enhance 
the strike army’s chances of success.  The aim was to make breadth of attack and 
depth of attack, simultaneously compatible, through the interaction of strike and 
holding forces.133  All formations were part of one operational whole, but the 
strike army was clearly more important than the holding force.  Therefore, “a 
holding group was designated for operations on a secondary sector……..it was 
assigned the mission of pinning down the enemy by dynamic action and by 
preventing him regrouping his forces for operations against the shock group”134 
whereas “the striking group in offensive battle is designated for action in the main 
direction.”135  Basically, the objective of a holding force was defined purely by its 
contribution to the strike army’s success, not its own.  In a similar way, during the 
Great Patriotic War, the success of a standard combined arms army was defined, 
not by its own achievements, but in its ability to create a gap for a mobile group to 
pass through and conduct deep operations. 
 
These principles retained their relevance at the operational level during the war 
but significant changes occurred at the tactical level.  The Infantry Combat 
Regulations of 1942-1945 argued, 
“the concepts of striking groups and holding groups in the composition of 
combat formations, as expressed in previous combat regulations, were 
conducive to inactivity of the holding group in battle……the present 
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infantry combat regulations abolish the distinction of combat order into 
striking and holding groups.”136 
 
Tactical commanders were to ensure the maximum use of troops and firepower in 
the front line.  At the tactical level, the enemy was to be fixed by a combination of 
breadth and firepower.  This replaced the universal idea of holding and strike 
groups.  Equally, in pursuit of firepower at the expense of depth, the Infantry 
Combat Regulations of 1942-45 abolished “echeloned deployment in depth of 
combat order in the platoon, company, battalion, regiment and division.”137  
Nevertheless, the idea of holding and shock forces remained relevant at the corps, 
army and front level.  Certainly, the operational level concept of holding and 
shock forces was a theme of Rokossovskiy’s operating art. 
 
The question of holding and strike forces had substantial implications for the 
conduct of operational art.  If all Soviet forces in a front were equal, then 
operational command would simply have been a matter of overseeing the 
deployment of a huge mass, before launching one massive rolling offensive.  
However, Rokossovskiy always sought to integrate holding and strike forces into 
an operational plan, before combining their actions during an operation.  This 
required a great deal of creative thought to foresee and control the process of 
interaction between holding and striking forces, in a way that worked towards the 
operational objective.  It was not just a question of manpower, firepower and 
repeated frontal encounters. 
 
The Don Front’s contribution to the Stalingrad encirclement, Operation Uranus, in 
November 1942, was dominated by the idea of holding and striking forces.  The 
Don Front’s operational task was to fix units north of Stalingrad, to ensure they 
did not disrupt South-Western Front’s main blow,138 against weak Romanian 
forces.139  It was an important operational mission because a German counter-
attack against South-Western Front’s left flank, as it engaged the Romanians, 
could have seriously compromised Operation Uranus.  Yet, Don Front’s holding 
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role evidently placed it in a subservient role to South-Western Front.140  This was 
entirely in line with Soviet theory, but of little consolation to Rokossovskiy.  141   
 
 
 
Figure 108: Operation Uranus: 19th-23rd November 1942 
(Bellamy, Absolute War, 2007, p.534.) 
 
The pattern of holding and strike forces was repeated within the Don Front.  On 
the right-wing of the Don Front, its strike force, 65th Army, 142 was to support 
South-Western Front’s 21st Army, while Don Front’s two other armies, 24th and 
66th Army played a holding role143 within the Don Front, designed to mirror the 
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overall operational holding role of the Don Front.144  This pattern of holding and 
strike forces, allocated separate but complementary roles, was an enduring, if 
orthodox theme, in Rokossovskiy’s operational art.  In Operation Kol’tso, of 
January 1943, 65th and 21st Army took on the main strike role with active support 
from 24th Army.145  The Don Front’s armies on the northern, southern and eastern 
perimeter of the pocket 
“were to attack on their respective sectors with limited objectives, the aim 
being to pin down as many enemy forces as possible and deny him any 
opportunity of manoeuvring.  These armies had to rely entirely on their 
own resources.”146 
 
On 15th July 1943, Rokossovskiy battle report on the opening day of Operation 
Kutuzov, made it clear that 48th Army played the holding role, while 13th Army 
struck the main blow.147  In the Gomel-Rechitsa Operation of November 1943, 
Rokossovskiy used 11th, 63rd and 48th Armies as holding forces, with 65th Army in 
the striking role.  Similarly, Rokossovskiy explicitly acknowledged that in the 
early stages of the East Prussian Operation in January 1945, the task of 3rd and 
50th Army “was to pin down enemy forces and prevent them from being 
transferred to the main line of advance.”148 
 
In summary, the use of holding and strike forces was a central feature of 
Rokossovskiy’s operational style.  In this sense, Rokossovskiy was an orthodox 
Soviet commander.  However, in another sense, Rokossovskiy’s use of holding 
and shock forces was notable for its creativity and brilliant harmonisation in the 
actual conduct of operations.  Officially, all Soviet commanders incorporated the 
idea of holding and strike forces into their conduct of operations.  However, few 
understood as well as Rokossovskiy the questions of timing that determined 
whether holding and strike forces genuinely interacted, or just happened to fight 
alongside each other.  At the conceptual level, this required creative imagination 
and was critical in distinguishing between commanders who simply threw a mass 
at the enemy, on an operational scale, and those like Rokossovskiy who had a 
genuine understanding of operational simultaneity. 
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Simultaneous General Assault: Operational Simultaneity 
In the words of Marshal M.V. Zakharov149 Chief of the 
General Staff of the Soviet Army, 
“the theory of the deep offensive operation 
proposed a method of conducting combat 
operations in which shock, holding, and other 
groups, and tactically disconnected echelons for 
penetration and development of the penetration, 
were united along the front and in depth, on the 
ground and in the air, into a single shock 
mechanism providing purposeful action against the entire enemy 
operational grouping until his complete defeat.”150  
 
It was called operational simultaneity.151  A Soviet offensive was launched 
simultaneously in the air, on the ground, in breadth and depth.  The simultaneous 
nature of the assault was designed to undermine the enemy commander’s ability 
to discern the main effort.  By disguising the main effort, the Soviet offensive 
undermined the enemy’s ability to deploy reserves effectively.  Equally, by 
attacking across the entire front, a combination of holding and strike forces fixed 
the enemy in place and undermined his ability to react in a flexible manner by re-
deploying troops to more threatened sectors.152  This concept underpinned the Red 
Army’s sustained commitment to the idea of a simultaneous assault on a broad 
front.  Thus, the Red Army’s commitment to a simultaneous general offensive 
was not a sign of the Red Army’s shortcomings or a penchant for the broad front 
offensive as an end in itself. 
 
The origins of operational simultaneity lay with Brusilov.  In June 1916, four 
Russian armies attacked simultaneously, but simultaneity only existed in breadth, 
not depth.  It was the Red Army, not the Tsarist Army that introduced the idea of 
a simultaneous attack in depth as well as breadth.  It was a key aspect of Soviet 
inter-war thinking and central to deep battle.  The notion of operational 
 
Figure 109: M.V. Zakharov 
(commons.wikipedia.org) 
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simultaneity found its clearest expression in the idea of the airborne desant.  The 
Polevoy Ustav of 1936 argued, “parachute desants are an effective means of 
disorganising the direction and work of the enemy’s rear.”153  The aim was for 
airborne forces to act as a catalyst of operational shock and disrupt the enemy’s 
capacity to organise a counter-attack.  In practice this consistent theme in Soviet 
inter-war thinking, proved utterly disastrous in practice and after November 1943, 
the role of airborne forces was increasingly taken up by airpower. 
 
Operational simultaneity in breadth and depth was a very ambitious concept but 
its literal expression was difficult to achieve.  In practice, during World War Two, 
operational simultaneity expressed itself in two ways.  An operation began with a 
simultaneous assault across the front, followed by the synchronisation of forces to 
achieve operational objectives.  The colossal scale of Rokossovskiy’s operational 
commands, the different speeds and capabilities of artillery, infantry, armour and 
airpower meant pure operational simultaneity was more or less impossible to 
achieve and sustain throughout an operation.  Nevertheless, Rokossovskiy’s style 
of operations suggests that the conceptual idea of a simultaneous general 
offensive was central to his thinking in deep battle.  At the start of Operation 
Kol’tso, 10th January 1943, “the whole perimeter of investment rose 
simultaneously to the attack.”154 
 
Rokossovskiy interpreted the concept of operational simultaneity and deep 
operations in a manner that ensured all forces under his command acted in a way 
that supported the achievement of the operational objective.  Rokossovskiy’s 
interpretation of operational simultaneity was guided by the need to link all 
combat activity to the needs of the wider operational plan.  It is perhaps better 
understood as operational synchronisation.  Isserson believed that “if a tactical 
effort does not develop into an operational achievement, it becomes, in essence, 
pointless.  A tactical effort is only a step toward achieving an aim; it can never be 
an end in itself.”155   Rokossovskiy’s approach was in keeping with this 
operational perspective.  A simultaneous general assault in tactical depth and 
operational breadth, across the front, was simply a means to an end, designed to 
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maximise the chances of a rapid penetration of the enemy’s tactical defences.  
This rapid penetration was to be achieved by the localised tactical annihilation of 
enemy forces. 
 
Localised Tactical Annihilation and the Conduct of Deep Battle 
Rokossovskiy considered annihilation as a means to an end, not an end in itself.  
He used selective, localised tactical annihilation.  In particular, Rokossovskiy 
understood that localised tactical annihilation of the enemy in deep battle was the 
key event in any Soviet operation.  All that went before it: broad front 
deployment, creation of an operational plan, maskirovka, massive localised 
concentrations of force, the designation of holding and striking force, was done to 
maximise the tactical annihilation of enemy forces, in order to create a 
breakthrough.  
 
Rokossovskiy’s thinking on localised tactical annhilation was absolutely 
dominated by speed.  A quick breakthrough that both annihilated and stunned the 
enemy was the ideal foundation for a deep operation designed to erupt into the 
enemy’s operational rear, denying him the time to recover.  This is why 
Rokossovskiy placed so much emphasis upon creative thought and time for 
meticulous preparation.  Rokossovskiy seems to have been acutely aware that a 
failure to achieve the rapid, localised tactical annihilation of the enemy often 
condemned an operation to grinding attrition and, at worst, a positional stalemate. 
 
Rokossovskiy’s attitude to localised tactical annihilation reveals a great deal about 
the essence of his operational style.  He was not interested in the gradual attrition 
and annihilation of the enemy as an end in itself.  It was not Rokossovskiy’s style 
to wear down the enemy or grind out a breakthrough.  On the contrary, he was 
interested in speed and the infliction of physical and psychological shock upon the 
enemy.  Rokossovskiy viewed attrition and annihilation as a means to an end and 
placed considerable emphasis upon the rapid localised tactical annihilation of the 
enemy.  Rokossovskiy was patient in the preparation of operations and considered 
meticulous planning a logical part of creating the conditions for a rapid 
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breakthrough.  Indeed, the whole pattern of patient preparation and rapid 
breakthrough followed by lightning deep operations, a pattern that dominated 
Rokossovskiy’s style, was related to his appreciation of time in the conduct of 
operations, particularly its physical and psychological implications for both 
attacker and defender.  Rokossovskiy wanted to disrupt, dislocate and shatter the 
moral and physical cohesion of the enemy.  This was dependant on a rapid 
breakthrough.  The historical evidence suggests Rokossovskiy positively disliked 
protracted breakthrough operations and acted quickly, usually after approximately 
forty-eight hours, to prevent operations stagnating into an attritional morass. 
 
In January 1943, during Operation Kol’tso, Rokossovskiy clearly wanted a quick 
breakthrough, followed by a rapid deep operation designed to split the German 
pocket in two.  However, as Kol’tso began, on 10th January 1943, progress was 
slow.  The 65th Army faced fierce resistance and made slow progress, while 21st, 
24th, 64th and 57th Armies all failed to pierce the German front.156   Indeed, “the 
fighting began to drag and our troops literally had to gnaw through the enemy 
defences.”157  On 12th January 1943, just forty-eight hours into the operation, 
Rokossovskiy revised his operational plan and “by shifting our efforts to the 21st 
Army zone, we aimed at breaking up the enemy’s defences as quickly as 
possible.”158  Rokossovskiy was not prepared to allow Operation Kol’tso to 
degenerate into a protracted slugging match.159  It was imperative to inject speed 
and momentum in order to exploit Sixth German Army’s lack of mobility and 
stamina, hence Rokossovskiy’s rejection of any operational pause on 17th January 
1943.  Operation Kol’tso reveals, at a relatively early stage of the war that 
Rokossovskiy’s was committed to rapid tactical annihilation as a platform for 
deep operations designed to shatter the moral and physical cohesion of the 
German troops. 
 
Operation Kutuzov of July 1943, on the northern face of the Kursk salient, did not 
develop in accordance with Rokossovskiy’s consistent preference for rapid 
tactical annihilation and intense dislike of grinding attrition.  A combination of 
Soviet mistakes, deep German defences and reserves, ensured that “instead of a 
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swift thrust the offensive deteriorated into protracted fighting.”160  Rokossovskiy 
repeatedly re-grouped his forces and switched direction in an attempt to create a 
breakthrough and a more fluid operational environment.  These efforts were not 
successful.  Orel was liberated on 5th August 1943, but it was the closest 
Rokossovskiy experienced to a pyrrhic victory. 
 
By 18th July 1943, after seventy-two hours of fierce fighting the Central Front had 
regained the ground it lost during the defensive phase of the Kursk Operation.161  
On 18th July 1943, Rokossovskiy ordered his forces to prepare for a new 
offensive, beginning on 19th July 1943.  The 48th Army was to play the holding 
role, while 13th Army, 70th Army and 2nd Tank Army attacked simultaneously, 
with support from 16th Air Army.  The operational objective was to cross the 
River Oka, near Kromy, south of Orel.162  However, in his midnight report on the 
Kromy Operation of 19th July, Rokossovskiy informed Stavka that 13th Army had 
met stubborn resistance and despite three attacks, had been unable to secure a 
rapid breakthrough.163   
 
The 70th Army, attacking towards Kromy, initially had more success but then 
faced stiff resistance and failed to rupture the German line.  The 13th and 70th 
Army had both confronted fierce German resistance followed by a fighting 
withdrawal to new defensive positions in the afternoon.  These prepared positions 
gave the Germans the platform to launch repeated counter-attacks supported by 
armour and airpower.164  This became a regular pattern of events over the next 
three weeks as Rokossovskiy’s Central Front struggled against German forces in 
deep, prepared defences supported by armour and airpower. 
 
On 20th July 1943, the Central Front attacked again.  It made little progress.  After 
approximately forty-eight hours and two major assaults without a breakthrough, at 
21.15 hours on 20th July 1943, Rokossovskiy ordered a halt.  Rokossovskiy 
ordered the shattered 13th Army, which had been in continuous action since 5th 
July 1943, to withdraw from the line for twenty-four hours and rebuild the battle 
spirit of the army.165  In order to avoid a grinding positional and attritional 
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advance Rokossovskiy granted his units a twenty-four hour pause in which to re-
organise and switch the focus of his attack.   
 
 
Figure 110: Operation Kutuzov 
(Glantz and House, The Battle of Kursk, 1999, p.231.) 
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On 21st July 1943, at 22.00 hours, Rokossovskiy ordered a new assault to begin at 
10.00 on 22nd July 1943.  The 70th Army and 2nd Tank Army were to form a shock 
group with the 2nd Tank’s Army’s entire armoured force ordered to attack 
simultaneously.166  Rokossovskiy’s willingness to dispense with normal 
operational procedure indicates the importance he placed on a quick breakthrough.  
It also indicates his frustration.  The 22nd July 1943 attack was more successfuland 
in the evening Rokossovskiy issued ambitious instructions for the pursuit of the 
enemy.  The Central Front’s forces were to create forwards detachments of 
infantry, tanks and sappers.  Rokossovskiy’s desire to break the attritional 
stalemate shone through in his specific orders that units were to avoid battle, by-
pass German formations and engage in parallel pursuit with liberated villages to 
be left to infantry forces.  Above all, the enemy was to be denied the opportunity 
to establish himself in new defensive positions or to reinforce those areas he 
wished to hold.167 
 
However, Rokossovskiy’s hopes of creating a fluid combat environment 
dominated by rapid manoeuvre and deep operations were frustrated.  German 
troops regained control and stemmed the Central Front’s advance.  However, 
rather than bash away, Rokossovskiy paused and re-organised to change the 
pattern of attack and create a quick breakthrough.  On 24th July 1943, 
Rokossovskiy’s directive, issued in the early hours, ordered 70th and 2nd Tank 
Army to attack, but, this time 70th Army was to fight an orthodox tactical deep 
battle.  The 2nd Tank Army was to slice through the enemy and strike deep 
towards Kromy on the River Oka and cut off the German retreat.168  The attack 
failed.   
 
As was Rokossovskiy’s habit throughout the war, he curtailed the attack after 
forty-eight hours, issuing orders at 00.30 on 26th July 1943, for a new attack by 
70th Army and 2nd Tank Army.  This time Rokossovskiy tried to create a rapid 
breakthrough by amassing overwhelming firepower.  To support the committal of 
2nd Tank Army, Rokossovskiy ordered the entire artillery resources of 55th 
Cavalry Division, 29th Infantry Corps, 4th Artillery Corps and 16th Air Army to be 
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used.169  In summary, once again, Rokossovskiy tried to create a solution rather 
than settle for grinding attrition.  On 27th July 1943, after receiving 3rd Guards 
Tank Army from the Bryansk Front, Rokossovskiy ordered the new assault.  It 
was to commence on the morning of 28th July 1943, force the Oka and by-pass the 
German defences in Kromy.  The 48th and 3rd Guards Tank Army were to break 
the enemy front with the support of 16th Air Army.170  However, yet again the 
attack failed and after approximately forty-eight hours, on 30th July 1943, 
Rokossovskiy suspended the assault.  Indeed, it was not until 6th August 1943, 
after nineteen days that Rokossovskiy’s Central Front forced the Oka and fought 
its way into Kromy.171 
 
In his attitude to localised tactical battles of annihilation, Rokossovskiy was 
clearly influenced by his appreciation of time, a central theme of his operational 
style.  Naturally, this influenced Rokossovskiy’s attitude towards localised tactical 
annihilation because a prolonged, attritional deep battle was incompatible with 
Rokossovskiy’s operational style.  It is clear that the operations of 18th July-6th 
August 1943 did not reflect Rokossovskiy’s intentions or his natural inclinations 
as an operational commander.  The relentless timetable of progress demanded by 
Stalin and Stavka in the wake of Kursk ensured the Kromy Operation, the Central 
Front’s contribution to Operation Kutuzov, was launched by tired, shattered units 
with inadequate preparations.  As a result instead of rapid localised annihilation 
followed by deep operational manoeuvre designed to split the enemy and shatter 
his operational cohesion, Rokossovskiy reluctantly found himself dragged into a 
protracted positional and attritional contest.   
 
The German positions, at least a year old, were formidable.  The defences were 
deep with at least three main defence lines, supplemented by numerous 
strongpoints and tactical positions, manned by the experienced, well led troops of 
Ninth German Army, with significant Luftwaffe support.  The Ninth German 
Army was tired after Kursk, but the strength of the German defences in the 
Kromy region, on the Oka, helped to offset these losses.  The Kromy Operation 
also demonstrated the residual tactical prowess of German troops capable of 
312 
 
holding defensive positions before engaging in organised tactical withdrawals, 
punctuated by rapid counter-attacks supported by armour and airpower.  The 
German positions in the Kromy region would have been a formidable proposition 
for a refreshed, full strength Central Front that had been given adequate time to 
prepare.  The tired Central Front struggled, as in relative terms did Rokossovskiy.    
 
In summary, Rokossovskiy had a problematic stop-start operation imposed on 
him, an operation at odds with his natural style.  There was no rapid, localised 
tactical annihilation, no clean break followed by deep operational manoeuvre.  
However, the Kromy Operation also demonstrates Rokossovskiy was not prepared 
to simply grind out attritional operational victories by dint of firepower and 
manpower.  The Central Front did advance, it did achieve its objective, it did 
suffer heavy losses, but the historical record indicates that in the face of 
formidable German positions and with exhausted troops Rokossovskiy 
relentlessly tried new ideas to break the deadlock.   
 
Similarly, in January 1945, after forty-eight hours fighting in the East Prussian 
Operation, Rokossovskiy intervened decisively in order to create a rapid 
breakthrough.172  As 2nd Shock Army and 48th Army struggled to create a rapid 
breach, Rokossovskiy took the unusual step of introducing 8th Guards Tank Corps 
into the tactical deep battle.  It ruptured the German line and 5th Guards Tank 
Army exploded into the German rear, utterly transforming the East Prussian 
Operation from one of static attrition to operational manoeuvre.   
  
Indeed, throughout the war Rokossovskiy seems to have operated an informal 
rule: if an attack had not achieved a rapid breakthrough within forty-eight hours, 
then either a deep operation force, against standard Soviet doctrinal practice, was 
employed to crack a creaking defence, or attacks were halted.  This pattern 
manifested itself in Operation Ko’ltso in January 1943, the Kromy Operation of 
July-August 1943, the Chernigov-Pripyat Operation of August 1943, the 
Belorussian Operation of June-July 1944, the East Prussian Operation of January 
1945 and the Oder-Elbe Operation of April 1945.  During all these operations the 
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point of attack was switched, forces regrouped, tactical methods changed and 
forces temporarily rested.  In summary, it is clear that Rokossovskiy preferred a 
quick, localised tactical battle of annihilation followed by a rapid transition to 
deep operations.  Rokossovskiy’s flexible and imaginative command during the 
Kromy Operation and above all his refusal to engage in deliberate, protracted 
operational scale attrition throughout the war forms a sharp contrast to the actions 
of Zhukov in November 1942 during Operation Mars, Sokolovskiy on the 
Western Front in Belorussian during 1943-44 and Malinovskiy at Budapest 
between October 1944-January 1945. 
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CHAPTER 7:  
FORMS OF OPERATION AND ROKOSSOVSKIY’S 
OPERATIONAL STYLE 
The Frontal Blow Operation 
The flawed nature of Polevoy Ustav 1936 and the Red Army’s limited 
understanding of the actual conduct, if not the theory of deep operations, made 
October 1942-August 1943 a time of intense experimentation in both deep battle 
and deep operations.  However, three forms of operational art, the frontal blow, 
the obkhod or turning movement and operational encirclement and annihilation 
dominated the conduct of operations during the Great Patriotic War. 
 
 
Figure 111: The concept of the frontal blow as conducted by a Front. 
(Soviet Military Encyclopaedia, Abridged English Version,Vol. 2, 1993, p.373.) 
 
The frontal blow was designed as a highly sophisticated form of operation that 
required careful harmonisation of attrition and manoeuvre.  A frontal blow 
operation began with an orthodox deep battle phase, marked by a broad front, 
maskirovka and a simultaneous attack in the air and on the ground over the entire 
operational breadth and tactical depth of the front.  It was intended to produce a 
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rapid breakthrough and rapier like operational manoeuvre in depth.  The frontal 
blow form of operation did not advocate operational scale attrition on a slow 
moving broad front.  However, if confronted by deep defences, adequate reserves 
and good intelligence, a frontal blow could descend into a grinding attritional 
advance, like Operation Kutuzov,1 the antithesis of Rokossovskiy’s modus 
operandii.   
  
The historical evidence suggests that Rokossovskiy’s preferred style of operations 
was the frontal blow2 and that his approach was distinctly reminiscent of Brusilov.  
In conducting a frontal blow Rokossovskiy’s aim was to penetrate the enemy’s 
tactical defences and launch a deep operation, designed to splinter and break up 
the enemy forces into isolated tactical pieces, before going on to shatter his 
operational cohesion by targeting the enemy system deep in the rear.3  The aim 
was to physically and psychologically unhinge the enemy so that, as in Brusilov’s 
victory of 1916, the enemy “melted away into miserable fragments.”4  
 
Rokossovskiy was trying to present enemy tactical and operational commanders 
with a painful moral and physical dilemma.  If a German tactical unit, usually a 
division or corps, confronted by a Soviet holding force won its individual tactical 
encounter, but neighbouring German units were annihilated by Rokossovskiy’s 
shock forces, then in operational terms it did the Germans little good.  In such 
circumstances, a German tactical commander faced a serious problem: the line 
was smashed with German units splintered, battered and divided from each other.  
A deep operation conducted by several mobile groups is underway with Soviet 
forces in front of you, flanking you and behind you.  Communications with higher 
headquarters are fitful or impossible.  There is no guarantee that German 
operational commanders have the situation in hand, or that reserves are on the 
way.  Nor is there adequate information about the fate, position and actions of 
neighbouring units or the exact position of the frontline.   
 
In such circumstances a senior German commander needed his tactical units to 
hold the line in order to create time for organised counter-attacks.  In contrast, 
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especially from autumn 1943, when their positions lacked physical depth and 
manpower, German tactical units confronted with fighting on, risking 
annihilation, or abandoning the mission and withdrawing to survive and fight 
another day, regularly opted to withdraw.  This increased Soviet operational 
momentum and accelerated the physical and psychological collapse of the enemy 
thereby shattering his physical cohesion.   
 
By 1944, confronted with suicide or survival, German tactical commanders often 
engaged in fighting withdrawals.  Indeed, senior German commanders often 
conspired with tactical commanders in defiance of Hitler’s standing orders to 
stand and fight.  At the very least German formations were forced to abandon 
their mission.  By Soviet standards this was operational shock.5  It was precisely 
Rokossovskiy’s aim to confront German tactical commanders with these 
dilemmas and to drive a wedge between the interests of operational and tactical 
commanders, between the physical survival of a force and the achievement of its 
mission.  It was a dilemma Rokossovskiy managed to impose on the Germans 
with great regularity in the period September 1943-May 1945. 
 
There were several forms of the frontal blow, many of which were outlined by 
Timoshenko on 31st December 1940.  The first form of frontal blow outlined by 
Timoshenko, in December 1940, involved a single main effort, within a broad 
front.6  The main blow was to be delivered on a narrow sector to ensure 
penetration, before widening the breach by expanding to the flanks to guard 
against counter-attacks.  Massive concentrations of force were designed to 
guarantee breakthrough and Timoshenko cited the “March penetration in 1918 by 
three German armies on a front of up to 70 kilometres.”7 Therefore, in this form 
of the frontal blow, Soviet doctrine advocated a single breakthrough but on an 
operational, rather than tactical scale. 
 
However, the Red Army was aware that a massive, single blow was extremely 
vulnerable to a counter-concentration.  This imposed a tremendous burden of 
deception and secrecy in preparation for an attack.  Yet, naturally, it was difficult 
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to conceal such a massive concentration8 and then sustain an offensive into 
operational depths, while simultaneously expanding an offensive to the flanks.  
Finally, a single thrust was extremely vulnerable to major counter-attacks against 
the shoulders of the penetration.  A mobile group with severed lines of supply was 
a liability in need of rescue, not an instrument of deep operations.9  Timoshenko 
was conscious of the fact that “countermaneuver by defensive reserves is most 
simple” and “an attack in a narrow sector, although conducted against the entire 
depth of the operational defense, involves a very insignificant portion of enemy 
forces.”10 
 
An alternative form of the frontal blow was the dividing strike or cleaving blow.  
“The pattern of the drobiaschii udar (dividing strike) concerned the severance of a 
certain operational entity from a broader strategic complex.”11 During the war 
these operations aimed, for example, to cut the links between German army 
groups.  In Belorussia, during autumn 1943, Rokossovskiy was involved in 
several operations that threatened to divide German Army Group Centre and 
South, to the extent that on 22nd October 1943, Field Marshal von Kluge, the 
commander of Army Group Centre warned Hitler that he might have to pull back 
the entire front in order to contain Rokossovskiy’s Loyev Operation.12  In a 
similar way, on 17th January 1945, during the East Prussian Operation, 
Rokossovskiy unleashed 5th Guards Tank Army with orders to reach the Baltic 
coast and cut off German forces in eastern Prussia, thus dividing them from the 
German homeland.  However, many of the concepts associated with the dividing 
strike were simply part of a style of operation that Rokossovskiy preferred and 
incorporated such ideas into offensives against German operational formations. 
 
Rokossovskiy’s true metier, his natural operational style was the form of frontal 
blow known as the fragmenting strike of rasskayuscchiy udar. 
“The pattern of rassekaiuscchi udar entailed the sundering of the 
operational system which had already been divided from the parent 
strategic complex, into compact tactical segments, isolating these tactical 
segments by encirclement, and bringing about their ensuing destruction.”13 
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In Rokossovskiy’s style of operations, the enemy force was to be splintered by 
two or more deep strikes to operational depth, its operational cohesion shattered 
and the isolated tactical groups destroyed in small encirclements.  In December 
1940, Timoshenko argued that this form of frontal blow involved “several 
mutually coordinated attacks and the formation of separate army penetrations on 
several operational axes.”14  Timoshenko cited Brusilov’s Offensive of 1916 as 
the prototype of this form of attack.  Brusilov’s success in June 1916 was marked 
by two main strikes at the northern and southern end of the front, by Kaledin’s 8th 
Army and Lechitskii’s 9th Army.  The 11th Army under Sakharov and 
Shcherbachev’s 7th Army, “the front’s weak central armies were assigned purely 
secondary objectives.”15 
 
This was clearly Rokossovskiy’s preferred operation, one he aspired to and tried 
to achieve in 1942-43 but did not have the resources for as shown in Belorussia in 
autumn 1943.  However, in 1944-45, during Operation Bagration, the Lublin-
Operation, the East Prussian Operation and the Eastern Pomeranian Operation, 
Rokossovskiy repeatedly used this form of the frontal blow.  It confirms the 
connection between Rokossovskiy and Brusilov.  Rokossovskiy’s style of 
operations had far more in common with Brusilov than the huge operational 
encirclements advocated by Tukhachevskiy and practised by Zhukov.  The broad 
front, maskirovka, localised tactical concentrations, and simultaneous general 
attack were common to Brusilov and Rokossovskiy, but also many other Soviet 
commanders.  However, in his commitment to creative foresight, meticulous 
preparation and mutually co-ordinated forces within a frontal blow, designed to 
fragment the enemy through deep strikes, Rokossovskiy was in many ways 
Brusilov’s successor and the heir to a long Russian military tradition of deep 
strikes.16  This was particular noticeable in Rokossovskiy’s emulation, deliberate 
or otheerwise, of Brusilov’s notion of two main strikes within a broad front, aided 
by maskirovka.  Indeed, during the Great Patriotic War, Rokossovskiy repeatedly 
challenged the Red Army’s doctrinal position of a single powerful blow, in favour 
of two main blows. 
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In autumn 1943 Rokossovskiy’s aggressive use of active deception in Belorussia 
ensured that subsidiary strikes had the impact of a second main strike, as seen in 
the Loyev Operation of October 1943, and in the Gomel-Rechitsa Operation in 
November 1943.  This process culminated in Rokossovskiy’s clash with Stalin, 
Stavka and the General Staff over his desire to explicitly utilise two main blows in 
the initial stages of the Belorussian Operation, a concept that played a critical role 
in the subsequent success of 1st Belorussian Front’s operation.  As early as March 
1944, Rokossovskiy knew Stavka was planning a major operation17 in Belorussia. 
On 22nd May 1944, Rokossovskiy presented his operational concept to Stavka.18   
 
The region’s problematic terrain and his experiences in Belorussia since autumn 
1943 persuaded Rokossovskiy that 1st Belorussian Front must conduct an 
operation involving two main blows within a broad front, one from Rogachev, in 
the north, and Parichi in the south.  This was not standard Soviet doctrine.  In the 
face of Stalin’s preference for one main blow, Rokossovskiy thrice defied him by 
insisting that the 1st Belorussian Front’s operation must contain two main blows if 
it was to succeed.  In the face of Rokossovskiy’s insistence, remarkably, Stalin 
consented.19  Furthermore, in the East Prussian Operation of January 1945, the 
second attack was altogether more substantial than a simple holding blow.  
Therefore, a distinct pattern emerged in Rokossovskiy’s operations during the 
war, one that made him both an innovator in terms of the wartime Red Army and 
an imitator of Brusilov.  In fact, the underlying nature of Rokossovskiy’s 
operational style had emerged as early as December 1942. 
 
In late November 1942, Rokossovskiy began to plan Operation Kol’tso, his first 
major offensive operation of the war.  It reveals a great deal about his natural 
inclinations as an operational commander.  In Rokossovskiy’s original plan “the 
basic idea of the operation was to split the surrounded group by striking at the 
centre from two sides and then to mop up the resulting pockets” and “this 
conception dominated the operation from the beginning to the end.”20  It was to be 
a rapid breakthrough followed by “an uninterrupted, deep and shattering blow 
along the main axis of advance.”21  The aim was to scatter German resistance and 
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thus destroy Sixth German Army’s physical and psychological cohesion.  In 
otherwords, Sixth German Army’s operational system and its ability to fight was 
to be broken up in order to induce a catastrophic implosion in German fighting 
spirit.  It was to be split and fragmented into isolated tactical pieces then 
overwhelmed by a Soviet deep operation that fused attrition and manoeuvre at 
high tempo.22  This was Rokossovskiy’s natural operational style, a model of 
operations that would be the conceptual backbone of virtually all the operations he 
planned and conducted on the Eastern Front. 
 
Rokossovskiy was never able to implement this plan due to the diversion of 2nd 
Guards Army, Rokossovskiy’s main strike force 23 in response Operation 
Wintersturm, launched on 12th December 1942.24 The 2nd Guards Army was not 
returned although Rokossovskiy did receive complete command of all Soviet 
forces charged with the destruction of Sixth German Army.25  Nevertheless,  
“with the transfer of the 2nd Guards Army to the Stalingrad Front we had 
to make some substantial adjustments in the plan of the operation.  The 
objective was still to slice the enemy group in half.  Only now it was to be 
achieved, not by two, but by one main thrust from west to east.”26 
Rokossovskiy’s operational concept remained the same but without the forces he 
wanted to execute it.  In order to compensate for his reluctance to use a single 
strike, Rokossovskiy assigned three armies to his main blow, with 65th Army in 
the centre, 24th Army to the north and 21st Army to the south.27  The remaining 
Soviet armies, 57th, 64th, 66th and 62nd Army were to hold German forces initially, 
followed by a transition to the offensive28 but had a less aggressive role in 
fragmenting a Sixth German Army that was to be split in two by the main strike.29  
In summary, Rokossovskiy sought to retain the original operational concept that 
underlay Kol’tso. However, he did not get an operation in keeping with what he 
wanted, or his natural style of operations in the Great Patriotic War. 
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Figure 112: The diversion of 2nd Guards Army: December 1942. 
(Times Atlas of the Second World War, P.  Young (ed.), 1973, p.199.) 
 
The breakthrough was sluggish, the holding armies lacked dynamism and the deep 
operation did not scatter Sixth German Army.  To generate momentum, on 12th 
January 1945, Rokossovskiy was forced to switch the main effort from 65th Army 
to 21st Army, drive his commanders on, overrule requests for pauses and engage 
in constant re-grouping to keep the Germans off-balance.  There is a retrospective 
assumption that Operation Kol’tso was a straightforward mopping up operation.  
In fact, Kol’tso was beset by significant structural weaknesses that undermined 
Rokossovskiy’s ability to fulfil his operational concept.  First, the competing 
demands of Operation Small Saturn in December 1942, robbed Rokossovskiy’s 
Don Front of sufficient armoured formations capable of conducting deep 
operational manoeuvre.  The Don Front had only three armoured corps in 
Operations Kol’tso.30  
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Second, the Don Front’s massive underestimation of German numbers meant 
Rokossovskiy planned Kol’tso on an entirely flawed estimate of Sixth German 
Army’s strength.  The Don Front’s intelligence estimated German strength at 
85,000.31  In fact, although frozen, shattered and malnourished, German strength 
in the pocket was closer to 270,000.  Therefore, on 10th January 1943, at 220,000 
when the Don Front believed it comfortably outnumbered Sixth German Army, 
Rokossovskiy actually had no true idea of the numbers he was facing.  The 1943 
Soviet General Staff Study was highly critical of this aspect of the Don Front’s 
conduct of Operation Kol’tso. 
“A great weakness in the planning of the operation was the miscalculation 
by the staff of the Front in estimating the strength of the encircled 
enemy……..in reality the enemy was much stronger and more numerous 
than the reconnaissance organizations estimated by the Front.  This 
explains the drawing-out of the operations, which, instead of lasting 7 days 
as planned, lasted 23 days.”32 
 
 
Figure 113: Operation Kol’tso (Ring):10th January-2nd February 1943. 
(Bellamy, Absolute War, 2007, p.548.) 
 
Rokossovskiy’s operational concept was praised,33 but this was stinging criticism.  
As a result of this enormous miscalculation, Rokossovskiy’s ordinary field armies, 
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already short of infantry, were forced to imitate Triandafillov’s flawed shock 
army.  In essence, the same formations were asked to conduct both deep battle and 
deep operations against the resistance of German soldiers who fought with 
astonishing tenacity and courage.  It is hardly surprising the Don Front struggled, 
at least initially, to overwhelm Sixth German Army.  It was only Rokossovskiy’s 
determined and agile command, in conjunction with German exhaustion that 
eventually enabled the Don Front to split Sixth German Army and achieve 
operational victory. 
 
Operation Kol’tso was a difficult operation and, given the flawed Don Front 
intelligence, Rokossovskiy was fortunate that Kol’tso was launched in mid 
January 1943, not early December 1942.  It is unlikely that 2nd Guards Army 
could have fully compensated for such a dramatic intelligence error against a 
more physically and spiritually robust enemy.  By 10th January 1943, 
encirclement, cold, malnourishment and the reality of abandonment after 
Christmas 1942 had sapped the moral and physical stamina of German troops.  
Operation Kol’tso was successful and celebrated as a great turning point in the 
war, but against Rokossovskiy’s wishes it was a grinding operation that wore 
down, rather than shattered the physical and psychological cohesion of Sixth 
German Army.  Nevertheless, Operation Kol’tso is most instructive in revealing 
Rokossovskiy’s natural operational style, namely his inclination to use the frontal 
blow in order to ensure a rapid breakthrough followed by deep strikes designed to 
splinter, fragment and shattering the enemy’s operational cohesion. 
 
Two years later, approximately 2,000 kilometres north-west of Stalingrad, on 17th 
January 1945, in the wake of an intense deep battle, Rokossovskiy unleashed 5th 
Guards Tank Army into East Prussia.  It crashed into the German operational rear, 
reached the Baltic and cut off German troops from the rest of Germany.34  This 
was a powerful dividing strike, a deep operation designed to strike deep into the 
enemy’s operational rear and shatter his operational cohesion by fragmenting 
German forces.  However, in overall terms the East Prussian Operation was a 
frontal blow.  It was influenced by purely physical and systemic considerations, 
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but there was also an overt psychological dimension.  It was clearly 
Rokossovskiy’s intention to reach the Baltic and isolate East Prussian forces and 
people from the Reich.  The 5th Guards Tank Army executed the main deep strike 
but Rokossovskiy also synchronised five other deep operations designed to 
splinter and fragment German forces already ripped apart by 5th Guards Tank 
Army.   
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Figure 114: 2nd Belorussian Front, East Prussia: 14th -26th January 1945. 
(Stephen Walsh) 
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In an arc, running from due north-west to directly north, Rokossovskiy had 1st 
Guards Tank Corps conducting a deep operation for 65th Army,35 8th Guards Tank 
Corps for 2nd Shock Army,36 8th Mechanised Corps for 48th Army and 3rd Guards 
Cavalry Corps for 3rd Army, all supporting the most powerful blow of all in the 
centre, 5th Guards Tank Army.37  In summary, the East Prussian Operation was a 
frontal blow that sought the strategic division of East Prussia from Germany, the 
operational splintering of German military forces in western and eastern Prussia 
and the tactical fragmentation of individual German formations.  In concept and 
execution the East Prussian Operation bore all the hallmarks of Rokossovskiy’s 
operational style and was devastatingly successful. 
 
At first sight the East Pomeranian Operation, ordered by Stavka on 5th March 
1945,38 appears to be an anomaly in Rokossovskiy’s operational command.  Its 
initial stages were dominated by a single, powerful, northerly blow by 19th Army 
towards Kesslin on the Baltic coast.  The 19th Army was part of a broad front, 
deployed on the extreme western edge of 2nd Belorussian Front.  This supports the 
idea that Rokossovskiy planned one powerful, dividing strike to protect his left 
flank and rear, before launching a deep operation by several formations designed 
to strike deep and secure the operational splintering and tactical fragmentation of 
German forces.  It should also be borne in mind that immediately to the west 
Zhukov’s 1st Belorussian Front was simultaneously conducting what amounted to 
a joint operation in western Pomerania.  Therefore, Zhukov’s breakthrough 
operation effectively acted as a second strike for Rokossovskiy. 
 
In a report to the General Staff, on 15th February 1945, Rokossovskiy outlined his 
operational plan for the East Pomeranian Operation.  The plan was approved on 
17th February 1945.39  The 19th Army’s main blow was actively supported by all 
2nd Belorussian Front’s formations, from west to east, 70th Army, 49th Army, 65th 
Army and 2nd Shock Army.  It was followed by deep operations, in which each of 
2nd Belorussian Front’s field armies launched mobile groups synchronised by 
Rokossovskiy.  On 2nd Belorussian Front’s left flank, the main deep operational 
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strike was led by 1st Guards Tank Army40 and 3rd Guards Tank Corps, both 
moving east along the Baltic coast to Gdynia-Danzig, the systemic hub of German 
resistance in Pomerania.  On their right flank, 8th Mechanised Corps acted as the 
deep operation force of 70th and 49th Armies.  Rokossovskiy’s aim, as usual, was 
to shatter the operational cohesion of German forces in eastern Pomerania and 
induce the tactical fragmentation of individual German units, before splintering 
and subdividing the German garrisons at Gdynia and Danzig.  Finally, 1st Guards 
Tank Corps, acting for 65th Army and 8th Guards Tank Corps for 2nd Shock Army, 
moved to isolate Danzig.41   
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Figure 115: The East Pomeranian Operation: 10th-30th March 1945 
(Stephen Walsh) 
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The main strike, in conjunction with Zhukov’s 1st Belorussian Front divided 
German Army Group Vistula in two, and 2nd Belorussian Front’s deep operations 
splintered the German forces in eastern Pomerania.42 On 25th March 1945, 2nd 
Belorussian Front reached the Gulf of Danzig.  This fragmented the German force 
into three parts, with groups trapped in Gdynia and Danzig and a third group 
marooned on the Putziger-Nehrung spit, in the Baltic Sea.  On 26th March 1945, 
amidst ghastly scenes of destruction, Gdynia fell, followed by the storming of 
Danzig, by 2nd Shock and 65th Army on 30th March 1945.43  In addition, 19th 
Army ruthlessly hunted down German troops on the Baltic spit.44  The German 
garrison at Danzig was crushed after it had rejected Rokossovskiy’s surrender 
ultimatum.45  In keeping with Rokossovskiy’s operational style , during the last 
act, 2nd Belorussian Front’s forces struck simultaneously from three sides in an 
attack that split the pocket into tactical fragments before finishing off the isolated 
pockets. 
 
Operational Encirclement and Annihilation 
In December 1940, Timoshenko concluded his discussion of ‘Brusilov’s method’ 
by arguing that it provided an excellent platform from which to encircle the 
enemy.46  Yet, Rokossovskiy did not use the frontal blow in this manner.  Indeed, 
Rokossovskiy argued that, 
“in our time of mass armies with continuous frontlines it is not so easy to 
envelop an enemy.  The forces of one army may prove insufficient to 
breach the enemy positions and it may take a large scale operation 
involving several army groups.”47 
Rokossovskiy’s style of operations emphasised depth and speed more than 
encirclement and annihilation of large numbers of enemy troops.  Nor, in June 
1916, did Brusilov pursue the encirclement of Austrian forces at the expense of 
greater depth of penetration.  Yet, after World War Two it was claimed that,  
“beginning with the operation at Stalingrad and in the course of the entire 
subsequent development of the Great Patriotic War, maneuver for the 
purpose of encirclement on operational and tactical scales acquired 
predominant significance in Red Army operations.”48   
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It was asserted that “the highest achievement of Soviet operational art was the 
conduct of operations to encircle large enemy groupings” and that “starting with 
the second period of the war, these operations became the usual form of front and 
armies operations.”49  In fact, an analysis of Rokossovskiy’s style of operations 
makes it far from clear that “operations to encircle the main enemy groupings 
became the primary form of the Soviet Army’s offensive actions”50 in World War 
Two.  Indeed, Rokossovskiy’s style of operations was notable for its absence of 
operational encirclements. 
 
It has been suggested that the Red Army did not possess enough officers of 
sufficient quality to execute the double envelopment.51  Indeed,  
“more often they were content with a single thrust or multiple thrusts, the 
objective being not so much to achieve a deep penetration along the line of 
advance as to force the opponent back on one front.”52   
It is not suggested that Rokossovskiy was incapable of such operations indeed in 
January 1945 German intelligence marked him out as “a highly qualified 
leader.”53 Rokossovskiy did not execute operational encirclements because he had 
a different style of operations and was not trying to imitate German methods.   
 
The German approach to the conduct of operations in the field during World War 
Two drew on long established historical and military traditions.  In strategic 
terms, the Prussian state of the late seventeeth and early eighteenth centuries 
simply did not possess the social, economic, financial and military resources to 
fight long wars.  Therefore it established a military tradition based about the 
strategic imperative that its wars must be short.54  By the reign of Frederick the 
Great (1740-1786) this military culture had become firmly established, a tradition 
that was passed to the Prussian Army of the nineteenth century and absorbed into 
the wider German military culture following the unification of Germany in 1871.  
The German Army’s culture of military thought was well established and 
contained several key themes.  First that the war must be short, aggressive and 
victorious.  This was to be achieved by an absolute commitment to an aggressive 
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bewegungskrieg or a war of mobility designed to destroy the enemy.55  This 
commitment to the destruction of the enemy armed forces was central to German 
military culture.  In the wake of the Prussian/German victories of 1866 and 1870 
the German Army became increasingly obsessed with destroying the enemy by 
means of physical encirclement and annihilation, the kesselschlacht.  These 
military traditions survived the First World War and dominated the German 
approach to operations in the Second World War.   
 
The German Army drew several lessons from World War One.56  However, 
equipped with armour, airpower, radios and dynamic leadership, the Wehrmacht 
retained its faith in the tactical idea of the kesselschlacht or cauldron battle of 
annihilation.  German fighting methods in World War Two have become known 
as ‘blitzkrieg’ and are widely, if erroneously, perceived as having constituted a 
revolution in warfare.  However, German officers did not use the word ‘blitzkreig’ 
because they were using tactical methods German forces had been using since the 
nineteenth century.  The means, armour, airpower, radio, motorisation were 
different but served traditional aims, namely the encirclement and physical 
annihilation of the enemy army.  German methods did not focus on the enemy 
system, or the brain of the army.  In fact, quite the opposite, the Germans believed 
that systemic paralysis or collapse was a symptom of victory, not its catalyst.  
Victory was achieved by manoeuvre that created a physical encirclement followed 
by the physical annihilation of the enemy force in the field.  Indeed, “the goal 
remained the destruction of the enemy army in a great Kesselschlacht; the means 
remained Bewegungskrieg.”57 If the operational scale of these encirclements in 
1941 was unprecendented, the underlying principles were not. 
 
The Polevoy Ustav of 1936 believed that “in the attack, the enemy must be 
encircled and annihilated.  The enemy must be pinned down in the entire depth of 
his position, encircled and destroyed.”58  However, the 1936 Polevoy Ustav dealt 
with tactical, not operational matters.  Equally, while Triandafillov endorsed 
tactical encirclement59 it is far from certain that he endorsed operational 
encirclement.  In ‘Tactics and Operational Art of the Workers and Peasants’ Red 
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Army at a New Stage’ issued under Yegorov’s name in 1932, the Red Army was 
committed to attacks “from the front and rear until full tactical encirclement is 
achieved”60 but was vague about operational scale encirclement even when 
discussing army level, not front operations.  In a similar way, Isserson and 
particularly Varfolomeyev advocated tactical encirclement of the enemy forces at 
the front but did not endorse operational encirclement, preferring to emphasise 
depth.61   
 
Therefore, just because Soviet tactical regulations endorsed encirclement and 
annihilation, it does not mean that the Red Army emphasised operational 
encirclement, at the expense of operational depth.  Indeed, “the Russians insisted 
that the encirclement should never exceed tactical-operational dimensions.”62 
Article 181 of the 1936 Polevoy Ustav, 
“stressed clearly that should an opportunity to encircle an enemy tactical 
grouping arise in the course of an operation, it should be left to a limited or 
secondary force to exploit it, while the main strike force (ERP or the DD 
tank grouping) should pursue the course of the main strike into the 
operational depth.”63 
 
However, there was a Germanic school of thought in Soviet military thinking that 
advocated operational scale of encirclement and annihilation.  It followed in the 
footsteps of the Tsarist officer A.A. Neznamov, a contemporary of Svechin and an 
influential military thinker during the inter-war years.  Neznamov agreed with 
Svechin’s analysis concerning the emergence of the operational level and 
operational art.  Nevertheless, “Neznamov’s real preference was for the 
envelopment maneuver”64 and he continued to regard the decisive engagement of 
annihilation as “the ideal of military art.”65  It was widely acknowledged that such 
ideas were Germanic in origin, indeed,  
“a characteristic feature of German operational doctrine in the period 
preceding the First World War was the attempt at a decisive annihilating 
engagement, the basis of which was enveloping manoeuvre on the flanks 
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to encircle the enemy.  The German General Staff and command cadre of 
the German Army were nourished on these ideas.”66 
 
As a devotee of the Germanic school, Neznamov advocated the operational 
encirclement and annihilation of the enemy army.  Equally, as Neznamov 
envisaged operations being carried out by two, three or even four armies, each in 
the region of 200,000 strong, there is little doubt that he was discussing the idea of 
operational annihilation by means of encirclement.67  In contrast, Svechin was 
distinctly sceptical of the idea of annihilation, pointing out that it required 
“extraordinary victory.”68 Svechin believed that “the significance which is given 
to the general operation for destroying an enemy in the strategy of annihilation 
seriously narrows the perspective of strategic thinking.”69  Svechin rejected the 
idea of operational annihilation and was instrumental in developing a distinctly 
Russian-Soviet, rather than Germanic approach to the conduct of operations.  This 
incorporated the idea of successive operations, deep operations and a distinction 
between the principles of tactics and operational art.   
 
Therefore, the idea of achieving operational victory through deep operational 
manoeuvre against the enemy’s system and shattering his operational cohesion 
was not the only proposal for achieving operational success in the Red Army.  
Several notable Soviet thinkers such as Neznamov and Tukhachevskiy advocated 
the physical annihilation of the enemy force on an operational scale, as well as 
tactical scale.  This important difference in Soviet theory and practice at the 
operational level played itself out between Tukhachevskiy and Svechin in debate, 
but also more significantly, on the Eastern Front, in the sharp contrast in 
operational styles between Zhukov and Rokossovskiy. 
 
Tukhachevskiy was a firm advocate of annihilation. He believed in keeping with 
the Germanic style, that the operational destruction of the enemy’s armed forces 
was a pre-requisite of victory in war.  Indeed, “the more fully such destruction is, 
the greater the degree of guarantee for the achievement of war aims.”70  In 
Problems of High Command he argued, 
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“operations are conducted to annihilate the enemy’s vital armed forces; 
this is necessary to achieve war aims……..an attempt to annihilate enemy 
personnel forces the chief conducting the operation to barely consider or 
completely disregard the acquisition or maintenance of territory.”71 
Svechin believed an excessive pre-occupation with annihilation was like a 
tyrannical compass needle.  As a result, “the notion of annihilation compels us to 
recognize all secondary interests and trends, all geographic objectives as 
insignificant.  Pauses in the development of military operations contradict the 
notion of annihilation.”72 
 
In 1923, Tukhachevskiy acknowledged it was 
impossible to annihilate a modern army in a single 
blow, but argued in favour of the progressive 
annihilation of the enemy through a series of 
successive operations.73  At first sight, 
Tukhachevskiy appeared to be admitting the 
principle of cumulative attrition, in line with 
Svechin, but in reality the concept of attrition was 
merely incidental to Tukhachevskiy’s comments.  
Tukhachevskiy’s idea of successive operations was really an argument for rolling 
annihilation.  He argued only “a series of successively conducted offensive 
operations joined by continuous pursuit can replace the destructive engagement 
which was the best type of encounter in former armies.”74   
 
Tukhachevskiy was trying to establish a credible concept of operational 
annihilation to replace the discredited notion of a single battle or single operation 
of annihilation, favoured by Neznamov.  In essence, “Tukhachevsky considered 
that to fully defeat the enemy it was necessary that one offensive operation 
develop into another without any loss of time whatsoever.”75  This was an 
operational idea, but it was unrealistic.  Tukhachevskiy seemed prepared to repeat 
his gamble of 1920, that speed and shock would offset logistical frailty.  In 
 
Figure 116: M. Tukhachevskiy 
(tonnel.ru) 
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summary, “he would have considered all successive operations as part of one 
large operation.”76 
 
Pavlenko suggests that in this respect Tukhachevskiy was in agreement with 
Svechin who argued that, 
“an annihilating offensive under complex conditions is a series of 
successive operations which, however, have such close internal ties that 
they fuse into one gigantic operation.  The initial position for the following 
operations emerges directly from the aim achieved in the operation which 
has just been ended.”77 
However, it is the opinion of this thesis that Tukhachevskiy and Svechin meant 
different things by successive operations.  Svechin talked of efforts being “dosed 
out”78 rather than the relentless all out offensive advocated by Tukhachevskiy.  
Equally, while Svechin talked of connecting a series of operations, Tukhachevskiy 
was talking of continuous attack in pursuit of operational annihilation.79  This was 
not the same as Svechin’s vision of successive operations connected in terms of 
their aim, but punctuated by operational pauses.  In summary, one might argue 
that Tukhachevskiy saw operational annihilation as one act with several scenes 
whereas Svechin saw successive operations as a number of acts linked by an 
overall theme. 
 
This theoretical argument played itself out in Rokossovskiy and Zhukov’s conduct 
of operations on the Eastern Front.  Rokossovskiy was not obsessed with 
operational annihilation, more with denying the enemy’s ability to fight 
effectively, and to persuade him through a rapid combination of attrition and deep 
manoeuvre, that he could not fulfil his mission without risking annihilation.  As 
Belorussia in 1943-44 demonstrated, Rokossovskiy used manoeuvre to lever out 
German formations, thus sustaining deep manoeuvre and operational momentum 
without a direct engagement of annihilation where everything halted to ensure the 
destruction of the pocket.  Rokossovskiy’s frontal blow was designed to shatter 
cohesion, induce psychological and physical collapse, leading to a withdrawal and 
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inflicting severe casualties during the pursuit, without compromising deep 
operational manoeuvre. 
 
This disinclination to engage in operational kesselschlachts was in keeping with 
Rokossovskiy’s emphasis on disrupting the enemy’s operational cohesion by deep 
operational manoeuvre.  This style of operations was heavily dependant upon a 
high tempo and substantial operational momentum.  The massive German 
encirclements of 1941-42 demonstrated that if an encircled force was prepared to 
fight, a considerable attritional engagement was likely to develop, such as 
Smolensk, in July-August 1941.80  In short, the rapid and secure annihilation of 
such massive pockets was incompatible with forward momentum and deep 
operational manoeuvre.  If, as in the case of the Wehrmacht, the acquisition of 
operational depth was less important than the physical encirclement of the enemy, 
this was problematic, but not vital.  Yet, in Rokossovskiy’s operational style, 
depth not annihilation was the main theme.  Smaller tactical encirclements, 
carried out by deep battle forces had to be made compatible with simultaneous 
deep operational manoeuvre, designed to split the enemy force and shatter his 
operational cohesion.   
 
Rokossovskiy’s ability to reconcile tactical encirclement with deep operation was 
a central theme of the Belorussian Operation (23rd June-29th August 1944).  The 
original Stavka directive of 31st May 1944, ordered 1st Belorussian to destroy the 
German group at Bobruisk before conducting further deep operations.81  
Therefore, the 1st Belorussian Front’s conduct of Operation Bagration contained a 
significant encirclement and annihilation of German troops.  By 27th June 1944, 
just seventy-two hours into the operation, 1st Belorussian Front encircled 
Bobruisk82 and trapped 40,000 troops.  By 30th June 1944, the pocket had been 
annihilated, smashed into wandering fragments, physically and psychologically 
battered into defeat.83  Bobruisk sat on the River Berezina and was a key road and 
rail junction, as well as Ninth German Army’s command centre.  The marshy and 
heavily forested terrain in Belorussia, together with numerous rivers meant that 
Bobruisk possessed an operational military importance out of all proportion to its 
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physical size.  It was the systemic hub of Ninth German Army and the key to its 
operational cohesion.  An effective defence of south-east Belorussia could not be 
sustained without it but nor could a deep operation. 
 
 
Figure 117: Bobruisk, 24-29 June, 1944 
(Adapted from Bellamy, Absolute War, 2007, p.609.) 
 
Bobruisk’s capture by encirclement and annihilation does not mean that 
Rokossovskiy had changed his style from frontal blow to operational encirclement 
and annihilation.  The ultimate purpose of the Bobruisk Operation was not the 
annihilation of German soldiers.  It was the facilitation of 1st Belorussian Front’s 
deep operations.  Equally, Rokossovskiy’s insistence on two blows, at Parichi and 
Rogachev, was not designed solely to create an encirclement, but to deal with the 
problematic nature of the ground east of Rogachev.   
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Figure 118: The Belorussian Operation and advance to the Vistula:June-July 1945 
(Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 1995, p.200.) 
 
On 27th June 1944, 9th Tank Corps coming from the north-east of Bobruisk met 
65th Army coming from the south and west.  The encirclement was completed by 
48th Army to the east and south-east of the town.  The orders issued by 
Rokossovskiy at this stage of the Belorussian Operation confirm that he 
considered Bobruisk a tactical encirclement designed to facilitate 1st Belorussian 
Front’s deep operations, not distract or divert them.  The pocket was to be 
annihilated, but the front’s main priorities were the deep operation on Minsk and 
CMG Pliev’s deep operation on the systemic rear of Army Group Centre.  First, 
“Army General Rokossovskiy, the front commander, assigned Lieutenant-
General Romanenko’s 48th Army the mission of destroying the encircled 
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enemy grouping and chose 65th Army’s 105th Rifle Corps to assist.  
Meanwhile, the front’s main forces were to continue the offensive to the 
west and northwest to capture Minsk and Slutsk within the next few 
days.”84 
Second, Rokossovskiy emphasised that “the Front’s main forces were to advance 
as far as possible, on Osipovichi, Pukhovichi and Slutsk and we also had to mop 
up the surrounded enemy forces.”85  Therefore, Rokossovskiy’s priority was not 
the tactical annihilation of the Bobruisk pocket.  In fact, Rokossovskiy had set 48th 
Army a very stiff task.  There were at least fifteen breakout attempts by German 
troops.86  However, Rokossovskiy refused to divert troops from 1st Belorussian 
Front’s deep operation.  He smashed the pocket by using 16th Air Army.87 
 
Several wandering pockets of German soldiers did escape from Bobruisk.  
Rokossovskiy ignored them and concentrated on deep operational manoeuvre.88  
This was a style of operation more in tune with the frontal blow than operational 
encirclement and annihilation.  The Ninth German Army had been scattered.  Its 
retreating forces posed no operational threat and were intent upon survival.  In 
fact they contributed to the general collapse of Ninth German’s position and 
increased the momentum of 1st Belorussian’s deep operation. 
 
Therefore, despite appearances, 1st Belorussian Front’s initial contribution to 
Operation Bagration was not an operational encirclement, nor was it a massive 
anomaly in Rokossovskiy’s operational style.  It was a frontal blow operation that 
incorporated a tactical encirclement that was less important to Rokossovskiy than 
deep operational manoeuvre against key systemic points.  In the words of the 
Soviet General Staff, 
“having completed the encirclement of the large grouping of German-
fascist forces in the Bobruisk region, the front commander left a third of 
his forces (48th and the 65th Army’s 105th Corps) to destroy it, and he 
dispatched the other two-thirds to pursue the enemy to Minsk and 
Baranovichi.  The 1st Guards Tank Corps had already reached Minsk on 
3rd July, and the cavalry-mechanized group engaged in battles on the 
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approaches to Baranovichi on 4th July.  This aggressiveness in pursuit not 
only prevented the enemy from aiding his encircled forces in the Bobruisk 
region but also denied him the possibility of organizing serious resistance 
in the depth, using reserves that were brought forward.”89 
 
In contrast, Zhukov’s main operational priority was the annihilation of enemy 
troops, usually by operational encirclement; the compass needle of his operations.  
The historical record provides significant evidence of Zhukov’s obsession with 
operational encirclement and annihilation.  It was his preferred method of 
operation at Khalkin-Gol in August 1939, the attempted encirclement of Army 
Group Centre in January 1942, Operation Mars in November 1942 and the 
planned, but not executed Operation Jupiter, in December 1942,90which again 
concentrated on Army Group Centre.  It was followed in February-March 1943, 
by an abortive operation involving Rokossovskiy’s Central Front, Bryansk Front 
and the Western Front, designed to trap and annihilate Army Group Centre.91  
Similarly, Zhukov planned Operation Polar Star,92 an operation cancelled in 
March 1943, but designed to encircle and annihilate the German forces at 
Leningrad.93  In January 1944, Zhukov co-ordinated Vatutin’s 1st Ukrainian Front, 
in the Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy Operation,94 an operation marked by the 
encirclement and annihilation of a substantial number of German troops.  Later, in 
March 1944, in command of 1st Ukrainian Front, Zhukov oversaw the 
encirclement of Hube’s 1st Panzer Army, although most of it escaped 
annihilation.95   
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Figure 119: The Red Army’s cosmic strategic plan showing Zhukov’s massive 
planned encirclements in Mars and Jupiter: Winter 1942-1943. 
(Bellamy, Absolute War, 2007, p.530.) 
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It is interesting to note that the only major operation in which Zhukov’s troops 
split the enemy and engaged in deep operational manoeuvre, rather than 
operational encirclement and annihilation, was the 1st Belorussian Front’s Vistula-
Oder Operation of January-February 1945.  This was the obvious operational 
method given the lack of depth in the German defences or possibly Zhukov 
inherited an operational concept from Rokossovskiy, or Rokossovskiy’s former 
staff officers who remained with 1st Belorussian Front in November 1944.  It is an 
intriguing thought and impossible to prove.  However, the Vistula-Oder Operation 
does represent something of an anomaly in Zhukov’s modus operandii, if not in 
Rokossovskiy’s.  In summary, Zhukov’s planning, supervision and active 
operational command was notable for his natural inclination towards the 
operational encirclement and annihilation of the enemy, a form of operation 
commonly associated with the Wehrmacht. 
 
Rokossovskiy and Zhukov’s different operational styles reflect a profound 
difference in attitude towards the question of operational depth.  If operational 
victory was to be achieved by striking deep  to shatter the enemy’s operational 
cohesion and ability to achieve his objectives, then rapid manoeuvre to 
operational depth was imperative, not optional, in order to undermine the source 
of effective, sustainable military power.  It was this school of thought that 
informed Rokossovskiy’s operational style.  Thus, operational depth was the key 
principle of Rokossovskiy’s operational method, not operational encirclement and 
annihilation.   
 
In contrast, operational depth was coincidental to Zhukov’s style of operations.  If 
maximum physical annihilation was the key to victory, then depth of manoeuvre 
was only related to the need to encircle enemy troops.  If the enemy lacked depth 
the encirclement would be shallow but if it was a massive force the depth of the 
penetration would be deeper.  Therefore, in Zhukov’s operational method depth 
was a means to an end, something designed to bring about operational 
encirclement and annihilation.  The dominant theme was annihilation, not depth.  
Therefore, Rokossovskiy’s operational style makes it far from obvious that 
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operational encirclement and annihilation were the dominant theme of Soviet 
operational art or a superior form of operational command.  It was, ironically, 
post-war Soviet claims about the Red Army’s inclination towards encirclement 
and annihilation that encouraged the idea that it was simply a pale imitation of the 
Wehrmacht.   
 
In summary, it is one of the stranger ironies of history, that Zhukov, in many eyes 
the epitome of a Soviet commander, was committed to an operational style that 
was Germanic, whereas Rokossovskiy, the Pole, possessed an operational style 
more in keeping with the Russian-Soviet tradition of Brusilov, Svechin and 
Varfolomeyev.  It is clear that Rokossovskiy and Zhukov had very different 
operational, as well as leadership styles, that reflected a very significant difference 
in their interpretation of Soviet operational thinking and the conduct of 
operational art.  Two of the Red Army’s most senior commanders possessed a far 
greater divergence in their operational methods than any comparable German 
commanders.  There is no doubting the brilliance of Manstein, Model and 
Guderian, but the German high command remained obsessed with the idea of 
encirclement and annihilation, despite clear evidence, as early as December 1941, 
that the Red Army had grown used to their methods.96  German commanders 
demonstrated remarkable tactical creativity but were predictable in their modus 
operandii.  At the very least, the stark differences between Rokossovskiy and 
Zhukov, two of the Red Army’s most senior commanders, challenges the image of 
a Soviet command stifled by uniformity, lacking in operational creativity while 
reliant on numbers and firepower.   
 
The Obkhod or Turning Move   
The destruction of the psychological will to fight was important to Soviet military 
theory and a central theme of the frontal blow.  Rokossovskiy’s inclination 
towards the frontal blow and his creative maskirovka indicate he appreciated of 
the interaction between the physical and psychological dimensions of fighting 
power.  This interaction was present in the frontal blow and, in a cruder form, 
during operational encirclement and annihilation, but Rokossovskiy also 
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conducted a form of operation that explicitly targeted the psychological will of the 
enemy to fight: the obkhod or turning movement.97   
 
An obkhod involved a deep physical thrust into the enemy rear.  It was designed 
to threaten the key points of the enemy system as well as the potential physical 
annihilation of the enemy.  It was not a direct physical attack on the flank, known 
in Russian as an okhvat, but an attempt to turn the enemy’s mind from the 
achievement of his primary mission, to one of survival.  Therefore, it was aimed 
at the enemy commander’s mind and his troops psychological fighting power.  
First, a turning movement aimed to persuade the enemy commander that his 
mission was no longer possible.  Second, to persuade him the survival of his force 
was at stake.  Third, to create a sense of imminent catastrophe designed to shatter 
the role of hope in sustaining psychological fighting power, thereby destroying the 
enemy as an organised fighting force 
 
In the aftermath of World War Two, operational encirclement and annihilation 
was clearly recognised as linked to the German idea of the kesselschlacht.  
Therefore, it is possible that German and western ignorance of the obkhod may 
have induced some commentators to assume operations, designed as turning 
movements, were actually indicators of the Red Army’s inability to execute 
operational encirclements.98  It is also possible that many Red Army operations 
planned as double envelopments, and subsequently lauded for their ability to 
manoeuvre the Germans out of a position, by a turning move, were simply 
encirclements that failed. 
 
In a purely physical sense, at first sight, a turning move and a double envelopment 
appeared to have much in common: their intent was quite different.  A more direct 
form of military operation than encirclement and annihilation is difficult to 
imagine.  Its aim was to trap, encircle and physically annihilate.  The primary aim 
of the obkhod was not the physical annihilation of the enemy, but by using the 
threat of annihilation, and, if necessary doing it, induce the enemy to abandon his 
mission and concede the area.  The obkhod was not a modern phenomenon99 or an 
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overtly intellectual theory of manoeuvre dreamed up by the Red Army.  On the 
contrary,  
“the Russian liking for the form of indirect approach known as the ‘turning 
movement’ probably stems from the tradition of Genghis Khan; certainly 
it has long been fundamental to Russian military thinking.”100 
It had played a role in Mischenko’s deep raid in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-
05.  The raid failed to achieve its objectives but Svechin’s analysis argued, 
“the psychological effect produced by the appearance of cavalry in the rear 
is incomparably greater when the army is engaged, when psychological and 
physical exhaustion lead to such tension that a single spark is sufficient to 
bring about panic among even the most disciplined troops.”101 
Ironically, Clausewitz, the intellectual authority behind the German obsession 
with physical annihilation of the enemy army also acknowledged that “possible 
engagements are to be regarded as real if they have the same consequences.”102  In 
essence, if the enemy can be persuaded to give up his mission because of the 
threat of being annihilated, the objective has been achieved. 
 
In April 1944, in the proposed Kovel’ Operation, Rokossovskiy appeared to 
depart from his usual operational style and recommended a massive 
operational/strategic encirclement, driven by the need to circumvent the terrain of 
south-eastern Belorussia.  The plan proposed to fix Second and Ninth German 
Armies in south-eastern Belorussia.  Simultaneously, two Soviet tank armies from 
1st Belorussian Front’s left flank would move north before turning in a great arc, 
from west to east.  At first sight the operation suggested by Rokossovskiy seems 
to have the explicit aim of trapping and physically annihilating two German field 
armies and shattering the strategic rear of Army Group Centre.   
 
However, it can be argued that, more in keeping with his habitual operational 
style, Rokossovskiy was actually trying to induce the collapse and withdrawal of 
Second and Ninth Armies, rather than their physical annihilation, an almost 
impossible task given the nature of the terrain.  The Belorussian Forests were 
infested with partisans who harried German troops and regularly disrupted the rail 
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and road lines essential to Second and Ninth German Armies.  These German 
armies had responded very nervously to previous deep operations by 
Rokossovskiy’s Belorussian Front and were acutely aware of their lack of depth 
and their vulnerability to being trapped in the forests of Belorussia.  Equally, 
Rokossovskiy knew that since Stalingrad all German troops feared encirclement. 
 
Therefore, by invading Army Group Centre’s strategic rear, infiltrating the 
operational rear and cutting the supply lines of Second and Ninth German Army, 
Rokossovskiy’s aim was to manipulate the threat of annihilation in the 
Belorussian marshes, to persuade German commanders to withdraw and take the 
most obvious route to survival, west, regardless of the overall German position in 
south-eastern Belorussia.  Certainly, an operation of this size would have posed a 
credible threat of encirclement and annihilation to Second and Ninth German 
Armies.  However, operational annihilation on this scale would have been an 
anomaly in Rokossovskiy’s normal operational style.  In contrast, a simultaneous 
use of attrition and manoeuvre designed to turn the enemy’s mind and induce 
fragmented withdrawal is much more in keeping with Rokossovskiy’s operational 
inclinations and the concept of the obkhod. 
 
As early as November 1941, Rokossovskiy used a turning move to ease 16th 
Army’s position at Volokalamsk, west of Moscow.  It successfully forced 10th 
Panzer Division away from Skirmanovo, where it had threatened 16th Army’s 
lines of supply and communication.103  Similarly, in December 1941, 
Rokossovskiy was concerned during the Moscow counter-offensive, that the 
Germans might stabilise their position on the River Istra.104  He wanted to bounce 
the Istra, but 
“on the approaches to the Istra sector the enemy’s resistance began to 
stiffen and I felt we would be unable to effect a swift crossing.  
Accordingly, I concentrated on strengthening the enveloping forces: F. 
Remizov’s on the right and M.Y. Katukov’s on the left.”105 
As the Germans blew up the Istra dam, Rokossovskiy used the two armoured 
mobile groups to lever the Germans out of the Istra position, thus restoring and 
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sustaining the momentum of 16th Army’s counter-attack.  In his words, “striking 
from the north and south, Remizov and Katukov forced the enemy back, thus 
helping the infantry divisions perform their tasks.  The outcome of the battle was 
decided in our favour.”106 
 
The Germans were turned in both a physical and psychological sense and 
manoeuvred out of an important position without a prolonged attritional 
encounter.  It is possible, but unlikely that Rokossovskiy intended this as a tactical 
battle of encirclement and annihilation which achieved partial but not complete 
success.  It is more likely it was planned and executed as an obkhod.  At that stage 
of the Moscow counter-offensive Rokossovskiy’s primary aim was momentum 
and Rokossovskiy’s natural instinct was to create momentum through deep 
operational manoeuvre.   
 
Therefore, trapping the enemy in an encirclement and annihilation operation made 
less sense than threatening an envelopment, a psychological message any German 
commander would have understood, in order to lever him out.  Rokossovskiy 
understood that given their failure to take Moscow and the scale of the Red 
Army’s counter-offensive that German troops in early December 1941 were 
distinctly susceptible to fears of disaster, central to the idea of an obkhod.  To the 
German soldier, encirclement, or worse being taken prisoner was an appalling 
prospect.  If an opportunity to withdraw and fight another day presented itself 
many took it, particularly as the traditional flexibility of German defensive 
doctrine made such a course of action entirely rational.   
 
The turning move, either as part of a frontal blow, or as an operational method in 
itself, was a regular aspect of Rokossovskiy’s operational command during the 
war.  Rokossovskiy’s style endeavoured to persuade the enemy, through a mixture 
of attrition and manoeuvre that sustained fighting at such a disadvantage, risked 
complete destruction.  Indeed, throughout the war, Rokossovskiy displayed a 
talent for the more subtle psychological dimensions of command yet, 
Rokossovskiy knew that a purely psychological threat, presented by a formation 
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marauding around behind German lines, was never going to turn over a German 
force, unless it had the raw, physical fighting power to make the threat of 
annihilation, inherent in the obkhod concept, a credible one.  Therefore, the 
psychological concept of the obkhod, perhaps the purest form of operational 
manoeuvre, relied heavily on physical fighting power.  A small force could be 
ignored: a big, powerful force could not.  Similarly, the credibility of the threat 
rested on an understanding that Rokossovskiy’s threat was no bluff.  As Moscow, 
Stalingrad and later Kursk showed, all German commanders understood that 
Rokossovskiy, if necessary, could and would systematically annihilate a German 
formation if it did not withdraw.   
 
In 1943-45, Rokossovskiy’s psychological credibility and the physical power of 
the forces he commanded enabled Rokossovskiy to lever out German units from 
key positions, thus retaining operational momentum.  In Belorussia, during 1943, 
this did not produce the operational collapse Rokossovskiy’s desired in Belorussia 
in autumn 1943 because his forces did not have the fighting power to uproot an 
entire German army.  The various attempts Rokossovskiy made to force the 
Germans out of Kalinkovichi, between October 1943-January 1944 are a 
particularly good example of how the psychological concept of the obkhod was 
directly related to physical fighting power.  In 1944-45, the underlying themes of 
Rokossovskiy’s operations in 1944-45 were very similar, but in this period 
Rokossovskiy possessed the cavalry-mechanised groups and tank armies to 
implement turning moves of operational, indeed strategic dimensions.  In 
addition, Rokossovskiy’s meticulous planning always ensured with the exception 
of February 1943, that operations were properly prepared and that his forces 
undertook obkhod’s in good logistical shape, not exhausted at the end of an 
operation.  Therefore, both Rokossovskiy’s reputation and the forces he 
commanded carried the psychological and physical fighting power to sustain an 
obkhod’s credibility.107   
 
It is tempting to regard the obkhod as a purely theoretical concept.  However, on 
several occasions the remarkably resilient Wehrmacht showed signs of being 
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susceptible to turning moves conducted by Rokossovskiy.  Indeed, a combination 
of factors made German forces on the Eastern Front peculiarly vulnerable, in both 
a physical and psychological sense to the obkhod.  First, in the aftermath of 
Stalingrad, a definite “Stalingrad complex” emerged.108  Second, German soldiers 
had a pronounced dread of capture by the Russians.  Third, as German resources 
dwindled, the lack of depth and reserves made them vulnerable to quick, deep 
Soviet breakthroughs and being cut off, annihilated or taken prisoner. 
 
A turning move began with a broad front deployment, maskirovka and a 
simultaneous general assault accompanied by the rapid, localised annihilation of 
the enemy.  Deep operation forces moved against the enemy’s operational rear 
focussing on key systemic points.  As the breach widened and the depth of the 
operation became greater, more forces moved through to increase the physical 
power and sustainability of the blow.  The initial purpose of the operation was to 
sever and disrupt the timely flow of information when enemy tactical 
commanders and soldiers needed it most.  The aim was to shatter the soldier’s 
faith that the situation was under control.  As a commander who had experienced 
the Red Army’s mauling in 1941, Rokossovskiy fully understood the profound 
psychological impact upon soldiers forced to operate under extreme duress 
without effective command, without secure supply lines and without control or 
proper knowledge of the enemy except that he is behind you and threatening to 
close off hope of escape.  Furthermore, as a man who had lived through the 3rd 
Red Army’s collapse in 1919, the Purge and the military defeats of 1941, few 
knew better than Rokossovskiy how a combination of fear, lack of sleep and 
systemic collapse could induce an implosion in the will to fight. 
 
Rokossovskiy keenly appreciated the psychological dimensions of war.  Indeed, 
several of Rokossovskiy’s operations seem almost designed to send psychological 
messages to German commanders.  The systematic targeting of key towns, 
command points, river lines, rail junctions and routes of escape seems to have 
been a pronounced aspect of Rokossovskiy’s operational style.  In the Loyev 
Operation of October 1943, Rokossovskiy’s turning move on Gomel was 
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specifically designed to play on German minds.  Gomel was a key systemic point 
of communication, mobility and supply.  It was critical to the operational position 
of Second German Army and Ninth German Army.  It was also central to the 
maintenance of strategic links between Army Group Centre and Army Group 
South.  If Gomel was threatened or taken, the entire German position in south-
eastern Belorussia was in danger of being compromised. 
 
On 15th October 1943, Batov’s 65th Army crossed the Dnepr and carried the town 
of Loyev.  As 65th Army surged on “with the imminent threat of our forces 
coming out in the rear of the whole Gomel group, the enemy had to start 
withdrawing his units from the Sozh-Dnieper area.”109    It was no accident that 
Field Marshal von Kluge, the commander of Army Group Centre, made scarce 
reserves available to prevent 65th Army enveloping Gomel.110  Indeed, “on 27th 
October 1943, Kluge and Model discussed taking Ninth Army and Second Army 
back to the Dnepr below Mogilev.”111  This would have been a remarkably 
successful obkhod.  The Germans were saved by Rokossovskiy’s lack of resources 
courtesy of Stavka’s strategic prioritisation of the Ukraine at the expense of 
Belorussia. 
 
Rokossovskiy’s most ambitious obkhod occurred in February-March 1943.  On 3rd 
February 1943, just twenty-four hours after the German surrender at Stalingrad, 
Stavka informed Rokossovskiy that the Don Front was being moved to the 
Bryansk area.112  As early as 2nd February 1943, Stavka had already issued orders 
that Don Front’s 21st and 64th Army were to move in to the Bryansk area.113 On 4th 
February 1943, Rokossovskiy was ordered to re-deploy to the central sector of the 
Eastern Front.  There, under his command, the newly formed Central Front114 was 
to launch a massive north-easterly operation where “in co-operation with the 
Bryansk Front it was to execute a deep turning movement in the general direction 
of Smolensk and Gomel aimed at the flank and rear of the enemy’s Orel 
group.”115   
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Stavka Directive No: 30043 issued on 6th February 1943 revealed the massive 
scope of the proposed operation.  The Central Front using 65th Army,116 2nd Tank 
Army and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps was to cross the Dnepr, split Second German 
and Second Panzer Army and move through Gomel and on to Smolensk, deep in 
the rear of Army Group Centre.  At the same time, Western and Bryansk Front 
would launch an operation to encircle and annihilate Second Panzer Army in the 
Orel region.117  In the words of Rokossovskiy, “this beautifully planned operation 
had been timed for February 15.”118   
 
Rokossovskiy was charged with an obkhod of massive strategic significance.  It 
would split the entire Eastern Front, invade the systemic rear of Army Group 
Centre and facilitate the annihilation of the German Orel group.  If the Central 
Front’s deep turning move managed to reach Smolensk, the Red Army would be 
astride the land bridge between the Dnepr and the western Dvina.  This land 
bridge acted as the entry to, and exit from, central European Russia.  The 
Smolensk land bridge, on the main road to Moscow, was possibly the most 
important piece of strategic ground on the entire Eastern Front.  It was absolutely 
pivotal to the Wehrmacht ability to wage war on the Eastern Front and without 
this systemic hub Army Group Centre could not have sustained itself west of 
Moscow.  Therefore, the physical and psychological implications of 
Rokossovskiy’s obkhod for Army Group Centre were considerable.  Smolensk 
was the keystone of Army Group Centre’s strategic rear, the foundation stone of 
the German position on the Eastern Front.  Furthermore, in the aftermath of 
Stalingrad, Army Group Centre’s position as the Wehrmacht’s strategic anchor on 
the Eastern Front, was more important than ever if the Germans were going to 
stablise their position. 
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Figure 120: The Central Front’s February 1943 Obkhod (Turning Move) on Smolensk. 
(Stephen Walsh)) 
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In early February 1943, the German strategic position in southern Russia appeared 
on the edge of total collapse.  Army Group A was fleeing the Caucasus, pursued 
by Soviet troops, having been given Hitler’s permission to withdraw on 28th 
January 1943, itself deeply indicative of the sheer scale of the German strategic 
crisis in January 1943.  Simultaneously, the South-Western Front’s Operation 
Gallop was moving south on Rostov and into the eastern Donbass region, an area 
of vital industrial importance.119  Further north, the Voronezh Front’s Operation 
Star120 was moving towards Khar'kov, a key systemic point in the eastern Ukraine.  
The Romanians had been crushed in Operation Uranus in November 1942.  The 
8th Italian Army had been destroyed in the Middle Don Operation of December 
1942.121  Equally, 2nd Hungarian Army had suffered massive losses at the hands of 
the Voronezh Front, during the Ostrogorzhk-Rossosh Operation of January 1943, 
an operation that “ripped a huge and gaping hole in the German front from south 
of Voronezh to Voroshilovgrad.”122  In summary, a whole series of simultaneous 
and successive operations in southern Russia threatened to engulf the Wehrmacht. 
 
In this strategic and psychological context, a major turning move by 
Rokossovskiy’s Central Front into the rear of Army Group Centre would have 
constituted a military earthquake on the Eastern Front.  It would have forced 
Army Group Centre to turn away from Moscow and contemplate fighting the 
Central Front to its west, the Western Front to its east and the Bryansk Front to 
the south-east, thus relieving Moscow, the defence of which, at Stalin’s insistence, 
had tied down many Red Army forces.  It is hardly surprising that Stavka urged 
this extraordinarily ambitious obkhod upon Rokossovskiy with little time for the 
effective re-deployment and preparation of the Central Front. 
 
The Central Front was to be made up of the Don Front’s armies at Stalingrad, plus 
70th Army and 2nd Tank Army123 from Stavka reserve.124  The sheer size of this 
potential force indicates the scale and significance of the operation.  However, 
Rokossovskiy’s Central Front was plagued by problems of re-deployment, logistic 
chaos, appalling weather and inadequate time for preparation.125  Rokossovskiy 
issued his first preliminary orders on 15th February 1943.  He outlined the concept 
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of the operation, the main lines of attack for 65th Army, 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, 
70th Army, 21st Army and 16th Air Army.  He also revealed that Stavka proposed 
an extraordinarily ambitious obkhod of approximately 500 kilometres in depth.126   
 
Rokossovskiy issued further instructions on 19th February 1943.  The 2nd Tank 
Army was to deploy in the middle of the Central Front, with 65th Army to its right 
and Kryukov’s 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps to the left.  It was to be ready for action 
by the morning of 22nd February 1943.127  The 65th Army was to deploy on the 
right with 13th Army of Bryansk Front on its northern flank, with the 2nd Tank 
Army to its left.  The 65th Army was to attack, a day later than 2nd Tank Army, on 
the morning of 23rd February 1943.128  Kryukov’s Cavalry Rifle Group was to 
deploy on the left wing, with 2nd Tank Army on its northern flank and 60th Army 
of the Voronezh Front, to the south.  It was given the key objective; a deep 
operation on the German supply point of Novgorod-Severskiy on the river Desna.  
It was to attack on the morning of 23rd February 1943.129      
 
Rokossovskiy secured a postponement until 25th February 1943, but the offensive 
began in heavy snow, with piecemeal deployment of forces as they arrived, very 
much out of keeping with Rokossovskiy’s normal style.130  However, due to the 
practical difficulties of getting combat units concentrated with their supplies, the 
timetable began to slip.  By early 24th February 1943, the first echelon of 65th 
Army had deployed, but other units were in transit.  Rokossovskiy reported that 
forward detachments would probe German lines on 26th February, but that the first 
echelon would not attack until 27th February 1943, with other units being fed in 
piecemeal.  In a similar way, the 2nd Tank Army would begin reconnaissance on 
24th February but the main attack would not develop until 26th February.  
Kryukov’s 2nd Guards Cavalry Group would begin operations on 27th February 
1943.  The 21st Army had not yet completed its redeployment from Stalingrad.  
The 70th Army had more or less finished its deployment, but all Central Front 
units were short of artillery, fuel, ammunition, transport vehicles and tractors.131   
 
359 
 
The improvised, ad hoc, downright chaotic preparations for the February 1943 
obkhod may initially have worked in the Central Front’s favour.  It guaranteed 
surprise.  The Second German Army did not anticipate an extraordinarily 
ambitious Soviet offensive, launched with virtually no preparation in the middle 
of a blizzard with waist deep snow.  However, as Central Front’s forces drove 
deeper they met stiff resistance.  As Army Group Centre recognised the menacing 
nature of Rokossovskiy’s intent, German reserves flooded into the area.  The 
improvised nature of Central Front’s preparations left Rokossovskiy’s forces short 
of heavy fighting power.  As intelligence reports began to warn of German 
reserves, Rokossovskiy was faced with an “acute shortage of food, fodder, fuel 
and ammunition”132 against an enemy who “had quite obviously edged ahead of 
us in the concentration and deployment of forces.”133 Rokossovskiy reported to 
Stalin that, 
“in the circumstances the Front would be unable to carry out its task.  
Shortly, afterwards the task was changed, and we were ordered to strike 
northwards towards Orel with the 21st and 70th Armies and the 2nd Tank 
Army.  The aim was to rout the enemy’s Orel grouping in co-ordination 
with the Bryansk Front and the left wing of the Western Front.”134 
 
The Stavka bowed to the inevitable and reigned in its ambitions, a little.  The deep 
obkhod through Gomel to Smolensk was abandoned.  However, on 7th March 
1943, Stavka issued new orders to Rokossovskiy’s Central Front.  In conjuction 
with the Bryansk Front, the Central Front was to move north in order to encircle 
and annihilate German forces belonging to Second Panzer Army in the Dmitriev-
Orlovskiy area.  The Central Front was then to move on Roslavl north-east of 
Smolensk, in a shallower turning move of German Army Group Centre.  135 
 
On 8th March 1943, Rokossovskiy issued orders for the new operation against 
Second Panzer Army.  The 21st Army was to wheel north, with 13th Army of 
Bryansk Front on its right flank and Central Front’s 70th Army on its left.  On 9th 
March 1943 at 21.00 hours, 21st Army was to begin its attack and move into the 
Orel region.136  On 9th March 1943, 70th Army was to attack north, with 21st Army 
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on the right flank and 65th Army to the left.  It was to co-operate with 21st Army 
and establish control of the Orel region, before cutting the Orel-Karachev road, 
the key systemic target of a deep operation.  Rokossovskiy warned them to be 
mindful of German counter-attacks coming from the west.137   
 
The 65th Army and 2nd Tank Army were to wheel north, cut the Orel-Bryansk road 
and invade the German operational rear around Dmitriev-Orlovskiy.  On the 
extreme left wing of the Central Front, 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps was to cut the 
Orel-Karchev road further to the west.138  It was also to continue its attack in a 
more westerly direction towards Novgorod-Severskiy, on the Desna, a systemic 
target that if captured would significantly undermine the combat power of the 
German reserves.  However, as Rokossovskiy issued these orders, to the west, 
German reserves led by 4th Panzer Division, were already concentrating against 
Kryukov’s 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps.   
 
On 11th March 1943, 4th Panzer Division counter-attacked east of Novgorod-
Severskiy.139  Simultaneously, at 01.30 hours on 11th March 1943, Stavka 
significantly increased Rokossovskiy’s combat power, on his eastern flank, by 
transferring 3rd, 13th and 48th Army from the Bryansk to the Central Front.140 
However, as Manstein’s counter-offensive in the Kharkov area gathered 
momentum, Rokossovskiy’s 21st Army was diverted to the Voronezh Front.141  
The Stavka also diverted 1st Tank Army, 24th,66th, 62nd and 64th Armies, some of 
which, but not all, had been earmarked for Rokossovskiy’s Central Front.  Now, 
they were ordered to bolster the Soviet position further south.142  The 2nd Guards 
Cavalry Corps withdrew east under heavy German pressure and the German 
counter-attack was halted on the River Sev by Rokossovskiy’s diversion of 
substantial forces from 65th and 2nd Tank Army.  The Central Front dug in on 
ground that would become the northern and western face of the Kursk bulge. 
 
In summary, the turning move assigned to Rokossovskiy’s Central Front was 
intended to be a very significant operation.  Yet, the fact that the operation did not 
fulfil its promise indicates that the obkhod was no more immune to the realities of 
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physical fighting power than any other form of operation.  The sustained 
resistance of Sixth German Army at Stalingrad was of great significance in 
delaying Rokossovskiy’s operation and Stavka’s unrealistic timetable meant that 
operational planning was rushed, improvised, lacking in foresight and 
characterised by ad hoc adjustments during the operation.  Rokossovskiy was 
acutely aware of this143 and tried to ameliorate the consequences of unseemly 
haste but was undone by logistic reality.  A turning move of such depth and 
strategic significance could not be improvised, however talented the operational 
commander and Stavka’s gamble turned into a bluff. 
 
A careful balance, requiring fine judgement, had to be struck in determining 
whether an obkhod was an appropriate form of operation to achieve an objective.  
First, as the February 1943 operation demonstrated, it had to be well prepared and 
sufficiently powerful.  Second, the target of the turning move had to be carefully 
selected.  If the target was so important the enemy could not operate without it, 
the enemy had to stand, fight and risk destruction, because the alternative was 
more unpalatable.  In February 1943, Smolensk and the Dnepr-Dvina land bridge 
were too important to be given up without a fight to the death.  If the Central 
Front had possessed the time to plan and prepare an operation of the skill and 
power required to carry through the February 1943 obkhod, Rokossovskiy would 
have found himself in a monumental struggle, assailed on all sides by German 
forces desperate to recover the Smolensk land bridge.  To the Germans the idea of 
abandoning this key strategic sector would have been demoralising at any time; in 
the immediate aftermath of Stalingrad it might have provoked a strategic rout.  It 
was simply too important to abandon. 
 
In conclusion, the psychological undermining of the enemy was an important 
element in Rokossovskiy’s operational style.  Rokossovskiy used turning moves 
against key systemic points such as road and rail junctions, or in a more direct 
sense to induce a sense of psychological panic at fear of being cut off by a 
physical barrier as in the East Prussian and East Pomeranian Operations.  These 
operations were designed to induce an implosion in fighting spirit, rather than to 
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deliberately trap and annihilate forces on an operational scale.  Rokossovskiy 
wanted the enemy force to disintegrate and waste away, thus increasing the 
momentum and effectiveness of the deep strike, designed to split the enemy and 
shatter his operational cohesion.  It is in this sense that Rokossovskiy’s attitude to 
the turning move should be understood indeed, that Rokossovskiy’s whole style of 
operations should be understood. 
 
The Nature of Rokossovskiy’s Deep Operations and Use of Mobile Groups 
The aim of deep operations was to transform tactical success into operational 
victory.  A deep operation was designed  
“to prevent or delay the arrival of his (the enemy’s) operational reserves by 
defeating these units in detail; to surround and destroy those units still at the 
front; and to continue the offensive into the defender’s operational 
depth.”144 
Triandafillov believed that, in modern operations, 
“the art of the attacker is to unleash the entire mass of forces quickly enough 
to break out to the flank and rear area of the enemy force, to cut his 
withdrawal routes and disrupt any new grouping of forces the enemy is 
preparing.”145  
These concepts were central themes of Soviet military thinking from the early 
1930’s and a dominant principles of the Red Army’s wartime operations.  A 
Soviet operation, be it a frontal blow, an obkhod or an operational encirclement 
and annihilation, consisted of two phases: the tactical deep battle and the deep 
operation, a period of manoeuvre designed to act as the catalyst of operational 
victory.  It was the job of front commanders such as Rokossovskiy to blend both 
phases.  Nevertheless, regardless of the specific focus of a deep operation all front 
commanders used mobile groups to achieve their objectives.   
 
In the First World War cavalry had proved hopelessly inept at translating tactical 
success into operational victory.  In contrast, in the Russian Civil War cavalry had 
played an important operational and even strategic role, raiding deep behind 
enemy lines, although this was a symptom of the peculiarly low ratio of force to 
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space that characterised the Russian Civil War.146  Nevertheless, on a conceptual 
level, the cavalry operations of the Civil War had a substantial influence on the 
notion of deep operations.  Isserson’s entire military career was based around 
depth in military operations.  Indeed, “Isserson’s idée fixe was the greatly 
enhanced role which the factor of depth had come to play in military affairs at all 
levels.”147  Isserson’s 300,000 strong shock army was organised into an attack 
echelon (eshelon ataki: EA), charged with smashing through the enemy’s tactical 
defences and a breakthrough development echelon (eshelon razvitiia proryva: 
ERP), configured for mobility.148  It developed the offensive into the enemy’s 
operational depth.   
 
Isserson outlined three variants concerning operations by the breakthrough 
development echelon (ERP).  The first variant envisaged the tactical encirclement 
of the enemy’s frontline soldiers, with only a few units left to strike deep.  In the 
second variant, working in conjunction with airpower and airborne forces, the 
ERP would strike deep, approximately one hundred kilometres in depth and 
engage enemy reserves while simultaneously blocking the withdrawal of 
retreating enemy units.  This ‘deep variant’ has more in common with 
Rokossovskiy’s wartime deep operations which emphasised depth, disruption, 
shattering the enemy’s cohesion and systemic targets.  Isserson’s third, or 
combined variant, envisaged two ERP’s striking deep on converging routes in 
order to create an operational encirclement.149  This was not a variant favoured by 
Rokossovskiy although it was clearly a prominent feature of Zhukov’s operations. 
 
Varfolomeyev, “divided his shock army into two echelons, distinguished by their 
differing objectives.”150  The first echelon, the tactical breakthrough echelon, was 
composed of rifle corps supported by a second echelon of army reserves.  It was 
designed to breakthrough the enemy’s tactical defences to a depth of 15-20 
kilometres.  The tactical breakthrough echelon was essentially an attritonal 
fighting force devised to fight deep battle.  In the wake of a successful tactical 
breach in the enemy line, a Soviet commander was to commit the operational 
breakthrough echelon.  Its task was to transform tactical success into operational 
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victory.  It was to strike deep, defeat enemy reserves, disrupt enemy supply, 
command and control and communications while simultaneously engaging in the 
tactical encirclement of the enemy’s frontline forces.  The historical evidence 
suggests that Rokossovskiy’s operational style and the nature of his deep 
operations had more in common with Varfolomeyev’s ideas than any other inter-
war theorist.   
 
Inter-war theorists provided a basic framework of ideas.  Nevertheless, on 16th 
October 1942, when Stalin issued Order No: 325,151 the Red Army did not 
actually have the instruments, or commanders, to implement deep operations.  It 
took a year of experimentation by commanders, such as Rokossovskiy, before the 
Red Army developed the ability, capacity and physical forces to conduct effective 
deep operations.  By 1944, the general name for a Soviet deep operation force was 
a mobile group.  There were basically three types: the all-arms tank army, the 
cavalry-mechanised group and the mechanised corps.  The most prestigious was 
the tank army, the elite military formation of the Red Army.152  It was an all-arms 
force, made up of two tank corps and a mechanised corps, with a multitude of 
supporting units.153  It was designed to fuse fighting power with manoeuvre.  The 
cavalry-mechanised group (CMG) was usually made up of one cavalry corps with 
a full complement of all arms and a mechanised corps.  It was often named after 
its commander and invariably used as a mobile group in difficult terrain.  In the 
Belorussian Operation of June-July 1944 CMG Pliyev played a crucial role as 
Rokossovskiy’s main mobile group.  Similarly, in January 1945, CMG 
Oslikovskiy played a key role in 2nd Belorussian’s East Prussian Operation.154   
 
In 1943, Rokossovskiy frequently used individual cavalry corps, considerably 
smaller than a cavalry-mechanised group, as his mobile groups, in the difficult 
terrain of Belorussia.  These cavalry corps, such as Kryukov’s 2nd Guards Cavalry 
Corps were agile and mobile in the conduct of operations, often striking deep into 
the German operational rear, but lacked the sustained fighting power to sustain 
deep operational manoeuvre.  As we have seen in the spring and autumn of 1943, 
Rokossovskiy repeatedly created brilliant deep operations that struck deep at the 
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systemic heart of German formations but was unable to capitalise due to the 
limited punching power of cavalry corps.   
 
A Soviet mechanised corps was rarely used as a mobile group on its own, but 
consisted of one tank division and two mechanised divisions.  It was often used in 
support of an army and straddled the transition between the tactical annihilation of 
deep battle and the rapid manoeuvre of deep operations.  By 1944, the fusing of 
mechanised corps and cavalry corps as CMG’s created a powerful instrument of 
deep operations that combined fighting power and remarkable mobility over very 
problematic terrain.  This was the type of mobile group Rokossovskiy desperately 
needed in Belorussia during autumn 1943.  Indeed, in Operation Bagration, 1st 
Mechanised Corps, deployed on 27th May 1944,155 played a significant role in 1st 
Belorussian’s deep operations, negotiating particularly difficult terrain in the 
Pripyat Marshes.156  Similarly, in the East Pomeranian Operation of March 1945, 
8th Mechanised Corps acted as the mobile group of 70th Army, part of 
Rokossovskiy’s 2nd Belorussian Front.157  
 
In whatever form it took, during the period October 1942-May 1945, a Soviet 
mobile group, under the overall command of a front commander, such as 
Rokossovskiy had several tasks.  These were 
• pre-emption of enemy defence lines 
• the defeat and disruption of enemy reserves 
• securing bridgeheads and crossings 
• seizure of key ground and systemic points 
• threatening of enemy retreat and approach units 
• exercising psychological leverage upon the enemy 
• by-passing enemy strongpoints and forces 
• inflicting losses on the enemy158 
It is against this yardstick that Rokossovskiy’s operational style and the nature of 
his deep operations should be judged. 
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The key issue for Rokossovskiy or any other front commander was the timing of a 
mobile group’s committal to an operation.  In Isserson’s opinion this was “one of 
the most complex and responsible decisions”159 faced by a commander.  It was the 
pivotal moment in an operation, the time when a front commander such as 
Rokossovskiy made his move to transform tactical success in deep battle into 
operational victory.  In the 1930’s Isserson studied a variety of committal 
scenarios in exhausting detail.160  Rokossovskiy had no hard and fast rules 
concerning the committal of mobile groups, being more concerned with a rapid 
tactical breach and a deep operational strike.  On several occasions Rokossovskiy 
did not wait, in the approved doctrinal manner, until a clear breach in the line had 
been created.  In his absolute commitment to avoid grinding attrition, on at least 
two occasions Rokossovskiy used mobile groups to complete the breach in order 
to restore manoeuvre to a situation, generate operational momentum and start a 
deep operation.   
 
In August 1943, Rokossovskiy used both 2nd and 3rd Tank Armies in an attempt to 
slice through the German lines, create momentum and deep strikes designed to 
undermine the Germans ability to conduct an organised fighting withdrawal.161  
Equally, on 26th June 1944, after two days of grinding battle,162Rokossovskiy 
formally ordered 3rd Army’s commander Gorbatov, to use his mobile group, 9th 
Tank Corps to complete the tactical penetration of the German defences at 
Rogachev.  The 9th Tank Corps smashed the German line, broke free of the 
Rogachev quagmire and rapidly encircled the German garrison at Bobruisk.  
Furthermore, in January 1945, Rokossovskiy used 8th Guards Tank Corps to 
complete the tactical deep battle begun by Fedyuninskiy’s 2nd Shock Army. 
 
However, for an operational commander whose natural instinct, as early as 
Operation Kol’tso, in December 1942, was to launch deep, uninterrupted strikes 
against systemic targets designed to split the opponent and shatter his operational 
cohesion, Rokossovskiy was seriously inhibited in his conduct of deep operations 
during 1942-43.  He conducted a series of operations that, although successful, 
did not deliver as much as they promised or as Rokossovskiy intended.  First, in 
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1942-43, the Red Army lacked armoured, mobile formations, capable of 
sustaining manoeuvre into the enemy’s operational depth.  In 1943, Rokossovskiy 
frequently used individual cavalry corps, considerably smaller than a cavalry-
mechanised group, as his mobile groups, in the difficult terrain of Belorussia.  
These cavalry corps, such as Kryukov’s 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, were agile and 
mobile, often striking deep into the German operational rear, but lacked sustained 
fighting power.  Rokossovskiy repeatedly struck deep at the systemic heart of 
German formations but was unable to capitalise due to the limited punching 
power of cavalry corps.  Rokossovskiy’s experiences at Stalingrad and in 
Belorussia during autumn 1943 demonstrated that Soviet armoured and cavalry 
corps did not have the fighting power and mobility provided by tank armies and 
cavalry mechanised groups from August 1943-May 1945. 
 
Secondly, in 1943, Rokossovskiy was forced to use mobile groups in less than 
ideal circumstances.  The circumstances of 2nd Tank Army’s actions in February 
1943, Kursk and Operation Kutuzov in July-August 1943, followed by the 
Chernigov-Pripyat Operation of August 1943 were distinctly problematic.  In each 
of these operations weather, rushed preparations, deep defences, enemy resistance 
and poor maskirovka made it difficult to create a clean breach and launch deep 
operations of the power and momentum Rokossovskiy desired.  In Belorussia, in 
autumn 1943, using cavalry corps Rokossovskiy was able to overcome the 
awkward terrain and launch deep operations but could not drive them home to 
achieve complete operational victories.   
 
For example, in March 1943, 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps reached Novgorod-
Severskiy, one hundred and sixty kilometres behind the German frontline.  
Novgorod-Severskiy was a key German supply base and represented key ground 
on the River Desna.  It offered the opportunity to establish a bridgehead of 
substantial tactical and operational significance.  Therefore, it was a target of 
considerable physical and psychological importance, a point borne out by the 
speed of the German reaction.  It was a natural target for one of Rokossovskiy’s 
deep operations.  Yet, although 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps demonstrated the 
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mobility and skill to strike deep and reach Novgorod-Severskiy, it did not have 
the fighting power to take and hold it.   
 
The remarkably successful deep operations Rokossovskiy’s conducted from June 
1944-May 1945, with CMG’s and tank armies make it reasonable to suggest that 
had Rokossovskiy possessed a tank army or, in particular, a cavalry-mechanised 
group of the 1944 vintage, it would have possessed the fighting power and 
mobility to hold Novgorod-Severskiy and Kalinkovichi long enough for the rest 
of the Central Front to pull up and consolidate.  In 1944-45, the new Soviet 
mobile groups, helped by thousands of American Dodge trucks, transformed the 
capacity of the Red Army to sustain deep operations.  In the period June 1944-
May 1945, Rokossovskiy finally had the instruments to realise his vision of deep 
operations, a vision that remained constant throughout the war. However, it was a 
long journey in theory and practice from Operation Kol’tso in January 1943 to the 
slashing deep operations that fragmented and splintered the Germans in East 
Prussia and Pomerania in 1945.   
 
To some “the Russians for their part, cared less for speed or the final stroke; they 
were content to wear the enemy down blow by blow.”163  This is not an accurate 
reflection of Rokossovkiy’s deep operations.  The entire concept of Operation 
Kol’tso was to pre-empt the German defence lines and shatter the German force, 
not grind out a victory.  Equally, in the Kromy Operation of July-August 1943 
Rokossovskiy was driven by the desire to pre-empt the enemy’s defence lines.  In 
a similar way, Rokossovskiy’s deep operations utilised physical points such as 
rivers in Chernigov-Pripyat Operation of August 1943, marsh in the Belorussian 
Operation, forest in the Mozyr-Kalinkovichi Operation of January 1944 and the 
Baltic coast in East Prussia, East Pomerania and in the Oder-Elbe Operations of 
January-May 1945.  In addition, Rokossovskiy’s entire campaign from autumn 
1943-April 1944 was driven by the desire to avoid attritional war and create the 
possibility of manoeuvre.  The manoeuverist nature of Rokossovskiy’s deep 
operations was the dominant theme of the Belorussian campaign.   
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This commitment to the conduct of manoeuvre and deep operations in highly 
problematic circumstances reveals Rokossovskiy military style and the nature of 
his deep operations.  In the course of several operations Rokossovskiy targeted the 
key systemic points that sustained Second and Ninth German Armies in south-
eastern Belorussia.  Gomel, the key point of command, supply and movement was 
repeatedly threatened, as were the vital rail junctions of Rechitsa and 
Kalinkovichi.  These rail junctions serviced the troops, weapons and fortifications 
required to make the Panther Line a deep, powerful position that would have 
required a series of systematic, attritional operations to penetrate.  Therefore,  
“a thrust across the Dnepr towards Rechitsa could outflank both the 
Panther position and confront 2nd Army with the unhappy task of trying to 
create a front in the partisan infested woods and swamps west of the 
Dnepr.”164 
 
The encirclement and annihilation of German forces in Belorussia would have 
required sustained preparation and considerable reserves, neither of which 
Rokossovskiy possessed.  Gradual attrition, wearing the enemy down blow by 
blow, would have been understandable but expensive. Furthermore, it would have 
given the Germans the time to consolidate the Panther Line and engage in the kind 
of stellungskrieg, or war of position and attrition,165 they desired, at this stage of 
the war, to recover from the calamitous strategic reverses of the period November 
1942-September 1943.  In contrast, Rokossovskiy went out of his way to deny the 
Germans time and the opportunity to conduct positional and attritional operations.  
These were not the actions of a commander content to wear the enemy down. 
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Figure 121: Belorussian autumn 1943 showing Rokossovskiy’s inclination to strike deep at 
systemic targets. 
(Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 1987, p.190.) 
  
Nevertheless, if the operations of autumn 1943 demonstrate the underlying 
conceptual nature of Rokossovskiy’s deep operations, it is the actual Belorussian 
Operation of June-July 1944 that most clearly demonstrates Rokossovskiy’s 
ability to turn theory into practice.  In spring 1944, Stavka began to plan a 
strategic offensive for the summer of 1944.166  It involved ten major operations.  
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The overall aim was to drive the Wehrmacht from Soviet Union and cripple 
German fighting power.  All operations were designed to achieve operational 
success in their own right, but were deliberately linked in time and space to create 
optimum conditions for subsequent or simultaneous operations.  The centrepiece 
of this strategic offensive was the Belorussian Operation (23rd June-29th July 
1944).167In a series of devastating deep operations Rokossovskiy’s forces pre-
empted several German defence lines, defeated and disrupted German reserves, 
seized key ground and systemic points, threatened the enemy retreat and approach 
routes and exerted massive psychological leverage on the enemy by repeatedly 
by-passing the enemy in order to strike deep.   
 
Stavka had ordered 1st Belorussian Front to destroy the German group at Bobruisk 
before conducting deep operations.168  In the space of approximately ten days the 
Belorussian Operation destroyed German Army Group Centre as an effective 
fighting force.  In addition to three other Soviet fronts, 1st Baltic, 2nd Belorussian 
and 3rd Belorussian, Rokossovskiy’s 1st Belorussian Front played a pivotal role in 
the destruction of Army Group Centre.  In particular, 1st Belorussian destroyed 
Ninth German Army before conducting deep operations that harassed Fourth 
German Army, liberated Minsk and undermined Army Group Centre by cutting 
its lines of communication and supply south-west of Minsk.  Rokossovskiy 
conducted a frontal blow operation that contained a classical deep battle, the rapid 
tactical encirclement and annihilation of Ninth German Army and three 
simultaneous deep operations that targeted the systemic lifeblood of Army Group 
Centre and sought, indirectly, to turn over Fourth German Army.  In essence, 1st 
Belorussian Front’s deep operations in Operation Bagration were a master class of 
operational art. The Belorussian Operation was Rokossovskiy’s finest hour and 
represents a singular example of Rokossovskiy’s operational style, particularly the 
systemic nature of his deep operations. 
 
The use of cavalry by the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War is often greeted 
with disbelief by those unaware of the fighting power and versatility of a Soviet 
cavalry-mechanised group.  In the Belorussian Operation, Cavalry Mechanised 
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Group (CMG) Pliyev made up of 4th Guards Cavalry Corps and 1st Mechanised 
Corps transformed tactical success into operational victory.  On 25th June 1944, 
just twenty-four hours into 1st Belorussian Front’s operation, CMG Pliyev had 
already launched a deep operation.  It moved through the breach created by 65th 
Army at Parichi.  Rokossovskiy’s target was a series of key systemic points 
designed to undermine the operational and strategic cohesion of Ninth German 
and Army Group Centre. 
 
The initial target was Slutsk169 because “Slutsk was on the main road from 
Bobruysk to Baranovichi and was the rail center for German divisions coming 
from the south.”170  Therefore, a successful deep strike on Slutsk had serious 
operational implications for Army Group Centre, undermining German mobility 
and “depriving the German command of the possibility of organizing a defence on 
the Minsk-Slutsk line.”171  In short, Rokossovskiy was determined to pre-empt the 
Germans ability to use Slutsk in order to organise defences south-west of 
Minsk.172   
 
By 29th June 1944, CMG Pliyev’s forward detachments were on the outskirts of 
Slutsk,173 followed by 65th and 28th Army.  At dawn, CMG Pliyev attacked Slutsk 
from the north, east and south, while 1st Mechanised Corps came from the south-
west and 28th Army from the south.  After a brief, but intense battle “our forces 
occupied Slutsk at 11.00 hours on 30 June, having completely driven the enemy 
from the town.”174  Slutsk was taken and the German objective of stabilising the 
line south-west of Minsk pre-empted.175  The Germans withdrew to Baranovichi, 
a key rail junction.  Rokossovskiy ordered aggressive pursuit and the capture of 
Baranovichi.176 
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Figure 122: Rokossovskiy’s deep operations during the Belorussian 
Operation on Slutsk, Stoltsby, Baranovichi and Minsk in July 1944. 
(Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 1995, p.200.) 
 
On 2nd July 1944, 1st Belorussian Front struck further powerful systemic blows 
against Ninth German Army and Army Group Centre.  The 4th Guards Cavalry 
Corps, also part of CMG Pliyev, captured in quick succession, the towns of 
Stoltsby, Mir, Gorodzei and Nesvizh.177  As a result “we had severed the most 
important lines of communication from Minsk to Baranovichi, Brest and 
Luninets.”178  This was a major operational, indeed strategic, setback for Army 
Group Centre.  Therefore, in a textbook example of deep operations, following 
Rokossovskiy’s orders, CMG Pliyev had seized key ground, pre-empted a major 
defence line, captured an enemy strongpoint and disrupted the enemy’s tactical, 
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operational and even strategic mobility by severing the rail links between Minsk, 
Baranovichi and Brest.  If Rokossovskiy’s style of operations had not emphasised 
depth and the targeting of systemic points, German forces trapped in Bobruisk 
would have been utterly annihilated, but 1st Belorussian Front would have faced 
greater resistance south and west of Minsk.  It was the operational pre-emption 
and disruption of these German plans that generated further momentum for the 
Belorussian Operation and created a German strategic catastrophe on the Eastern 
Front. 
 
The systemic nature of 1st Belorussian Front’s deep operations was also revealed 
by Rokossovskiy’s orders to 65th Army.  On 28th June 1944, the very day the 
encirclement at Bobruisk was secured, Rokossovskiy actually ordered 65th Army 
to move away from Bobruisk.  It was ordered to take Osipovichi and cut the main 
Minsk-Bobruisk line.  On 29th June 1944, 65th Army took Osipovichi, moved on 
Slutsk and then following CMG Pliyev’s capture of Slutsk, on 1st July 1944, 65th 
Army moved on Baranovichi, ninety miles west of Slutsk.  Baranovichi was a key 
rail junction, south-west of Minsk.  It was of absolutely critical importance in 
feeding in German reserves already on the move from other sectors of the Eastern 
Front in an attempt to stabilise Army Group Centre.  Its operational, indeed 
strategic significance was not lost on the German high command.  Indeed, such 
was Baranovichi’s importance to Army Group Centre, that on 3rd July 1944, the 
day Soviet troops actually entered Minsk, Field Marshal Model still “concentrated 
his forces to delay the Soviet drive southwest toward the rail center at 
Baranovichi.”179   
 
Rokossovskiy knew the entire German position in Belorussia hinged on 
Baranovichi and without it Army Group Centre would be in mortal jeopardy. 
“The German command hurriedly reinforced its Baranovichi grouping by 
transferring the 4th Panzer Division to it.  The remnants of the 6th, 383rd, 
45th, 36th, 269th, 35th and 102nd Infantry Divisions were hurriedly 
regrouped and organized a defense around Baranovichi.  Our forces began 
to be subjected to ever increasing enemy air attacks.”180 
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The Germans wished to use Baranovichi as a platform to introduce reserves and 
drag 1st Belorussian Front into a positional struggle, thus creating more time to 
deploy further German reserves.  Rokossovskiy was determined to prevent the 
need to capture Baranovichi from curtailing 1st Belorussian’s operational 
momentum.  It was never going to be conceded to an obkhod as Baranovichi was 
too important.  On 4th July 1944, Rokossovskiy ordered 65th and 48th Armies to 
take Baranovichi by concentric attack, supported by 9th Tank Corps and 1st 
Mechanised Corps.  Simultaneously, CMG Pliyev was to envelop Baranovichi 
from the north while sustaining the depth of 1st Belorussian’s advance.181 
 
The relationship between the rapid capture of Baranovichi the Soviet deep 
operation and the Germans desire to halt Rokossovskiy’s offensive became even 
more acute on 4th July 1944.  The Stavka formally ordered Rokossovskiy’s 1st 
Belorussian Front to develop its offensive deep into the operational and strategic 
rear of Army Group Centre.  It was to take Baranovichi and Luninets, no later 
than 10th-12th July 1944, before moving on Brest, a key systemic point, upon 
which German hopes of stablising the situation in Belorussia depended.  The 1st 
Belorussian Front was also to cross the River Bug and establish a bridgehead.  
These were extraordinarily ambitious objectives.182 On 5th July 1944, 1st 
Belorussian faced fierce resistance in Baranovichi.  The fighting intensified on 6th 
July as Rokossovskiy launched attacks on Baranovichi from the north-west, north, 
east and south supported by airpower.   
 
On 7th July 1944, with five hundred bombers,183 Soviet armour and infantry 
fought their way into Baranovichi.  The attack splintered the defenders and drove 
them out through the western gateway deliberately left open by Rokossovskiy.  In 
short, Rokossovskiy knew he would have to fight for Baranovichi but wished to 
flush them out, rather than trap them in order to preserve depth and operational 
momentum.  On 8th July 1944, two days earlier than demanded, 184Baranovichi 
was cleared by Soviet troops and 1st Belorussian Front resumed its pursuit of 
German forces towards Brest. 
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Simultaneously, Rokossovskiy’s 1st Belorussian Front also conducted a deep 
strike on Minsk.  It is the contention of this thesis that with its destruction of 
Ninth German Army, its assault on Army Group Centre’s systemic rear and the 
deep operation on Minsk, Rokossovskiy’s 1st Belorussian Front played a key 
tactical, operational but also strategic role in the Belorussian Operation, the 
greatest Soviet victory in World War Two.185  By 26th June 1944, just four days 
into Operation Bagration, it was already clear that the Red Army had launched an 
operation of tremendous magnitude.  However, it was not inevitable that the 
defeat of individual armies, such as Ninth German Army, should lead to the 
systemic implosion of Army Group Centre.  The city of Minsk was pivotal to the 
question of whether Bagration was tactically and operationally successful, in that 
individual German armies were defeated or strategically successful by inducing 
the collapse of an entire German army group.  Minsk was the capital of Belorussia 
and the administrative, communications, supply and command headquarters of 
Army Group Centre.  It was the brain that controlled the mass of Army Group 
Centre.  It was, therefore, a natural target for Rokossovskiy. 
 
Minsk lay at the heart of the regional rail and road network in a region notoriously 
bereft of both, littered with forests, rivers and marshes all infested with partisans.  
If Minsk held, then German reserves could be deployed quickly, in a relatively 
organised manner, enabling the Germans to establish a defensive position on the 
Berezina.  It was this strategic issue that made the operational question of 
Baranovichi so important, for without Baranovichi, the German position around 
Minsk would be pre-empted and seriously compromised.  If Minsk fell, Army 
Group Centre faced collapse and with it a German strategic crisis on the Eastern 
Front.  Therefore, the strategic question of Minsk was directly related to the 
operational question of 1st Belorussian Front’s deep operations on Slutsk and 
Baranovichi.  This is why Rokossovskiy had prioritised the acquisition of 
operational depth rather than the destruction of German troops in the Bobruisk 
pocket. 
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The 1st Belorussian Front was also connected to the fate of Fourth German Army, 
deployed east of Minsk, in eastern Belorussia.  By early 26th June 1944, Fourth 
German Army’s position was extremely difficult but not catastrophic.  To the 
north, Third Panzer Army was adrift, pursued by 1st Baltic Front; to the east, 
Fourth German Army was directly engaged by 3rd Belorussian Front, which after 
seventy-two hours had finally managed to punch a hole in Fourth German Army’s 
defences. The 3rd Belorussian Front was about to launch two deep operations 
targeted at Fourth German Army’s operational rear, on the Berezina, east of 
Minsk.  In the south-east, 2nd Belorussian Front confronted Fourth German Army.  
Its three armies, 33rd , 49th and 50th fixed the German forces in continuous, 
attritional fighting.186   
 
Naturally, 3rd Belorussian Front’s deep operations on the Berezina represented a 
serious operational threat to the German idea of a coherent fighting withdrawal.  
By 27th June 1944, it was clear that despite its fighting prowess, on its own Fourth 
German would struggle to contain a combination of 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Front, 
east of the Berezina.  However, although Fourth German Army confronted a 
problematic situation, its position was not utterly hopeless.  Its southern divisions 
were conducting a highly efficient rearguard operation against 2nd Belorussian 
Front.  If Fourth German managed a coherent fighting withdrawal to the Berezina, 
if Baranovichi and Minsk held, then with the help of German reserves there was a 
chance that the German line could be stabilised.   
 
However, in many respects the fate of Fourth German Army was just as 
dependent upon the outcome of 1st Belorussian Front’s deep operations.  By 29th 
June 1944, the imminent collapse of Ninth German Army and 1st Belorussian 
Front’s deep operations were already beginning to exert considerable influence on 
Fourth German Army and Army Group Centre.  A rapid, deep strike by 1st 
Belorussian Front, up the west bank of the Berezina, towards Minsk, could trap 
Fourth German Army, east of the Berezina.  To be gradually pushed out of eastern 
Belorussia by 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Front, while conducting a fighting 
withdrawal, in the psychological expectation of German reserves in Minsk was 
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one thing.  To be trapped east of the Berezina between 2nd and 3rd Belorussian to 
the east and 1st Belorussian Front coming from the south and south-west, risked 
complete annihilation.  If Fourth German Army collapsed, then Army Group 
Centre was lost.  Furthermore, regardless of the situation east of the Berezina, if 
Baranovichi was lost, Army Group Centre would struggle to find sufficient 
reserves to stabilise the German line east of Minsk. 
 
The original Soviet General Staff plan for Bagration of 20th May 1944 formally 
included the idea of 1st Belorussian conducting an obkhod on Minsk.187 Therefore, 
in keeping with the obkhod theory, 1st Belorussian Front’s deep operation on 
Minsk targeted the will of Fourth German Army’s and the brain of Army Group 
Centre.  It began on 28th June 1944, and quickly began to have a psychological 
impact out of all proportion to its actual size.  Rokossovskiy ordered 1st Guards 
Tank Corps to move on Minsk with clear instructions to by-pass enemy 
formations.  On 29th June 1944, 1st Guards Tank Corps by-passed German 
blocking units at Talka, a hundred kilometres south of Minsk, and resumed its 
advance up the Bobruisk-Minsk highway.188  Equally, in keeping with the Stavka 
directive of 31st May 1944,189 Rokossovskiy ordered 3rd Army to systematically 
harass the southern divisions of Fourth German Army.190  As German units 
disengaged from 2nd Belorussian Front’s Mogilev sector they came under attack 
from Gorbatov’s 3rd Army infiltrating the marshes.191  On 30th June 1944, CMG 
Pliyev took Slutsk and moved on the key junctions of Stoltsby and Baranovichi.   
 
In this sense, 1st Belorussian Front’s deep operations south-west of Minsk exerted 
a powerful psychological and physical influence upon the operational situation 
east of Minsk, as well as the strategic fate of Army Group Centre.  Therefore, 
Rokossovskiy’s prioritisation of 1st Belorussian Front’s deep operations and their 
systemic focus transformed the operational and strategic dilemma confronted by 
Fourth German Army and Army Group Centre.  First, 1st Belorussian Front was 
already on the western bank of the Berezina.  Secondly, it was moving north, up 
the Berezina, on Minsk, to cut off Fourth German’s route of escape.  Third, 
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further west, 1st Belorussian Front was in the process of disrupting the movement 
of German reserves into Minsk, to stabilise Army Group Centre.   
 
As early as 27th June 1944, Army Group Centre understood the operational and 
strategic implications of 1st Belorussian Front’s deep operations.  The 12th Panzer 
Division, rushed into Minsk, was not sent east to support Fourth German Army.  
It was sent south to protect the southern approaches to Minsk, against 1st 
Belorussian Front.  Therefore, 
“on 28 June most of the fresh 12th Panzer Division had arrived at Marina 
Gorka on the Ptich River, 50 kilometers northwest of Osipovichi and 55 
kilometers south of Minsk.  The panzer division had three possible 
courses: first, to help delay Panov’s 1st Guards Tank Corps in moving up 
the main road to Minsk from Bobruysk; second, to delay Bakharov’s 9th 
Tank Corps from threatening the southern flank of Tippelskirch’s 4th 
Army; and, third, to move down to Slutsk to help 4th Panzer Division to 
stop the Pliev Horse-Mechanized Group that had broken through north of 
Herrlein’s LV Corps.  The decision was made to use the 12th Panzer 
Division along with Battle Groups von Bergen and Lindig to stop Panov’s 
1st Guards Tank Corps and Batov’s 65th Army at Talka on the main road to 
Minsk.”192 
 
Army Group Centre recognised that Rokossovskiy’s 1st Belorussian Front 
threatened a strategic calamity, whereas 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Front, if they 
could be held on the Berezina, threatened a severe, but manageable operational 
defeat.  In the period 29th June - 2nd July 1944, 12th Panzer fought a series of 
tactical actions that delayed, but did not halt 1st Belorussian Front’s deep 
operations.  Thousands escaped Bobruisk but 12th Panzer was by-passed because 
it could not operate effectively in the marshes and forests west of the Berezina.193  
In contrast, as part of his meticulous preparations, Rokossovskiy had specifically 
trained his armoured forces for such conditions. 
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On 1st July 1944, as 5th Panzer Division fended off 5th Guards Tank Army, other 
units of 3rd Belorussian Front by-passed the German rearguard and took Borisov, 
on the Berezina.  The Fourth German Army was split in two: half on the western 
bank and half on the eastern bank.194  On 3rd July 1944, as 3rd Belorussian forces 
entered Minsk from the north and east, they met up with 1st Belorussian’s 1st 
Guards Tank Corps, coming from the south.195  German units streaming away to 
the south-west from Minsk found their escape routes already severed by 
Rokossovskiy’s CMG Pliyev. It had taken Stoltsby, identified by the General 
Staff as a key objective,196 on 2nd July 1944.197 
 
Operation Bagration represents the pinnacle of Rokossovskiy’s operational career.  
It was an operation that brought together all aspects of Rokossovskiy’s 
operational style with deep operations that shattered the enemy’s operational 
cohesion and undermined his ability to fight effectively.  The 1st Belorussian 
Front played a critical tactical, operational and strategic role in the Belorussian 
Operation turning it from a hugely impressive operational success into a victory of 
shattering strategic proportions.  In short, “for the German army in the east, it was 
a catastrophe of unbelievable proportions, greater than that of Stalingrad, 
obliterating between twenty-five and twenty-eight divisions, 350,000 men in 
all.”198 
 
In conceptual terms, there was little to choose between the systemic nature of 
Rokossovskiy’s deep operations in February and November 1943 with the 
shattering blows he inflicted on the Germans in July 1944.  Rokossovskiy’s deep 
operations were marked by speed and depth designed to shatter the enemy’s 
operational cohesion by targeting systemic points upon which effective enemy 
resistance depended.  At the same time, Rokossovskiy also focussed on the 
psychological turning of German minds by presenting them with the imminent 
threat of catastrophe.  In summary, with greater resources Rokossovskiy was 
finally able to realise the true nature of his deep operations, first revealed in his 
original plan for Operation Kol’tso in December 1942, continued in Belorussia in 
1943 but not refined until 1944-45.   
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CHAPTER 8:  
CONDUCTING THE RED ORCHESTRA 
Operational Synchronisation: Conducting The Orchestra 
Once commissioned by Stavka to conduct an operation, Rokossovskiy was 
essentially cast as composer and conductor.1  Rokossovskiy had to visualise the 
operation and foresee the interaction of individual forces in order to achieve the 
objectives laid down by Stavka.  The ability to create a plan and blend different 
forces together in its execution was the essence of operational art.  It explains why 
creative foresight and meticulous preparations were such an intrinsic element of 
Rokossovskiy’s operational style.  Operational synchronisation, at least in the 
hands of an accomplished commander, was not a mindless attempt to ensure all 
units did the same thing at the same time.  Formations did not duplicate, but 
complement each other in pursuit of the operational objective.  As the conductor 
Rokossovskiy had to blend his forces into an operational whole to achieve the 
operational objective 
 
Once an operation began, the conductor or commander had to synchronise the 
individual parts in order to make them into one coherent whole.  All members of 
an orchestra are capable musicians, but some are more talented and significant 
that others.  Nevertheless, all subject themselves to the conductor, who must cue, 
blend and co-ordinate the various instruments in pursuit of an effective 
performance.  Furthermore, all players accept the authority of the conductor and 
recognise that unscripted individual initiative will produce chaos.  It is the 
commander’s job to pick the right people and the right instruments for the right 
task and to deploy his forces in the right order to maximise their individual 
strengths for the greater benefit of the whole.   
 
Naturally, the music may emphasise one instrument or formation while others 
play a supporting role, but in unison with other instruments, not at their expense.  
Therefore, in a sense, mobile groups were the Red Army soloists, capable of 
devising their own concerto within a wider operation.  The insertion of a mobile 
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group was written into an operational plan but its precise moment was a matter of 
instinct, not a mechanical rendition of notes.  In contrast, as Rokossovskiy’s plan 
for the Orlovka Salient Operation of October 19422 and his report of 21st August 
1943 to the Chief of the General Staff, concerning the Chernigov-Pripyat 
Operation3 reveal, the more methodical deep battle lent itself to a more scripted 
composition than deep operations.   
 
During the inter-war years, a Soviet theorist, N.N. Movchin, defined individual 
army operations as ‘simple’ because an army could only pursue one operational 
objective.  Front operations were labelled as ‘complex’ because they 
simultaneously pursued several goals.4  These questions of operational 
synchronisation, involving the constant juggling of forces, were directly related to 
complex front operations.  Movchin went on to argue that “the theory of a series 
of consecutive operations is the theory of a series of front (complex) operations.”5  
Operation Bagration and the Lublin-Brest Operation of July 1944, simultaneously 
fulfil Movchin’s criteria of successive and highly complex operations, indicating 
the difficulties involved in operational synchronisation, namely conducting the 
orchestra, even under the most favourable conditions. 
 
Operational synchronisation of forces on the scale commanded by Rokossovskiy 
was a highly demanding intellectual task and difficult to achieve in practice.  
Rokossovskiy had to constantly monitor units in relation to each other and the 
operational plan.  If discrepancies arose, Rokossovskiy had to assess if they were 
temporary problems or more fundamental matters that seriously threatened the 
operation.  A serious problem required Rokossovskiy to decide what action to 
take, when, and which forces to slow and which forces to speed up or whether, as 
in the Chernigov-Pripyat Operation of August 1943, to alter the whole operational 
plan.  In this respect, the improvised operation of February 1943 was as 
Rokossovskiy knew full well, entirely at odds with the idea of operational 
simultaneity.  In many respects Rokossovskiy’s ‘command’ of this operation was 
defined by his attempts to impose operational synchronisation.  It proved 
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extremely difficult to conduct the orchestra and blend the instruments at the same 
time as writing the music. 
 
However, in matters of operational synchronisation Rokossovskiy’s judgement 
was invariably sound.  Although, he was a meticulous planner, Rokossovskiy was 
not unreasonably obstinate if an operation was not going according to plan.  
Indeed, within the established parameters of an operational plan Rokossovskiy 
was adept at finessing the operational synchronisation of forces engaged with the 
enemy.  In January 1943, Rokossovskiy changed a core component of Operation 
Kol'tso.  He also intervened in the deep battle of the East Prussian Operation, but 
refrained from major changes in terms of operational synchronisation.  This meant 
that on 17th January 1945, Vol'skiy’s 5th Guards Tank Army was committed on 
schedule, if not as planned.6  In Belorussia between autumn 1943-spring 1944 
Rokossovskiy’s conduct of the Belorussian campaign was marked by the 
outstanding operational synchronisation of his forces.  Equally, in Operation 
Bagration of June 1944, Rokossovskiy’s ability to synchronise the vast force 
under his command reached new heights and played a critical role in the rout of 
Army Group Centre.   
 
Operational synchronisation was the litmus test of operational art and command 
during an operation, a point recognised by Tukhachevskiy.  In essence, 
“mindful of the natural differences in speeds that existed among the various 
combat arms and operational elements, Tukhachevskii focussed the essence 
of generalship at that level on the ability to achieve synchronization within 
the framework of a single operation.”7 
Tukhachevskiy was not a delegator.  He was a charismatic authoritarian.8  At first 
sight Rokossovskiy’s instinct to delegate appeared to flatly contradict 
Tukhachevskiy’s prescription but operational synchronisation was a high priority 
for Rokossovskiy.  He was very critical of South-Western Front’s commander, 
Kirponos, on 26th June 1941, for his failure to synchronise an attack by the front’s 
four mechanised corps.9  Similarly, in the planning and execution of Operation 
Kol’tso, during January 1943, “I was mainly concerned with the question of co-
392 
 
ordination between Batov’s and Christiakhov’s armies.”10  Rokossovskiy’s 
criticism of Vatutin at Kursk amounted to an accusation that Vatutin had failed to 
synchronise and co-ordinate the defensive operation of the Voronezh Front.  To 
Rokossovskiy, the essence of operational command was the ability to receive 
information, analyse it and make decisions based on an overview of the 
operational objective.  It was the operational commander’s job to ensure the 
overall co-ordination of the various battles fought by a Front, in order to achieve 
operational objectives laid down by Stavka.   
 
Figure 123: The Central Front at Kursk indicating the scale of Rokossovskiy’s task in 
synchronising operations. 
(Glantz and House, The Battle of Kursk, 1999, p.  82.) 
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In his memoirs Rokossovskiy explicitly analysed the difference between tactical 
and operational command.  In effect, he defined it as operational synchronisation, 
“the battle of Kursk made me reflect again upon the place of the 
commander.  Many top-ranking generals held the view that the Army or 
Front commander who spent most of his time at the CP, in his 
headquarters was not up to the mark.  This is a view that I cannot accept.  
As I see it there is only one rule: the commander’s place is where he finds 
it better to control his troops.  All through the defensive campaign from 
beginning to end, I had never left my CP.  There I could constantly feel the 
development of events at the front, keep my fingers on the pulse of the 
battle and react promptly to changes in the situation.  I consider that as a 
rule visits to the troops in a complex and highly fluid situation can serve 
no useful purpose; on the contrary, the Front commander is likely to lose 
sight of the overall picture, making it impossible for him to lead his forces 
correctly, and this may lead to defeat.  This is not to say, of course, that the 
commander should in all circumstances sit it out at his headquarters.  The 
commander’s presence among the troops can be of tremendous importance 
- it all depends on the time and situation.”11 
 
At Kursk,12 Rokossovskiy had to synchronise and co-ordinate four separate 
battles as part of one defensive operation.  All four battles, Olkhavotka Ridge, 
Samudorovka, Ponyri and Maloarkhangelsk13 were clearly linked and defeat in 
one could have compromised success in the others, or rendered them 
meaningless, thus jeopardising the entire defensive operation.14  The Wehrmacht 
did not begin the battle of Kursk, Rokossovskiy did.  On the night of 4th –5th 
July 1943, the Central Front captured German sappers, removing Russian mines, 
in the defensive sectors of 13th and 48th Armies.  In the light of questioning 
“they declared that the offensive was scheduled to start at 03.00hrs and German 
forces had already occupied the line of departure.”15  Rokossovskiy faced a 
dilemma.  Kursk had been planned as a defensive operation, yet Rokossovskiy 
had the chance to tactically pre-empt Ninth German Army.   
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There was no time to contact Moscow and Zhukov, not a man known for his 
inclination to delegate, ‘generously’ left the decision, and the responsibility, to 
Rokossovskiy.  Rokossovskiy “ordered the Front Chief of Artillery to open fire 
at once.”16  Central Front’s pre-emptive barrage did little physical damage to 
Ninth German Army, but it must have been a disconcerting psychological 
experience.17  This is often characterised as a bold decision by Rokossovskiy 
and so it was, but it is important to remember that the Germans were going to 
attack.  The battle of Kursk was inevitable: Rokossovskiy in tune with his 
dynamic, creative instincts engaged in a piece of tactical pre-emption, but he did 
not start a battle that did not have to be fought.  It was a bold decision but along 
with other Soviet commanders in the Kursk region, Rokossovskiy had been 
warned on 2nd July 194318 and again, in the early hours of 5th July 1943,19 that 
the German attack was imminent. 
 
 The 48th Army’s battle, on the eastern perimeter at Maloarkangelsk, was less 
intense, but a quick German breakthrough would have threatened the rear of 
Central Front’s forces fighting further west at Ponyri, Samudorovka and 
Olkhavotka Ridge.  Maloarkhangelsk was a significant road and rail junction.  It 
was also on the boundary line of 13th and 48th Army.20  However, this German 
assault was primarily a feint, designed to draw Soviet reserves and attention 
away from the key German objectives, further to the west, namely Ponyri and 
Olkhavotka Ridge.  Rokossovskiy had anticipated this: the village of 
Maloarkhangelsk was strongly defended, but he did not unduly commit his 
forces. 
 
During the defensive phase of the Central Front’s operations at Kursk (5th-10th 
July 1943), at different times all of Rokossovskiy’s army commanders requested 
reserves, but as an operational commander, Rokossovskiy had to synchronise all 
four battles, not just one, react to current events but also anticipate the likely 
course of the individual battles and how their interaction affected the Central 
Front’s ability to carry out its defensive operation.  The truly formidable nature of 
395 
 
ensuring the operational synchronisation of forces fighting four separate battles in 
an engagement of this magnitude is revealed by the archival evidence concerning 
Rokossovskiy’s command at Kursk.   
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Figure 124: The Four Simultaneous Battles of the Central Front’s 
Defensive Operation at Kursk: 5th -10th July 1943. 
(Stephen Walsh) 
 
At 10.30 on 5th July 1943, Rokossovskiy informed his army commanders that 
three German infantry divisions and three panzer divisions were attacking 13th 
Army, across its whole front.  He issued orders that 2nd Tank Army should 
concentrate its forces for a counter-attack, approximately eighteen hours later, at 
dawn on 6th July 1943.  The counter-attack was to be launched against German 
forces assaulting 13th Army’s left flank.21 It was to be a co-ordinated counter-
attack, delivered in conjunction with 13th Army.22  At 01.00 hours on 6th July 
1943, Rokossovskiy reported to Stavka that the main German assault was focused 
on 13th, 48th and 70th Army, in particular N.P. Pukhov’s 13th Army, being attacked 
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by 400 German tanks.  Since midnight on 5th July 1943, Rokossovskiy’s staff had 
counted 2220 air attacks by Luftwaffe units operating in groups ranging from 15-
150 aircraft.  Yet, in the western section of the Kursk salient, 65th and 60th Army 
reported that their sectors were not under sustained assault.23   
 
At the same time, in the period 5th-8th July 1943, on 13th Army’s right wing, a 
battle of extraordinary intensity developed for possession of Ponyri.24  Ponyri was 
an important regional rail junction, on the centre right of 13th Army’s defensive 
position, while the Olkhavotka Ridge lay 10 miles west of Ponyri.  This high 
ground, especially Hill 274, dominated the surrounding area, as far south as the 
town of Kursk.  Rokossovskiy had anticipated the nature of the German attack and 
implemented variant No.2, of his plan.25  In the next three days, the Central 
Front’s 13th Army, especially 307th Division,26 fought a ferocious battle for 
Ponyri.  Time after time German forces attacked, were driven back or secured part 
of the town, only to lose it to Soviet counter-attacks.   
 
In his report to Stavka, given at 22.00 hours on 6th July 1943, Rokossovskiy 
indicated that fierce fighting had developed for Ponyri.  The 307th Division had 
suffered heavy losses and he had sent reserves, 81st Infantry Division, to support it 
and maintain cohesion with 48th Army’s left wing, which had also been attacked 
five times.27 In the next three days, 5th-8th July 1943, Ponyri changed hands 
several times.  However, while Rokossovskiy gave reserves to 13th Army, he did 
not become inordinately pre-occupied by events at Ponyri at the expense of 
Samudorovka and Olkhavotka, especially Olkhavotka Ridge.  These 
Rokossovskiy correctly discerned were the main German objectives and the key 
to operational victory or defeat.  If these were lost, a tactical victory at Ponyri 
would be of little account.   
 
In the same report, Rokossovskiy revealed 13th Army had regrouped, but 2nd Tank 
Army’s counter-attack had met heavy opposition, led by Tiger tanks.  The Soviet 
107th Tank Brigade lost sixty-seven tanks.28  However, although 2nd Tank Army 
had not driven the Germans back, it had stifled their assault, with part of 2nd Tank 
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Army, 16th Tank Corps holding the critical high ground, Hill 274, between Ponyri 
to the east and the Olkhavotka Ridge to the west.29  At the same time as 
Rokossovskiy was monitoring the battle for Ponyri, 13th Army and 2nd Tank 
Army’s counter-attack, the 70th Army30, came under attack from two German 
infantry divisions with one hundred tanks.  Equally, further to the east at 11.30, 3rd 
Tank Corps had engaged in a tank battle.31   
 
It is important to understand this all happened on one day, 6th July 1943.  It is 
highly unlikely that Rokossovskiy had much sleep between the interrogation of 
German prisoners in the early hours of 5th July 1943 and the time he delivered his 
report to Stavka at 22.00 hours on 6th July 1943.32  This sequence of events vividly 
reveals the sheer complexity of operational command as well as the punishing 
physical and psychological demands of operational synchronisation.  
Rokossovskiy’s commitment to delegation and the use of initiative by his 
commanders, within clear parameters, made his practical system of operational 
synchronisation compatible with Tukhachevskiy’s theoretical concept.   
 
On 7th July 1943, the Central Front fought defensive battles across the entire 
northern face of the Kursk salient.  It was fighting seven German infantry 
divisions and five panzer divisions.  Simultaneous fighting raged to the east at 
Ponyri, where 13th Army faced five assaults, and in the west, where German 
troops attacked the junction of 70th and 2nd Tank Army, near Samudorovka in 
search of Hill 257, where according to Rokossovskiy, the Germans attacked 
sixteen times.  The fighting was ferocious but Rokossovskiy reported to Stavka 
that “all enemy attacks in the course of the day were successfully repelled by 
our troops.”33  The Central Front was being gradually forced back but its front 
had not been pierced.  However, at Ponyri and Olkhovatka “the eighth of July 
proved to be the crisis point in both key sectors of the Soviet defense north of 
Kursk.”34 
 
On 8th July 1943, Ninth German Army made a monumental attempt to break the 
Soviet resistance at Samudorovka and Ponyri.  On Hill 257, 17th Guards Rifle 
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Corps, supplied with timely reserves by Rokossovskiy,35 fought 20th and 4th 
Panzer Division to a standstill.  Soviet troops conceded ground but held the line 
against four German assaults.  At Ponyri, on 8th July 1943, 307th Division, 
exhausted after 72 hours of fighting began to wilt.36  Finally, German troops 
captured most of Ponyri, but thanks to 18th Guards Rifle Corps and 3rd Tank Corps 
their progress was contained.  A similarly bitter struggle developed west of 
Ponyri, where 2nd Tank Army and 70th Army fought for the Olkhovatka Ridge and 
Samudorovka.37  
 
On the left, at 08.00 hours, on 8th July 1943, 13th Army came under fierce attack 
from three German infantry divisions and four hundred tanks, supported by 
airpower and heavy artillery.  After five German attacks, Hill 257, four kilometres 
north of the Olkhavotka Ridge was taken.  Simultaneously, to the west 
Rokossovskiy had to contend with a massive German attack that smashed into the 
right wing of 70th Army.  After artillery preparation and Luftwaffe bombing over 
two hundred tanks led by 4th Panzer Division and the Tigers of 505th Panzer 
Detachment smashed into the Russian lines.  In the course of thirteen attacks, the 
Germans cut through to Samudorovka and the village of Teploe.  It is clear from 
his report that Rokossovskiy was seriously concerned about developments in this 
sector.38 
 
Yet, ironically, although Rokossovskiy could not know it at the time, by the end 
of 8th July 1943, the Soviet crisis on the northern face of the Kursk bulge had 
actually peaked.  Nevertheless, on 9th July 1943, stubborn but indecisive fighting 
for Ponyri continued, while another massive German aerial and ground assault on 
the Olkhavotka Ridge was beaten off.  Rokossovskiy reported that heavy fighting 
had taken place, mainly in 13th and 70th Army’s sectors, but, that in contrast to the 
8th July 1943 the Germans did not achieve success.39   
 
In summary, at Ponyri Olkhavotka, Samudorovka and Maloarkhangelsk, Ninth 
German Army ground out tactical successes but did not achieve an operational 
breakthrough.  By 10th July 1943, in all four battles, the Central Front had either 
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prevailed or fought the Ninth German Army to a standstill.  This amounted to a 
significant operational victory.  The Central Front’s defensive operation was an 
extraordinarily demanding phase of fighting.  Yet, Rokossovskiy managed to 
synchronise the operation in a relatively efficient manner that bought time and a 
degree of control to the Central Front’s operation.  The Central Front faced 
several crises, but its defensive battles were not marked by the degree of 
improvised panic that seemed to infect the Voronezh Front.  This is not to suggest 
that Rokossovskiy’s operational synchronisation was exemplary.  The Central 
Front’s counter-attacks on 6th July 1943 stalled the Germans in a tactical sense, 
but did not achieve all their objectives, partly because 2nd Tank Army deployed 
and attacked in a piecemeal fashion, either because its commanders were 
lacklustre or Rokossovskiy did not issue his orders in a timely manner.40  
However, on the whole, Rokossovskiy’s operational synchronisation of the 
Central Front, through five days of ferocious fighting, was calm and efficient. 
 
The significance of the Lublin-Brest Operation has been overshadowed by the 
destruction of Army Group Centre in Operation Bagration and the Warsaw 
Uprising of August 1944.  The Lublin-Brest Operation began on 18th July 1944.41  
It was carried out by the left wing of Rokossovskiy’s 1st Belorussian Front and 
explicitly planned as a successive operation to exploit the success of 1st 
Belorussian Front’s right wing in Operation Bagration.42  The 1st Belorussian 
Front’s deep operations were carried out in an operational climate where 
Rokossovskiy’s forces clearly controlled the tactical and operational initiative.  At 
the end of July 1944, the Lublin-Brest Operation had been successful.  Lublin had 
been taken and two bridgeheads at Magnuszew and Pulawy had been established 
over the Vistula.  Yet, Rokossovskiy’s ability to synchronise his forces was tested 
to the limit as he sought to reconcile the competing needs of his forces in order to 
achieve the ambitious objectives set by Stavka.   
 
On 18th July 1944, Chuikov’s 8th Guards Army broke the German line.  
Rokossovskiy launched 2nd Tank Army on a deep operational manoeuvre 
supported by several mobile corps.  The 2nd Tank Army was to split the German 
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front, scatter opposition, strike deep for Lublin and then move on the Vistula, east 
of Warsaw.  Simultaneously, other 1st Belorussian Front forces, 8th Guards Army 
and 69th Army, were to force the Vistula at Magnuszew and Pulawy respectively.  
In addition, 70th Army and 47th Army, in conjunction with 11th Tank Corps was to 
advance on the key road, rail and communications point of Brest.  As if this was 
not enough, 1st Belorussian Front’s right-wing was expected to capitalise on the 
German’s pre-occupation with the Lublin-Brest Operation.  It was to fight through 
the forests of Belorussia before establishing a bridgehead over the River Narev, 
north of Warsaw.  This was certainly as Movchin would have termed it a 
‘complex’ operation.  Speed was essential, both to exploit the German disorder in 
the wake of Bagration, but also to bounce the Vistula and pre-empt the ability of 
German reserves to stabilise the situation. 
 
Rokossovskiy’s operational synchronisation of his forces was made even more 
‘complex’ because Stavka took away two of his right wing armies.  On 4th July 
1944, it ordered the transfer of 3rd Army, all ten divisions, to 2nd Belorussian 
Front.43  The 3rd Army was to assist 49th Army in the pursuit of German troops 
and in mopping up drifting pockets.44  It was not returned.   Equally, on 19th July 
1944, the day after the Lublin-Brest Operation began Stavka ordered that 61st 
Army was to be placed in Stavka reserve.45 In addition, 70th Army was to be taken 
into reserve after the fall of Brest.46  Therefore, despite being in complete control 
of the tactical and operational initiative, Rokossovskiy did not have enough forces 
to achieve the objectives set by Stavka.  This lack of correlation between ends and 
means became particularly acute when significant German reserves deployed east 
of Warsaw and the Vistula.  The problems Rokossovskiy encountered in late July 
and early August 1944 indicate the sheer complexity and intellectual demands of 
operational synchronisation on this scale, with insufficient forces in a fluid, fast 
moving, but unlike Kursk, generally benign and favourable operational 
environment.  It was a formidable test of Rokossovskiy’s operational art.   
 
In the last days of July 1944, Chuikov’s 8th Guards Army approached the Vistula.  
In a good example of delegation and empowerment, Rokossovskiy allowed 
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Chuikov to choose his own crossing site at Magnuszew.  However, a series of 
contradictory orders from Rokossovskiy, initially authorising 8th Guards Army to 
advance, then stop, then advance again, before halting on, but not crossing the 
Vistula, illustrate that Rokossovkiy was facing significant problems in the 
operational synchronisation of 1st Belorussian Front.47  It was highly unusual for 
Rokossovskiy to act in this manner, for as Kursk, Belorussia in autumn 1943 and 
Bagration demonstrated he was invariably highly adept in matters of operational 
synchronisation.  In fact, Rokossovskiy was deeply concerned that events to the 
north of Chuikov’s 8th Guards Army might leave it isolated on the western bank, 
if it crossed the Vistula.   
 
On 26th July 1944, Rokossovskiy received intelligence indicating there maybe 
substantial German reserves in the Warsaw region.48  However, two days later at 
24.00 hours on 28th July 1944, Stavka issued still more ambitious orders to 
Rokossovskiy.  In the wake of the fall of Brest, 1st Belorussian Front’s right-wing 
was to develop its offensive on Warsaw.  It was to seize control of Praga, the 
eastern suburb of Warsaw where Rokossovskiy had lived as a boy and establish a 
bridgehead, over the Narev, north of Warsaw, at Pulutsk, in co-operation with 2nd 
Belorussian Front with a view to future operations in Poland and East Prussia.49 
Simultaneously, 1st Belorussian Front was also to establish a bridgehead in the 
centre of its front, south of Warsaw, at Deblin.  These objectives were to be 
achieved no later than 5th-8th August 194450 and bore no relation to reality.  To 
make matters even more difficult, at 24.00 hours on 29th July 1944, Stavka issued 
another directive that bore the unmistakable personal imprint of Stalin.  It was 
issued to Rokossovskiy of 1st Belorussian and Konev at 1st Ukrainian Front.  It 
demanded the forcing of the Vistula and stressed that massive importance and 
great significance attached to this task, the essential nature of which was to be 
impressed upon all commanders.  It emphasised those first across the Vistula 
would be in line for the coveted status of Hero of the Soviet Union.51  
 
Therefore, in late July 1944, despite the apparently seamless progress of the 
Lublin-Brest Operation, Rokossovskiy had much to consider.  In a period of little 
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more than twenty-four hours, Rokossovskiy faced key decisions concerning 8th 
Guards Army’s assault over the Vistula at Magnuszew, the presence of significant 
German reserves east of Warsaw, 69th Army’s assault on the Vistula at Pulawy 
and a major German counter-attack.  All this against a backdrop of increasingly 
strident demands from Stavka and Stalin based on the assumption that Warsaw 
would be taken.  In these circumstances, rather than hesitant, Rokossovskiy’s 
authorisation of 8th Guards Army to cross the Vistula at Magnuszew was a bold 
decision.   
 
These objectives demanded the careful operational synchronisation of 1st 
Belorussian Front’s forces as they approached the Vistula, in order to ensure that 
they could provide mutual support.  This would disperse German reserves and 
increase the chances of a sustainable operational crossing of the Vistula and the 
Narev, rather than creating a set of isolated, tactical bridgeheads.  It was the 
complexities of operational synchronisation in such circumstances that provoked 
Rokossovskiy’s contradictory orders to Chuikov.  It is not surprising, given his 
tactical perspective that Chuikov was irritated by Rokossovskiy’s contradictory 
orders and being forced to give up three divisions to help 2nd Tank Army, while 
8th Guards Army was battling for the Magnuszew bridgehead.52 To Chuikov, an 
army commander, it was as Movchin put it a ‘simple’ matter, but for 
Rokossovskiy, as a front commander charged with the operational 
synchronisation, it was definitely a ‘complex’ affair. 
 
On 29th July 1944, 2nd Tank Army received intelligence53 that German panzer 
divisions were in the area, but carried on its advance.On 30th July 1944, as 2nd 
Tank Army’s spearheads approached Warsaw54 the world assumed the fall of 
Warsaw to Rokossovskiy’s 1st Belorussian Front was imminent.  However, on 1st 
August 1944, in dire need of logistic replenishment, 2nd Tank Army came under 
attack between ten and twelve times55 from the Herman Goring, SS Viking, SS 
Totenkopf and elements of the 4th and 19th Panzer Divisions.  On 3rd August 
1944, these attacks evolved into a sustained counter-offensive.56  The 2nd Tank 
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Army was driven back fifty miles from the Vistula and 3rd Guards Tank Corps 
more or less destroyed.57   
 
Furthermore, in addition to the events immediately east of Warsaw, Rokossovskiy 
had to monitor events east and north-east of Warsaw where 1st Belorussian Front’s 
right wing was facing renewed German resistance.  On 16th July 1944, two days 
before the Lublin-Brest Operation, Rokossovskiy had ordered 70th Army and 
CMG Pliyev to take Brest.58  Brest was a major fortified German defence region 
and a highly significant road, rail and communications centre.  Its capture would 
undermine the German aim of rebuilding their front in western Belorussia and 
enable Rokossovskiy to unify the two wings of the stretched 1st Belorussian Front, 
giving him more scope to synchronise the approach to the Vistula.   
 
On 17th July 1944, CMG Pliyev reached the western Bug and cut German 
communications between Brest and Bialystok.59  CMG Pliyev began “deeply 
enveloping the enemy’s Brest Fortified Region from the north-west.”60  
Rokossovskiy had ordered the encirclement and annihilation of Brest because he 
assumed, given its defensive importance, the Germans would fight to the bitter 
end.  He would have preferred a major turning move to maintain operational 
momentum, but the loss of 61st Army on 19th July 1944, in addition to 3rd Army 
meant he did not have forces of sufficient power to induce the Germans to 
abandon Brest.  Rokossovskiy was relying on the psychological momentum of 
Bagration and the progress of the Lublin-Brest Operation towards the Vistula, 
deep in the rear of Brest, to turn German minds.  However, he did not have the 
physical forces required to make that psychological unease sufficiently 
compelling to induce a withdrawal.   
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Figure 125: The challenge of synchronising 1st Belorussian Front’s two wings in late July 1944 
on the approach to Warsaw. 
(Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 1995, p.  200.) 
 
This also meant, should the Germans fight for Brest, its reduction would take time 
and further increase the gap between the 1st Belorussian Front’s right and left 
wing, making the operational synchronisation of 1st Belorussian Front 
increasingly difficult and ‘complex’.  On 22nd July 1944, 70th Army cut the road 
west of Brest and “all that remained to complete the encirclement was to link the 
70th Army up with units from the cavalry mechanized group.”61  However, 
“the German command undertook every possible measure to hold on to 
Brest.  Thus, the front’s forces, which were operating on both sides of the 
Pripiat River, were deprived of the opportunity to link up, and the road to 
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Warsaw was blocked to them.  The German forces at Brest resisted our 
advancing formations stubbornly.”62 
The encirclement at Brest began on 22nd July 1944.  It lasted until 28th July 194463 
because  “eight German divisions, the remnants of the German Second and Ninth 
Army, hung on to Brest-Litovsk for as long as possible, the garrison reinforced 
with tanks moved up from Warsaw.”64 This delay proved crucial in ensuring the 
relative isolation of 2nd Tank Army on 31st July 1944 as it approached Warsaw.  It 
was proving impossible for Rokossovskiy to synchronise the left and right wing of 
1st Belorussian Front. 
 
To complicate matters still further on 23rd July 1944, in the forests of Belorussia, a 
German counter-attack crashed into Batov’s 65th Army.  The situation was 
rectified but required a visit to 65th Army in order to clarify the situation and 
assess the implications.65  Furthermore, on 26th July 1944, Rokossovskiy ordered 
Cavalry-Mechanised Group Sokolov, containing 11th Tank Corps and Kryukov’s 
2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, to capture the important junction of Siedlce66 off the 
march before marching on the Vistula, an order that demonstrates Rokossovskiy 
understood the need to close up the two wings of 1st Belorussian Front.  Siedlce 
was sixty miles west of Brest-Litovsk and a key supply route.  It is likely that 
Rokossovskiy was trying to use this assault on Siedlce to deepen the sense of 
physical and psychological isolation of the Brest garrison.  However, 11th Tank 
Corps’ attempt to bounce the town met fierce resistance.67  It forced CMG 
Sokolov to formally assault Siedlce.  It did not fall until 31st July 1944, the same 
day that 2nd Tank Army was hit by the German counter-attack. 
 
Thus, in the last week of July 1944, Rokossovskiy had a lot to co-ordinate.  As a 
result, the synchronised advance on the Vistula, Warsaw and the Narev did not 
materialise.  There were several reasons for this.  First, bitter German resistance 
undermined the ambitious timetable Stavka had set for 1st Belorussian Front.  
Second, because Stavka deprived Rokossovskiy of 3rd and 61st Armies, in the last 
ten days of July 1944, the right-wing of 1st Belorussian Front on the Brest-Siedlce 
axis was robbed of fighting power just as German resistance was strengthening.  
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Third, the right-wing of 1st Belorussian had already been in action for nearly a 
month.  If Rokossovskiy had retained 3rd Army, a well led and powerful army 
with ten divisions, in conjunction with 61st Army, these two armies could have 
invested the encirclement of Brest with substantially greater power, thereby 
releasing CMG Sokolov, 65th Army and 48th Army for an advance on the Vistula 
and Narev, a line they did not actually reach until early September 1944.68  It then 
faced a bitter battle to hold the Narev bridgehead.  69This combination of factors 
meant Rokossovskiy struggled to synchronise the two wings of 1st Belorussian 
Front.  The main body of the left wing, 47th ,69th ,1st Polish and 8th Guards Army 
gave each other mutual support and Rokossovskiy synchronised their approach to 
the Vistula well.  However, 2nd Tank Army on the northern edge of the left-wing, 
closest to Warsaw, was particularly exposed by the failure of 1st Belorussian 
Front’s right-wing to close up to the Vistula.   
 
In summary, operational synchronisation was an essential quality of operational 
art.  At Kursk, in Belorussia, Bagration and later in East Prussia during January 
1945, Rokossovskiy proved himself a master of reading the field.  However, in the 
last week of July 1944, Rokossovskiy’s ability to synchronise his forces 
confronted the basic fact that, despite the enormous size of 1st Belorussian Front, 
he did not have enough forces to achieve the objectives set by Stavka.  It was not 
the first or last time, that Rokossovskiy would face significant challenges in the 
operational synchronisation of his forces due to Stavka’s inability to correlate 
ends and means.  If anything, the East Prussian Operation of January 1945 would 
present Rokossovskiy with even greater challenges in terms of operational 
synchronisation.  Nevertheless, the Lublin-Brest Operation reveals the 
considerable intellectual demands of synchronising a ‘complex’ front operation. 
 
Operational Momentum: Harmonisation of Attrition and Manoeuvre 
The initial momentum of a Soviet operation was generated by a combination of 
maskirovka, surprise and localised tactical annihilation.  This permitted a swift 
transition to deep operational manoeuvre.  It was essential that this tactical 
momentum turned into sustainable operational momentum.  Operational 
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momentum had a clear physical expression, but it was also a psychological 
phenomenon aimed at the enemy commander’s mind.  A force advancing deep 
into the enemy operational rear had the ability to deny the enemy time and to 
disrupt the organisation of enemy counterblows.  In numerous operations such as 
the crossing of the Dnepr in September 1943, the Belorussian operations of 
autumn 1943, CMG Pliyev in Operation Bagration during June-July 1944 and 
East Prussia in January 1945, Rokossovskiy’s operational momentum was able to 
keep German forces off balance by pre-empting, surprising and disrupting the 
enemy.   
 
In essence, “a lively tempo helps to gain time, creates unexpected situations for 
the enemy, ensures the initiative and deprives the enemy of taking steps to stem 
the progress of the offensive.”70  This statement effectively summarises 
Rokossovskiy’s attitude to operational momentum.  However, it was also argued 
after the war that, 
“a Front operation should progress without interruption.  Victory is 
achieved by a series of powerful blows delivered with increasing 
momentum.  The art of conducting an operation consists in the 
achievement of continuity of blows of ever increasing force.  The final 
blow should be the mightiest blow.”71 
 
Rokossovskiy’s attempts to synchronise the operations of 1st Belorussian Front in 
July 1944, were also undermined by the significant disparity in operational 
momentum between the left and right wing.  The right wing lacked the forces, 
fresh or otherwise, to inject momentum into the deep operations of 1st Belorussian 
Front when it encountered sustained resistance at Brest.  In contrast, the 2nd Tank 
Army had the mobility to surge ahead, but when it met serious opposition it did 
not have the fighting power to sustain the momentum of its advance.  
Rokossovskiy’s meticulous preparations were related to his dislike of operational 
pauses, but his operational career clearly indicates that the last blow of an 
operation was often the weakest, not the mightiest, as demonstrated by 2nd Tank 
Army’s experiences, east of Warsaw in July 1944.  It was the natural unravelling 
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of fighting power as units sustained heavy casualties and moved away from their 
supply bases.  Therefore, operational momentum was linked to a logistical reality 
that commanders ignored at their peril, as well as the natural exhaustion of units.  
In summary, increasing casualties, diminished supplies and greater enemy 
opposition all combined to place natural limits on an operation and undermine 
operational momentum.  The ragged operations east of Warsaw not withstanding, 
Rokossovskiy’s operational command was marked by a desire to create 
sustainable operational momentum and curtail operations before exhaustion 
undermined the ability to retain control of objectives. 
 
In response to the perceived need for operational momentum, Soviet theory 
emphasised the idea of deeply echeloned forces.  During the inter-war years, 
Isserson had argued that depth in deployment was an essential pre-requisite of 
operational momentum.  It was argued that “offensive combat demands a constant 
supply of manpower from depth.  Therefore, the structure of combat order must 
be deeply echeloned and in correspondence with the depth of the enemy’s 
defences.”72  However, the massive losses of 1941 had significant implications for 
Red Army’s ability to develop operational momentum in the style of deep 
operations favoured by Rokossovskiy.  In simple terms from August 1941- 
August 1943,73 the Red Army did not have enough formations of sufficient 
balance, fighting power and speed, under effective leaders, to sustain the 
operational momentum.  By 1944-45, Rokossovskiy possessed a powerful array of 
mobile forces 74capable of conducting deep operations.75  Equally, the greater 
mobility of Soviet infantry and artillery produced a significant rise in the speed, 
tempo, mobility and fighting power of Soviet deep operation forces.   
 
Rokossovskiy’s understanding of operational momentum was not just concerned 
with the speed of leading formations but the whole fighting force.  As the 
adventures of Kryukov’s 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps in February 1943 indicated, 
genuine operational momentum was not simply a product of speed and mobility 
but also fighting power.  This was also a constant problem for Rokossovskiy in 
Belorussia in autumn 1943, but on 21st July 1944, a brigade sized forward 
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detachment, used by 2nd Tank Army to flush out German infantry, was able to 
develop a momentum out of all proportion to its size.76  The forward detachment 
had agility and speed, but its fighting power and momentum were derived from its 
parent formation 2nd Tank Army.  On its own, a forward detachment was simply a 
nuisance, buzzing around the German lines.   
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Figure 126: Harmonisation of attrition and manoeuvre through the use of front and army level 
mobile groups in conjunction with field armies: 14th-26th January 1945. 
(Stephen Walsh) 
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Operational momentum was developed, increased and sustained in the Lublin-
Brest Operation of 1944 and the East Prussian Operation of 1945, because 
Rokossovskiy had several mobile corps capable of army level deep operations, as 
well as 2nd Tank Army and 5th Guards Tank Army capable of front level 
operations.  Indeed, in many ways these corps released the tank armies for 
genuinely deep operational strikes that generated operational momentum by 
shattering the enemy’s operational, not just tactical cohesion.  By 1944-45, the 
greater mobility and firepower of a whole Soviet front, not just its mobile groups, 
had a significant impact on operational momentum.  It meant Rokossovskiy could 
launch deep operations confident in his ability to marshal the latent fighting power 
of the entire front, the end of the Lublin-Brest Operation being a salutary 
exception to this rule.   
 
In East Prussia, the operational momentum of 2nd Belorussian Front was sustained 
in the teeth of bitter opposition, by a combination of  combat power and mobility.  
On 18th January 1945, 48th Army and 5th Guards Tank Army worked in tandem to 
smash through the East Prussian border and capture the key operational objective 
of Mlava.77  Two days later they co-operated in taking the town of Neidenburg.78 
These events generated significant operational momentum for 2nd Belorussian 
Front.  Equally, after 2nd Shock Army’s difficult positional and attritional start to 
the East Prussian Operation, its close co-operation with 8th Guards Tank Corps79 
provided a more balanced combination of attrition and manoeuvre.  This gave 2nd 
Shock Army greater operational momentum.  On 20th January 1945, as it began to 
harmonise attrition and manoeuvre with 8th Guards Tank Corps, 2nd Shock Army 
advanced 25 kilometres.80  By 22nd January 1945, 2nd Shock Army and 8th Guards 
Tank Corps had crashed through the East Prussian border and taken Deutsch-
Eylau, a key German position.81 On 25th January 1945, 2nd Shock Army advanced 
25 kilometres and was approaching Marienburg from the south, while 8th 
Mechanised Corps its new partner, was enveloping Marienburg from the north-
east, with 8th Guards Tank Corps as 2nd Shock Army’s reserve.82  At 21.00 hours, 
on 25th January 1945, 2nd Shock’s Army commander, Lt.General Fedyuninskiy 
reported that 2nd Shock was fighting its way into Marienburg from the south and 
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8th Mechanised from the north.83 In six days, since 20th January 1945, it had 
advanced of 60 kilometres.   
 
The key to Rokossovskiy’s operational momentum was the ability to harmonise 
attrition and manoeuvre, both within individual formations and the Front as a 
whole.  Indeed, “just as attack and defence are, at first sight, opposed concepts, 
which in fact exhibit constant interaction and harmony, so are manoeuvre and 
attrition.”84 The ability to harmonise attrition and manoeuvre was a particular 
hallmark of Rokossovskiy’s operational command and a key task for any 
operational commander.  The first phase of a Soviet operation, deep battle, was 
predominantly attritional in character, but purely as a means to an end, designed 
to create the right conditions for the second phase of an operation, the deep 
operation.  Deep operations were predominantly manoeuverist in character, but a 
mobile group drew its power and momentum from its combined fighting strength 
and mobility.  In essence, it could harmonise attrition and manoeuvre.85  
 
Indeed, the whole concept of harmonisation and manoeuvre was a central theme 
of Soviet thinking.  It was integral to Triandafillov’s shock army, a force 
specifically designed to conduct attritional battle before embarking on deep 
operations.  In a similar way, Varfolomeyev’s shock front clearly incorporated the 
ideas of attrition and manoeuvre as did Isserson’s massive shock army.  The 
interaction of attrition and manoeuvre was explicitly advocated in the Soviet Field 
Regulations of 1944.  The purpose of attrition was to create the opportunity for 
manoeuvre, with manoeuvre being responsible for creating the chance for further 
attrition.  The 1944 Polevoy Ustav declared that 
“maneuver is one of the most important conditions for achieving success.  
Maneuver consists of the organized movement of troops for the purpose of 
creating the most favourable grouping and in placing this grouping in the 
most favourable position for striking the enemy a crushing blow to gain 
time and space (for manoeuvre).  Maneuver should be simple in 
conception and be carried out secretly, rapidly, and in such a way as to 
surprise the enemy.”86 
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Manoeuvre was used to create a platform for the attrition of deep battle, which in 
turn created the right conditions for operational manoeuvre.  In summary, Soviet 
thinking was not completely dominated by attrition.  This was particularly true of 
Rokossovskiy’s style of command, especially at the operational level. 
 
Rokossovskiy sought to ensure the harmonisation of attrition and manoeuvre for 
the whole front, but also for individual formations within the front.  This ability to 
hold a front together, without curtailing its flexibility, made Rokossovskiy a very 
potent commander.  It demanded foresight and the ability to distinguish between 
transitory factors and more significant ones that could seriously undermine the 
combination of attrition and manoeuvre that generated operational manoeuvre.  In 
December 1941, the Moscow counter-offensive never really generated operational 
momentum because there was no balance between manoeuvre and attrition.  The 
lack of armour, troop exhaustion and deep snow did not help, but many mistakes 
were also made in the counter-offensive.  In January 1943, the lack of 
harmonisation between attrition and manoeuvre seriously undermined Operation 
Kol’tso.  Similarly, in July 1943, the failure of Western, Bryansk and 
Rokossovskiy’s Central Front to strike “the enemy a crushing blow to gain time 
and space”87 made Operation Kutuzov a grinding slog, with no balanced 
interaction between attrition and manoeuvre.88  In contrast, Rokossovskiy’s 
effective harmonisation of attrition and manoeuvre played a key role in the 
success of the Belorussian Operation, the Lublin-Brest Operation, East Prussia 
and East Pomerania. 
 
Rokossovskiy intensely disliked prolonged attrition but was also uneasy about 
mobile groups that became disconnected from the main body.  Rokossovskiy’s 
desire to keep his front together did not mean he imposed a straitjacket on his 
commanders.  He was not an unduly cautious commander, but Rokossovskiy 
appreciated that deep operations drew their power from the latent strength of the 
whole front as much as their own mobility and fighting power.  The main forces 
of Rokossovskiy’s front would rapidly close up and consolidate the position in 
order to defend it against enemy counter-attacks.  It was this harmonisation of 
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attrition and manoeuvre, in conjunction with operational synchronisation of the 
whole front that marked the crossing of the Dnepr in September 1943, the 
Belorussian operations of 1943 and Operation Bagration.  In this sense, the 
isolation and exhaustion of 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps in February 1943 and 2nd 
Tank Army in July 1944 were anomalies in Rokossovskiy’s operational 
command, anomalies that appear to have influenced his handling of 2nd 
Belorussian Front in the German campaign of 1945. 
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Figure 127: Harmonisation of attrition and manoeuvre to generate operational 
momentum in the East Pomeranian Operation; 10th -30th March 19945. 
(Stephen Walsh) 
 
During the East Pomeranian Operation of February-March 194589 Rokossovskiy 
made a conscious effort to hold 2nd Belorussian Front together.  A.P.  Panfilov’s 
3rd Guards Tank Corps surged ahead but Rokossovskiy took a closer grip than 
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normal “sometimes even slowing down the tank corps’s advance when a risk 
arose of it being cut off from the main forces.”90  Rokossovskiy ordered Panfilov 
to consolidate, while, “simultaneously I instructed Romanovsky(sic) to speed up 
the advance of his units.”91  Rokossoskiy’s front was stretched “indeed for the 
first time in my experience as a Front commander, I had been left without 
reserves, and I must say that I did not like it at all.”92  
 
Rokossovskiy’s aim was to generate sustainable operational momentum by 
harmonising attrition and manoeuvre.  Rokossovskiy’s foresight enabled 19th 
Army and 3rd Guards Tank Corps to win a pitched battle at Rummelsberg.  In the 
wake of Rummelsberg, Rokossovskiy unleashed a deep operation very much in 
keeping with his operational style.  By 5th March 1945, 
“units of the 3rd Guards Tank Corps reached the Baltic Sea, slicing the 
enemy’s East Pomeranian group in half.  A messenger arrived at HQ with 
three bottles of clear liquid, a gift from Panfilov’s tankmen to the Front 
Military Council.  Curious, we tasted it.  It was water, brackish water 
smelling of seaweed.  Water from the Baltic Sea.”93 
 
The harmonisation of attrition and manoeuvre became easier as the war developed 
because of the greater power and mobility of Soviet forces.  However, as 
Rokossovskiy’s problems east of Warsaw in July 1944 indicate, the generation of 
operational momentum through the harmonisation of attrition and manoeuvre was 
not an elementary matter of procedure.  There was a significant interaction 
between operational synchronisation, operational momentum, attrition, 
manoeuvre and deep operations.  It was Rokossovskiy’s task as an operational 
commander to keep all these elements in balance.  If one aspect of this matrix was 
substantially out of balance with the rest, such as in Operation Kol’tso, Operation 
Kutuzov and in the later stages of the Lublin-Brest Operation, it had discernible 
consequences for other aspects of an operation. 
 
The most compelling evidence for Rokossovskiy’s desire to harmonise attrition 
and manoeuvre was his consistent aversion to grinding attritional operations or 
415 
 
prolonged positional fighting.  As early as December 1941, Rokossovskiy 
revealed a pronounced dislike of protracted attrition as well as a determination 
that operations should combine attrition and manoeuvre.  In December 1941, in 
the Moscow counter-offensive, Rokossovskiy’s 16th Army endured a rapid 
transition from defensive operations to counter-attack with physically exhausted 
and depleted forces.94 
 
The Moscow counter-offensive was a highly significant strategic event that 
changed the character of World War Two, but there was no rapid attrition, no 
quick breakthrough and no real harmonisation of attrition and manoeuvre.  
Therefore, despite its apparent success, the Russian offensive developed relatively 
little sustainable operational momentum. The Soviet offensive and German 
exhaustion brought German Army Group Centre to the edge of collapse but the 
Red Army bludgeoned its way forward.  The Red Army’s lack of preparation, its 
exhaustion, deep snow and inexperience in major offensive operations all 
undermined its capacity to create and sustain operational momentum.  
Rokossovskiy successfully harmonised attrition and manoeuvre to avoid a 
prolonged positional encounter at Istra, but this was an isolated if impressive 
example.  Subsequntly, Rokossovskiy’s 16th Army confronted a strong German 
defensive position at Volokalamsk that forced shattered troops to grind their way 
forward for every yard of ground, an event that signalled to Rokossovskiy, if not 
Zhukov and Stavka that the Germans were beginning to recover.  The 16th Army’s 
part in the Moscow counter-offensive “ended at the beginning of January.”95 
 
In February 1942, Western Front informed 16th Army that “while holding 
Sukhinichi firmly, the army will engage in offensive operations, continuing to 
wear down the enemy and denying him any opportunity of consolidating firmly 
and building up forces.”96  Rokossovskiy objected to this positional and attritional 
approach: he argued that his forces were exhausted the Germans outnumbered 16th 
Army and were already in strong defensive postions.  Rokossovskiy recalled that 
“all our exhausted troops could do was force the enemy back at one point 
or another at the cost of great efforts and with negligible results.  I 
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frequently visited various sectors and units to investigate the meagre 
results of our offensive actions.  Everything I saw led to the conclusion 
that decisive success was beyond our reach.”97 
In a detailed report to Zhukov, Rokossovskiy posed the question  
“would it not be better, I thought, to make use of the breathing spell we had 
gained to assume the defensive in order to build up forces and means for a 
powerful offensive?”98   
In Rokossovskiy words, “the reply was curt: carry out orders.  There was nothing 
for us to do but work out the ways and means of carrying out our task.”99 
 
In response, Rokossovskiy tried to impose his operational style by ensuring that 
individual battles had realistic objectives and were properly prepared to avoid 
unnecessary losses.  “We had insufficient strength for extensive offensive 
operations, so we decided that in each case we would restrict ourselves to a 
definite, concrete objective.”100  The whole series of minor tactical battles were 
linked together into a coherent operational sequence “because this overall defence 
system suggested the idea of striking consecutively at one point after another, 
concentrating as much strength as possible without excessively weakening other 
sectors.”101  In summary, deprived of the resources to harmonise attrition and 
manoeuvre in pursuit of decisive success, Rokossovskiy did everything to avoid 
prolonged positional attrition.  During February and early March 1942, 
“our Army nibbled steadily at the enemy’s defences, weakening them now 
at one point, now at another.  We were incapable of breaching the front, 
but we methodically pushed it southwards, taking village after village, 
forcing the Germans back to the River Zhizdra.”102 
 
The desire to avoid prolonged attrition in favour of harmonising attrition and 
manoeuvre to create operational momentum was a persistent hallmark of 
Rokossovskiy’s operational style.  On 4th August 1943, he exhorted 70th Army 
and 2nd Tank Army to prevent German reserves from the north and north-west 
interfering with the Central Front’s operations.103  On 6th August 1943, when the 
Central Front finally crossed the Oka, Rokossovskiy emphasised that 3rd Guards 
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Tank Army and 2nd Tank Army must not allow the enemy to settle into new 
defensive lines.104  Finally, on 10th August 1943, as the Central Front began to 
leave behind the grinding attritional advance to the Oka, Rokossovskiy was 
determined that the new operation, planned for 11th August 1943, was not going to 
suffer from lack of operational momentum.  He emphasised three times in his 
orders that the enemy must not be permitted to withdraw to new defensive 
lines.105 
 
In many ways, the most impressive example of Rokossovskiy’s ability to 
harmonise attrition and manoeuvre was the Gomel-Rechitsa Operation (10th-30th 
November 1943.  The Belorussian terrain and extensive German defences meant 
Rokossovskiy was faced with the possibility of a prolonged period of grinding, 
attritional operations.  However, Rokossovskiy brilliantly utilised all of his forces 
in simultaneous attrition and manoeuvre, to generate operational momentum and 
deep operations.  He grasped the initiative and forced the Germans out of key 
positions, splitting the enemy front and undermining German operational 
cohesion.  There was a consistent refusal to pursue attrition as an operational aim 
in itself.  On the contrary, attrition was used as a means to an end in order to 
create opportunities for manoeuvre and deep operations.   
 
The aim of the Gomel-Rechitsa Operation was “to attack from the Loyev 
bridgehead, penetrate the enemy defences, take Rechitsa, Vasilevichi and 
Kalinkovichi and cut into the rear of the enemy’s Gomel group.”106 The Central 
Front was deployed on a front of one hundred and sixty kilometres.  However, 
three forces 63rd Army, 3rd Army and 50th Army covered the northern half, while 
the southern half of the front contained 11th Army, 48th Army, 65th Army and 61st 
Army.107  The main concentration of forces lay with 65th Army, supported by 1st 
Guards Tank Corps and 9th Tank Corps, in addition to 2nd Guards and 7th Guards 
Cavalry Corps’ poised to engage in deep operations.  Rokossovskiy was very keen 
to avoid a grinding, attritional victory that cost more than it gained, 
“What we needed was a bold manoeuvre involving diversionary action to 
mislead the enemy.  The initiative was in our hands and we could well 
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afford the risk of pretending to concentrate forces on one sector of the 
front while preparing to strike on another.  This is just what we did.”108 
 
 
 
Figure 128: The Gomel-Rechitsa Operation and the operational harmonisation of attrition and 
manoeuvre: 10th -30th November 1943. 
(Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin,1987,  p.190.) 
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In order to create active maskirovka Rokossovskiy ordered Fedyuninskiy’s 11th 
Army, east of Gomel, and its northern neighbour 63rd Army, to continuously 
attack “the enemy north of Gomel drawing his attention to the area while we 
prepared the main attack on the Loyev sector.”109  Simultaneously, 48th Army was 
to attack north-east, over difficult terrain, towards Rechitsa.  It lay directly west of 
Gomel on the key Gomel-Rechitsa-Kalinkovichi rail line, a vital strategic point 
that linked Army Group South to Army Group Centre as well as Second and 
Ninth German Armies. 
 
On 10th November 1943, without warning and with German attention focussed on 
Rokossovskiy’s diversions, 65th Army110 surged through German lines and 
launched a deep operation.111  On 18th November 1943, Batov took Rechitsa, 
virtually without a shot being fired, courtesy of a turning move.112  This cut the 
Mozyr-Kalinkovichi-Rechitsa-Gomel rail link, the lifeblood of Second German 
Army’s position.  Therefore, in this one piece of harmonised attrition and 
manoeuvre, Rokossovskiy compromised Gomel and Second German Army’s 
entire position.  Second German Army was threatened indirectly from the west by 
65th Army’s deep operation, directly from the south and west by 48th Army, as 
well as from the east, by 11th Army.  It continued to fight bitterly for Gomel, but 
despite Gomel’s obvious significance, Rokossovskiy refused to be drawn into an 
attritional and positional contest.  It would only give Army Group Centre time to 
marshal reserves, utilise the awkward terrain and stabilise the German position.  
In a classic exposition of deep operations, Rokossovskiy struck deep, confident 
that an advance on key systemic points in the German operational rear would 
increase the Belorussian Front’s operational momentum and eventually 
compromise Second German Army’s ability to hold Gomel, the loss of which 
would involve taking the entire German front back.   
 
After beating off German counter-attacks on 18th November 1943, Rokossovskiy’s 
left wing moved on Kalinkovichi, the supply centre for Second German Army.  If 
Kalinkovichi was lost to a deep operation, Second German Army had just four 
days ammunition and two days fuel.  Rokossovskiy’s move caused consternation 
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in the highest echelons of the German high command.113  On 20th November 
1943, Hitler permitted Second German Army to transfer all areas north of the 
Berezina and east of the Dnepr, an area that included Gomel, to Ninth German 
Army.  In short, in operational terms, Second German Army could not sustain its 
position without Kalinkovichi.  However, once again Rokossovskiy refused to be 
drawn into a prolonged attritional contest.   
 
In order to increase operational momentum, on 22nd November 1943, 
Rokossovskiy gambled. In a dramatic move, ordered his forces, led by 65th Army 
and 1st Guards Tank Corps to strike even deeper.  He ordered them to by-pass 
Kalinkovichi and sever the main Mozyr-Kalinkovichi-Zlobin-Rogachev-Mogilev 
rail line.  This was the main strategic line that connected Army Group Centre and 
Army Group South.114  It was critical to the strategic mobility of German troops 
on the Eastern Front and fed the operational branch lines that sustained Second 
and Ninth German Army.  In operational terms, Rokossovskiy’s aim was to split 
Second and Ninth German Army deployed, respectively, on the southern and 
northern banks of the Berezina-Dnepr confluence.  It was this final systemic blow 
that persuaded Hitler to authorise Second German Army to withdraw from the 
Dnepr in the Gomel region, thus conceding control of an important area of south-
eastern Belorussia.115  In short, Second German Army had been levered out by a 
deep operational strike that combined attrition and manoeuvre to develop 
powerful operational momentum. 
 
As Rokossovskiy synchronised the deep operations on the left wing against 
Second German Army, he stunned Ninth German Army by launching an attack on 
the Belorussian Front’s extreme right wing.  On 19th November 1943, a few days 
earlier, Zeitzler, the Chief of the General Staff, had informed Hitler that “Ninth 
Army believed that nothing will come here.”116  Therefore, 3rd and 50th Army’s 
surprise attack “dealt Ninth Army a staggering blow.”117  It was a brilliant strike 
designed to split and fix Ninth Army, as well as undermine German forces, further 
south, on the River Sozh fighting the Belorussian Front’s middle grouping of 11th, 
63rd and 48th Armies.  It also seriously compromised the Ninth Army forces 
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fighting in the Gomel sector, a sector that it had just taken over from Second 
German Army.  On 25th November 1943, 3rd Army crossed the psychologically 
significant Dnepr at Bykhov.118  Simultaneously, further south, 48th Army carried 
the Berezina-Dnepr confluence119 and once again threatened to split Second and 
Ninth German Armies, thus compromising the whole German front in south-
eastern Belorussia.   
 
On 26th November 1943, the Ninth German Army withdrew from the Gomel 
salient, withdrew from the Sozh and re-established its line on the Dnepr further 
west, utlising the key rail junctions of Zhlobin and Rogachev.  Rokossovskiy 
officially terminated the Gomel-Rechitsa Operation on 30th November 1943,120 
although we now know the fighting around Kalinkovichi resumed within days.  
The Gomel-Rechitsa Operation was a stunning example of Rokossovskiy’s 
operational art and his ability to harmonise attrition and manoeuvre.  German 
formations were repeatedly wrong-footed and forced to scramble in desperate, 
improvised operations, to protect their systemic rear.  It is therefore distinctly 
ironic that the Gomel-Rechitsa Operation, an operation that generated 
considerable momentum was actually terminated because Rokossovskiy’s deep 
operational forces ran out of steam, just as Rokossovskiy was threatening to 
impose a major strategic crisis on Army Group Centre and Army Group South.   
 
As a result, although Second and Ninth German Army suffered an operational 
defeat, they did not suffer the operational collapse Rokossovskiy inflicted on the 
Wehrmacht during Operation Bagration.  It is reasonable to speculate that if 
Rokossovskiy had possessed a tank army or cavalry mechanised group of the 
1944-1945 vintage he may have inflicted a significant operation defeat on the 
Wehrmacht. Certainly, through a combination of creativity, maskirovka, attrition 
and manoeuvre he created an opportunity that went begging. 
 
By 1944-45, Rokossovskiy had the instruments to harmonise attrition and 
manoeuvre on an operational scale.  In turn, this combination of mobility and 
fighting power gave him the capacity to generate the massive operational 
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momentum that enabled him to overwhelm German forces and turn the theory of 
deep operations into practice.  The greater Soviet armoured production from 
spring 1943 made it easier to combine attrition and manoeuvre in a more effective 
manner for more prolonged periods of time, within formations and for the Front 
as a whole.  Soviet rifle armies received powerful, heavy infantry support tanks 
such as the JS-2, that combined attrition and manoeuvre in deep battle to support 
the massive attritional capabilities of Soviet tactical artillery.  The superior 
mobility of Soviet infantry equipped with Dodge trucks transformed the internal 
cohesion of many Soviet formations.  In conjunction with self-propelled artillery 
such as the SU-76 and SU-152, it made them far more capable of harmonising 
attrition and manoeuvre.  Equally, by 1944-45, the increasing number of mobile 
armoured corps gave individual armies a greater ability to fuse manoeuvre and 
attrition.121  Furthermore, in 1944-45, Rokossovskiy made extensive use of army 
level mobile corps.  These were integrated into a wider front operation in order to 
introduce a greater degree of simultaneous attrition and manoeuvre in support of 
tank armies and cavalry-mechanised groups.   
 
It is clear from operations campaigns such as Moscow, Kol’tso, Kutuzov, 
Bagration, East Prussia and East Pomerania that the desire to harmonise attrition 
and manoeuvre were consistent themes in Rokossovskiy’s conduct of operations.  
However, the evidence presented by Rokossovskiy’s operational command is that 
far from being the strongest blow, the final blow was invariably the weakest.  This 
significantly undermined the ability of a commander to fuse attrition and 
manoeuvre in a sustainable operational manner.  These questions of operational 
momentum, sustainability and the harmonisation of attrition and manoeuvre were 
intimately linked to operational judgement as to when an operation had begun to 
out-run its ability to sustain itself.  In these matters of operational art 
Rokossovskiy’s military style places him in line with Svechin, not 
Tukhachevskiy. 
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Rokossovskiy’s Judgement: Making The Right Decisions 
In the nineteenth century Clausewitz argued every offensive had a natural life of 
its own, beyond which the law of diminishing returns undermined the benefits of 
continuing an attack.  At this point an offensive should be halted, before 
operational exhaustion left an attacking force unable to defend its gains.  The 
Clausewitzian concept of the culminating point was well understood in the Soviet 
era.  Svechin, in particular, was a disciple of Clausewitz and argued that “an 
offensive that goes beyond its culmination point very swiftly becomes a 
gamble.”122  To Svechin, and later to Rokossovskiy, the ability to determine the 
point at which an operation had run out of steam was a fundamental aspect of 
operational art and command.  Svechin believed, “the attacker must remember 
that simple forward movement only weakens him and is a very conditional 
plus.”123   
 
It was a question of judgement, based on intellect and reason, not simply a blind 
emotional commitment to go forward or an unthinking obedience to ideological 
dogma about the offensive established in the 1920s.124  Svechin argued that, 
“hence, it is understood how important it is to estimate opportunely the limit 
beyond which an offensive turns into a gamble and begins to turn into preparation 
for an enemy counter-attack.  This is a very broad question.”125  It was also a 
profound insight into the nature of command and played itself out in several 
operational scenarios in the Great Patriotic War.  In short, both the German and 
Soviet commanders repeatedly ignored this aspect of operational and strategic 
command in war.  Yet, the historical evidence suggests that invariably 
Rokossovskiy’s judgement in such matters proved sound. 
 
Svechin’s comments were part of the Red Army’s inter-war debate about a 
doctrinal commitment to offensive action.  These thoughts contained a barely 
concealed criticism of Tukhachevskiy’s dash on Warsaw in 1920, but Svechin, an 
intellectual Tsarist officer was in the minority.  In 1926, Svechin lost the debate, 
less on the quality of argument and more on the ideological soundness of 
Tukhachevskiy’s argument.126 As a result, in the period 1926-1942, at the 
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strategic, operational and tactical level the Red Army was doctrinally committed 
to the offensive.  In 1941, these doctrinal principles were blindly and dogmatically 
applied in a reckless and inflexible manner that had terrible consequences.  In 
addition, Svechin’s warning that “the best positions are abandoned if there is a 
possibility of advancing several kilometres”127 was blindly ignored in the period 
1939-1941.   
 
In summary, it is easy to blame Stalin for the Red Army’s reckless offensives in 
the period June 1941-March 1943, but this had been Red Army doctrine for years, 
formulated and endorsed by senior Red Army officers such as Tukhachevskiy.  
Stalin did force the Red Army’s wasteful general offensive of January 1942, but 
the disastrous Khar'kov Operation of May 1942,128 was proposed by Timoshenko, 
not Stalin.129  Furthermore, in the period January 1943-March 1943, as 
Rokossovskiy’s memoirs show Stavka, not Stalin, authorised several inordinately 
ambitious offensives, designed to destroy German forces in the Caucasus, eastern 
Ukraine, southern and central Russia, including Rokossovskiy’s monumentally 
ambitious operation of February 1943.   
 
In 1942-43, Stavka mistakenly believed a series of successive and simultaneous 
operations could induce a strategic collapse amongst German and Axis forces, 
already wobbling after Stalingrad.  These offensives began well and had 
considerable success in the Caucasus, but the wilful disregarding of intelligence 
ensured that Golikov’s Voronezh Front, conducting Operation Star130 and 
Vatutin’s South-Western Front, carrying out Operation Gallop,131 were smashed 
by Manstein’s counter-offensive of February-March 1943.  In essence, Stavka 
completely ignored Clausewitz’s and Svechin’s warnings about pushing 
offensives beyond their natural limits,132 because the hard evidence contradicted 
their emotional beliefs about German weakness and imminent Soviet triumph.  133 
.   
 
Equally, regardless of Stavka’s failings many field commanders were guilty of 
poor judgement and an obsession with relentless attacks in their conduct of their 
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operations.  In contrast, at the tactical, operational and strategic level, 
Rokossovskiy consistently argued against over-ambitious, hastily prepared 
offensives driven beyond their natural limits without regard for the enemy’s 
combat power.  The extended operations in the Moscow area, after the counter-
offensive of December 1941, forced Rokossovskiy’s 16th Army to undertake a 
series of tactical attacks that achieved little and incurred many casualties.  
Rokossovskiy argued that,  
“by forcing them out we frequently placed ourselves in unfavourable 
conditions, stretching out the front, which in some places curved and 
looped in the most preposterous fashion.  Very often the enemy sliced off 
the salients.”134 
 
However, if a rational analysis of the operational situation demanded it, 
Rokossovskiy was quite prepared to drive an operation on, particularly if it 
prevented protracted attritional and positional fighting.  On the Istra in December 
1941, “to prevent the enemy from consolidating there I ordered the units to push 
forward at top speed and force the river on the heels of the retreating Germans.”135  
Similarly, in August 1943, during the Chernigov-Pripyat Operation, Rokossovskiy 
urged his commanders to bounce the Dnepr.  In the same operation, further north, 
German forces attempted to stabilise their position on the Desna.  This “had to be 
denied at all costs, so I ordered Batov to accelarate his advance and force the river 
without halting.”136   
 
Clearly, from an operational perspective, this emphasis upon getting across rivers 
to deny them to the enemy made considerable sense.  Striking the enemy, in a new 
operation, from a river you had already crossed, posed fewer tactical and 
operational problems than an assault crossing against an enemy in prepared 
defensive positions.  Yet, it was a serious dilemma.  It involved weighing the risks 
of further action, incurring casualties or the false economy of halting an operation, 
to face a harder task later.  The worst outcome was to carry on an operation too far 
and get smashed by an enemy counter-attack.  It was this dilemma that shadowed 
Rokossovskiy’s contradictory orders to Chuikov’s 8th Guards Army in late July 
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1944, before the German counter-attack that pummelled 2nd Tank Army, east of 
Warsaw.   
 
There is little doubt that in late July 1944, that 2nd Tank Army and the right wing 
of 1st Belorussian Front had gone beyond their culminating point.  The natural 
pendulum of operations had begun to swing away from Rokossovskiy towards 
German troops falling back on shorter supply lines and substantial reserves.  
Rokossovskiy had no fresh troops and was operating at a considerable distance 
from 1st Belorussian’s supply base.  In summary, regardless of Stalin’s 
willingness to allow 1st Belorussian Front to help the Warsaw Rising, 
Rokossovskiy’s forces had gone beyond their culminating point several days 
before the German counter-attack confirmed it.  However, given Stavka and 
Stalin’s emphatic orders to cross the Vistula, it is difficult to see how 
Rokossovskiy could have resolved the dilemma.  Arguably, it was a gamble worth 
taking for the idea of a formal assault operation across the Vistula and Narev, 
without a bridgehead, against a prepared enemy was not an option to cherish.   
 
Clausewitz argued,   
“war is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which 
action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.  
A sensitive and discriminating judgement is called for; a skilled 
intelligence to scent out the truth.”137 
Clausewitz emphasised the instinctive ability of senior field commanders to make 
key decisions based on limited knowledge, in a short period of time.  This requires 
a specific form of intellect, coup d’oeil, that instinctively assesses the situation 
rather than coming to the correct decision through a methodical analytical process.  
This is because 
“circumstances vary so much in war, and are so indefinable, that a vast 
array of factors has to be appreciated – mostly in the light of probabilities 
alone.  The man responsible for evaluating the whole must bring to his 
task the quality of intuition that perceives the truth at every point.  
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Otherwise a chaos of opinions and considerations would arise, and fatally 
entangle his judgement…”138 
 
In the Moscow defensive operation of 15th November-4th December 1941, 
Rokossovskiy’s 16th Army played a critical role in one of the most intense and 
significant battles in history.  The Red Army and Rokossovskiy did possess 
certain advantages at Moscow that were not present during Operation Barbarossa.  
The obvious nature of the German objective made surprise difficult to achieve and 
intelligence was easier to acquire.139  Furthermore, the terrain punctuated by 
forest, marshland and numerous rivers140 made the German lines of advance 
predictable, particularly as the winter conditions undermined the Germans ability 
to launch the fluid armoured operations in which they were considerably superior 
to the Red Army at this stage of the war.   
 
In addition, by December 1941, talented commanders such as Zhukov and 
Rokossovskiy had long recognised the German propensity to encircle and 
annihilate the enemy.141  At Moscow, 16th Army was 50,000142 strong in positions 
twenty kilometres deep,143  whereas its neighbours 5th Army at 30,000 and 30th 
Army, 23,000 were considerably smaller.144   while on the southern wing of 
Western Front’s defences, 50th Army’s positions were particularly strong.  In 
combination, despite the Red Army’s parlous strategic situation, in operational 
and tactical terms, the battle of Moscow was fought on something like equal 
terms. 
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Figure 129: The Moscow Defensive Operation as the decisive strategic engagement of the 
1941 campaign.   
(Bellamy, Absolute War, 2007, p.258.) 
 
Nevertheless, in contrast to previous Soviet defeats on the June 1941 border, 
Vyazma and Bryansk both in early October 1941, where the Russian defences 
were characterised by broad fronts with little depth, at Moscow, 16th Army had 
deep, strong defences.  These defences had the power to sap the German blow and 
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drag the Wehrmacht into a positional and attritional struggle.  This would deny 
the Germans the rapid encirclement and annihilation victories they had become 
accustomed to and test the Wehrmacht’s ability to sustain its forces in prolonged, 
high intensity fighting.  The German logistical chain was already stretched to 
breaking point as the road based systems slithered in the mud, or struggled with 
the cold.  Furthermore, Rokossovskiy and the Red Army fought with Moscow 
behind them.  Moscow’s pivotal position in the Soviet rail network was 
instrumental in strategic re-deployment and operational mobility, enabling quick 
manoeuvre in any direction.145  In addition, the Moscow road network meant 
commanders like Rokossovskiy could rely on a rough and ready supply chain to 
get reserves and equipment to the frontline.  Rokossovskiy often complained 
about Zhukov’s conduct at Moscow but frequently mentions that 16th Army 
received regular reinforcements, especially artillery.  They were fed to 16th Army 
in a piecemeal fashion, but they were made available. 
 
It is quite clear that at Moscow, Rokossovskiy’s 16th Army faced the main 
German blow, north of the city, a massive attack spearheaded by Third Panzer and 
Fourth Panzer Armies.146  In total, in the Klin-Solnechnogorsk sector, Third 
Panzer Army deployed 1st, 6th and 7th Panzer Divisions, supported by the 14th and 
36th Motorised Divisions with 23rd Infantry Division.  On the Volokolamsk-Istra 
sector, Fourth Panzer Army deployed 2nd, 5th, 10th and 11th Panzer Divisions, SS 
Das Reich Division with 35th and 106th Infantry Division.147  This German force 
was not solely targeted at 16th Army, but during November-December 1941, 
Rokossovskiy’s 16th Army fought a gruelling, shattering battle.  The 16th Army 
was at the schwerpunkt of the German attack and was the fulcrum of the Soviet 
defence at Moscow.  A rapid German breakthrough had potentially ominous 
implications for Moscow, Zhukov’s plans for a counter-offensive, the survival of 
the Soviet state and the outcome of World War Two.  Rokossovskiy’s judgement 
and his instinctive tactical acumen, as well as his ability to think clearly under the 
most extreme pressure, in circumstances of tremendous uncertainty, were tested to 
the limits of human endurance.   
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Figure 130: The Western Front’s Moscow Defence Operation led by Rokossovskiy’s 16th 
Army: 15th November-5th December 1941 
(Bellamy, Absolute War, 2007, p.314.) 
 
On 16th November 1941, the main German assault smashed into the 16th Army 
and 30th Army on Western Front’s right flank, north-west of Moscow.148 During 
the next fourteen days, 16th Army was involved in constant fighting and slowly 
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driven back towards Moscow.  In the first forty-eight hours Rokossovskiy faced a 
major crisis.  On 16th-17th November 1941, 30th Army, on his right wing, 
buckled.149  The 16th Army was in danger of being enveloped150 and “we were 
greatly worried by the situation developing on the left flank of the 30th Army, 
especially when towards evening, we lost contact with its headquarters.”151  To 
make these uncertain, but ominous matters worse, on 18th November 1941, a 
massive German concentration of force, 2nd, 5th, 10th and 11th Panzer Divisions, 
supported by 35th Infantry Division and the Luftwaffe, attacked 16th Army’s left 
flank, at the junction with 5th Army.152  Indeed, “by bringing in additional forces, 
the enemy was able to push back the right flank units of the 5th Army, penetrate 
the gap between the two armies and advance towards the Volokalamsk-Moscow 
Highway, threatening to outflank us in depth.”153 
 
This was a critical moment in the Moscow defence operation.  At all costs, the 
Germans had to be denied a rapid breakthrough, for a German armoured column 
racing down the main road to Moscow had the capacity to wreak physical and 
psychological havoc among the city’s defenders.154  As 16th Army received a 
terrible pounding, in the air and on the ground, assailed on two sides, 
Rokossovskiy held his nerve, did not waste his reserves, picked his spot and 
ordered 78th Siberian Division to block the German assault on the main road to 
Moscow.155  The Siberians clashed head on with SS Das Reich.  After three days 
the line held with Das Reich describing “the fighting of the last few days the 
heaviest of the Eastern campaign and with the highest number of casualties.”156  
The “enemy was not able to breakthrough our defences to operational depths.”157  
The Germans switched their focus from Volokalamsk and began to probe the rest 
of Rokossovskiy’s 16th Army, gradually gaining momentum as it pushed back 16th 
Army in exhausting, grinding fighting.  If ever there was a situation wrapped in 
uncertainty that called for a sensitive and discriminating judgement that had the 
skilled intelligence to scent out the truth, 18th November 1941, on the road to 
Moscow, was it. 
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There was no respite.  A fierce struggle for the Klin-Solnechnogorsk road 
developed.  In Rokossovskiy’s words “an extremely grave situation developed in 
the Klin and Solnechnogorsk sectors.”158  On 22nd November 1941, the Germans 
approached Klin from the north, south and west with infantry battles taking place 
in the streets.159  On 23rd November 1941, Klin was lost, Solnechnogorsk was lost 
and trapped between the Germans, Stalin and Zhukov, who considered the 
situation catastrophic,160 Rokossovskiy’s command car was machine-gunned.  
German shells were landing in and around Rokossovskiy’s headquarters.  Zhukov 
insisted, over Rokossovskiy’s objections, that Solnechnogorsk was to be re-
captured.161  Several hasty and poorly organised counter-attacks, including a 
disastrous one involving 44th Cavalry Division,162 were launched but “by nightfall 
the unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the enemy had to be abandoned.”163   
 
During 23rd and 24th November 1941, 16th Army was under attack from all 
directions.164  The Germans approached the line of the River Istra and the Istra 
Reservoir.  In the wake of Zhukov’s refusal to countenance Rokossovskiy’s idea 
of a tactical withdrawal to the Istra reservoir,165 the Soviet position north-west of 
Moscow continued to deteriorate.  On 25th November 1941, German and Soviet 
troops were fighting on both banks of the Istra.  The 78th Siberian was still 
fighting in the streets of Klin, but the German assault ground forward.  
Nevertheless, although the situation was desperate, the Germans had still not 
ruptured 16th Army’s line.  The 16th Army evacuated its headquarters at Lyalova, 
under fire and withdrew to Kryukovo.166  On 27th November 1941, a German 
strike force made up of infantry and tanks drawn from 7th Panzer Division and 
231st Infantry Division, surged down the main Leningrad to Moscow highway, 
from Solnechnogorsk towards Kryukovo and the heart of Moscow.167  At 
Kryukovo, Rokossovskiy was blessed with a call from Stalin who politely 
inquired,  
“if I was aware that enemy units had appeared in the neighbourhood of 
Krasnaya Polyana, and what steps I was taking to prevent them from 
occupying the place.  He stressed the point that from Krasnaya Polyana the 
nazis could reach the capital with long-range artillery.”168 
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This was the crisis of the battle of Moscow.  A few minutes later, with no 
discussion, Sokolovskiy, Western Front’s Chief of Staff, informed Rokossovskiy 
that he was to counter-attack German units in Krasnaya Polyana.169  Troops that 
had been allocated by Rokossovskiy for a counter-attack on Solnechnogorsk were 
switched, at Stalin’s whim, to Krasnaya Polyana.  At 17.00 hours on 28th 
November 1941, the 16th Army counterattacked.170  Astonishingly, the assault was 
successful and drove German troops out of Krasnaya Polyana.171   
 
 
Figure 131: The Crisis of the Moscow Defence Operation north-west of Moscow in 16th 
Army’ sector: 22nd November-6th December 1941. 
(Orenstein, Soviet War Experience, 1993, p.  7.) 
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However, as Svechin might have predicted, the gain at Krasnaya Polyana was a 
very conditional plus.  The situation in Solnechnogorsk deteriorated, “we threw 
all we had into the battle, but even so the Army CP in Kryukovo was in trouble.”  
The CP was being bombed but “for the first time since the beginning of the war I 
saw our planes in action in relatively large numbers.”172  The German advance 
continued: on 28th November 1941, in the face of bitter resistance German troops 
crossed the Moscow-Volga Canal, before being driven back over it by 16th Army, 
with the help of 1st Shock Army,173introduced into the battle at a critical moment 
by Zhukov.  On 29th November 1941, 16th Army again managed to fight the 
Germans to a standstill.  On 30th November 1941, 1st Shock Army, to 16th Army’s 
north continued to attack over the Moscow-Volga Canal.174 Nevertheless, in the 
first days of December 1941, Rokossovskiy’s 16th Army faced continuous assaults 
north-west of Moscow.   
 
However, although Rokossovskiy did not know it, for 16th Army the worst of the 
German assault was over.  On 1st December 1941, the Wehrmacht switched its 
main attack to Fourth German Army, west of Moscow.  On 4th December 1941, 
although 16th Army was still involved in bitter defensive fighting to its north, 1st 
Shock Army and 20th Army launched sustained counterattacks that disrupted the 
momentum of the German offensive.  As a result, on 4th December 1941, the left 
wing of Rokossovskiy’s 16th Army, pounded, driven backwards, but not broken, 
began to grind its way forward.  175 Finally, on 5th December 1941, Field Marshal 
von Bock gave permission for German forces, north of Moscow, to halt their 
assault.176 
 
The pages of history have naturally celebrated Zhukov’s achievement in 
organising the successful defence of Moscow, with the timely committal of 1st 
Shock Army, on 27th November 1941, a decision of monumental significance.  It 
halted the momentum of the German blow, just as it seemed to be developing an 
irresistible force, having crossed the Istra and the Istra Reservoir.177  Zhukov’s 
skillful husbanding of his forces, his allocation of reserves and concealment of the 
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Red Army’s subsequent counter-offensive, was a remarkable achievement that 
changed the course of World War Two.   
 
However, western historiography is relatively ignorant of the key role played by 
Rokossovskiy’s 16th Army.  In the face of incessant attacks, and physical and 
mental conditions of the most extreme kind, Rokossovskiy handled his forces in 
an accomplished manner, and at least gave Zhukov the chance to contest the 
initiative, whilst retaining some degree of control, a state of affairs denied to most 
Soviet commanders in the period June-November 1941.  The 16th Army’s conduct 
of the battle of Moscow required constant juggling of forces to deal with the 
regular crises that threatened to rupture the Soviet line.  In particular, the counter-
attack of 78th Siberian Division on 18th November 1941 was a critical event.  At 
Moscow, 16th Army fought a battle for the highest stakes, one that had tactical, 
operational and strategic implications.  It was handled well by Rokossovskiy who 
demonstrated considerable coup d’oeil, refined judgement and a skilled, 
instinctive intelligence under the most extreme pressure. 
 
Naturally, some of Rokossovskiy’s decisions worked out better than others and 
with the benefit of hindsight, on rare occasions, Rokossovskiy’s judgement was 
questionable.  In December 1942, Rokossovskiy’s argued that 2nd Guards Army 
should stay with the Don Front, and, that a rapid crushing of the German pocket 
would render Operation Winterstorm irrelevant.  Vasilevskiy,178 Stavka’s 
representative and Chief of the General Staff overruled Rokossovskiy.  Operation 
Kol’tso was delayed.  Rokossovskiy was given command of all Soviet forces 
involved in the destruction of the German pocket.179  He was not actually given 
command of all forces in the Stalingrad region, including 62nd, 64th and 57th 
Armies until 1st January 1943.180  The intelligence failures of the Don Front, and 
the fierce resistance it encountered a month later, in January 1943, suggest 
Vasilevskiy was right and Rokossovskiy was wrong.  As Clausewitz pointed out, 
“of all the passions that inspire a man in battle, none we have to admit, is so 
powerful and so constant as the longing for renown and honour.”181  In retrospect, 
Rokossovskiy may have been saved from the consequences of his own emotional 
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impetuosity to crush what he thought were 85,000 troops, by the wisdom of 
Vasilevskiy’s reason. 
 
In February 1943, Rokossovskiy had serious misgivings about the headlong 
advance of Kryukov’s 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps.  He ordered Kryukov to dig in 
on the river Sevsk.  However, “the old war horse was flushed with success and it 
was not so easy to hold him back in mid-career.  He pushed on as far as the Desna 
River and Novgorod-Severskiy, showing little or no concern for reconnaissance 
on his flanks.”182  Rokossovskiy repeated his warnings to Kryukov and ordered 
him to step up reconnaissance, consolidate his position and wait for 65th Army. 
“But it was too late.  The enemy struck at the flanks and rear of his cavalry 
force that had reached out of the Desna.  At the cost of considerable losses 
the group fought its way out of the trap, greatly assisted by the units of 2nd 
Tank and 65th Armies, which had hastened to the rescue.  To halt the 
enemy here, we had to deploy the 65th Army on a wide front along the 
eastern bank of the River Sev.”183 
 
Why was Rokossovskiy not more forthright with Kryukov and why didn’t he take 
a firmer grip of the situation?  In Rokossovskiy’s defence, the operational 
situation was an extremely complex and dynamic one.  The progress of 2nd Guards 
Cavalry Corps was just about the only thing going well.  In the centre, 2nd Tank 
Army was bogged down and there were serious problems with 70th Army.184  
Similarly, despite Kryukov’s recklessness, he had briefly occupied Novgorod-
Severskiy, a key German supply and communications point on the Desna.185  It is 
possible that Rokossovskiy was tempted by the possibility of 2nd Guards Cavalry 
Corps holding Novgorod-Seveskiy until 65th and 2nd Tank Army drew up and 
consolidated Central Front’s gains. 
 
Stavka’s timetable of deployment, the difficult weather, involving waist high 
snow, made it extremely difficult to hold the Central Front together, without 
slowing the whole front down.  This would only have undermined an operation 
that was already an ambitious gamble.  A rapidly delivered blow by 2nd Guards 
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Cavalry Corps had some chance of success, but as 2nd Tank Army indicated, a 
slow, grinding advance was no panacea and entirely alien to Rokossovskiy’s 
natural style.  It would only incur greater casualties and alert German reserves, 
while giving them the time to deploy in an organised fashion.  Therefore, 
Rokossovskiy had problematic and contradictory choices that made it difficult to 
reconcile operational cohesion and operational momentum, with time and speed.  
On 7th March 1943, Second German Army deployed 4th Panzer Division, soon 
joined by the 82nd and 88th Infantry Divisions.  On Rokossovskiy’s right wing, 
Second Panzer Army blocked 2nd Tank Army and 65th Army, by deploying two 
more infantry divisions.186  At least Rokossovskiy did not ignore the intelligence 
about German divisions in the same way that Stavka and Vatutin did further south.  
In short, Kryukov knew about the threat and should not have been surprised. 
 
The choices of Rokossovskiy were further complicated by his knowledge that in 
early March 1943, 1st Tank Army, 21st Army, 64th Army and 62nd Army were still 
pencilled in for Central Front.  If Rokossovskiy had been able to deploy these 
forces, 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps had the prospect of quick relief from isolation.  
Equally, it would have been easier for Rokossovskiy to synchronise the Central 
Front and create the balance of manoeuvre and fighting power that held the key to 
operational momentum.  However, Manstein’s counter-offensive of March 1943 
entirely undermined Rokossovskiy’s chances of decisive success and turned 
Kryukov’s isolation from potentially splendid to perilous.187  It is difficult to 
assess whether Rokossovskiy could have deployed these extra forces with 
sufficient alacrity to bolster the Central Front’s operation, but 21st Army was 
about to deploy, when on 11th March 1943, it was transferred to the Voronezh 
Front.188  Furthermore, 
“in addition the STAVKA ordered 1st Tank Army southward to back up 
the Voronezh Front and both 24th and 66th Armies from Stalingrad to 
concentrate in the Voronezh Front’s rear area around Voronezh.  The 
STAVKA correctly judged that these forces, together with 62nd and 64th 
Armies newly arrived from Stalingrad, would be sufficient to bring von 
Manstein’s juggernaut to a halt.”189 
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Figure 132: The February 1943 Obkhod (Turning Move) of the Central Front: 
25th February-11th March 1943. 
(Stephen Walsh) 
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Therefore, Manstein’s offensive diverted forces already allocated by Stavka to 
Rokossovskiy.  These forces would have significantly augmented the Central 
Front’s striking power and enabled Rokossovskiy to gather sufficient operational 
momentum to sustain the deep operation and challenge the Germans for the 
operational, indeed strategic initiative on the Eastern Front, in the same way that 
Manstein’s counter-offensive hijacked Stavka’s plans.  Therefore, during 
February-March 1943, Rokossovskiy was faced with an operational and strategic 
situation that significantly complicated the apparently simple issue that Kryukov’s 
2nd Guards Cavalry Corps had marched off into the distance.  Rokossovskiy did 
warn Kryukov and had ordered him to step up reconnaissance, but Rokossovskiy 
did not order a halt because he knew the potential scale and significance of the 
operation unfolding in February 1943.   
 
The real issue, in late February and early March 1943, was time.  Rokossovskiy 
knew the Central Front was not ready but another delay, following numerous such 
requests before Kol’tso, was out of the question.  If 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps 
could ward off German reserves long enough for 65th and 2nd Tank Army to close 
up, Rokossovskiy knew the Central Front was about to receive an enormous 
accretion of fighting power.  It was this, the latent overwhelming potential of the 
Central Front’s operation that explains Rokossovskiy’s apparently tentative 
decisions concerning 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, when to all intents and purposes 
he should have just imposed his will on Kryukov.   
 
One might also debate Rokossovskiy’s judgement concerning the German 
counter-attack in East Prussia, in January 1945, a counter-attack that at one stage 
threatened Rokossovskiy’s headquarters.  On 26th January 1945, the right flank of 
Rokossovskiy’s 2nd Belorussian Front came under sustained attack from German 
forces desperate to restore the physical link between eastern Prussia and the 
German heartland.190  It was a serious counter-attack on 48th Army’s right flank 
that threatened to reach the Vistula.  This would have presented 2nd Belorussian 
Front’s forces on the Baltic coast and west of the Vistula, with an extremely 
problematic situation.  In Rokossovskiy’s words, 
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“We went into action at once, rushing a substantial portion of the forces of 
5th Guards Tank Army, the 8th Tank Corps and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps 
into the breach.  At the same time instructions were issued to 2nd Strike 
Army’s Commander to turn the part of his forces deployed at and south of 
Elbing to the east with the task of denying the enemy an approach to the 
Vistula, should he succeed in breaking through our positions at any 
point.”191 
 
After a difficult forty-eight hours, the German counter-attack was beaten off.  It is 
quite possible to argue that Rokossovskiy should have foreseen a major counter-
attack from an easterly direction, by German forces desperate to regain control of 
the Vistula and to re-connect eastern Prussia to Germany.  However, it is equally 
possible, indeed more likely, that Rokossovskiy was pre-occupied with the highly 
problematic operational situation that Stavka, not the Wehrmacht had imposed on 
2nd Belorussian Front.  In fact, it is reasonable to argue that the German counter-
attack simply made a bad situation worse. 
 
On 20th January 1945, six days before the German counter-attack, Stavka had 
ordered Rokossovskiy to divert 2nd Belorussian’s right wing, north and north-east, 
to conduct operations against German forces in eastern Prussia.  “The order came 
as a complete surprise.  It meant a total change of our plans, which had been based 
on the GHQ directive of November 28, 1944.”192  This directive had outlined 2nd 
Belorussian’s main mission as moving its left wing through western Prussia and 
eastern Pomerania, in support of 1st Belorussian’s operations in northern Poland.  
Simultaneously, a secondary attack was to contain German forces in eastern 
Prussia.193  In Rokossovskiy’s words, 
“the GHQ directive failed to say a word about any participation of forces 
of the Second Byelorussian Front in the Third Byelorussian’s Front’s 
operations against the East Prussian group.  And now our main task was to 
be precisely that of surrounding the East Prussian group with a strike by 
the Front’s main forces to the north and north-east, aimed at reaching the 
Frisches Haff.  At the same time we were not relieved of our previous task 
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of co-operation with the First Byelorussian Front on the flank and had to 
continue the offensive westward, although we had only two armies left on 
that sector.”194 
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In essence, Stavka had turned 2nd Belorussian Front inside out.  Now, the right 
wing was to carry out the main blow, while the left wing tried, in vain, to support 
the 1st Belorussian Front.  Rokossovskiy had been given a new, highly demanding 
operation that required his front to move in two directions at once.  Yet, 
Rokossovskiy had been given no extra forces in the face of stiff opposition, 
appalling weather and terrain, “which abounded in forests, marshes, big and small 
lakes and rivers, most of them joined by canals.”195  It was also to be conducted in 
a highly charged psychological atmosphere, along roads strewn with shattered and 
terrified German refugees. 
 
In Rokossovskiy’s words, “the overall situation was very complicated, with half 
the Front’s forces facing eastward against the East Prussian group and the other 
half advancing to the west.”196  Nevertheless, from 20th January-10th February 
1945, Rokossovskiy responded with a devastating operation, that splintered and 
shattered the German position in eastern Prussia, driving one German group west 
into Pomerania and another east into Konigsberg.  In a difficult situation, 
Rokossovskiy had juggled his forces, kept his front together and swept through 
East Prussia in an overwhelming display of manoeuvre and attrition.  In the 
meantime, in eastern Prussia, 3rd Belorussian slowly bashed its way forward 
against fanatical resistance and deep defences.  As far as Rokossovskiy was 
concerned, 
“the wrong sector had been chosen for Chernyakhovsky’s main attack.  
The General Staff could not have been ignorant of the fact that the 
strongest fortifications in Prussia were located in the eastern and 
southeastern areas, where it would be very difficult to break through the 
enemy defences.  Besides, the very configuration of the frontline 
suggested that the main attack ought to be delivered from south to 
north.”197 
 
In otherwords, Stavka should have planned a deliberate attack along the lines of 
the improvised one it had imposed on Rokossovskiy, to help 3rd Belorussian 
Front.198  Therefore, ironically enough, Rokossovskiy’s 2nd Belorussian Front 
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rescued Stavka’s flawed plans for East Prussia.  It became the hammer that forced 
the Germans on the anvil of 3rd Belorussian Front.  On 10th February 1945, Stavka 
effectively conceded Rokossovskiy’s argument.  It ordered Rokossovskiy to 
transfer his three right wing armies, 3rd ,48th 50th plus 5th Guards Tank Army, to 
3rd Belorussian Front.199  In return, 2nd Belorussian Front received 19th Army and 
1st Guards Tank Army, as it moved west, to conduct what became the Eastern 
Pomeranian Operation.200  
 
It is ironic that rather than challenging it, eventually, the East Prussian Operation 
actually endorsed Rokossovskiy’s judgement.  It is hardly surprising that he failed 
to anticipate the German counter-attack as he was engaged in the process of 
completely re-orienteering the 2nd Belorussian Front, while simultaneously 
planning a new operation with no extra resources.  In the end, Rokossovskiy’s 
response to Stavka’s decision was a highly impressive display of operational art 
that smashed German military power in eastern Prussia.   
 
Clausewitz argued that, 
“a distinguished commander without boldness is unthinkable.  No man 
who is not born bold can play such a role, and therefore we consider this 
quality the first pre-requisite of the great military leader.  How much of 
this quality remains by the time he reaches senior rank, after training and 
experience have affected and modified it is another question.”201 
As a soldier and junior officer in World War One, Rokossovskiy’s boldness was 
documented by two decorations for bravery and four nominations, with two 
wounds in the Russian Civil War.  Yet, time did not modify Rokossovskiy’s 
boldness, if anything it increased it.  This calculated boldness was driven by the 
rational manipulation of risk, rather than ignoring it through an emotional inability 
to confront ambiguity or a blind, simplistic commitment to attack.  This was 
distinctly unusual, for as Clausewitz argued, 
“the higher the military rank, the greater the degree to which activity is 
governed by the mind, by the intellect, by insight.  Consequently, 
boldness, which is a quality of the temperament, will tend to be held in 
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check.  This explains why it is so rare in the higher ranks, and why it is all 
the more admirable when found there.”202 
 
In June 1941, Rokossovskiy ignored the orders of his front commander Kirponos, 
as well as Moscow’s standing orders to attack and drive the enemy back.  
Rokossovskiy held back 9th Mechanised Corps, put it on the tactical defensive and 
concentrated its artillery on the main road, confident that the Germans would seek 
the best going, in order to make rapid progress.  As 13th Panzer Division moved 
forward, it was given a bloody nose.203  It was a temporary setback, but an early 
indication of Rokossovskiy’s calculated boldness and confidence in his own 
judgement, a pattern that would be repeated throughout the war, despite 
Rokossovskiy’s rise through the higher ranks.  Clearly, Rokossovskiy did not lack 
confidence in his own judgement and this often gave his decision making a 
remarkable boldness.  To defy Stalin, three times, over Operation Bagration was 
an astonishing act of calculated boldness that bordered on the suicidal, but it was a 
product of Rokossovskiy’s intellectual conviction that unless 1st Belorussian had 
two main blows it would fail.   
 
Rokossovskiy was not an impetuous, rash commander but nor was he an unduly 
cautious one.  In the conduct of operations, if faced with a stalemate or an 
operation that was losing momentum, Rokossovskiy’s response was invariably a 
bold and decisive one, in which he sought to alter the parameters of the situation 
rather than just hammer away.  Nevertheless, with the possible exception of 
Rokossovskiy’s desire to launch Operation Saturn and Operation Kol’tso in 
response to Operation Winterstorm, a concept that was breathtaking in its 
imagination and audacity, Rokossovskiy boldness was calculated, informed by 
intellect, not emotion or unreasonable, unquestioning optimism.   
 
As his actions in repeatedly asking for delays before Operation Kol’tso in January 
1943, and in securing a delay of ten days before the February 1943 operation 
show, Rokossovskiy’s calculated boldness was not simply a product of a 
favourable environment that encouraged daring, dashing ambition.  In these 
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operations subsequent events proved his calculated boldness to have been based 
on sharp intellect and sound judgement.  Furthermore, as his gumption in 
informing Stalin in early March 1943, that the Red Army’s most ambitious 
operation of the war could not be achieved indicates, Rokossovskiy was just as 
willing to advise the termination of an operation, as take an unreasonable gamble 
that was no more than a bluff.  Equally, as his thoughts about the Orlovka 
Operation in October 1942204 demonstrate, Rokossovskiy’s calculated boldness 
often led him to argue against certain operations.   
  
At the Seelow Heights, Zhukov’s determined boldness was driven by the 
emotional need for glory.  It was also the product of Zhukov’s temperamental 
inability to countenance failure, whatever the cost.  This was a hallmark of 
Zhukov’s operations around Moscow in 1941-42, Operation Mars in November 
1942, Kiev in November 1943 and the Berlin Operation (16th April-May 1945).  
Therefore, unlike Rokossovskiy, Zhukov’s boldness was as much the product of 
wilful, murderous obstinacy as his undoubted military abilities.  Zhukov, along 
with Stalin never accepted and perhaps did not wish to, that operations could be 
pushed too far.   
 
Vatutin was also an imaginative and bold commander, but the historical record 
indicates that Vatutin’s boldness was driven more by emotion than reason.  It 
lacked Rokossovskiy’s more refined calculation of risk.  During the war Vatutin 
displayed an almost irrational optimism and a desire to attack, regardless of 
evidence that demanded more sober judgement.  In September 1942, despite clear 
evidence that the operation was going to fail, Stavka had to order Vatutin, twice, 
on 19th September 1941205 and 28th September 1942,206 to halt his attempts to 
recapture Voronezh.  Vatutin was also rash in his disregard of credible 
intelligence warnings about a German build-up in February 1943.  He deluded 
himself, as late as 17th February 1943, that the Germans were planning to 
withdraw over the Dnepr and ignored warnings from army commanders about 
Germans preparations for a counter-attack.207 In the next three weeks, as the 
South-Western Front reeled backwards from the German blow that he had 
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dismissed, the unfailingly optimistic Vatutin learned the true scope of his 
misjudgement, based on the emotional wave of victory and the desire for glory.   
 
It is difficult to disagree that,  
“the front commander, (Vatutin) caught up in the optimistic mood of the 
STAVKA and prodded by often sarcastic STAVKA directives, also 
ignored or misread intelligence indicators on initial enemy movements and 
made the fatal mistake of allowing subjective judgements concerning 
German intentions to cloud objective judgements concerning German 
capabilities.  Moreover, Vatutin opposed the advice of his subordinate 
army commanders, who were more tuned to the realities of the situation.  
Like the STAVKA, Vatutin did not react quickly enough to avert 
disaster.”208   
 
Rokossovskiy weighed, accepted and manipulated risk through rational analysis, 
based on his own intellectual appreciation of the evidence.  If necessary he was 
prepared to defy Stalin and Zhukov in order to uphold his judgement, yet despite 
his self-confidence and calculated boldness, none ever accused Rokossovskiy of 
arrogance.  Thus, both Rokossovskiy and Vatutin possessed flair, but 
Rokossovskiy had a more thoughtful intellect and better judgement.  
Rokossovskiy’s was prepared to gamble as an act of calculated boldness, but 
Vatutin’s boldness often appears to have been reckless.   
 
Rokossovskiy’s boldness was a product of a sharp intellect, as well as his natural 
temperament, so it did not impair his judgement.  Therefore, Rokossovskiy 
managed to straddle the line between iron will, blind obstinacy and the optimistic 
disregard of reality in the pursuit of operational objectives.  Rokossovskiy was a 
tenacious, demanding commander with the highest standards, who pursued 
operational objectives in a single-minded, but rarely mindless manner, and 
invariably displayed sound judgement.  On several occasions in Operation 
Kol’tso, the Chernigov-Pripyat Operation, East Prussia and the Oder-Elbe 
Operation of April 1945, when faced with deadlock, Rokossovskiy adapted the 
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plan to reality, rather than simply pounding away at the German defences while 
berating tactical commanders.   
 
Rokossovskiy was fortunate that as an attacking commander, he never really 
found himself in a situation where he had no options.  He was not dragged into 
prolonged urban fighting in Stalingrad, Warsaw, Konigsberg or Budapest.  
However, his imaginative response to other difficult situations indicates that 
Rokossovskiy’s natural instinct would have tried to adapt and create a solution, 
rather than grind out an advance over a sea of bodies.  Rokossovskiy and Zhukov 
were both men of exceptional talent and personal resilience.  Indeed, “people who 
knew both said Zhukov was tougher, Rokossovskiy was smarter.”209  Yet, Zhukov 
frequently crossed the line between stubborn persistence and blind, bloody 
obstinate slaughter.  In summary, Rokossovskiy repeatedly demonstrated during 
the Great Patriotic War, that he was able to combine the intellectual courage of his 
own convictions, with the temperamental ability to adjust to circumstances as he 
found them, not as he wanted them to be.   
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CONCLUSIONS 
Marshal Konstantin Konstaninovich Rokossovskiy, victor of Moscow, Stalingrad, 
Kursk, Belorussia and East Prussia remains an obscure 
figure in western historiography, vaguely associated 
with great events, but in reality unknown, lost in a state 
of western historical ignorance.  In contrast, in the 
Soviet Union and Russia, Rokossovskiy was and is a 
household name, but his style of leadership and 
operational command, in particular the radical way in 
which it differed from the standard authoritarian Red Army model, is only 
beginning to be discovered.  Rokossovskiy is both famous and yet unknown. 
 
In the Soviet era, a striking combination of extraordinary scope, detailed narrative 
and an acute sense of historical destiny in general histories, military history 
journals and unit histories, combined to create an enormous body of historical 
knowledge concerning the basic story of the Great Patriotic War.  This recorded in 
detail the broad sweep of history as heroic individuals, great or previously 
unheralded, formations large and small, with the tireless support of the 
Communist Party, met the Wehrmacht and after an agony of suffering, saved the 
world from Nazism.   
 
The literature, in both English and Russian, lots of it written by senior 
commanders and carefully scrutinised by the Soviet political authorities, must be 
treated with caution.  Rokossovskiy’s real memoirs, not the censored ones, are an 
indictment of the Soviet high command’s entire approach to the whole war.  In 
terms of planning, creative thinking, consultation, delegation, encouragement of 
initiative and toleration of mistakes, Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership and 
operational command were entirely at odds with the Stalinist Red Army.  There is 
no denying Zhukov, Konev, Malinovskiy and Vatutin, amongst others, got results, 
but so did Rokossovskiy.  Rokossovskiy was just as successful in the field, if not 
more so than any other senior Red Army commander.  Indeed, according to Woff, 
 
Figure 134: Rokossovskiy 
(theeasternfront.co.uk) 
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he was, “considered by many senior wartime German commanders as ‘the Red 
Army’s best general’.”1 
 
In character and in style of leadership, Rokossovskiy was different from his peers 
and contemporaries.  Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership was based on his 
authority, his dignitas, his referent, legitimate and expert power, not his formal 
coercive power.2  In a sense, he was part of the Red Army’s system, but not a 
product of it and his style of leadership was very much his own.  A man whose 
record as a soldier bore comparison with any of his colleagues, Rokossovskiy led 
with fine judgement, moving betwixt and between different styles of leadership: 
authoritative, democratic and occasionally authoritarian with the ease of a natural 
leader.  He was by instinct and considered judgement, primarily an authoritative 
leader, a man who, even in this Stalin’s Red Army, understood that in the final 
analysis, true leadership was borne of ability, trust and personal example, not the 
pitiless wielding of power.  In Stalin’s state and Zhukov’s Red Army this was a 
radical philosophy of command and a truly distinct style of leadership, one that 
challenges the traditional image of Soviet military leadership during the Great 
Patriotic War.   
 
Rokossovskiy was arguably the Red Army’s leading exponent of operational art 
because of his distinctive style of leadership, not in spite of it.  It was not an 
optional extra but an integrated and considered philosophy of leadership and 
command.  The unusual degree of initiative, delegation and empowerment that lay 
at the heart of Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership complemented and reinforced 
operations that emphasised speed, agility, and the desire to stun, grasp and retain 
the initiative, in order to throw the enemy off balance.  Tukhachevskiy believed 
that the dictates of operational synchronisation placed limits on initiative 
especially among junior commanders.  Yet, it can be argued that Rokossovskiy’s 
style of leadership actually increased rather than undermined, efficient operational 
synchronisation.   
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First, senior officers clearly understood Rokossovskiy’s intentions, the wider 
operational concept and the plan.  Second, they knew their own role and how it 
related to other units and aspects of the plan.  Third, the culture of initiative and 
independent thought that Rokossovskiy consistently encouraged, permeated 
further down the chain of command than many other Soviet fronts, where 
authoritarian retribution in response to mistakes stifled initsitiava as well as 
creative initiative.  Fourth, Rokossovskiy’s inclination to delegate before and 
during an operation left him free to concentrate on operational synchronisation, 
not tactical detail.  This was critical in maintaining operational co-ordination 
whilst refraining from excessive tactical interference.  It is clear that because 
Rokossovskiy trusted the judgement of his commanders their judgement 
improved.  This mutual trust and confidence ensured that within the parameters of 
the operational plan, Rokossovskiy’s forces acted with an agility and dynamism 
that challenges the traditional image of the lumbering Soviet mass.   
 
In short, the culture of encouragement of initiative, consultation, creativity, 
toleration of mistakes and honest reporting produced senior commanders whose 
conduct of operations was marked by creativity, imagination, risk-taking and 
decisiveness.  This did not happen by accident.  It was the manifestation of 
leadership and command culture encouraged, nurtured and developed by 
Rokossovskiy.  It enabled Rokossovskiy to guide operations with a loose rein, 
rather than a firm grip that amounted to a stranglehold.  If Rokossovskiy had been 
German, he would be a renowed commander, cited as an impressive exponent of 
auftragstaktik, or a role model for the contemporary western concept of mission 
command.  Yet, as a commander of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War 
for different complex political, social and cultural reasons the historical 
significance of his truly radical philosophy of leadership and command remain 
relatively unknown.  Nevertheless, it seems clear that modern leadership, in 
particular military leadership, has much to learn from Rokossovskiy, especially 
the manner in which his style of leadership informed and sustained his conduct of 
operations.   
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In the conduct of operations Rokossovskiy thought carefully, prepared 
meticulously and moved rapidly, creating operations that at their best, developed 
operational momentum without pause, from beginning to end.  Rokossovskiy’s 
operations were marked by his desire to wrongfoot German commanders, and an 
inclination to acquire and retain the initiative through daring thrusts designed to 
turn German defences rather than grind out attritional victories.  Once an 
operation began, the denial of time to the enemy became Rokossovskiy’s 
operational imperative.  The consistent themes in Rokossovskiy’s operational 
style were the desire for a quick breakthrough, an intense dislike of protracted 
attrition and a commitment to rapid, deep operational manoeuvre designed to split 
and fragment the enemy, thereby shattering his operational cohesion.   
 
The Germanic notion of operational encirclement and annihilation sponsored by 
Neznamov, Tukhachevskiy and Zhukov had little in common with 
Rokossovskiy’s conduct of operations.  Rokossovskiy’s deep operations 
consistently sought out overt systemic targets such as road and rail junctions and 
towns.  The nature of Rokossovskiy’s deep operations was not to wear the enemy 
down, nor to engage in deep operations designed to carry out operational 
encirclements.  Rokossovskiy’s conduct of operations was marked by rapid, 
intense bursts of deep manoeuvre that seized operational objectives before the 
enemy could recover his poise.  They were designed to undermine the enemy’s 
capacity to conduct effective and sustained military operations, while inflicting 
substantial casualties in the breakthrough and pursuit phase.   
 
In contrast to Zhukov, Rokossovskiy’s deep operations were dominated by the 
idea of depth and the physical and psychological unhinging of the enemy rather 
than operational encirclement and annihilation.  In this Rokossovskiy was the heir 
to Brusilov, Varfolomeyev and a long tradition of Russian military thinking 
stretching back into the nineteenth century, indeed back to Genghis Khan.  
Furthermore, in his rejection of what Aleksandr Svechin called the obsessive 
tyrannical needle of operations designed to annihilate the enemy force in the field, 
and in his criticism of an unthinking, blind commitment to relentless attack, 
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Rokossovskiy’s operational art had much in common with Svechin, the 
intellectual father of Russian operational art.   
 
At first sight, Rokossovskiy’s meticulous planning of operations, would appear to 
be in conflict with Clausewitz’s arguments that the nature of command in war is 
dominated by uncertainty and the need to make difficult decisions based on 
limited, contradictory information, often in a short period of time.  Rokossovskiy 
believed effective operational planning and timely preparations were essential to 
military success, a reflection of his extremely sophisticated understanding of the 
strange anomaly that meticulous preparation fostered rapid but sustainable 
operations.  Rokossovskiy was fully aware, even if occasionally Stavka was not, 
that time invested in preparation was time gained in operations, not the other way 
round.   
 
Rokossovskiy was a thoughtful commander who preferred planned operations, not 
amateurish improvisations, full of Bolshevik ardour, passionate commitment and 
no brains.  This did not mean that Rokossovskiy was a manipulator of esoteric 
military schemes, searching for the perfect operation.  Rather, Rokossovskiy was 
a military professional, who understood the need for effective operational 
planning and considered judgment.  He recognised that dynamic, urgent 
improvisation, while a key military skill, was not a sensible way to win a long 
war.  Nevertheless, the historical record clearly indicates that Rokossovskiy was 
not a slave to plans.  Indeed, once an operation began, in contrast to other Soviet 
commanders such as Sokolovskiy and Zhukov, Rokossovskiy’s style was notable 
for its agility.   
 
Rokossovskiy’s constant improvisation during the period June-October 1941 is a 
powerful retrospective endorsement of his ability to lead flexibly in accordance 
with the situation.  At Yartsevo, in July 1941, Rokossovskiy conducted operations 
instinctively, with no fixed headquarters for several weeks.  In December 1941, he 
followed his instincts on the Istra, while at Moscow Rokossovskiy repeatedly 
demonstrated the ability to improvise and react flexibly to the course of events.  In 
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Operation Kol’tso, at Kursk, in the Chernigov-Pripyat Operation, the Belorussian 
and East Prussian Operations Rokossovskiy trusted his instinct and made 
decisions that fundamentally affected the outcome of operations.  Indeed, the 
flexibility and creative imagination that Rokossovskiy showed throughout the war 
in adapting to circumstances as he found them, rather than as he wanted them to 
be, was a hallmark of his leadership and command.  It was in stark contrast to the 
bloody, inflexible obstinacy displayed by the likes of Zhukov, Malinovskiy and 
Sokolovskiy. 
 
Rokossovskiy possessed natural intuition and an instinctive feel for operations as 
well as an excellent more considered judgement.  As a corps, army and front 
commander Rokossovskiy spent four years on the Eastern Front.  Yet, it is 
genuinely difficult to identify any major error of judgement or significant 
operational failure.  There were setbacks and relative failures, but there is no 
Vyazma of October 1941, Khar'kov of May 1942, Mars of November 1942 to 
tarnish Rokossovskiy’s operational record in the same way as Konev, 
Timoshenko and Zhukov.  The Moscow counter-offensive of December 1941, the 
obkhod of February 1943, Operation Kutuzov of July 1943 and the Lublin-Brest 
Operation of July 1944 did not achieve all of their objectives, but none could be 
called a failure.  It is difficult to attribute their problems to Rokossovskiy’s 
operational judgement.   
 
In the end, as an operational commander in the greatest, most terrible military 
contest in the history of warfare, Rokossovskiy’s judgement was repeatedly tested 
and not found wanting, despite the fact that he was a bold and imaginative 
commander.  Rokossovskiy’s calculated boldness and refined judgement were 
distinct hallmarks of his operational command.  In combination with 
Rokossovskiy’s instinctive creativity, this intellectual boldness created operations 
far removed from the stereotypical image of ruthless, unimaginative operations 
conducted by Soviet commanders with no regard for casualties.   
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Rokossovskiy was clearly a determined and persistent commander who possessed 
the intellectual conviction and moral courage to confront and defy the likes of 
Zhukov and Stalin.  Yet, Rokossovskiy’s determination and confidence did not 
degenerate into blind obstinacy.  If an operational plan did not work, 
Rokossovskiy was prepared to amend or abandon it.  Therefore, Rokossovskiy 
managed to combine a determined will with a 
discerning judgement that enabled him to pursue 
operational objectives with a degree of flexibility and 
imagination that was often missing from the operational 
art of other Soviet commanders.  To conclude, 
Rokossovskiy’s style of command, in both the planning 
and conduct of operations, was marked by clarity of 
thought and a cool, artful quality of execution that gives 
his operational command, as well as his style of 
leadership, a distinct, virtually unique signature 
amongst the Red Army’s leading commanders of the 
Great Patriotic War.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Richard Woff, Rokossovsky in ed., Harold Shukman, Stalin’s Generals, op. cit. p. 177. 
2
 See Robert P. Vecchio, ‘Power, Politics and Influence,’ in ed., Robert P. Vecchio, Leadership: 
Understanding the Dynamics of Power and Influence in Organizations, op. cit.  pp. 69-95, p. 69. 
 
Figure 135: Rokossovsky, 1944 
(Rokossovskiy, 2002) 
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EPILOGUE 
On 24th June 1945, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Konstantin Konstantinovich 
Rokossovskiy, cavalryman, veteran of World War One, the Russian Civil War, 
prisoner of Stalin, beaten half to death, survivor of torture and solitary 
confinement, Barbarossa, victor of Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, the Belorussian 
Operation and East Prussia took command of the Red Army’s victory parade in 
Red Square.  Rokossovskiy, on a black horse, presented the parade to Zhukov, 
on a white horse.  Zhukov commended the Red Army to Stalin, perched on 
Lenin’s mausoleum, the master of all and in thrall to none.  Hitler and Nazi 
Germany were destroyed.  Stalin and the Soviet Union were victorious.  
Rokossovskiy, the Marshal from the Gulag had survived.                
 
 
 
 
Figure 136: Rokossovskiy, Victory Parade, Red Square, 1945 
(Rokossovskiy, 2002)) 
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APPENDIX A:  
Translated From Autobiography Written by Marshal Sovestkogo 
Soyuza (Rokossovskiy) 
27 December 1945 
 
 
Born in 1896 in the town of Velikiye Luki in Pskov oblast into the family of a railroad 
worker.  Nationality Polish.  Employment stonemason.  Party member 1919.  Education 
average. 
 
Military service began in August 1914 in the town of Sluzhil in the old Russian army in 
5th Dragoon Regiment.  Final rank-Junior Under Officer.  Participated in battles on 
Western and North-Western Fronts until October 1917. 
 
In October 1917 joined the Red Guards: commanded a cavalry detachment in a cavalry 
division and a cavalry regiment.  Participated in battles particularly on the Eastern Front 
against Czechoslovakians, Kolchak, Semenov and Baron Ungern until complete 
liquidation. 
 
In peacetime engaged in command of a cavalry brigade, cavalry division, cavalry corps 
and command of a mechanised corps.  In 1929 I commanded the cavalry brigade 
detachment that fought against the Chinese on the Manchurian axis. 
 
At the start of the Great Patriotic War I commanded 9th Mechanised Corps in the Kiev 
Special Military District leading the corps in action on the Lutsk and Novgorod-
Volynsk axes. 
 
In July 1941 I was appointed to command of an army and transferred to the Western 
Front (Smolensk Direction) where I was the head of the Yartsevo group of forces.  The 
successful offensive actions of these forces forced the Germans to halt on the Yartsevo 
direction. 
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At the time of the German attack on Moscow, I commanded the troops of 16th Armand 
led them in defensive fighting on the Volokalamsk, Solnechnogorsk and Istra direction. 
 
In the decisive days of the battle of Moscow I led the forces of 16th Army in 
counterattacks on the Solnechnogorsk and Istra direction as result of which German 
assault was destroyed and they fled panic stricken to the west 
 
In 1942 at the time of the German breakthrough at Voronezh I was appointed to 
command of the Bryansk Front.  I led the forces of the Bryansk Front with the result 
that despite many attempts the Germans were not able to expand their breakthrough to 
the north in the direction of Yelnia. 
 
In the period of the German advance on Stalingrad I was appointed to command of the 
Don Front.  I led the troops of the Don Front in breaking through the hostile enemy 
front on the river Don in the Kletskaya axis and operated in co-ordination with the 
South-Western Front in the complete encirclement of the German group of forces at 
Stalingrad. 
 
By order of Stavka the liquidation of the encircled German forces at Stalingrad was 
given to the forces of the Don Front.  I commanded these forces leading them in 
operations achieving the complete annihilation of this group capturing more than one 
hundred thousand German officers and soldiers including their commander Field 
Marshal Paulus. 
 
In 1943 I commanded the forces of the Central Front leading them in the defensive 
engagement on the front of the Kursk-Orel bulge, concluding the defeat of the Germans 
with the successful transition of our forces on to the counteroffensive. 
 
In the following days I led the troops of the Central Front in offensive operations that  
broke through the German defences west of Kursk, destroying German forces followed 
by a rapid offensive in the direction of Putivl’, Vorozhba, Konotop, Bakhmach, 
Nezhvin, Kozelets, Chernigov, Kiev.  As a result of these operations all the territory 
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east of the Sozh and the river Dnepr from Gomel to Kiev was liberated from the 
Germans.  The conclusion was a bridgehead on the western bank of the river Dnepr 
north of Kiev and by the river Sozh, south of Gomel. 
 
At the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944 I commanded the troops of the 1st 
Belorussian Front, leading the front’s forces in offensive operations on Belorussian 
territory.  As a result of these operations we created a wide bridgehead west of the river 
Dnepr and liberated the towns of Mozyr, Kalinkovichi, Rechitsa, liberated the town of 
Gomel and seized a bridgehead across the river Dnepr and the river Drut, north of 
Rogachev and across the river Berezina, south and south-west of Rogachev.  These 
were of great importance in the preparation of the Bobruisk-Minsk Operation. 
 
In 1944 I commanded the forces of the 1st Belorussian Front leading the front’s forces in 
offensive operations that inflicted two successive blows.  First blow-in the direction of 
Bobruisk, Minsk, Baranovichi, Brest. 
 
Second blow-in the direction of Kovel, Kholm, Lublin, Krepost, Demblin (Ivan-Town), 
Praga.  As a result of these operations the German forces were completely destroyed, 
Belorussian was liberated and our forces advanced to the line of the river Narev river 
Vistula and seized bridgeheads on the western bank of the river Narev, north of Warsaw 
and on the western bank of the river Vistula, south of Warsaw. 
 
In 1945 I commanded the forces of 2nd Belorussian Front conducted three significant 
operations.   
 
First-the East Prussian Operation, consisting of breaking through the German defences 
on the river Narev and the forces of the right-wing advancing to the Baltic Sea in the 
region of Elbing.  As a result the entire enemy’s East Prussian group was encircled and 
destroyed.  Besides that the troops of the front’s left wing seized a wide bridgehead on 
the western bank of the river Vistula west of Graudenz, Kul’m enabling us to prepare a 
new operation. 
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Second-the Pomeranian Operation, consisting of breaking through the German defences 
and the left wing forces of the front advancing to the Baltic Sea in the region of Kesslin, 
Kolberg and encircling the  East Pomeranian group of German forces.  As a result this 
group was completely annihilated and liberated the substantial towns of Gdynia and 
Danzig. 
 
Third-the Oder Operation consisted of breaking through the German defences on the 
river Oder.  As a result of this rapid offensive the Stettin group of German forces was 
destroyed and subsequently the front’s forces advanced to the line of Rostock on the 
river Elbe completing the destruction of the German troops and met up with the troops 
of Allied forces. 
 
During the time of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars and in the course of many years of 
service in the Workers and Peasant Army (RKKA) Ihave been awarded: two golden 
stars (twice Hero of the Soviet Union), four Orders of Lenin, five Orders of Red 
Banner, Order of ‘Victory’, Order of Suvorov, 1st Class, Order of Kutuzov, 1st Class.; 
Medals: ‘20 Years RKKA’, ‘ Defence of Moscow’, ‘ Defence of Stalingrad’, ‘ Capture 
of Konigsberg’, ‘ Liberation of Warsaw’, and ‘Victory over Germany’. 
 
Foreign:  Mongolian Order of the Red Banner; Polish Orders: Master of the Military 
First Class with Stars and Cross of Gryunvald First Class; French Orders: Legion of 
Honour, Military Cross; British Knight Commanders Cross of the Order of the Bath. 
 
During the Civil War I was wounded twice and during the Great Patriotic War- once. 
 
MARSHAL SOVETSKOGO SOYUZA (ROKOSSOVSKIY) 
 
27 Dekabrya 1945 Goda 
Gor.  Lignitz. 
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APPENDIX B:  
Belorussian Front Order of Battle: 1st January 1944 
Army General K.K. Rokossovskiy 
 
3rd Army: Lt.Gen.  A.V.Gorbatov 
41st Rifle Corps: Major General 
V.K.Urbanovich 
120th Guards Rifle Division 
186th Rifle Division 
80th Rifle Corps: Major General 
I.L.Ragulia 
5th Rifle Division 
283rd Rifle Division 
362nd Rifle Division 
17th Rifle Division 
269th Rifle Division 
36th Separate Tank Regiment 
31st Separate Armoured  Train 
Battalion 
55th Separate Armoured Train 
Battalion 
 
48th Army: Lt.Gen.  P.L.Romanenko 
25th Rifle Corps: Major General 
A.B.Barinov 
4th Rifle Division 
197th Rifle Division 
273rd Rifle Division 
29th Rifle Corps:Major General 
A.M.Andreev 
102nd Rifle Division 
137th Rifle Division 
307th Rifle Division 
42nd Rifle Corps:Major General 
A.M.Kolganov 
170th Rifle Division 
194th Rifle Division 
399th Rifle Division 
73rd Rifle Division 
175th Rifle Division 
217th Rifle Division 
42nd Separate Tank  Regiment 
231st Separate Tank Regiment 
1897th Self-Propelled Artillery 
Regiment 
 
61st Army: Lt.Gen.  P.A.Belov 
9th Guards Rifle Corps: Major General 
A.A.Boreiko 
12th Guards Rifle Division 
76th Guards Rifle Division 
77th Guards Rifle Division 
89th Rifle Corps:Major General 
G.A.Khaliuzin 
15th Rifle Division 
55th Rifle Division 
81st Rifle Division 
356th Rifle Division 
2nd Guards Cavalry Corps: Lt.Gen.  
V.V.Kryukov 
3rd Guards Cavalry Division 
4th Guards Cavalry Division 
17th Guards Cavalry Division 
149th Guards Tank Destroyer 
Regiment 
2nd Guards Separate Tank 
Destroyer Artillery Battalion 
10th Guards Mortar Regiment 
60th Guards Mortar Battalion 
1730th Anti- Aircraft Artillery 
Regiment 
7th Guards Cavalry Corps: Major 
General M.P.Konstantinov 
14th Guards Cavalry Division 
15th Guards Cavalry Division 
16th Guards Cavalry Division 
145th Guards Tank Destroyer 
Regiment 
7th Guards Separate Tank 
Destroyer Artillery Battalion 
7th Guards Mortar Regiment 
57th Guards Mortar Battalion 
1733rd Anti-Aircraft Artillery 
Regiment 
68th Tank Brigade 
1459th Self-Propelled Artillery 
Regiment 
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50th Army: Lt.Gen.  I.V.Boldin 
46th Rifle Corps: Major General 
K.M.Erstakov 
238th Rifle Division 
369th Rifle Division 
380th Rifle Division 
108th Rifle Division 
110th Rifle Division 
324th Rifle Division 
413th Rifle Division 
233rd Separate Tank Division 
21st Separate Armoured Train 
Battalion 
43rd Separate Armoured Train 
Battalion 
 
63rd Army: Lt.Gen V.A.Kolpakchi 
35th Rifle Corps: Major General 
V.G.Zholudev 
129th Rifle Division 
250th Rifle Division 
348th Rifle Division 
40th Rifle Corps:Major General 
V.S.Kuznetsov 
41st Rifle Division 
169th Rifle Division 
53rd Rifle Corps:Major General 
I.A.Gartsev 
96th Rifle Division 
260th Rifle Division 
323rd Rifle Division 
26th Guards Separate Tank Regiment 
1901th Self-Propelled Artillery 
Regiment 
 
Front Reserves 
121st Rifle Corps:Major General 
D.I.Smirnov 
23rd Rifle Division 
218th Rifle Division 
115th Fortified Region 
119th Fortified Region 
161st Fortified Region 
6th Guards Cavalry Corps:Lt.General 
S.V.Sokolov 
8th Guards Cavalry Division 
13th Guards Cavalry Division 
8th Cavalry Division 
65th Army:Lt.Gen.P.I.Batov 
18th Rifle Corps:Major General 
I.I.Ivanov 
69th Rifle Division 
162nd Rifle Division 
193rd Rifle Division 
115th Rifle Brigade 
19th Rifle Corps:Major General 
D.I.Samarskiy 
38th Guards Rifle Division 
82nd Rifle Division 
27th Rifle Corps: Major General 
F.M.Cherokmanov 
60th Rifle Division 
106th Rifle Division 
354th Rifle Division 
95th Rifle Corps:Major General 
I.A.Kuzokov 
37th Guards Rifle Division 
44th Guards Rifle Division 
172nd Rifle Division 
105th Rifle Corps: Major General 
D.F.Alekseyev 
75th Guards Rifle Division 
132nd Rifle Division 
253rd Rifle Division 
1st Guards Tank Corps:Major General 
M.F.Panov 
15th GuardsTank Brigade 
16th Guards Tank Brigade 
17th Guards Tank Brigade 
1st Guards Motorised Rifle Brigade 
237th Self-Propelled Artillery 
Regiment 
1001st Self-Propelled Artillery 
Regiment 
1541st Self -Propelled Artillery 
Regiment 
1st Guards Motorcycle Battalion 
65th Motorcycle Battalion 
732nd Tank Destroyer Artillery 
Regiment 
455th Mortar Regiment 
43rd Guards Mortar Battalion 
80th Guards Anti-Aircraft Artillery 
Regiment 
2nd Guards Tank Brigade 
255th Separate Tank Regiment 
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1813th Self-Propelled Artillery 
Regiment 
142nd Guards Tank Destroyer 
Regiment 
6th Guards Separate Tank Destroyer 
Artillery Battalion 
11th Guards Mortar Regiment 
47th Guards Mortar Battalion 
1732nd Anti-Aircraft Artillery 
Regiment 
193rd Separate Tank Regiment 
251st Separate Tank Regiment 
253rd Separate Tank Regiment 
1444th Self-Propelled Artillery 
Regiment 
1538th Self-Propelled Artillery 
Regiment 
39th Separate Armoured Train 
Battalion 
40th Separate Armoured Train 
Battalion 
59th Separate Armoured Train 
Battalion 
 
1816th Self-Propelled Artillery 
Regiment 
1888th Self-Propelled Artillery 
Regiment 
 
  
